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As international law and legally recognised states have been generally taken as the primary 
structures and actors of international politics, polities without those legal rights and privileges have 
been subordinated as rather insignificant in international relations. Over the past few years, 
however, events in Ukraine, as well as in Iraq and Syria, have reminded us of the persistence of such 
unrecognised polities claiming a semblance of statehood in international politics. This thesis, 
therefore, contends that the abundance and tenacity of these unrecognised political entities 
suggests a reconsideration of purely “legal” notions of international political life. It employs the term 
“geopolitical anomalies” (McConnell 2009a; 2009b; 2010) – political entities without the recognised 
rights and privileges of legal states, but with state-like structures and manifestations nonetheless – 
to call for a more serious consideration of these “actual” political exercises in international relations. 
This concept of geopolitical anomalies is utilised as a signifier of the physical and spatial 
manifestations of a wide array of political communities that demonstrate the essential irregularity of 
the international legal and political system. 
By specifically focusing on the differences between conceptualisations of juridical (de jure) 
and material (de facto) of sovereignty, this thesis aims to demonstrate how geopolitical anomalies 
help us gain a clearer understanding of the differences between legal and normative power, material 
power relationships, and specific manifestations of de facto sovereign power. Utilising classical 
realist perspectives on the nature of de facto sovereignty, based in the ideas of Thomas Hobbes, Carl 
Schmitt, and Hans Morgenthau, this thesis argues that geopolitical anomalies are best understood as 
manifestations of exceptions and crises in international law and international politics. In order to 
shed light on these theoretical contentions, and draw out different aspects of the existence of 
geopolitical anomalies in international politics, two examples – Somaliland and Kosovo – are 
thoroughly examined in three chapters. This thesis concludes, subsequently, that in spite of 
persistent assumptions about the (trans)formative and regulatory capacity of international norms 
and legalities, precisely these assumptions are rebuked by geopolitical anomalies. As a consequence, 
any possible future vision for the dissolution of geopolitical anomalies from international politics will 
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International Politics and Geopolitical Anomalies 
 
The twenty-first century is increasingly becoming an age politically characterised by entities other 
than states institutionalised in international law. This is certainly not to say that “conventional” 
juridical statehood is completely disappearing or losing its importance, but it appears nonetheless 
that more frequently than ever anomalous polities are popping up to try and be part of international 
political society. In recent years, for instance, violent conflicts in the world now seem far less likely to 
occur between legal (formal) states than within them. Formally legal states are far more often 
militarily challenged not by another state, but by people who have politically organised themselves 
without the statuses, institutions, or territorial arrangements that accompany formal statehood (see, 
for instance, HIIK, 2015). Also, political units are perhaps increasingly allowed more autonomy or 
independence within the territorial confines of conventional states. In any case, it appears that 
states that are legally recognised in international law (have to) take into account a far more diverse 
array of international political actors than merely each other.  
 These assertions notwithstanding, it apparently remains very difficult for “conventional” 
global political actors to deal with these “unconventional” polities, to engage with them, to interpret 
their actions and wishes, let alone to take them seriously as actual political players in the 
international arena. This is signified in three recent major international political occurrences, all of 
which happened in a one-year timespan.  
First of all, when the Islamic extremist group(s) in Syria and Iraq – variably referred to as ISIS, 
ISIL, Daesh, or simply IS – proclaimed themselves as an independent state on June 29th 2014, US 
President Barack Obama assured very firmly that ‘ISIL... is certainly not a state’ and that ‘[i]t is 
recognised by no government, nor by the people it subjugates’ (Obama, 2014). From one 
perspective, he might be correct in making such statements, and the Islamic State’s radical 
ideologies and manifestations of extreme violence certainly do not immediately seem to warrant a 
granting of a more significant international political/legal status or consideration.  
Yet, undeniably, the existence of this political entity, its claim to statehood, and its literal 
“breaking” of boundaries to create both an ideological and spatial political community, does provoke 
a (re)consideration of what we mean by state authority, state institutions, and territorial control. 
While Stern and Berger (2015) ‘discuss ISIS as a non-state actor’, they consider it ‘at the very edge of 
the [state] definition, possessing extraordinary infrastructure and expertise... and a will to govern’ 
(p. 11). As Cockburn (2014) has asserted, ‘[p]oliticians and diplomats tend to treat ISIS as if it is a 
Bedouin raiding party that appears dramatically from the desert, wins spectacular victories and then 
retreats to its strongholds... Such a scenario is conceivable but is getting less and less likely’ (p. 3). 
Even as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria remains an entity under siege, little seems to suggest that 
it is likely to disappear as a political organisation or movement any time soon. 
Similarly, the ongoing political crisis in Ukraine, in which secessionist forces in Crimea and 
particularly the eastern regions of the country are attempting to form political entities independent 
from the Ukraine, presents difficulties for many formal states to come up with a strategy for such 
situations of secessionist conflict. Although (or perhaps because) the Russian Federation openly 
supports the separatist endeavour militarily and politically, other major global players remain 
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uncomfortable or divided about whether and how to engage with such new political movements. 
This trepidation and reluctance was and remains understandable, and can be interpreted as a 
rejection of the secessionists’ claims or a simple refusal to get involved in an “internal” political 
conflict, but that does not dissolve any of the issues that these polities pose to – for want of a better 
word – the “international community”.  
The tragic incident involving passenger flight MH17, which, as it now seems, was accidentally 
shot down by the secessionists’ armed troops (Dutch Safety Board, 2015), painfully exposed some of 
these problems. When Dutch Prime-Minister Mark Rutte turned to Russian President Vladimir Putin 
to demand permission to access the crash site (because, in his own words, he ‘did not know who 
else to call’ (Rutte, 2014; translated from Dutch)) he again confirmed how hard it is to establish 
reliable communication lines in such situations of violent separatist conflict. 
Finally, the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence from the United Kingdom, which 
narrowly resulted in the retention of the British union, presented some entirely different issues. It 
demonstrated, for instance, how even a completely peaceful and constitutional attempt to break 
away from a formal state may spark fears of a “domino-effect” of secessions. From the Spanish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs arguing that Scottish independence ‘would start a process of 
Balkanisation that nobody in Europe wants’ (Kassam & Traynor, 2014), to the Australian Prime-
Minister finding that ‘people who would like to see the break-up of the United Kingdom are not the 
friends of justice, not the friends of freedom’ (Press Association, 2014), many comments on 
Scotland’s possible independence reiterated how any extra-state polity is seen as a threat not just to 
a particular formal state, but to legal statehood and its apparently universal “good” values in 
general.  
Furthermore, although the call for Scottish independence failed, the overwhelming electoral 
victory of the Scottish National Party (SNP) a little over half-a-year later seems to indicate that those 
sentiments of rejection of the UK’s political establishment have not waned. Moreover, it now 
appears that in spite of the vote against independence in 2014, significant powers will nonetheless 
be transferred from Westminster to Edinburgh (Clifford & Morphet, 2015, 57). The tentative 
prospect of such devolutions raises the question why full independent statehood was on the table in 
the first place, and why, presumably, only full legal statehood is perceived as independence (Sharp, 
Cumbers, Painter & Wood, 2014, 37-39). In other words, at what point is a political entity effectively 
autonomous, even if it does not possess the legal statuses and institutions of a state? 
These three examples are indicative of how the traditional actors, structures, and networks 
of international politics still take themselves, their foundations, and their normative values, 
somewhat for granted. Not only does international politics remain to be portrayed as a set of legal 
institutions, formal interactions, and intangible flows, our perceptions on international politics 
remain those of a political life that is formalised, institutionalised, and legalised in a specific manner. 
International law, juridically recognised states, established diplomatic relations, and institutionalised 
supra-national organisations are generally regarded as the international political actors and 
processes that matter.  
However, in spite of the difficulties mentioned above, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
we have to strive not just to better understand polities that reside outside of these traditional 
elements of international relations, but also to better conceptualise these traditional elements 
themselves. As it appears that these alternative political entities are permanent phenomena of 
international relations, we are forced to come to terms with their existence, and/or to accept and 
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comprehend that in some instances and for some people it might be preferable to live in political 
arrangements other than a conventional state (e.g. see Nolan, 2015). 
In this thesis, as such, I want to uncover – or at least make more discernable – the distinction 
between these traditional institutional and juridical political practices on the one hand, and those 
polities residing outside of those practices on the other. I want to separate the political from these 
particular conceptualisations of legality, normativity, and formality, investigating how international 
politics might be able to understand these less “conventional” political entities. To that end, I utilise 
the concept of geopolitical anomalies – a term first proposed by Fiona McConnell (2009a, 2009b, 
2010) – and put them in contrast to the international legal state structure. The main research aim of 
this thesis, as such, is to counter purely legal or normative notions of international political life, and 
analyse what political communities existing externally to these (international) legal-normative 
arrangements could teach us about the nature of international politics. In working towards this 
research aim, I hope to satisfactorily answer the question: How do geopolitical anomalies manifest 
themselves in the interstate framework, and what do their manifestations tell us about the practice, 
discourse, and nature of international relations? 
 
On Geopolitical Anomalies 
The concept of geopolitical anomalies is first presented and seriously discussed in an article by Fiona 
McConnell (2009a), in which she explains the term as ‘non-state entities, which in diverse ways 
challenge, disrupt or reconfigure the relationship between sovereignty and territory’ (p. 1904). A 
year later, she seeks to define geopolitical anomalies more elaborately, revealing them as ‘political 
entities which, though decidedly not sovereign nation-states with bounded territories, appear to be 
acting in state-like ways and are striving to exist within the state system’ (McConnell, 2010, 763). As 
such, geopolitical anomalies can be understood as manifestations of politics expressing themselves 
both inside and outside the terms of statehood; they are defined as “state-like”, but are definitely 
not states nonetheless. Immediately, thus, the question arises about what is implied by the use of 
this “state-like” term: does this assumed similarity stand for “sameness”, signifying that geopolitical 
anomalies are states, or does it mean that they are still different from states? In other words, at 
what point are geopolitical anomalies so “state-like”, that we are just talking about states instead? 
McConnell herself differentiates these entities into three separate (albeit interrelated) 
categories. Firstly, she identifies entities that are only partially decolonised and independent, and 
are known nowadays as dependencies, UN Trust Territories and Non-Self Governing Territories. 
Although most of these polities are intended to be either completely independent or assimilated 
into a legally sovereign state, they are often in fact “stuck in limbo”; examples are Gibraltar (Great 
Britain), Guam (United States), and New-Caledonia (France). Secondly, McConnell specifies enclaves 
(e.g., India-Bangladesh border, see Jones, 2009; Van Schendel, 2002), condominiums (e.g., the Brčko 
District in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Dahlman & O’Tuathail, 2006; Geoghegan, 2014), 
governments-in-exile (e.g., Tibet, see McConnell, 2009b), and leased territories (e.g., Guantánamo 
Bay, see Colangelo, 2009; Strauss, 2007) as polities where the connection of juridical sovereignty 
with legal state territory is not straightforward. These entities exemplify the ongoing struggle of the 
international political community to set straight its ‘awkward spaces and historical irregularities’ 




Finally, a wide range of political units has emerged out of the transformation of international 
norms about the legitimacy of legal states, and out of the discrepancy between international (legal) 
conceptions of self-determination and territorial integrity. This category includes insurgencies and 
national liberation movements (Berti, 2013; 2015) such as the PKK and the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (Clapham, 1995; Radu, 2001), stateless nations like the Basques and the Quebecois 
(Guibernau, 1999), and de facto states (Caspersen, 2009; Pegg, 1998a) like the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (Navaro-Yashin, 2003), and Somaliland (Renders, 2012). 
In this thesis, I will deploy the concept of geopolitical anomalies primarily to refer to this 
third category. Again, these latter polities are most fundamentally characterised, influenced, and 
shaped by their existence outside of the established international legal framework, and it is their 
non-legal manifestations of statehood that makes them most helpful in fulfilling the aim of this 
thesis to distinguish between international law and international politics. 
Many terms other than “geopolitical anomalies” have been used to describe these kinds of 
entities. Some thinkers have referred to them as ‘de facto states’ (Pegg, 1998a), ‘separatist states’ 
(Lynch, 2004), ‘contested states’ (Geldenhuys, 2009), or ‘states-within-states’ (Kingston & Spears, 
2004). Caspersen and Stansfield (2011) even utilised the label ‘unrecognised states’ to distinguish 
them ‘from other anomalies in the international system’, emphasising how these type of polities 
‘have managed to build at least some state institutions’ and thus ‘achieved a level of “stateness”’, 
and ‘demonstate a clear aspiration for full independence’ (p. 3; see also Caspersen, 2012). 
In these “unrecognised states”, however, simultaneously ‘we find a high level of variation, 
and despite being known for their intransigence, these entities are frequently characterised by a 
sense of flux and... perceived as transitional’ (Caspersen & Stansfield, 2011, 5). Some authors, 
therefore, prefer to speak of geopolitical anomalies as ‘incipient political entities’ (Kingston, 2004, 
1). While such terminologies may risk overlooking geopolitical anomalies’ achievements as relatively 
developed entities (teleologically implying that they are all destined for some “higher” status), the 
political existence of these polities can, a lot more than juridical states, be based on ad hoc 
agreements, on improvisational interactions of power, and on more organic and grass-roots 
structured socio-political forms of organisation. In geopolitical anomalies, formal and informal socio-
political arrangements may seemingly become infused, as these polities are sometimes forced to 
build more flexible and looser communal structures than the conventional formal and legal 
foundations of (international) politics. 
That does not imply, however, that geopolitical anomalies are simply synonymous with 
terms such as “non-state actors” or “non-state entities”. Such concepts have been widely discussed 
in international relations literature (Fogarty, 2013; Haufler, 1993; Higgott, Underhill & Bieler, 2000; 
Katsikas, 2010; Milner & Moravcsik, 2009; Peters, Koechlin, Förster & Zinkernagel, 2009; Taylor, 
1984), but have thereby become somewhat diluted terms lacking any unified and specific 
denotation. Clapham (2009), for instance, defines the term “non-state actor” ‘to include every entity 
apart from [legal] states’ (p. 202), yet he himself admits that this ‘open-ended nature of the term... 
gives rise to misunderstandings and tensions’ (p. 209). Indeed, the term “non-state actor” 
problematically seems to imply that there exists a distinctly defined idea among international 
political actors about what a state does (and does not) behave and look like, whereas, in fact, 
international political scholarship still does not appear to have fundamental agreement about what a 
state actually is. Josselin and Wallace (2001), therefore, problematise the “non-state actor” concept, 
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because it represents a ‘theoretical purity of... opposing ideal types’ that ‘is muddled by the 
complexities of practice’ (p. 2). 
This thesis, accordingly, will actually largely refrain from providing clear-cut definitions of 
statehood, aside from identifying official statehood simply as statehood as recognised in 
international law. Given the attempt being made in this thesis to acknowledge varieties of political 
community and avoid ideals and absolute norms of statehood, a very narrowly-defined assessment 
of the practical and political manifestations of “the state” would in fact seem unnecessarily 
counterproductive.  
Some geopolitical anomalies’ leaders and representatives would themselves object to being 
labeled as “non-state”, since they would contend that they already resemble and behave like legal 
states, and are sometimes even recognised as such by some other countries (Clapham, 2006, 494). 
Geopolitical anomalies’ degree of recognised independence from juridical state authority may be 
hugely variable, ranging from some having the full approval and support from one or more formal 
states, to others that are even seen as threats to the established legal state order. Clapham (1998) 
already observed that in international politics one could speak of ‘degrees of statehood’, and that 
‘rather than distinguish sharply between entities that are and are not states, we should regard 
different entities as meeting the criteria for international statehood to a greater or lesser degree’ (p. 
143).  
Thus, geopolitical anomalies are specifically not official legal states, yet they do throw into 
question any (constitutive) assumptions about legal state existence (see also Chapter Two). These 
entities, in fact, are in many respects indistinguishable from legal states. They may even hold 
elections, may have a judiciary, may be able to organise a form of law enforcement, and may 
possess other state-like characteristics. In that sense, geopolitical anomalies possess a quality of 
clearly bringing out the discrepancies between what exists in formal state and international law, and 
what are international political actualities. It is this quality of geopolitical anomalies to make the 
legal and formal become specifically (geo)political that so aptly demonstrates the necessity of a 
reconceptualisation of what international relations entail. 
It is for this reason, furthermore, that geopolitical anomalies should not be confused with 
non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) serving more operational and 
advocacy purposes for broader social, economic, or environmental issues, nor with 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) that function as platforms for formal state interactions. In 
the same way, the concept neither refers to other economic, social, or cultural movements that can 
be found in the international system. Many of such actors remain very reliant on legal frameworks 
and normative elements of international politics. For McConnell, moreover, even though such actors 
do in fact challenge conventional ideas about legal state sovereignty and territoriality, they ‘have 
logics and motives that significantly diverge from those of the interstate system’ (McConnell, 2009a, 
1904).  
Geopolitical anomalies, instead, are specifically geopolitical, as they do manage to be part of 
the territorial interstate system in some form. They are not completely beyond the territorialised 
legal state framework, like NGOs, multinational corporations, or global socio-economic and socio-
cultural groups would be. Such latter types of organisations certainly exercise a degree of power and 
influence in international affairs, but their status, prestige, and proceedings do not appear to rely on 
the exercise of that power over a (legally) defined territory. They challenge or transform not merely 
the spatial rules, discourses, and practices of legal statehood, but almost function more as 
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challenges to political territoriality in itself. Certainly, as they try to manifest themselves 
independently from legal state territory, this may even be their essential raison d’être. In a sense, 
then, they are actually not part of the international territorial political system, nor do they act in 
concordance with it. 
It is, therefore, also through their “geographicalness” and territoriality that we may 
distinguish geopolitical anomalies from these “non-state actors”, from legal states, as well as from 
each other. From Gray’s (1999) point of view, ‘all politics is geopolitics’ (p. 162), insofar as ‘all 
political matters occur within a particular geographical context’ (p.  164). It is in the realm of these 
“anomalous spaces”, therefore, that the limitations of pure state legality most clearly come to the 
fore – where the essential insubstantiality of legality has no material effects in situ.  
Additionally, a geopolitical understanding of these entities helps us to bring into focus the 
extent to which they engage in the erection of boundaries and create social structures and norms 
that are separate and independent. As we will discover, geopolitical anomalies do vary in their 
willingness or capacity to govern a defined space. McConnell (2009b), actually, provides a helpful 
elucidation of this, explaining that ‘[geopolitical anomalies’] construction of territory and power 
[may be] somewhere between... traditional territorial arrangements and the hyper-real cyberspace’ 
(p. 348). In other words, the degree to which geopolitical anomalies are spatial as opposed to “lost in 
space” forms a signifier for the differentiation between the political and physical “materiality” and 
“immateriality” of geopolitical anomalies themselves. 
 
On Sovereignty 
Geopolitical anomalies, thus, can be identified as political entities that do not fully possess the 
recognised rights and privileges of formally legal states, but nonetheless manifest themselves as 
legal states in myriad ways. They therefore instantaneously make apparent the gap between, on the 
one hand, states as fully recognised in international law (which geopolitical anomalies are certainly 
not) and on the other hand, the practical ways in which groups perform functions and activities that 
are very similar to those of legal states. In international relations thinking, this gap is usually referred 
to as the discrepancy between de jure and de facto sovereignty. Indeed, to the extent that 
geopolitical anomalies may behave like formal states while they are not juridically recognised as 
such, that behaviour relies on the degree to which they exercise de facto sovereignty without the 
possession of de jure sovereignty. As geopolitical anomalies have been referred to above as 
distinctly (geo)political entities, they have been tentatively referred to as entities with de facto 
sovereign practices and structures.  
In this thesis, therefore, this concept of de facto sovereignty (“factual” effective sovereign 
power possessed by political actors) will be explicitly contrasted to de jure sovereignty (sovereign 
rights and statuses as recognised and attributed to states according to international law). As this 
thesis revolves around exposing the differences and contradictions between legal state structures 
and practices, and those of geopolitical anomalies, it is almost inevitable that these two concepts of 
sovereignty have to be discussed and unravelled. 
However, the principle of sovereignty is simultaneously one of the most paramount and one 
of the most confusing in international politics. It is a crucial element of nearly every study 
undertaken within the field, but it has thereby become an almost complacent term to describe any 
form of independence, authority, and/or legitimacy. Although the concept of sovereignty has been 
commonly regarded as the central organising principle of international relations, it has remained 
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surprisingly unexplained and vague in modern political science. As Bartelson (1995) remarks, ‘What 
is sovereignty? If there are questions political science ought to be able to answer, this is certainly 
one. Yet modern political science often testifies to its own inability when it tries to come to terms 
with the concept and reality of sovereignty’ (p. 1). 
Thus, although sovereignty is embraced as the ‘primary constitutive rule of international 
organisation’, its ‘essence’ is rarely defined; it is generally taken as an unquestionable concept 
underlying international politics (Barkin & Cronin, 1994, 107). As a scholarly discipline, international 
relations thinking has failed to uniformly define the principle of sovereignty precisely because it has 
become the focal point of our taken-for-granted understanding of political life, and vice versa 
(Walker, 1990, 8-9). 
Very broadly taken, I argue, the sovereignty principle has been discussed from three 
different, although not mutually exclusive, angles. It has been referred to as effective supreme 
power in a political entity (de facto sovereignty), as a juridical principle and status (de jure 
sovereignty), and in terms of a relationship between rulers and subjects (popular sovereignty). This 
triangle of perspectives on sovereignty goes back to some of the earliest thinkers on the concept.  
Concerning the latter, for example, Locke already argued in the 17th century that citizens 
possessed the right to make claims upon the sovereign as part of a conditional social contract (Stacy, 
2003, 2032). For Locke, any human who denies another human’s freedom ‘becomes liable to be 
destroyed by... the rest of humankind, as any other... noxious brute’ (Locke, 1988, 383). Lockean 
sovereignty, thus, denoted ‘a conditional acceptance of authority’ (Shaw, 2008, 26). As the 
sovereign, in Locke’s view, derived its legitimacy from the subjects’ delegation of sovereignty, he 
was equally obliged to not deny the freedom of the subjects. Locke, thus, was among the first 
political thinkers to actually replace the subject with the concept of the citizen, who even within the 
social contract with the sovereign retained inalienable rights to ‘life, liberty, and estate’ (Locke, 
1988, 323; Shaw, 2008, 266; Stacy, 2003, 2034). According to Locke, the authority of a monarch or 
any other form of governing body was (is) legitimised and authorised by the population, meaning 
that sovereignty ultimately resides in the people. 
For the purposes of this thesis, however, I am more interested in the other two mentioned 
categories of sovereignty. Firstly, as popular sovereignty can be conceptualised as something that is 
“shared” or “divided” equally among ruler and ruled (Locke, 1988, 368-369), sovereignty becomes 
more perceivable as a legalistic or constitutional arrangement. The Dutch Jurist Hugo de Groot, 
Latinised into Hugo Grotius, was among the first to define sovereignty as such. In his most 
prominent work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), Grotius presented sovereignty in terms of ‘[t]hat 
power... whose actions are not subject to the legal control of another, so that they cannot be 
rendered void by the operation of another human will’ (Grotius, 1925, 102). While Grotius, thus, 
conceptually saw sovereignty as a ‘unity, in itself indivisible’ (Grotius, 1925, 123), he was also quick 
to mention a whole series of exceptions indicating that in practice sovereignty was repeatedly 
divided (Keene, 2002, 44).  
To be sure, while Grotius did not believe that ‘everywhere and without exception 
sovereignty resides in the people’ (Grotius, 1925, 103), he did find that the populace possessed the 
juridical right to grant sovereignty. In other words, Grotius did not think sovereign and subject could 
de facto ever be equals, but he did argue that the people had the legal right to grant sovereignty less 
than absolute (Grotius, 1925, 156; Keene, 2002, 45). Grotius (1925) found that sovereignty could be 
‘held in part by the king, in part by the people or senate’, and that thus force could lawfully be used 
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against the king ‘if he attempts to usurp that part of the sovereign power which does not belong to 
him’ (p. 158). Grotius argued, in other words, that ‘it may be possible for some marks [of 
sovereignty] to reside... with persons or assemblies, while others do not’ (Grotius, 1994, 227). Each 
of those persons or assemblies is supreme within the scope of its own authority; each is sovereign 
over their own prerogative (Grotius, 1925, 158).  
These remarks demonstrate how Grotius saw sovereignty as a legal right that could be 
awarded, partitioned, and exchanged (Haggenmacher, 1983, 583). Both Locke and Grotius, then, 
seemingly viewed sovereignty as a legal principle above considerations of actual political power, and 
Grotius, indeed, ‘has been celebrated, if a little exaggeratedly, as the father of international law’ 
(Shaw, 2008, 23). Looking at Grotius’ convictions, de jure sovereignty, accordingly, is interpreted in 
this thesis as that collection of rights, obligations, and statuses that make a political entity a member 
of the international legal system; I will use this concept of de jure sovereignty/statehood 
interchangeably with terms such as “formal”, “juridical”, or “legal” statehood and sovereignty. 
Notably this legal sovereignty may carry some form of normative power, but cannot on its own 
possess material power in the same way that de facto sovereignty does. For geopolitical anomalies, 
therefore, as entities without legal status but with material power, theories of de facto sovereignty 
are much more relevant.  
One of the first thinkers seriously dealing with this type of sovereignty, Jean Bodin, regarded 
sovereignty in his Six Books on the Republic (1576) as ‘that absolute and perpetual power vested in a 
commonwealth’ (Bodin, 1955, 25). By “absolute”, Bodin did not necessarily mean that the sovereign 
was always in control of everything happening within the state, but rather that he was more 
powerful than any other force within the state; Bodin’s sovereignty, thus, may be considered not as 
all-powerful, but as super-powerful. As such, in Bodin’s understanding of sovereignty there was a 
very clear distinction between sovereign and subjects. It was impossible to be both sovereign and 
subject simultaneously, and sovereignty could thus neither be transferred from the people onto the 
sovereign nor be shared between them. In Bodin’s own words: 
 
[I]t is the distinguishing mark of the sovereign that he cannot in any way be subject to the 
commands of another, for it is he who makes law for the subject, abrogates law already 
made, and amends obsolete law... It follows of necessity that the king cannot be subject to 
his own laws (Bodin, 1955, 28). 
 
In Bodin’s view, thus, the sovereign could create law without being subject to it. The only 
authentic requisite of a sovereign was the ability to create law independently, which meant that 
sovereignty was by its very nature vested in a single person or institution within a political entity 
(Keene, 2002, 43). Moreover, as the sovereign existed independently from the law, sovereignty 
resided first and foremost in a de facto manifestation of power. For Bodin, it was obvious to consider 
“actual” capacity as the primary source of any legal or moral authority. In such considerations, 
furthermore, the perpetuality of the sovereign was inherently assumed, because there existed no 
higher authority that could put a time-limit on the sovereign. Bodin’s de facto sovereignty was in 
some sense eternal, because an individual sovereign could only be eliminated by a person or entity 




It should be noted that all three of the abovementioned angles have been tied in some way 
to perhaps the most prominent classical thinker on the nature of sovereignty – Thomas Hobbes. 
However, as will transpire in this thesis, Hobbes’s theory can most usefully and appropriately be 
applied to this last notion of de facto sovereignty. Indeed, the Hobbesian emphasis on the de facto 
sovereign as the resolver of crises and conflicts within a socio-political order will be given a 
prominent position later on in this thesis.  
For now, I would merely like to point out a few initial observations. First of all, although 
sovereignty has been presented here as a concept with perhaps clearly distinguishable meanings, in 
international political scholarship and practice the term remains altogether convoluted. While the 
sovereignty principle is mainly ascribed solely to formal states, solely denoting legal independence, 
legal authority, and/or legal legitimacy, it simultaneously remains repeatedly unspecified whether 
the concept is used to refer to such legal statuses or to “actual” employments of power. Max 
Weber’s incessantly recited definition of statehood – ‘the state is the form of human community 
that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of the legitimate physical violence within a particular 
territory’ (Weber, 2004, 33) – is a case in point insofar as it actually portrays a rather confusing 
picture of sovereignty. Does a state, or any political entity, claim or successfully possess such a 
monopoly? And does it require a certain form of legitimacy, an issue that is important mainly in 
reference to a claim to de jure sovereignty rather than a possession of de facto sovereignty? 
In this thesis, then, I want to argue that international political thinking should get in the 
habit of making a much clearer distinction between these “actual” expressions of sovereignty and 
legally constructed sovereignties, and moreover, that we should reconsider which of these 
conceptualisations of sovereignty we prioritise. Admittedly, de facto sovereignty is not the only thing 
that matters in international relations. For one, the fact that geopolitical anomalies are limited and 
constrained by their lack of de jure statehood implies that juridical sovereignty certainly possesses 
some power in international politics, and de facto and de jure manifestations of sovereignty are not 
mutually exclusive; on many occasions, in fact, they coincide. However, although a formal state may 
possess both de facto and de jure sovereignty simultaneously, they do remain two very dissimilar 
conceptualisations of sovereignty. As exemplified by some geopolitical anomalies, sometimes de 
facto sovereignty has no legal status, and conversely, de jure sovereignty does not always have 
actual material effectuality or authority – these two situations may even go hand in hand (e.g. see 
Kingston & Spears, 2004). 
Secondly, it is not my claim that power relations other than de facto sovereignty are 
unimportant in international (or domestic) politics, as a variety of power dynamics between 
individuals, groups, and entities around the world continuously give rise to international political 
developments and occurrences. The diverse nature of geopolitical anomalies in itself denotes that 
non-sovereign power in international politics deserves our attention, and this thesis actually does 
not exclude polities without de facto sovereignty from its consideration of geopolitical anomalies. 
Yet, again, while international politics can be characterised by a large diversity of different power 
relations, not all of those can be qualified as de facto manifestations of sovereignty. Crucially, in fact, 
geopolitical anomalies not only bring out the discrepancies between considerations of de jure and de 
facto sovereignty, but also those between divergent notions of de facto sovereignty itself. In short, 
they help us gain a clearer understanding of the differences between legal and normative power, 
material power relationships, and specific manifestations of de facto sovereign power. 
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As such, I understand de facto sovereignty – sometimes referred to in this thesis as effective 
or material sovereignty – as a very specific kind of power; it is any type of power that is more 
powerful than any other power in a political community. De facto sovereignty, thus, is both supreme 
and singular, and while perhaps other modes of power could be conceived as divisible and 
subjective, such modes should not be considered in terms of de facto sovereignty. Rather, in this 
thesis the de facto sovereign is defined from a classical realist perspective, as that political actor who 
is powerful enough to bring multiple competing or conflicting powers together within a political unit. 
On the face of it, such a particular notion of de facto sovereignty may perhaps diminish its 
significance and prominence for international relations, but in my contention, a more concise 
understanding of this concept actually forms a more valuable contribution to the study and practice 
of international politics than a more general, but thereby also more convoluted, explanation (see 
also Moses, 2013; 2014). 
 
Geopolitical Anomalies and Classical Realism 
In light of the assertions made above about the nature of geopolitical anomalies and their 
relationship to concepts and practices of sovereignty, this thesis will proceed with its investigation of 
these entities mainly from a classical realist viewpoint. Such a viewpoint, I argue, which emphasises 
the particularistic rather than relational nature of international politics, and the consequentional 
rather than foundational meaning of norms and legalities for factual materiality, is largely missing 
from studies on geopolitical anomalies as they exist today. A relatively small but expanding body of 
literature exists on these polities outside of the conventional international legal-political framework. 
Certainly, any of these works makes important and insightful contributions to our understanding of 
these entities and their significance for international relations scholarship and practice. However, a 
few gaps and limitations remain unaddressed. As I maintain, any of these gaps and limitations have 
to do with a certain disregard for the value of classical realist perspectives for studying geopolitical 
anomalies.  
To begin, quite a few works concerning themselves with geopolitical anomalies are 
dedicated to the political-strategic and legal-normative considerations of state recognition under 
international law. For instance, Ryan Griffiths’s works on secession particularly address the question 
of when and how formal states permit a particular secession to (formally) come into effect, 
describing the strategic, normative, and economic factors that influence formal states’ willingness to 
“let a region or people go” (2014), and contending that existing domestic juridical and administrative 
patterns to a large extent influence a secessionist group’s chances of gaining legal independence 
(2015). James Ker-Lindsay (2012), on the other hand, discusses ways in which formal states could 
prevent the international legal recognition of break-away entities.  
Others, like Milena Sterio (2013), argue that the success or failure of secessionist 
movements – or ‘Selfistans’ (p. 1) – in becoming legal states depends heavily on political-strategic 
considerations of the global “Great Powers”. This argument is also advanced by Jonathan Paquin 
(2010), who writes about such considerations feeding into the recognitional attitudes and practices 
of the United States’ foreign policy. Bridget Coggins (2011) similarly finds that geopolitical anomalies 
‘need friends in high places’ (p. 435) in order to become formal states, and that, in turn, existing 
formal states (should) utilise international legal recognition as a strategic tool to advance their own 
interests (Coggins, 2016, 8-10). For Coggins (2011), thus, ‘statehood is inherently social’ (p. 435), as it 
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does not ‘inhere in governmental control on the ground alone. Without external legitimacy, an actor 
is not a state’ (Coggins, 2016, 8).  
In perhaps the most important recent contribution to the study of international legal 
recognition, Mikulas Fabry (2010) similarly critiques representations of formal states as ‘self-
constituted and self-contained bodies’ (p. 2) existing ‘ontologically prior to international society’ (p. 
3). Rather, building on the English School tradition of international relations scholarship, Fabry offers 
a ‘normative account of the practice of recognising new states’ (p. 4). Drawing a (historical) 
distinction between the practice of recognition as an acknowledgement of “factual” statehood, and 
the act of recognition as the affirmation of an international legal entitlement to independence, Fabry 
concludes that only the former constitutes a ‘viable international standard’ of recognition (p. 219). 
Yet, while in doing so he appears to prioritise norms of “factual” independence over international 
legal norms, Fabry’s overall topic of recognition itself precludes a deeper inquiry into the questions 
of political power inherently tied to the “factual” existence of geopolitical anomalies. 
Whereas both Coggins and Fabry thus see an English School or constructivist approach as 
the most appropriate way to study non-legally recognised political entities, this research will adopt 
classical realist viewpoints to challenge such contentions. Any of the arguments, theories, and 
studies above certainly require a place in debates about geopolitical anomalies, but they 
fundamentally do not account for the fact that the essential characteristic of any geopolitical 
anomaly is their undermining, to some higher or lesser degree, of the normative regulations and 
regularities on which such “social” and “relational” accounts and practices of international and 
domestic politics are based. Fabry (2010) maintains that ‘international relations take place within 
embedded normative structures’ (p. 4), but thereby seems to overlook the notion that such 
normative structures are precisely disrupted by geopolitical anomalies. They exist mostly in spite of 
norms and laws of recognition, not because of them. 
Here, then, we have arrived at the nature of studies on geopolitical anomalies itself. The 
discrepancy between political existence and (the lack of) legal recognition forms the basic premise of 
any of such studies, but the acknowledgement of that discrepancy generally does not feed into a 
genuine (or realist) critique of the normative and/or legalistic elements of international politics. 
While each work engaging with political entities outside of the international legal framework (i.e. 
geopolitical anomalies) logically pays heed to the limitations of international legal and normative 
structures in the face of political power, many of the analyses and conclusions drawn in those works 
still appear to be grounded not in realist but in constructivist, liberal, and social assumptions of 
international relations. 
For example, one of the main themes that runs throughout this body of literature is the way 
in which these polities are represented in international political discourse. Kolstø and Blakkisrud 
(2011) discuss the ‘securitisation discourse’ (p. 126) portraying geopolitical anomalies as threats to 
international stability. In turn, Harvey and Stansfield (2011) mention the ‘nationalist rhetoric focused 
upon independence’ (p. 19) expressed by unrecognised states themselves. For Meadwell (1999), 
‘[r]hetorical moves are an integral part of the political game set in motion by a claim to 
independence, and the languages of justification... can have causal force’ (p. 386). Alternatively, 
much concern is directed at how norms of sovereignty and statehood affect geopolitical anomalies’ 
chances of recognition (see, for instance, Mulaj, 2011). Caspersen (2012), for instance, emphasises 
the relationship between these entities’ abidance by international standards of democratisation and 
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internal legitimacy, and international perceptions and approaches towards these entities (pp. 76-
101). 
Often, in fact, such inquiries into the connection between ideals of statehood and practices 
of (non-)recognition feed into a wider criticism on dominant patterns and paradigms of sovereignty 
and international relations in general. Kingston (2004) suggests that stabilising geopolitical 
anomalies’ relationships with formal states ‘may... require rethinking the strict adherence to Cold 
War notions of sovereignty’, and deems it to be clear that ‘the emergence of greater pluralism in 
world affairs will require shifts in the practice and theory of international relations’ (p. 9). Likewise, 
Caspersen (2012) wonders whether geopolitical anomalies ‘should be seen as a new form of 
statehood, and indeed a new form of sovereignty’ (p. 102). While she rightly emphasises that 
geopolitical anomalies in many ways reinforce prevalent tropes of sovereignty and statehood, rather 
than reform them, she simultaneously claims that they challenge ‘dominant simplistic conceptions of 
sovereignty’ (p. 103). 
Here, regularly, notions such as “cosmopolitan governance” and “shared sovereignty” come 
into play as potential reframings of (international) political structures. Barry Bartmann (2004) 
laments how ‘a firm commitment to keep [geopolitical anomalies] beyond the gate is hardly 
consistent with patterns of greater universality and inclusiveness’ (p. 14), while Liam Anderson 
(2011) suggests that reintegrating geopolitical anomalies into formal state structures will have to be 
accompanied by federal autonomy and power-sharing arrangements (see also Chapter Two). 
According to the latter, such domestic arrangements could be ‘guaranteed’ by embedding them in 
international legal documents (p. 202). 
However, as I will argue in this thesis, such “guaranteeing” terminology in fact reveals the 
limitations of shared or cosmopolitan forms of (international) politics. Aside from Anderson, 
Herrberg (2011) and Caspersen (2012) similarly call for ‘security guarantees’ that can assure and 
protect geopolitical anomalies’ security if de jure state recognition remains elusive, yet in these 
proposals the inescapable uncertainties of international politics are once again overlooked. Ideas of 
cosmopolitan and/or “shared” solutions to geopolitical anomalies once again pay too little attention 
to (classical) realist perspectives that show how security cannot be guaranteed in purely legal-
normative arrangements. 
In accordance with this, a final issue with the literature on geopolitical anomalies lies in its 
general emphasis on finding solutions and alternatives to the “problem(s)” associated with these 
polities. This might seem a rather odd criticism to make, and I certainly would not imply that striving 
towards better circumstances for individual geopolitical anomalies is a pointless exercise without 
merit. Such attempts at resolution, however, should once again beware not to ignore their own 
inescapable limitations.  
Herrberg’s (2011) and Anderson’s (2011) discussions of (respectively) conflict mediation and 
juridical (re)integration have already been mentioned above, and in the same volume Stephen Wolff 
(2011) analyses the resolving potential of international engagement with geopolitical anomalies. 
Scott Pegg (1998b) also describes several international legal models for future international 
interactions with geopolitical anomalies (pp. 8-11). In this regard, Dov Lynch (2004) provides quite 
specific policy advice about the Caucasian de facto states (pp. 103-143), broadly arguing that ‘some 
form of acceptance’ of these entities, combined with a package of economic, societal, and security 
measures, is the only possible solution to problems in that region (p. 9). Kingston and Spears (2004a) 
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similarly conclude their volume with a collection of recommendations for policy-makers engaging 
with geopolitical anomalies (pp. 189-192). 
Yet, any proposals for resolution – well-intended as they may be – suffer from two 
fundamental complications. First of all, these alternatives for geopolitical anomalies are still 
primarily normative or legal, rather than political, in nature. Caspersen (2012), for example, does 
acknowledge the limitations of ‘solutions that “pool” sovereignty and disperse territoriality... 
through various forms of federal and confederal arrangements’, but ascribes those limitations to 
‘unhelpful’ understandings, imaginations, and views of sovereignty and territoriality. In a similar 
way, her own suggestions, based on the ‘fudging of sovereignty’, do not actually address the factual 
political realities of the relationship between de facto sovereignty and territory (p. 136; see also 
Chapter Three on “tacit sovereignty”). 
Secondly, particular caution should be exercised when it comes to attempts at resolving the 
issue of geopolitical anomalies per se. Geldenhuys (2009) devotes a specific chapter to this question 
(pp. 45-66), asserting that ‘there is a wide spectrum of conceivable alternative destinations for 
contested states, opening up possibilities for peacefully resolving the problems of existing contested 
states and preventing the emergence of more such entities in future’ (p. 66). Others equally come up 
with general policy proposals for ‘a more fluid system of norms that allows different types of units to 
exist simultaneously’ (Kingston & Spears, 2004a, 191).  
However, the establishment or emergence of such an “anti-anomalous” system remains 
highly unlikely, if not impossible, in light of the inherent limitations of global political life. While 
claims continue to be made about promising road maps to settlement for individual geopolitical 
anomalies, even those claimants must admit that geopolitical anomalies will continue to come into 
being in the international political system (Bartmann 2004, 29-30). For, as Fabry (2010) admits, 
‘violence is unlikely to be extirpated from conflicts over statehood – there will probably always be 
those who will see no other means left to respond to what they regard as intolerable injustice’ (p. 
225). 
A notable exception to any of these studies concerned with norms and solutions for 
geopolitical anomalies might seem Daria Isachenko’s The Making of Informal States (2012). 
Criticising the preoccupation of existing research on geopolitical anomalies with state criteria and 
ideals, Isachenko attempts to unravel the actual political processes that make these entities’ 
existence a reality. That being said, this empirical analysis is informed by French and German 
thinkers’ conceptualisations of politics as a relational and plural process, as ‘a network of 
interdependencies’ in which ‘the balance of power fluctuates’ (pp. 3-4). Again, this shows very little 
regard for the singular and instantaneous acts cementing balances of power that lay at the 
foundation of (classical realist) de facto sovereignty. 
To sum up, the collection of works on political entities outside conventional international 
legal structures provides helpful insights into the characteristics of these entities, but they leave 
unaddressed certain issues emphasised by classical realist thinking. Perhaps given their research 
topic, which inherently implies a critique on dominant patterns and discourses of power in 
international politics, most literature on geopolitical anomalies dismisses classical realist 
perspectives almost out of hand. I maintain, however, that that leaves some very important aspects 
underexposed. These works primarily deal with legal-normative questions of international politics – 
such as legitimacy, recognition, international political discourse, and cosmopolitanism – but not so 
much with what happens at moments of disruption of the social regularities and relational rules in 
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which these legal-normative arrangements are embedded. Therefore, while this thesis does not 
completely reject normative perspectives and questions, it will prioritise classical realist views that 
emphasise the importance of material power, de facto sovereignty, and the crisis or exception in 
(international) politics.  
Thus, the concept of geopolitical anomalies is used in this thesis for a number of reasons. 
First of all, it is able to function as an umbrella-term incorporating a range of different polities. The 
term indicates how international relations is rife with a wide array of political modes, and that it thus 
should not be regarded as an absolute and universal structure of legal state-featured international 
politics. Simultaneously, this thesis does not employ this concept simply as a common denominator 
for any activity outside the international territorial and legal state system. As I consider geopolitical 
anomalies particularly as political entities which, through their specifically geopolitical 
manifestations, become “anomalies” or exceptions to the international legal order, I utilise the term 
also to denote a specific kind of political body with specific connotations and related issues. As these 
anomalies are geopolitical, these concepts shed light on the ways in which these political 
arrangements dishevel not merely the legal but also the spatial/territorial nature of formal state 
existence (Dahlman, 2009, 31; see also Lewis, 2011; Lewis, 2015a; Lewis, 2015b; Lewis, 2015c; Lewis, 
2015d). 
Most importantly, McConnell’s term is so compelling because it points us to the 
exceptionality both of these entities and of international affairs in general. This thesis will not only 
maintain that the exception, the crisis, and the disruption of order, is crucial for the coming into 
being of geopolitical anomalies and the way they manifest themselves. Also, geopolitical anomalies 
raise questions about how we might think of exceptions and regularities of international politics, and 
whether we should truly consider these polities as “anomalies”, “irregularities”, or “exceptions”.  
 
Research Objectives and Research Questions 
Accordingly, a first subquestion engaged with in this thesis considers how we might qualify the 
current position of geopolitical anomalies in international relations discourse and conduct. In order 
to address this question, my first research objective is to assess the ubiquity of political entities we 
may consider as geopolitical anomalies, and outline predominant ways of thinking about them.  
In one sense, formal states seem to have the most prominent position in global politics; the 
fact that many geopolitical anomalies desire international legal recognition underlines this. This 
prominence is reflected not just in the fact that de jure states (may) still factually form the 
individuals of international law and the main propellers, contributors, conductors, and enablers of 
international agreements, military actions, and policies, but perhaps even more so in the central 
position that legal statehood has attained in our discursive conceptualisations about the nature of 
international relations. For geopolitical anomalies, the ideal of de jure sovereignty is still the “holy 
grail” or “gold standard” to be pursued, the benchmark against which they are defined as 
anomalous, and the presumed jump-off point from which they come into being (McConnell, 2010, 
766). Thus, orthodox (legal) viewpoints on sovereignty and statehood still hold significant purchase, 
and the exercise and possession of de jure sovereignty still forms the dominant ‘political-territorial 





As such, the existence and functional patterns of geopolitical anomalies remain explained in 
reference to the international structure of de jure sovereign states: their origins from, and 
aspirations to exist within, the legal state system is what ostensibly motivates their outlook, shape, 
and behaviour. In other words, the international de jure state framework remains taken as the 
benchmark to which these political entities abide, and in that sense geopolitical anomalies remain 
seen as exceptions to an (international) legal state regularity. They are: 
 
comprehended as realities not eclipsing the powers of the state, but made possible 
precisely because of the organisational centrality of the state in life... Such are exceptions 
that define the rule whose primary “author”, “creator”, and “guarantor” remains the state 
(Soguk & Whitehall, 1999, 679). 
 
However, it is rather questionable whether such representations are completely justified or 
useful. While geopolitical anomalies are embedded in a framework of thought constructed around 
legal states exercising de facto sovereignty over a fixed state territory, they should not be 
understood purely as the exceptions confirming the rule of de jure sovereignty. Instead, they pose 
significant challenges to this international legal state framework, offering food for reconsideration of 
this way of thinking, and motivating us to come up with new paradigms for understanding and 
describing international politics. The de jure sovereign state is not necessarily the only relevant 
entity of our international political environment, as geopolitical anomalies help us to consider the 
irregularities that characterise our current international (legal) state structure. International 
relations are not undeniably and uniformly driven and regulated by legal states, and perhaps the 
existence and manifestation of geopolitical anomalies should thus be fully included in our 
perceptions on global politics.  
In light of the first research objective, therefore, I argue that we should take geopolitical 
anomalies more seriously as entities characteristic of international politics. This multitude of polities 
presents major challenges to a perception of international society being solely characterised by legal 
state interactions, and of de facto sovereignty being irrelevant if not officialised by some juridical 
status. Thus, while states carrying legal sovereignty over territory might be seen as the primary 
benchmark actors of the international political framework, the viability and plethora of geopolitical 
anomalies seems to call for de facto sovereignty and effective power relationships to be more fully 
incorporated into our global political imagination. By paying heed to the challenges and 
counterevidence geopolitical anomalies bring upon our current international political conception, 
we may be able to transform international politics into a system in which geopolitical anomalies and 
de facto sovereignty are the modes of politics that define it. 
The second (sub)question of this research about geopolitical anomalies, then, is to what 
extent they possess de facto sovereignty in international politics. As I just argued, from a more 
general perspective we might wonder whether geopolitical anomalies are more important to 
international political developments than de jure states, but also individually, some geopolitical 
anomalies might actually demonstrate the ultimate de facto sovereign capacity to resolve a conflict 
or crisis situation. Moreover, the way we tend to think about the manifestations of geopolitical 




Therefore, the research objective accompanying this second question is to untangle 
different conceptions of sovereignty in international political practice, scholarship, and discourse. 
Again, sovereignty is both one of the most used, and one of the most confusing concepts in 
international politics – not only in the sense that there is not a fundamental agreement within 
international relations scholarship about the exact nature and meaning of sovereignty, individual 
scholars writing about sovereignty also often do not very well specify the concept. As I will maintain, 
furthermore, even when differences between de jure and de facto sovereignty are explicitly 
acknowledged, disagreement remains over what those differences are, and over the nature of de 
facto sovereignty itself.  
A third question that will be investigated in this thesis is how to conceptualise possibilities 
for integrating geopolitical anomalies into the current international legal and/or political framework 
– not necessarily individually, but on a more collective level. Accordingly, this thesis will attempt to 
fulfil the research objective of mapping out the strengths and weaknesses of ‘routes to resolution’ 
(McConnell, 2009a, 1905) for geopolitical anomalies. 
It seems that, as I intend to critique the prevalence of de jure sovereignty in international 
political practice and discourse, such possibilities should not be found in international juridical 
principles and solutions. In addition, given the repeated new emergence of geopolitical anomalies, 
and the persistence of many of them “against the odds”, it might also be considered that geopolitical 
anomalies to some extent benefit from their lack of status and position excluded from conventional 
international law and politics. Therefore, we can perhaps hypothesise that a transformed 
understanding and discourse about the qualities of geopolitical anomalies and de facto sovereignty 
could be helpful not just to geopolitical anomalies themselves, but also to an international 
community that has no choice but to deal with them. In that respect, an alternative view on our 
present-day international legal-political structure is imperative to finding such emancipatory 
perspectives on de facto sovereignty and geopolitical anomalies. 
However, as I have explained above in my discussion of existing studies on geopolitical 
anomalies, there are some essential limitations to finding conclusive “solutions” – discursive, 
normative, or legal – for the challenges raised by these political entities. In that regard, this thesis 
will touch upon a fourth (sub)question of how to theorise about “anomalies” or “exceptions” in 
international relations. Are exceptions an inevitable and eternal part of international political life, 
and how do they relate to an assumed “rule” in international politics? Can we even truly think of 
“regularities” in international relations, and if so, what are they?  
These questions run deeper than merely conceptualising certain inherent elements of 
international politics and thus exceptionalising other phenomena. Rather, they ask us how to 
identify and regard the nature of exceptions in social life in general. Geopolitical anomalies are not 
only excluded from the perceived regularity of international law and de jure sovereignty, their 
manifestations of (supposed) de facto sovereignty also rely very much on their ability to create 
internal orderliness in their exceptional circumstances. These political entities force us to reconsider 
what constitutes the exception in global political life, not merely by identifying those exceptions but 
also assessing what those exceptions uncover about the nature of international relations. More 
fundamentally, they demonstrate how any social circumstance and arrangement, such as 
international law or de jure sovereignty, cannot possibly ever rule out the exception, which is always 
intrinsically unforeseeable, unaccounted for, and unregulated. 
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Therefore, this research’s fourth (and final) objective is to contribute to existing ways of 
thinking about regularities and exceptions of international relations, and to emphasise that 
geopolitical anomalies are in fact testament to the inherent impossibility of “normalising” the 
exception – of conclusively integrating or regulating these entities.  
 
Methodology and Outline 
Geopolitical anomalies, to sum up, expose issues that lie at the very heart of international relations 
scholarship. In focusing on and analysing these polities, this thesis eventually has to come to certain 
very basic international political questions. What exactly is a state? What do we mean when we talk 
about sovereignty? How might it be different from other manifestations of power? And what is the 
significance of these concepts for our conceptualisations of international politics? In light of the 
profoundness and inescapable ambiguity of such questions in international political scholarship, this 
research will employ a meta-theoretical approach to the study of geopolitical anomalies, or what is 
sometimes referred to as a classical approach to international political scholarship. 
 The earlier discussed studies of geopolitical anomalies (or any other terminologies used to 
refer to such polities) have a few things in common in terms of research methods. Many of them 
carry, to a stronger of weaker degree, some fieldwork element to them (e.g. Isachenko, 2012; Kolstø 
& Blakkisrud, 2012; Lynch, 2004). Fiona McConnell’s research itself (2009a; 2009b; 2010) is similarly 
informed by extensive participant observation “on the ground”. Alternatively, or in addition, key 
stakeholders within geopolitical anomalies often constitute primary resources for these studies (e.g. 
Pegg, 1998a, Renders, 2012). Also, particularly the edited volumes discussing these entities usually 
take the form of a systematic overview, either of different individual cases (Bahcheli, Bartmann, & 
Srebrnik, 2004) or of different aspects related to their existence (Caspersen & Stansfield, 2011; 
Kingston & Spears, 2004). Nina Caspersen’s individual contribution to the body of knowledge on 
geopolitical anomalies (2012), as well as work by Berg and Kuusk (2010) and Geldenhuys (2009), can 
also be categorised as comparative analyses of different case studies (see also Berg, 2007; Berg, 
2009; Berg, 2012). 
 To restate, it is by no means my intention to discredit any of these types of research on 
geopolitical anomalies. In some sense, the very nature of geopolitical anomalies endows any of the 
above methodologies with some merit. Given the fact that geopolitical anomalies by definition 
cannot rely on some common denominator like de jure sovereignty, they are inherently varied 
entities characterised by a plethora of elements. Therefore, research practices like participant 
observation or community immersion can be useful to uncover and analyse specific social 
complexities within individual geopolitical anomalies. This is why, for example, the critical geopolitics 
school of thought calls for a ‘re-peopling’ of international political scholarship (Megoran, 2006, 625) 
and ‘a critical analysis of the everyday functioning of [geopolitical anomalies]’ (McConnell, 2010, 
763). Such ethnographic approaches, fostering a kind of humility and sensibility in particular 
contexts of human life, can be apt tools to investigate geopolitical anomalies’ real life on the ground 
(see also Schatz, 2009). 
At the same time, in order to bring out the varied nature of geopolitical anomalies, 
comparative analyses are similarly helpful as a mode of research. Through such systematic 
comparisons, we can gain a wider insight in the significance of geopolitical anomalies for 
international political practice, and make sense of their specific manifestations in a global context 
(see Caspersen & Stansfield, 2011; Geldenhuys, 2009; Kingston & Spears, 2004). Both the 
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“ethnographic” and comparative approaches, furthermore, can make use of key stakeholders in 
finding local and international attitudes towards such polities (e.g. Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2011; 
Renders, 2012). 
In my view, however, this collection of methodologies, and the types of research they 
engender, should be supplemented not only with a classical realist perspective, but also with a 
broader conceptual framework for analysing their existence within international politics. Fieldwork-
based studies of geopolitical anomalies, for instance, tend not to be elaborately concerned with 
questions of de facto sovereignty at the international level. As Schatz (2009a) admits, ‘many of the 
interesting topics about the exercise of power [may be] simply beyond the reach of the participant 
observer’ (p. 307). In other words, perhaps for international relations ‘the level of analysis 
encumbers attempts at ethnographic enquiry’ (p. 306). A similar argument could be raised about the 
interviewing or surveying of key stakeholders within or connected to geopolitical anomalies. They 
might help us understand geopolitical anomalies’ particular strategies or behaviours, but do not by 
themselves really add any deeper conceptual insights into the nature of power, de facto sovereignty, 
or international law. 
With regard to those studies systematically describing and contrasting a selection of 
geopolitically anomalous cases, I will deliberately refrain from framing this thesis in such a way. As 
this thesis adheres to a theoretical model for geopolitical anomalies that stresses their exceptionality 
and irregularity in relation to international laws and norms, a systematic comparison would not 
actually add any meaningful conceptual understandings to that model. Instead, it would likely not 
progress beyond the rather bland conclusion that every geopolitical anomaly is unique. Therefore, 
while I will discuss two particular examples of geopolitical anomalies in detail, these discussions 
should not be read as factual descriptions that, through their comparison, provide conclusive 
evidence about the nature of all of these entities.  
Instead, this research about geopolitical anomalies adopts a traditional or classical approach 
to the study of international politics. These labels – “classical” and “traditional” – are not only 
derived from the fact that this approach draws heavily from historically seminal (or “classic”) pieces 
of political writing and theory, this approach has also historically formed the prevalent mode of 
(international) political inquiry (for instance, see Jahn, 2006). That being said, the utility and 
application of classical methods certainly has not wavered in the present day. For example, Mikulas 
Fabry’s research (2010), which has already been discussed, employs this approach. Jackson (2004) 
has also relatively recently attempted ‘to renovate and refurbish the classical... approach in the area 
of international studies’ (p. 55). 
For international relations, classical approaches of research methodology were ushered in 
and informed by thinkers such as Martin Wight (1960), John Vincent (1974), and especially Hedley 
Bull (1966), who grounded it in the idea that research into political processes or actions – especially 
those at the international level – is bound to run into limitations as an enterprise of “truth-seeking”. 
In that sense, the traditional method in the international relations academe can broadly be 
juxtaposed with what is called the “scientific” or “positivist” approach (see Kaplan, 1966).  The 
classical approach, indeed, rejects any “scientific” propositions of international political research 
‘based either upon logical or mathematical proof, or upon strict, empirical procedures of verification’ 
(Bull, 1966, 362). For classical proponents, ‘social science positivism... limits unduly the questions we 
can ask about international relations and thus the answers we come up with and the theories we 
construct’ (Jackson, 2004, 67). 
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The classical research methodology, therefore, is defined by the ‘exercise of judgment’ and a 
‘scientifically imperfect process of perception or intuition’ (Bull, 1966, 361). It involves discerning 
and diagnosing international political activity, construing and clarifying its meaning and purpose, 
translating it into well-suited language, and constantly reflecting on research biases and outcomes – 
methods derived from academic realms such as philosophy, history, and law (Jackson, 2004, 57). In 
other words, the classical approach is ‘an artistic enterprise rather than a scientific one’ (Hoffman, 
1986, 182). 
This is not to suggest that there are is no value in “scientific” research methods in 
international relations, as is indeed acknowledged by Bull himself and others (George, 1976; Ogley, 
1981). However, the nature of the phenomenon of geopolitical anomalies itself, and its implications 
for international politics, endorses a research approach that remains open to tentative and 
inconclusive variables, propositions, and findings. Here, we have arrived at the crux of the classical 
approach’s antipathy towards positivist methodologies in international relations scholarship: the 
very character of international politics does not lend itself easily to “scientific” or “positivist” 
research. As Bull (1966) puts it, ‘if we confine ourselves to strict standards of verification and proof, 
there is very little of signicance that can be said about international relations’ (p. 361). 
As will be expounded in this thesis, geopolitical anomalies in fact expose the character of 
international politics as inherently incomprehensible. Thus, any desire to “scientifically” eradicate 
international unclarity or uncertainty, and to devise an infallible representation of global political 
reality, is challenged by geopolitical anomalies that demonstrate that the study of international 
affairs is compelled to grapple with ambiguity and irresolvability. Returning to Bull (1966): 
 
The difficulties that the scientific theory has encountered... appear to arise... from 
characteristics inherent in the subject matter...: the unmanagable number of variables...; 
the resistance of the material to controlled experiment; the quality it has of changing 
before our eyes and slipping between our fingers even as we try to categorise it. (p. 369) 
 
Accordingly, the methodology opted for in this research on geopolitical anomalies will steer 
clear of “measurements” or “models” (pp. 370-372), nor will it give in to the “scientific” urge to 
conclusively predict or resolve issues or tensions in international politics (Hoffman, 1986, 181). 
Rather, I will investigate and analyse geopolitical anomalies by recognising, assimilating, and 
allowing for the uncertainties, contradictions, complexities, limitations, and ambiguities embodying 
the nature of international politics (Jackson, 2004, 83). From an international political perspective, 
believing that “scientific” research methods could engender a full and complete measure of 
geopolitical anomalies would be ‘academic vanity and self-delusion’ (p. 96). 
This research, therefore, is not designed to provide conclusive answers or solutions, but to 
expose issues related to the existence of geopolitical anomalies in different ways, or present new 
angles on existing ideas about them. Its purpose is not to prove anything, but to shed a different 
light on the manifestations and significance of these political entities. As any research method 
should be an appropriate tool for addressing the questions informing the research, I maintain that 
the classical approach is the best available instrument for coming to grips with the questions asked 
in this thesis. Each of these four questions, indeed, seems to be essentially moral or normative, or so 
elusive that definitive answers are in fact highly difficult to provide (Bull, 1966, 366-367). As a 
research method that perceives and imagines international political scholarship as a ‘constant 
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debate about fundamentals’ (p. 370), the classical approach therefore appears the most useful 
methodology for this research. 
Obviously, there are things that this kind of research cannot do. It is, by definition, not a 
value-neutral type of political science, although it is questionable whether such an “objective” study 
of international relations is at all possible (Jackson, 2004, 50). Also, any “non-scientific” approach still 
requires rigor, precision, and coherence, and should be wary of dogmatism or untidy reasoning (Bull, 
1966, 375). Most notably, the classical approach is not capable of extracting small-scale or 
community-based “facts” about affairs within geopolitical anomalies.  
Again, therefore, whereas I will delve deeper into two specific examples of geopolitical 
anomalies, these analyses should not be understood as factual accounts of processes “on the 
ground”, but as (historical) examples that are illustrative of the theoretical arguments made in this 
study. These examples will be analysed in order to shed light on all of the questions mentioned 
above, and draw out different aspects of the existence of geopolitical anomalies in international 
politics. I will, thus, focus on two examples of geopolitical “anomalousness” to extract and 
investigate some of the most significant issues related to the manifestation(s) of geopolitical 
anomalies in international political affairs.  
A problem or limitation of such an approach, admittedly, might be that the findings 
emerging from each of these examples can actually not be extrapolated to make any general 
assumptions about geopolitical anomalies. Precisely because geopolitical anomalies are so 
intrinsically diverse, making general claims in regard to them becomes difficult or even impossible. I 
would counter such limitations or criticisms, however, by emphasising that I do not utilise this 
research design to generate any cross-case conclusions or predictions about the manifestations of 
geopolitical anomalies themselves. Rather than generalising for the entire population of geopolitical 
anomalies or extrapolating probabilities of their behaviour, my aim is to make certain theoretical 
propositions and expand on existing ways of thinking in international relations. In this thesis, indeed, 
I utilise these examples of certain geopolitical anomalies to develop or refine theories and 
hypotheses that can help us to think about these entities – to make ‘analytical’ instead of ‘empirical’ 
generalisations (Yin, 2014, 40-44). 
As the examples in this thesis are thus selected in order to build new or expand on existing 
theory, I argue that the examples selected for such theory-building have to be specifically relevant to 
that goal, and that certain examples may be regarded as more informative for a particular focus of 
interest than other ones. The reasons for selecting the specific examples of this thesis will be briefly 
outlined in the chapter overview below, but for now I want to maintain that the examples in this 
thesis are ‘strong only to the extent that [they are] especially instructive for theory’ (Eckstein, 2000, 
139). In other words, these examples are utilised deliberately to discern important issues 
surrounding geopolitical anomalies and enable theoretical expansion on these issues (p. 137). 
This dissertation, as such, will start with a theoretical component consisting of three 
chapters. In the first of these, I argue that the study of international relations has become a slightly 
one-dimensional field of knowledge through the pervasiveness of a Westphalian myth that 
centralises legal sovereignty as the inescapable building-block of global political life. As a result, 
geopolitical anomalies do not fit in with these dominant assumptions about the nature of 
international relations. In order to make a tentative contention for a reconsideration of this 
presumed exceptionality of geopolitical anomalies, and provide a better idea of the issues and 
processes that characterise them, I will discuss some preliminary examples of these kind of polities. 
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Finally, I will proceed to discuss the rather confusing and inconsistent application of the principle of 
sovereignty in the four main “theoretical camps” of international relations scholarship. 
To remedy these confusions and inconsistencies, the next two chapters will respectively 
attempt to make clear the distinctions between de jure and de facto sovereignty. In the second 
chapter, the nature of international law and de jure sovereignty forms the centre of attention. 
Furthermore, as geopolitical anomalies are particularly thwarted by their international legal 
exclusion, it seems important to investigate whether (and how) they might in fact be integrated into 
this global juridical framework. As will become apparent, however, perhaps the most helpful 
“resolution” to the problems of/for geopolitical anomalies lies in a better international political 
scholarly understanding of de facto sovereignty.  
Chapter Three, then, aims to demonstrate the usefulness of de facto sovereignty for 
international politics and geopolitical anomalies as a more precise and clearly identifiable notion of 
sovereignty. It argues that a classical realist way of thinking of de facto sovereignty provides the 
most utilisable insights into this phenomenon, and that other conceptualisations of de facto power 
should be perceived as very different from expressions of de facto sovereignty. In line with this 
contention, it maintains that geopolitical anomalies can either be seen as political entities excluding 
themselves from their de jure state through a manifestation of de facto sovereignty, or as a 
suspension of the de facto sovereign decision to re-establish order in an exceptional situation. 
Following on from this theoretical exposition, this thesis shifts its focus towards its two 
example studies. The first of these chapters involves the so-called “collapsed state” of Somalia and 
the apparently functioning de facto state of Somaliland. In this chapter, these two polities will be 
analysed to expose certain inconsistencies in the functionalities of the legal recognition of 
statehood. Furthermore, Somaliland is discussed as a potential example of a geopolitical anomaly 
creating order in a chaotic environment through a manifestation of de facto sovereignty.  
The second example, which will be discussed in two separate chapters, revolves around the 
comparatively matured geopolitical anomaly of Kosovo. While the variedness that characterises 
geopolitical anomalies perhaps warrants less of an emphasis on this one entity, Kosovo provides 
such a wealth of elements that are of concern for this thesis that it gives licence to special 
observation. Not only is it arguably one of the most prominently studied geopolitical anomalies in 
international relations scholarship, thereby supplying this thesis a lot of material to work with, it 
more importantly brings up a collection of issues which have great relevance for the way in which 
we may think about and understand geopolitical anomalies. 
The first half of the Kosovo example, discussed in Chapter Five, focuses on the Democratic 
League of Kosovo (LDK) and its “parallel state” in the early 1990s. This case presents us a geopolitical 
anomaly exercising a variety of political responsibilities and “authorities”, and supposedly engaging 
in a non-violent resistance against overwhelming de jure state (Serbian) power. I will, however, 
investigate the extent to which this movement did in fact manage to peacefully create an 
independent geopolitical anomaly from the formal governing institutions of Serbia, or whether 
Kosovo in that time period actually merely submitted to Serbian de facto sovereignty and thus still 






The following chapter, also focusing on Kosovo, studies an example of possible ways in 
which the international community has tried to find legal approaches to geopolitical anomalies, both 
domestically and internationally. Again, however, this chapter raises certain questions concerning 
the effect of such legal approaches on the nature of de facto sovereignty in such situations. As will 
be explained, while Kosovo seems to be on its way to entering the international legal framework as a 
formal state, its existence as a geopolitical anomaly principally rests on the exercise of de facto 








Places That Do Not Exist? Geopolitical Anomalies and  
Westphalian Sovereignty 
 
Welcome to places that don’t exist. 
(Opening line of BBC Four’s same-titled documentary series; Reeve, 2005) 
 
Even in the increasingly globalised world we live in today, legally sovereign states are still regarded 
as the primary building blocks of our international political structure. Admittedly, cross-border 
movements of people, goods, and knowledge have increased; the strength and influence of multi-
national supercompanies has grown; and environmental, economic, and social issues have 
delocalised. As a consequence, it is widely agreed that formal state governance and its role in the 
world have transformed drastically. Simultaneously, however, many still believe that international 
politics remains primarily constructed around, and executed by, formal states. As such, political 
entities that do not correspond with this image and framework, such as geopolitical anomalies, are 
seen as abnormalities to a “legal state standard”. Such polities are not acknowledged as a regular or 
natural part of the international political system, but instead fall in between the spheres of legal 
state politics as idealised in international relations, and that of people’s everyday lives. In short, in a 
figurative sense, they are seen as “places that do not exist”. 
As this thesis has already suggested, this distinction between legal statehood and political 
entities residing outside of those (international) legal arrangements can be best understood in terms 
of a distinction between de jure and de facto sovereignty. Paradoxically, then, it may seem that in 
international political thought these “actual” manifestations of sovereignty are in fact subordinated 
to international juridical conventions and norms. I would maintain, however, that in mainstream 
international relations scholarship material political capabilities and “power politics” are generally 
considered as more important to international developments than agreements and treaties of 
international law.  
Crucially, rather, the secondary position of geopolitical anomalies in international politics 
stems from another issue. The problem is not necessarily that international relations thinking deems 
de facto sovereignty to be less important than de jure sovereignty, but that the de jure sovereignty 
of formal states is perceived to automatically imply de facto sovereignty. As I will try to argue in this 
chapter, the general “disregard” for geopolitical anomalies in the traditional international political 
mindset can be explained by the fact that de jure sovereignty and de facto sovereignty have been 
conflated to mean the same thing, as they are amalgamated into a “Westphalian myth” of 
sovereignty. 
To reiterate certain claims made in the introduction, sovereignty is simultaneously one of 
the most seminal and one of the most confusing concepts in international political thinking. In fact, 
as it has been used so commonly in a variety of theoretical and practical contexts, sovereignty has 
become a multi-faceted principle on which there is very little definitional consensus in international 
politics. Its central position and its ambiguous meaning in international relations discourse thus go 
hand in hand. One particular consequence of this plethora of different meanings of sovereignty in 
international political discourse is that it has become rather tempting to remedy confusion by simply 
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conjoining both its legal and material aspects. The sovereignty concept is often used without truly 
separating its factual (de facto) from its legal (de jure) elements, reinforcing its rather diffuse and 
convoluted meaning in present-day international political discourse.  
Again, thus, the problem is not that sovereignty has necessarily been thought of only as a 
legal principle, but that when de jure state sovereignty is discussed, it is automatically assumed that 
it also means de facto sovereignty. It apparently remains very difficult for many theorists of 
international politics to differentiate juridical statuses and agreements from “factual” and effective 
expressions of power. The “myth” of Westphalian sovereignty – de jure sovereignty as equivalent to 
de facto sovereignty expressed universally over a strictly defined territory – has permeated 
international political discourse to such an extent that it has become very difficult to think of de jure 
states in other ways than as the de facto sovereign entities of international law and politics. 
Geopolitical anomalies, then, become minor aberrations in an altogether “Westphalian” 
international system, even though these entities precisely highlight the fact that legally recognised 
state sovereignty is not inherently the same as that de jure state’s material de facto sovereignty. 
In this chapter, therefore, I will first briefly explain the connotations and elements of the 
concept of Westphalian sovereignty, which tends toward an affiliation of de jure statehood with de 
facto sovereignty. Thereafter, I present geopolitical anomalies as places that do exist without the 
rights and privileges of de jure sovereignty. As I hope to demonstrate, the (tentative) de facto 
sovereign and territorial manifestations of geopolitical anomalies throw into question Westphalian 
conflations of de jure and de facto sovereignty. Indeed, the abundance and sustained existence of 
geopolitical anomalies would at least attenuate the central role and position that Westphalian state 
sovereignty possesses in present-day international political discourse and conduct. Putting it 
alternatively, the persistent emergence and manifestation of geopolitical anomalies outside the 
(international) legal state framework suggests that such political entities should be taken more 
seriously as significant parts of our global political environment. 
Finally, then, I will discuss how the ideals and assumptions (or “myths”) of Westphalian 
sovereignty form an impediment to such a revaluation of geopolitical anomalies. Denoting the 
synergy of de jure state sovereignty with de facto sovereignty over territory in a single concept, 
notions of Westphalian sovereignty have become indispensable to current imaginations of 
international politics, but thereby also risk to ignore those effective power and de facto sovereignty 
manifestations that exist without de jure state sovereignty. This chapter, therefore, aims to show 
how current international political scholarship is affected by this Westphalian myth. As will be 
explained, present-day international relations theories, varying from neorealism to liberal 
internationalism and constructivism, are still very much centred on these Westphalian idea(l)s of de 
jure state sovereignty, or at least remain rather careless in distinguishing between these juridical 
expressions of sovereignty and de facto sovereignty. The purpose of this chapter, in this context, is 
to begin to make the case for clearer definitions of sovereignty in international relations thinking, as 
a starting point for creative reconsideration of the importance of geopolitical anomalies for 
international politics. 
 
The “Myth” of Westphalian Sovereignty 
The conception of Westphalian sovereignty is derived from the Treaties of Westphalia, signed in 
1648, which ended the Thirty Years War between different sources of political authority in the Holy 
Roman Empire. As it supposedly formed the first (international) legal expression of de facto 
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sovereignty over a clearly defined territory, these Westphalian Treaties are in present day 
international relations scholarship still often mentioned as the ‘birth of the modern state system’ 
(Zacher, 2001, 216). Tilly (1990) and Spruyt (1994) offer differing explanations for the subsequent 
sustainability of this international system, the former suggesting that only the modern formal state 
had the material capacity to create political security and survive in a hostile anarchical system, and 
the latter placing the rise of the modern formal state system more in institutional and legal 
evolutions. 
Regardless, in the conventional narrative of international relations, the Westphalian treaties 
are assumed to be the first and foremost juridical expression of territorial statehood, and are 
therefore supposedly a distinctive point of origin for the modern global system of legal states with 
universal de facto sovereignty over their territories. As the modern state system was allegedly 
“born” in the Westphalian Treaties, the idea of Westphalian sovereignty has nowadays become seen 
as the defining characteristic of the international political framework. Notions of Westphalian 
sovereignty speak to a legal ideal of de facto sovereignty over de jure state territory, which is 
assumed nowadays to be the central component of international politics. 
In traditional international relations thinking, such ideals have become rather primordial 
requisites of formal state politics. De jure sovereignty is generally seen as an ‘electromagnetic-like 
charge of [de jure] state control and authority across an operational zone’ (Agnew, 2009, vii), and 
therefore ‘[w]ithout [de jure] sovereignty bonded to territory... meaningful politics... seems to melt 
in the air’ (pp. 1-2). As Taylor (1994) puts it, ‘[a]cross the whole of our modern world, territory is 
directly linked to [de jure] sovereignty to mould politics into a fundamentally [legal] state-centric 
social process’ (p. 151). Territory concretises the legal state entity – ‘the [de jure] state is reified by 
placing it in space’ (Sack, 1980, 178), and for Knight (1992), therefore, it is ‘the critical quality for 
[legal] statehood’ (pp. 312-313). This means, in short, that legal statehood is assumed to inherently 
accompany full and absolute control over that de jure state’s entire territory. Thus, de jure 
sovereignty becomes infused with a perception of de facto sovereignty over a defined territory into 
a single concept of the de jure – or Westphalian – state.  
 This Westphalian ideal has been scrutinised by many scholars of international relations 
history and contemporaneity (Farr, 2005; Gross, 1948; Lesaffer, 1997; Philpott, 2001), some of 
whom have (dis)qualified this ideal as the “myth” of Westphalian sovereignty (Osiander, 2001; 
Teschke, 2006). Aside from critiques of this myth that focus on the actual contents of the 
Westphalian treaties, or on their historical meaning for international politics, for the purpose of this 
chapter criticisms of Westphalian sovereignty as the foundational principle of modern international 
politics are more interesting (Piirimäe, 2010, 64-65). Such challenges to the Westphalian myth 
attempt to find out why this ideal of de jure states possessing untrammelled de facto sovereignty 
within rigidly circumscribed territories has become the cornerstone of our perspectives on 
international relations. Scholars like Beaulac (2000; 2004a; 2004b) and Joyce (2011) point to the 
complex connections between these (Westphalian) mythologies and international political language 
and discourse, the intricacies of which I will leave aside (see Barthes, 1972; Derrida, 2005; Eagleton 
1991; Flood, 1996; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Torfing, 1999). 
More relevant here, is the argument that the particular connotations of Westphalian 
sovereignty have ‘managed [their] way into the very fabric of our international legal order’ as the 
models and the ideals for de jure state sovereignty in international law (Beaulac, 2004a, 212). Carley 
(2009) even goes so far as to contend that ‘the myth of Westphalia... has changed the rhetoric and 
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decision-making process when discussing critical human rights issues’, leading to ‘the present 
suffering of real people’ (p. 1783).  
In a landmark piece on state legality being inextricably tied to territorial de facto 
sovereignty, John Agnew (1994) refers to this Westphalian myth as a ‘territorial trap’ (p. 54), in 
which the legal state system is decontextualised and dehistoricised, political processes “above” or 
“below” state levels are obscured, and society is viewed as contained and defined within de jure 
state territory. 
Agnew helpfully outlines four connotations of this territorial trap, or Westphalian myth, for 
international political theory. First of all, as the juridical state is regarded as a singular unit with 
universal de facto sovereignty over its territory, political identity is only defined in de jure state 
terms. Alternative political identities – ethnic, regional, gendered – within legal state territory are 
then overlooked or viewed a potential threat to the de jure state. Secondly, therefore, the 
Westphalian myth exacerbates perceptions about people inside de jure state territory being superior 
to those outside of it (see Chapter Three about de facto sovereignty’s friend/enemy distinction). 
Thirdly, the de jure state is viewed ‘not in its historical particularity, but abstractly, as an idealised 
decision-making subject’ (Ashley, 1988, 238). This means that the manifestations of de facto 
sovereignty of geopolitical anomalies are ignored in favor of an ideal legal territorial (Westphalian) 
state. Finally, the Westphalian myth ‘denies alternative possibilities because it fixes our 
understanding of… future opportunities’ (Walker, 1990, 14), thus making it more difficult to imagine 
a possible restructuring of international politics (Agnew, 1994, 62-65). 
In spite of these connotations of the Westphalian myth, however, geopolitical anomalies in 
particular render invalid any such interpretations of de jure sovereignty as universal de facto 
sovereignty over bounded territory. Recalling the first of McConnell’s (2009a) definitions of 
geopolitical anomalies (p. 1904), it exposes a connection between de jure sovereignty and territory 
that is challenged and disrupted by the existence and activities of geopolitical anomalies. Through 
their effective territorial control and physicality, geopolitical anomalies unsettle any territorial 
(Westphalian) assumptions about de jure sovereignty.  
Therefore, while geopolitical anomalies challenge and alter our legal-territorial conceptions 
of statehood, my argument is not that geopolitical anomalies demonstrate “the end of borders” or a 
“de-territorialisation” of socio-cultural, political, and economic affairs (see, for instance, Murphy, 
2001; Ohmae, 1990; Ohmae, 1996; Rosenau, 1988; Sassen, 1996; Strange, 1996; Taylor, 1994). On 
the contrary, I dismiss the idea that we can ever seriously imagine a political framework devoid of 
space or territoriality. De jure state territoriality may be re-territorialised and in transformation 
(Brenner, 1999), but de facto sovereignty is inherently not “lost in space” (see Elden, 2005a). In fact, 
it is precisely the “geographicalness” of geopolitical anomalies – their physical existence occupying 
space – that defines them. They form challenges to our current global legal-territorial framework, 
but definitely not to political territoriality in itself. As playwright Samuel Beckett (1986) put it: ‘You 
are on earth, there’s no cure for that!’ (p. 129). 
Thus, as all geopolitical anomalies carry out material territorial power strategies in one way 
or another, these polities appeal to the need to reshape our Westphalian understanding of a 
presupposed amalgamation of de jure statehood with de facto sovereignty over territory (Dahlman, 
2009, 31-32). The existence of geopolitical anomalies employing de facto sovereignty within de jure 
state borders means that these Westphalian qualities do not carry universal or absolute value, and 
thus expose the relative weakness of the Westphalian myth. Discourses like the Westphalian myth 
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only result in materiality through some kind of “real” agent, and as certain agents (like geopolitical 
anomalies) do not embody Westphalian realities, they debunk the Westphalian myth. Geopolitical 
anomalies help us to deconstruct the “discursive hegemony” of the Westphalian myth in present-
day international relations through material power manifestations. The Westphalian myth, thus, in 
many cases may be just an ideal of de jure sovereignty (Biersteker, 2002, 162), instead of existing 
arrangements of material power and de facto sovereignty. 
 
Places that Do Exist 
As it is conventionally believed that international politics predominantly occurs among legal states 
with full de facto sovereignty over their territory (Biersteker, 2002, 167; Knight, 1992, 311; Lake, 
2008, 41; Taylor, 1984, 4; Taylor, 1991, 397), polities without legally recognised sovereignty (such as 
geopolitical anomalies) are often seen to exist outside the logics of global politics. In an international 
political system in which de jure sovereignty is predominantly discussed in reference to de facto 
sovereignty principles, political entities without such Westphalian sovereignty may appear to 
actually have no sovereignty whatsoever. To put it differently, Westphalian views of de jure 
sovereignty tend to invoke ideas about the legal state representing civilisation, stability and order. 
Polities other than de jure states, conversely, are characterised by unlawfulness, disorder, and 
primitivism. In this conception, “non-state” societies are considered to be ‘incomplete’, as ‘their 
existence continues to suffer the painful experience of a lack – the lack of a [legal] state’ (Clastres, 
1977, 159). 
Geopolitical anomalies, then, might be referred to in many alternative ways (McConnell, 
2009a, 1908). Aside from those terminologies mentioned in the introduction, they may be presented 
in terms of being a ‘fourth world’ (Griggs & Hocknell, 1995; 1996), as ‘non-institutionalised’ or 
‘pseudo-states’ (Kolossov & O’Loughlin, 1999, 152), or as ‘para-states’ or ‘almost-states’ 
(Stanislawski, 2008, 368). More normative labels may include an ‘underground geopolitical world’ 
(Kolossov & O’Loughlin, 1999, 152) or ‘black spots’ of which ‘we know they exist, but [which] are 
difficult or impossible [for us] to see’ (Stanislawski, 2008, 366). As Clastres (1977), again, puts it, 
‘[h]ow, then, can one conceive of the very existence of [non-state] societies if not as the rejects of 
universal history, anachronistic relics of a remote state that everywhere else has been transcended?’ 
(p. 160). 
The symbolic notions of non-existence of geopolitical anomalies can be found, aside from 
the BBC television series mentioned in the epigraph, in many other examples of representation of 
these entities. Middleton (2015), for instance, refers to them in a similar manner in his Atlas of 
Countries that do not Exist, which on its back cover rather contradictorily claims to ‘[bring] to life a 
parallel world of nations that... exist only in the minds of the people who live there’ (see also 
Robson, 2015).  
McCanne (2014) uses the term “no man’s land” to discuss spaces that “fall in the cracks” 
between different zones of governance, while political geographers Noam Leshem and Alisdair 
Pinkerton set up a blog about an expedition Into No Man’s Land (2015a). According to them, such 
spaces ‘often do exist in a state of “in-betweenness”, as ribbons of land between... different regimes 
of power’ (as cited in Caffrey, 2015), and they explain the appeal of the “no man’s land” terminology 
offering ‘an easily appropriated trope... that account[s] for spaces from which organised political 
power has been either intentionally withdrawn or significantly curtailed by adverse social-political or 
ecological-environmental circumstances’ (Leshem & Pinkerton, 2015b, 3). However, they find that 
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such territories should be associated not only with desolation or destruction, but also with ‘a lively 
process’. As they put it, ‘it is really important for us to rethink these spaces... not just as “dead 
zones”, but also as living spaces’ (as cited in Caffrey, 2015). 
In this regard, understandings of these entities in reference to human life and death are 
particularly interesting. For Leshem and Pinkerton (2015b), the fact that the toponym of “no man’s 
land” is historically associated with killing fields in war zones, and with burial grounds in times of 
plague, ‘alludes to the spatial conjuncture of liminality and death’ that has become a hallmark of 
these perceivably ungovernable spaces, which have thereby become seen ‘as the ultimate locus of 
physical and corporeal destruction’ (pp. 2-3). Wood (2009), in an article in Foreign Policy Magazine, 
not only writes rather negatively about ‘wannabe states’ with ‘an emphatic lack of officialdom’ that 
inhabit only a ‘limbo world’ and a ‘legal wilderness’ (they allegedly represent ‘a dangerous new 
international phenomenon’ and ‘a mess waiting to happen’); he also does so in a specific manner. 
Such political communities apparently reside ‘in the international community’s prenatal ward’, and 
often require ‘midwifing’ by de jure states lest ‘such embryonic countries will end stillborn’; 
alternatively, they are staying in ‘political purgatory’. Such conceptualisations seem to imply that 
these polities only “come to life” when they enter the formal and legal realms of international 
relations or that for them redemption only lies in the ascension into formal international political 
heaven. 
As will be explored further on in this thesis, such notions of non-life or sub-life can be 
interesting allegories for political entities outside of conventional international relations, but they do 
remain complete inversions of the actual “lived spaces” that such entities represent. Therefore, this 
chapter will now proceed to bring some of the de facto sovereignty and “living” power 
manifestations of geopolitical anomalies into focus. In doing so, I hope to provide insights into how 
the de facto sovereign and territorial instances and expressions of geopolitical “anomalousness” 
disrupt Westphalian assumptions about statehood and sovereignty. 
 
De Facto Sovereignty and Westphalian Sovereignty 
The category of geopolitical anomalies that most aptly exposes the problems of the assumed 
Westphalian correlation between de facto sovereignty and de jure statehood is that of de facto 
states. The first encompassing examination of these polities has been made by Scott Pegg (1998a), 
who defines the de facto state as a territory with ‘an organised political leadership’ that is 
legitimised ‘through some degree of indigenous capacity’ and ‘popular support’, and that is able ‘to 
provide governmental services to a given population... for a significant period of time’. Most 
importantly, a de facto state ‘views itself as capable of entering into relations with other states’ (p. 
26). However, it seems that de facto states come short on this last aspect: their ‘empirically defined 
claim to statehood’ is not legally recognised by other states (Lynch, 2004, 15-16). 
As such, their claims to independent statehood are seen as illegal and not-to-be-considered 
in the eyes of the “international community”. Since all de facto states exist within the recognised 
territorial boundaries of some “real” juridical sovereign state, they are generally perceived as 
internal conflicts to be dealt with within the parameters of that metropolitan state, rather than as 
new manifestations of statehood. Indeed, de facto states have enormous difficulty breaking through 
the ‘rigidities of diplomatic orthodoxy’ which privilege the continued existence of recognised borders 
of de jure states (see Chapter Two). They are forced to tangle with the ‘formidable common front of 
the organised international system’ where no state ‘breaks ranks’ (Bartmann, 2004, 27). This 
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seemingly impermeable order endows legal states with an array of possibilities and juridical 
arrangements for self-defence, and establishes them firmly in international society. Coincidentally, 
de facto states have very few rights protecting them in international law, and are restricted in terms 
of juridical powers, economic decision-making, and legal defence mechanisms (McConnell, 2009a, 
1903). 
As a result, while the impenetrability of the international system limits potentialities for de 
facto states, at the same time it reinforces a deep-seated desire of attaining legal statehood 
recognition. In other words, because there appears to be no room for ambiguity when it comes to 
their legal position, de facto states lack the vitality that legally recognised sovereignty provides and 
simultaneously adamantly pursue towards that full legal state sovereignty. The absolute nature of de 
jure state sovereignty in our international society has formed an incentive for de facto states to 
strive for statehood rather than any other form of status or existence – such as autonomy within 
their metropolitan state (Lynch, 2004, 18-19; see also Chapter Two). To be sure, ‘[t]he international 
game is now closer to zero-sum; there are states and there is little else. [This] has meant that most 
self-determination movements will be content with nothing less than [legal] state sovereignty to 
achieve what they perceive as justice’ (pp. 18). 
Dov Lynch (2004) has written an extensive analysis of the collection of de facto states that 
came into being after the collapse of the Soviet Union – Abkhazia, Transnistria, South-Ossetia, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh. While these unrecognised entities form but one specific set within a wider range 
of such polities, and Lynch himself states that his ‘argument... does not have wider theoretical 
ambitions’ (p. 11), his analysis offers some helpful insights into the functionalities, motivations, and 
challenges of de facto states in general.  
First of all, the abovementioned insistence of de facto states on full state sovereignty is one 
of the internal driving factors behind their continued existence.  Despite the fact that de facto states 
vary in their degree of governmental service provision and control over territory, and politics is often 
highly personalised, lacking transparency, and far from pluralistic, de facto governments maintain 
that their empirical sovereignty structures are strong enough to justify a declaration of juridical state 
sovereignty. From their perspective, legal recognition does not create a state but rather reflects an 
already existing reality of empirical sovereignty (see Chapter Two for more clarification on such 
declarative understandings of recognition). Added to these assertions, de facto states claim their 
independence through their right of self-determination, founded in popular referenda reflecting the 
will of their people, and in a sense of moral entitlement derived from the alleged oppression or 
illegitimate rule by the former central state (pp. 42-50). 
The singular wish for fully independent de jure statehood by de facto states means that they 
are rarely interested in a “power-sharing” agreement with the metropolitan state. There are, 
however, a few other reasons for the rejection of non-state centred settlements. Most de facto 
states feel a potent sense of fear and insecurity, which is regarded as “existential” and “total” – even 
if the metropolitan state’s armed forces are perhaps too weak to seriously pose a threat. This sense 
of insecurity makes compromise based on reconciliation and autonomous association with their 
former central state a difficult issue. Calculations of force and power, instead of the rule of law, have 
become seen as the only way of guaranteeing security. As such, some, but not all, de facto states 
have become devoted to extensive military structures. These systems, which are often founded on 
separatist armies that “were the state” during struggles for self-determination, are transformed into 
state-building and nation-building mechanisms themselves. They “realise” de facto states in the 
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minds of their populations, while representations of the “Other” metropolitan state as a threat are 
utilised to build popular support (Lynch, 2004, 51-61). 
The dominance of military elements and emphasis on external danger of war has frequently 
combined with extensive criminalisation and economic mismanagement by weak governments, 
producing de facto states that suffer from what Lynch calls ‘subsistence syndromes’. This relentless 
determination of authorities to survive at all costs, in spite of hyperinflation, collapse of social 
services, and economic isolation, has become a key component of the internal logics sustaining de 
facto states. Their citizens reiterate this attitude, as they prevail political and security imperatives 
over economic ones. They therefore put up with desperate conditions and failure of governance – 
although it should also be noted that many are forced to do so because they are practically 
incapable of leaving. Added to this, finally, many de facto state inhabitants tolerate their socio-
economic predicament because they feel that it is just as bad, if not worse, in their metropolitan 
states (Lynch, 2004, 63-64). 
The descriptions above certainly do not apply to all de facto state situations; circumstances 
in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Somaliland, for instance, may be quite 
different. Nonetheless, additional comments made by other scholars reconfirm a ‘modal tendency’ 
(Kolstø, 2006, 723) of these de facto states for deficient state-building – due to lack of will, but also 
because of insufficient capabilities or unfortunate circumstances. Their dismal economic situation, 
for instance, has also been ascribed to war damage from secessionist struggles and a dearth of 
economic resources. Furthermore, foreign enterprises are reluctant to invest in de facto states 
outside international contractual binds, or may be wary of offending the parent state. This 
‘economic cost of non-recognition’ (Pegg, 1998a, 43), without international conventions or 
monitoring by international regulatory organisations, encourages illegal business, and large shadow 
economies have emerged whose profits do not benefit the particular de facto state as a whole. This 
lack of external involvement is also reflected in the fact that the “international community” (or its 
more powerful members) have mainly shown indecisiveness, inconsistency, and disinterest when it 
comes to de facto states (Kolstø, 2006, 728-734). 
At the same time, however, all de facto states are strongly connected to the outside world, 
as they are beneficiaries of significant external financial support. Firstly, large diasporic communities 
in North-America, Europe and Australasia, which have ‘retained and indeed reinvented their 
identity’, support de facto states both in spirit and in practice (Bahcheli, Bartmann & Srebrnik, 
2004a, 6; Kaldor, 1999, 208). In addition, international humanitarian organisations assist in 
sustaining de facto states (Lynch, 2004, 81-85). Most importantly, de facto states have often built 
tight and intricate relations with a patron state supportive of their cause.  
This reliance on external help has been clearly elucidated by Nina Caspersen (2009), who 
simultaneously reflects on this aid’s contradictory position in the de facto states’ legitimising 
narratives for claims to legal statehood. De facto states believe they “deserve” legal recognition of 
their sovereignty by demonstrating their “stateness”, and thus promote an image of independence, 
viability, and democracy, yet these arguments significantly lose traction when these polities are 
dependent on the external power of a de jure state for economic development and security. Some 
critics contend, therefore, that these entities’ de facto independence is an illusion, as it paradoxically 
requires external dependence; they are states ‘on the dole’ (Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2008, 494). Some 
observers have even argued that de facto states merely function as political instruments for patron 
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states that significantly influence the internal politics of these ‘puppet states’ beyond democratic 
control (Caspersen, 2009, 48-52).  
On the other hand, many de jure states also are dependent on international economic 
linkages, and even some patron state governments themselves could lose domestic public support 
should they neglect their relations with co-ethnics in de facto states. Furthermore, de facto states 
often maintain that they have no alternative to external dependence on a patron state, as they are 
generally denied access to international trade, loans, and other politico-economic relations. Also, 
earlier mentioned diaspora movements and ‘shadow’ transnational trade networks can sometimes 
rival patron state assistance, leading to a lesser reliance on these formal states’ financial resources. 
Some de facto states, thus, can hold a high degree of autonomy that coexists with some form of 
external dependence, and as such, regarding de facto states as mere puppets of larger patron states 
is simplistic and exaggerated. These unrecognised entities are ‘not pliant clients doing their master’s 
bidding’ (Kolstø, 2006, 733), and their policy agendas can be quite contrary to those of financially 
assisting legal states. Having external connections with de jure patron states does not necessarily 
mean that power is not exercised domestically in de facto states (Caspersen, 2009, 50-58).  
While external support from de jure states perhaps throws into question how substantive 
the domestic power of some geopolitical anomalies actually is, this does not seem to be the case for 
perhaps the most prominent of geopolitical anomalies: Taiwan (officially named the Republic of 
China, ROC). This barely legally recognised de facto state (by 22 marginal states) has in the past 
decades become known as an “economic and political miracle”, as it has successfully developed 
democratic institutions and economic policies (Clark & Tan, 2012; Tan, 2009). It is, therefore, 
commonly regarded as the “champion” of de facto states. It manages to uphold economic, 
technological, and cultural ties even with juridical states that do not legally recognise it, through the 
privatisation of its foreign relations. It conducts ‘what looks like diplomacy masquerading as 
business’ (Reno, 2006, 172). The American institute in Taiwan and the Council for North American 
Affairs, for instance, manage relations with the United States; the Straight Exchange Foundation and 
the Taiwan Affairs Office conduct linkages even with China. 
In addition, Taiwan has entered into several international institutions, such as the World 
Trade Organisation and the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum, based on being an “economy” and 
possessing “functional competence” rather than international legal recognition (Lynch, 2004, 20; 
Pegg, 1998b, 8-11; Pegg, 2000, 94-96). Some argue that, despite this situation, Taiwan still is an 
‘outcast’ residing in a ‘shadowy world short of normal diplomatic intercourse’ (Bartmann, 2004, 27), 
and that the US effectively functions as a patron state for Taiwan (Kolstø, 2006, 733). These 
qualifications, however, do not really take away from the fact that Taiwan has a quite recognisable 
legal presence in international politics, and that it undeniably has obligations under international law 
(Pegg, 1998b, 12-15). Indeed, a few interesting aspects of the contradiction between de facto and de 
jure sovereignty come to the fore in this case.  
The ROC was the sole legitimate representative of China to the United Nations, backed by 
the US, until 1971. Under increasing pressure from the People’s Republic of (mainland) China (PRC) 
to set straight this ‘mismatch between the ROC’s de jure jurisdiction (China) and the de facto one 
(Taiwan)’, UN Resolution 2758 stripped that status from the ROC and granted it upon the PRC (Chu & 
Lin, 2001, 117). Remarkably, that resolution left unmentioned what Taiwan’s status was henceforth 
going to be, as the PRC’s “one China-policy” (including Taiwan) made it difficult for other de jure 
states to award any juridical form of recognition to Taiwan.  
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In spite of this omission, however, until this day, private non-profit corporations function as 
embassies and consulates to maintain relations with other states in the absence of diplomatic 
recognition. The representatives of these organisations are even provided with diplomatic privileges 
and immunities. The US government’s policies to continue commercial, cultural, and governmental 
ties with Taiwan have particularly had a serious impact on the sustained presence of Taiwan in 
international politics. As long as these linkages do not carry the label of ‘formal diplomacy or 
recognition’, as long as Taiwan is ‘actually but not officially’ regarded as an independent sovereign 
state, this situation is acceptable to China, Taiwan, and the states that deal with these two countries 
(Lee, 1995, 323-325). 
As such, Taiwan exemplifies how de jure recognition is a matter of (great power) politics, 
rather than an outcome of set guidelines of international law. The question is not whether de facto 
sovereignty should be juridically recognised, but whose de facto sovereignty – and by whom. In 
addition, it seems that in Taiwan’s example the nomenclature of sovereignty is important. The 
question is not whether Taiwan possesses de jure or de facto sovereignty, but how its political 
authority and relations are referred to. Also, the case of Taiwan signifies how some political entities 
may possess a degree of “de facto recognition” in absence of legal recognition. International law, 
and thus specifically de jure sovereignty, then, is above all else a construct deliberately susceptible 
to restructuring or reinterpretation. In any case, the above paragraphs have hopefully helped to 
expose how the performance of sovereignty is not intrinsically related to the legal – or Westphalian 
– nature of it.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that the distinction between de jure statehood and de facto 
sovereignty also runs the other way. This is most obviously manifested in so-called “weak”, “failed”, 
or “quasi-states” that do not exercise de facto sovereignty over their entire territory, but formally 
maintain their recognition as de jure states (see also Chapter Two). Although it is not this thesis’s aim 
to extensively discuss these kinds of polities, they very clearly (re-)exemplify the differences 
between de jure sovereignty and de facto sovereignty.  
More importantly, if in these cases de facto sovereignty is not fully tied to the de jure state, 
it almost automatically means that it resides elsewhere. It appears that geopolitical anomalies and 
“failed states” are mutually reinforcing entities, as the presence of geopolitical anomalies 
exemplifies the lack of de facto sovereignty by the juridical state, and the lack of a state’s de facto 
sovereignty simultaneously enables the emergence of (new) manifestations of de facto sovereignty 
in that country. Somalia and Somaliland – respectively an ‘archetypical failed or collapsed state’ and 
a relatively well-functioning de facto state within Somalia’s nominal borders – are prime examples of 
this assertion (Elden, 2009, 99-101). They are, indeed, one of the analysed examples of this thesis 
(Chapter Four). 
 
Territoriality and Westphalian Sovereignty 
Thus, as the Westphalian relationship between de jure and de facto sovereignty is problematised by 
geopolitical anomalies exercising the latter without the former, the relationship between de jure 
statehood and its legally ascribed territory also becomes more complicated. A de jure state may not 
exercise de facto sovereignty universally over its territory, as that territorial de facto sovereignty 
might instead be exercised by other political entities. Again, while Westphalian considerations of 
sovereignty imply a very fixed and clearly discernable connection between the de jure state and the 
space over which it is supposed to possess de facto sovereignty, geopolitical anomalies exemplify 
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how such territorial practices are dependent much more on actual manifestations of de facto 
sovereignty than on purely legal arrangements of de jure state sovereignty. 
The complexity of the relationship between legal statehood and its territoriality is exposed 
by a few interesting examples. For instance, up until very recently the India-Bangladesh border 
region was characterised by a complicated patchwork of 106 Indian enclaves surrounded by 
Bangladeshi territory, and 92 Bangladeshi territories within the “metropolitan” Indian boundaries. 
On both sides of the frontier, the situation in these enclaves/exclaves could be described as one of 
lack of contact with the “home country” and absence of governance from the “host country”; they 
were generally left to fend for themselves (Jones, 2009, 373). The respective countries allowed the 
“use” of their territories by the communities living in these exclaves, but such arrangements did not 
qualify as the awarding of legal sovereignty. Those external territories thus in a juridical sense 
remained firmly Bangladeshi or Indian (Van Schendel, 2002, 138).  
While these territories, thus, were largely dependent on the infrastructure of one state, they 
officially existed under the legal sovereignty of the other. As such, the inhabitants of these enclaves 
were not considered to be citizens of the surrounding state, and were therefore unprotected by the 
laws of that state. Particularly in crisis situations, when normal order was disrupted, this exclusion 
from rights became painfully clear (Jones, 2009, 377; see Chapter Three for a deeper analysis of the 
relationship between sovereignty and emergencies). 
These enclaves, therefore, could in some sense perhaps be considered as territories over 
which no legal state possessed de facto sovereignty. Alternatively, as the enclaves were not 
territories without de jure sovereignty, like certain parts of Antarctica and the Bir Tawil area along 
the Egyptian-Sudanese border, they could perhaps more accurately be described as ‘displaced 
sovereignties’ (Jones, 2009, 377) or ‘non-state spaces’ (Van Schendel, 2002, 139-140). Although on 
July 31st 2015 India and Bangladesh came to a historical agreement to “exchange” the majority of 
these enclaves, thus untangling this patchwork of borders and awarding official citizenship to the 
inhabitants of these communities, many of the territorial and legal issues of this boundary region 
remain. With an increasing number of Bangladeshis attempting to cross the Indian border, proposals 
have been made to cover it with barbed wire fencing and “sterile zones” (Kashyap, 2015), suggesting 
that this transition from “statelessness” to statehood is still characterised by various forms of 
“abandonment” by competing modalities of de jure state power (Shewly, 2015).  
A variation of such “spaces of exception” (see Agamben, 1998; Chapter Three), furthermore, 
can be found in the de facto states of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, where Russia has distributed its 
passports to the residents of these areas. This “passportisation” not only created Russian citizens, it 
also actively testified to the fact that the bearers of these passports had severed ties to the Georgian 
formal state (Artman, 2013, 693). In some way, then, many inhabitants of these regions became 
Russian “citizens”, yet these de facto states are simultaneously recognised by Russia as independent 
state territory. To make things more complicated, from the perspective of international law they 
reside still within Georgia’s borders. These entities, as well as their “passportised Russian citizens”, 
thus in many ways appear to undermine the logic of Georgian de jure sovereignty and its nominal 
territory (p. 698). 
As we can find such instances of possibly “stateless” space, perhaps we could also raise the 
question whether we can find cases of “spaceless” statehood. While this issue may become 
increasingly prominent in international law and politics as sea-level rises threaten to submerge 
certain low-lying island states like Kiribati and Tuvalu (see, for example, McAdam, 2010), the most 
45 
 
prominent contemporary example of seemingly “de-territorialised de jure statehood” is the 
Sovereign Military Order of Malta (SMOM), whose territory consists of ‘two buildings in Rome in 
which it enjoys extraterritorial legal privileges’ (Lewis, 2010). SMOM is, nevertheless, widely 
acknowledged as a sovereign entity in international law. It is fully juridically recognised by a 
significant amount of de jure states, issues its own passports and has embassies abroad, and enjoys 
rights of treaty-making and membership in international organisations.  
In some sense, therefore, SMOM again shows the disconnect between de jure sovereignty 
and territorial de facto sovereignty; de jure sovereignty in itself is not necessarily attached to factual 
territorial practices or possessions (Constantinou, 2004). From a more “physical” de facto 
sovereignty perspecive, however, even those two Rome offices might be considered as territories, 
suggesting that political entities – de jure states and geopolitical anomalies – do in fact need some 
material and grounded existence. Territory seems ‘inescapable’ for the exercise of political power 
(Gray, 1999). 
The example that perhaps illustrates this most clearly is the Tibetan Government-in-Exile 
(TGiE). McConnell (2009b) herself uses this case study to present and discuss her analyses of 
geopolitical anomalies. TGiE was established in India in 1960, and has subsequently developed into 
an institutionalised exilic political structure with a constitution, a legislative parliament, and a 
judiciary. It organises democratic elections, provides health and education services, collects taxes 
(chatrel), and issues Tibetan passports (Green Books) (p. 343). According to McConnell, therefore, 
TGiE ‘has a degree of de facto sovereignty based on its claims to and production of legitimacy’ (p. 
344), but this assertion might be questionable. Whereas McConnell simply equates de facto 
sovereignty with ‘the ability and capacity to exercise power’ (p. 345), in this thesis the concept of de 
facto sovereignty will be explicitly separated from just any general form of effective power (see 
Chapter Three).  
Aside from such differentiations, McConnell demonstrates how TGiE exercises its authority 
certainly not in a conventional territorial manner, as this authority is employed over a Tibetan 
community-in-exile scattered over India, Nepal, Bhutan, and other parts of the world.  As such, TGiE 
seems to have all the trappings of a de facto state, were it not for an apparent lack of a territorially 
defined political framework, since TGiE’s settlements in India are established on land granted by the 
Indian government. On the one hand, therefore, McConnell argues that TGiE ‘has at most a highly 
tenuous relationship to territory’ (pp. 347-348). For one, TGiE is awarded a “share” of governing 
responsibilities over its settlements, and the relationship between Indian de jure sovereignty and 
Tibetan authority is thus constantly (re)negotiated, yet this does not equate to an Indian legal 
recognition of Tibetan territorial sovereignty. TGiE’s structures of government are only 
acknowledged on a local scale in order to make such negotiations pragmatically possible.  
Moreover, these political institutions are never declared or recognised openly. Political 
authority is constantly ‘held in suspension’ between legal and lived realities, and these semantic 
subtleties enable the coexistence of TGiE’s political structures with India’s legal sovereignty in de 
jure Indian territory. McConnell labels this coexistence of political frameworks as ‘tacit sovereignty’ 
(pp. 349-351), a concept that again raises problems in relationship to notions of de facto 





Seemingly departing from understandings of sovereignty, in a later study McConnell 
analyses the “governmentality practices” of this geopolitical anomaly – the potentially extra-
territorial techniques of governance aiming to manage and utilise a population of human bodies 
rather than defined space (Foucault, 1991; see Chapter Three). For instance, TGiE has “come to 
know” its population through census and survey-taking, which has served to create state-citizen 
relationships between Tibetans dispersed over non-contiguous and dispersed places, and an 
ostensibly central government-in-exile (McConnell, 2012, 81-86).  
For McConnell (2012), therefore, ‘TGiE foregrounds the important distinction between 
governing strategies and the realms over which governance is enacted’, as the Tibetan population 
seems to be defined in national more than territorial terms (p. 92). TGiE has nourished a degree of 
domestic legitimacy founded on the Dalai Lama’s authority, on the institutionalisation of 
government structures, and on a historical precedence of governance over Tibet before exile (p. 91). 
These legitimising factors are also utilised externally, with narratives of democracy and national self-
determination employed to build international recognition for official Tibetan statehood. TGiE 
engages in what can be described as ‘paradiplomacy’ (Aldecoa & Keating, 1999): the Dalai Lama’s 
meetings with state leaders, the institutionalisation of ‘quasi-embassies’ in several countries, and 
linkages with several NGO’s serve to ‘mimic’ state diplomacy behaviour, so to find credibility and de 
jure status in international politics (McConnell, 2009b, 346-347; McConnell, Moreau, & Dittmer, 
2012, 806-808). Apparently, TGiE engages in all these state-like activities with neither legal 
sovereignty nor clearly delineated territory. 
On the other hand, McConnell emphasises that TGiE ‘is not a non-territorial entity’ 
(McConnell, 2009b, 347). Besides its ‘diasporic geographies’, TGiE forms a rather ‘conventionally 
territorialised set of political spatialities’, and, like any geopolitical anomaly, thus occupies some 
space in some sort of way. These spatialities are direct expressions of the TGiE’s ‘territorialising 
strategies’ through which it attempts to ‘control space and institutionalise the Tibetan-nation-in-
exile at a range of scales’. TGiE, as such, even claims to possess “jurisdiction” over these localities, 
which, according to TGiE, can therefore even be regarded as “sovereign spaces”. This Tibetan control 
over these spaces stays far away from legal jurisdiction or de jure sovereignty, and appears 
ultimately subject to Indian de facto sovereignty, but TGiE does possess a degree of autonomy over 
its own affairs within these settlements (p. 348). 
Additionally, these territories have in some ways become a “second homeland” to many 
Tibetans, as the TGiE has ‘re-territorialised itself... in displacement’. Its being-in-exile has now 
become a large component of Tibetan cultural-national identity (McConnell, 2009b, 348). The 
discourses through which TGiE has fostered a national Tibetan identity are also ostensibly grounded 
in quite territorial terms. This national identity discourse is based around notions of a population 
functioning as a ‘repository’ preserving Tibetan culture, but also around narratives of preparing for 
territorial governance once resettlement has taken place, and of a population-in-exile waiting to 
return to the Tibetan heimat (McConnell, 2012, 86-87). 
Most importantly, while some of the governmental strategies employed by TGiE, such as 
health and education services, can be maintained and managed seemingly in a non-territorial way, 
the TGiE’s mechanisms for actually regulating its citizens’ behaviour rest primarily on the 
constitution of “national spaces-in-exile” in which the population can be kept together, observed, 
and managed (McConnell, 2012, 88-89). TGiE, therefore, even regards and portrays those cohorts of 
the Tibetan population that reside or move outside of these spaces as problematic for its governing 
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capabilities. Given the exilic circumstances of its population, it is very difficult for TGiE to utilise 
territory as a tool for social control. Exposing the fundamental spatiality of de facto sovereignty, 
McConnell maintains that ultimately TGiE cannot force its citizens to either move or remain, as it 
lacks the coercive powers to control Tibetans’ residency and mobility (pp. 90-91). McConnell, 
therefore, even wonders ‘whether the settlement spaces in exile enable TGiE to operate as a 
“government”. Or, conversely, if the Tibetan diaspora in India was more conventionally dispersed, 
would the governmental functions of TGiE be diminished?’ (p. 91). 
In any case, TGiE’s governance appears to be more effective when it is territorialised, so that 
in spite of India’s de jure and de facto sovereignty, TGiE, exercises a particular kind of authority over 
the territories in which the Tibetan communities reside. As such, regardless of what kind of power 
practices TGiE employs – de facto sovereign or non-sovereign – there is a distinct territoriality to 
them. This is a territoriality that is ‘partial’ and ‘differentiated’, yet where political practices cannot 
escape or move “beyond” the bounded spaces of the Tibetan settlements (McConnell, 2012, 92). 
TGiE attempts to create uniform government structures and practices over all of the non-contiguous 
Tibetan settlements and communities abroad, and describes the relationship between the central 
Tibetan authority and its dispersed localities as comparable to that between central and local 
governments – as integrated authorities on different levels. In this way, TGiE acts as a single 
governing authority for Tibetans all over the world, but remains far more institutionally organised 
than any global or “de-territorialised” socio-political network. Therefore, it may not possess 
sovereignty over territory in a de jure or even a de facto sense, but it does possess a degree of local 
authority and international legitimacy (McConnell, 2009b, 348).  
In sum, geopolitical anomalies and employments of de facto sovereignty deconstruct the 
Westphalian amalgamation of sovereignty in a variety of ways. Geopolitical anomalies may exercise 
de facto sovereignty without legal state recognition, and so, in turn, de jure states do not exercise 
their de facto sovereignty universally over territory. As such, geopolitical anomalies should not be 
marginalised into non-existence. In fact, the examples described above seem to point out that they 
are “more real” and “exist more” than the conventional de jure states that are assumed to be the 
core units of international politics. In a sense, geopolitical anomalies tell us more about the “lived 
realities” of international politics than de jure statehood does. If any praxis of international relations 
appears to be actually constructed and imagined in a very particular Westphalian “myth”, it would 
be the pairing of de jure statehood with de facto sovereignty.  
 
Sovereignty in Contemporary International Political Discourse 
The remainder of this chapter, then, will direct its attention towards this “construct” of Westphalian 
sovereignty in present-day international relations discourse, outlining the ways in which it has 
conceptualised de jure sovereignty as the primary component of international politics. As I hope to 
demonstrate, the Westphalian myth still seems to possess much normative strength in international 
political discourse, conflating international politics with international law. As it has become 
increasingly tempting to simply tie de facto sovereignty to the most central elements of international 
political discourse (de jure states), the meaning of sovereignty has increasingly been convoluted – in 
spite, or perhaps because, of its commonplace usage within the field. Not only has the meaning of 
sovereignty been complicated in the academic field of international politics as a whole, many 
scholars and theoretical “camps” have assumed an internally inconsistent interpretation of 
sovereignty in their writing.  
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The possibly most important theories about the nature of international politics – neorealism, 
liberal internationalism, and constructivism – deal with issues of sovereignty frequently and 
diversely, but simultaneously in a haphazard or inconsistent manner. Therefore, in attempting to 
alleviate the sway of the Westphalian myth over international relations discourse, in which de jure 
states are assumed to have complete territorial de facto sovereignty, a good starting point seems to 
be to expose these inconsistencies as an alleyway into a transformed view on the nature of 
international politics and, thus, geopolitical anomalies. 
 
Neorealism and Liberal Internationalism 
Traditionally, the intellectual arena of studies of international politics has been characterised by a 
‘great debate’ (Delaney, 2005, 53) between realist (Carr, 1964; Morgenthau, 1948) – later neorealist 
(Gilpin, 1981; Waltz, 1979) – and liberal internationalist (Keohane & Nye, 1977) views on 
international relations. It should be clarified here that the terms realist and neorealist are often used 
interchangeably, as the latter (logically) shares a number of theoretical grounds with the former. 
Grieco (1988), for instance, does not distinguish between the two because ‘on critical issues... 
modern realists like Waltz and Gilpin are very much in accord with classical realists like Carr and 
Morgenthau’ (p. 485). However, when we isolate the concept of sovereignty as our object of study, 
some classical realist starting points open up opportunities for viewing this concept in a way that is 
quite different from neorealism’s perceptions; a point that is further developed in the third chapter 
of this thesis. 
Neorealists, or structural realists, uphold that world politics takes place in an anarchic global 
structure, and that survival and power accretion are the primary aims of any entity that lives within 
such a structure.  With the term “anarchic” they do not refer to a situation of utter chaos and 
disorder, but to one in which there is no overarching body of authority above the independent 
political units comprising the international system – legally sovereign states (Mearsheimer, 1994, 
10). As such, in an environment of anarchy with no overarching governing authority, legal states are 
only concerned with their own survival and have to ‘perform all survival-enhancing tasks themselves’ 
(Fischer, 1992, 429).  
All of these neorealist ideas are offshoots of those set out by Kenneth Waltz and his seminal 
Theory of International Politics (1979), yet nonetheless, in this work the concept of sovereignty is in 
fact only scantily discussed in explicit terms (Lake, 2003, 306). Moreover, Waltz’s more structure-
focused writings on international relations leave some inconsistencies as to where he believes 
sovereignty actually resides. Waltz (1979) looks at international politics in a systemic way, and 
argues that this system should be defined through ‘the principle by which the parts are arranged’ (p. 
81), that principle being systemic anarchy. What this principle means, according to Waltz, is that ‘the 
units of international political systems are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform’ 
(p. 93), but rather ‘by their greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks’ (p. 97). Legal 
states, therefore, are ‘like units’, and ‘[t]o call states like units is to say that each state is like all other 
states in being an autonomous political unit. It is another way of saying that states are sovereign’ (p. 
95).  
However, if the units of international politics are differentiated by capabilities instead of 
functions, that appears to imply that we can define the structure of international politics on the 
basis of de facto sovereignty instead of de jure sovereignty. Waltz’s assertions, indeed, raise the 
issue of how to interpret de jure (state) sovereignty. Does it denote de facto sovereignty held by a de 
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jure state, or does the term refer to the legal rights and duties placed upon a de jure state that make 
it a member of the international legal community? Waltz appears to lean more to the former, but in 
my view the latter explanation results in more clarity about the distinction between international 
law and international politics. States may be legally recognised without the possession of de facto 
sovereignty, and geopolitical anomalies may exercise de facto sovereignty without de jure 
sovereignty. 
While Waltz argues that his views on sovereignty mean that the most powerful legal states 
are the units that define the system, in the context of this thesis about geopolitical anomalies 
perhaps different conclusions can be made. Waltz (1979) acknowledges ‘people, corporations... or 
whatever’ as important units in international politics (p. 111), but ‘[t]he conclusion that the state-
centric conception of international politics is made obsolete by them does not follow’ (p. 94). For 
him, ‘structures are defined not by all of the actors that flourish within them but by the major ones’ 
(p. 93), and ‘so long as the major states are the major actors, the structure of international politics is 
defined in terms of them’ (p. 94).  
Waltz may have been accurate in making such claims, but does not extend his views on the 
central role of de facto sovereignty and material power in international politics to entities other than 
de jure states. Waltz has a de facto and more classical realist interpretation of sovereignty in mind, 
finding that ‘[w]hen the crunch comes [legal] states remake the rules by which other actors operate’, 
but thus seems to attribute this de facto sovereignty only to de jure states (Waltz, 1979, 94). Waltz’s 
neorealism, thus, is heavily influenced by the myth of Westphalia. While he qualifies de facto 
sovereignty as the defining principle of international politics, he subsequently does not deduce that 
the international political system might not be primarily characterised by de jure states. In Waltz’s 
words, ‘only if nonstate actors develop to the point of rivalling or surpassing the great powers’ can 
we ‘call the state-centric view of the world into question’ (p. 95). In a more recent publication, Waltz 
(2000) revisited this stance, reiterating that ‘[t]ransformation... awaits the day when the 
international system is no longer populated by [de jure] states’ (p. 39). 
For neorealists, thus, sovereignty denotes the de facto sovereignty of de jure states, which 
means that a state ‘decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems’ (Waltz, 
1979, 96), because its legal sovereignty ensures that it can ‘exercise a monopoly of the legitimate 
use of forces’ and embodies the idea that the legal state’s rule is universal (Gilpin, 1981, 17). De jure 
states, according to neorealists, possess de facto sovereignty, as they are completely independent 
and not thwarted by any higher governing authority; they construct the anarchic environment in 
which they reside. Notably, this stream of thought is circular as it necessitates the assumption that 
de jure state sovereignty is supreme, absolute, and universal in order to explain the anarchy within 
global affairs, and vice versa. Because juridical states are de facto sovereign, the international arena 
is anarchic, hence juridical states are de facto sovereign. Here, again, we are reminded of that 
Westphalian myth that latches itself almost inseparably onto international political discourse. The de 
facto sovereignty of de jure states, indeed, remains the ‘bedrock assumption of [structural] realism’ 
(Litfin, 1997, 172). 
The main opponent of (neo)realism in the academic debate about international relations has 
been the intellectual camp of liberal internationalism. In contrast to neorealism, liberal 
internationalists (such as Keohane and Nye) find that legal states regard each other less as potential 
enemies, and more as companions who are crucial in ensuring well-being and survival. They argue 
that de jure state cooperation is more likely than neorealists would make believe, and institutions 
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are able to change legal states’ aims and preferences and alter their behaviour by discouraging 
acting out of self-interest. As Keohane and Nye (1977) contend, ‘in a world of multiple issues 
imperfectly linked, in which coalitions are formed transnationally, the potential role of international 
institutions in political bargaining is greatly increased’ (p. 35).  
However, while these views seem to diverge from neorealist understandings quite clearly, 
they are actually not all that dissimilar. Keohane (1984) himself, for instance, admits that ‘we need 
to go beyond realism, not discard it’ (p. 16), and seeks to show how ‘[neo]realist assumptions about 
world politics are consistent with the formation of institutionalised arrangements... which promote 
cooperation’ (p. 67). Grieco (1988) finds that liberal internationalists merely reject neorealism’s 
conclusions by employing its basic assumptions (p. 493). The similarities of liberal internationalism 
with these basic neorealist ideas, then, are reflected in liberal internationalist perspectives on the 
relationship between legal statehood and sovereignty.  
While neorealist sovereignty allegedly refers to unlimited power within de jure state 
boundaries, according to liberal internationalists a legal state’s behaviour can be affected by 
international institutions and other states. For liberal internationalists, however, this does not mean 
that the sovereignty of that state is “waned”; ‘interdependence... does not reflect an erosion of 
sovereignty’ (Thomson, 1995, 215). On the contrary, they argue, the decision of juridical states to 
abide to international institutional rules that ‘tie their hands’ does not demonstrate a constraint or 
infringement on their sovereignty, but rather an expression of it (Lake, 2003, 307). Keohane and 
Hoffman (1991), for example, conclude that state sovereignty is reinforced by interdependence and 
global institutions, as de jure states are validated as the only legitimate members of such institutions 
and cooperation increases a juridical state’s governing capabilities. 
It seems, however, that liberal internationalist thinkers overlook or mix up the differences 
between de facto and de jure sovereignty. Liberal internationalism speaks of de facto sovereignty 
almost inadvertently, without truly making explicit when it distinguishes it from legal sovereignty. 
Even though liberal internationalism prescribes that international institutions and other external 
entities do not curtail de jure state sovereignty, it does acknowledge that those political phenomena 
do reconfigure a legal state’s effective autonomy and control (Litfin, 1997, 174).  
As such, a greater role of cooperation and international institutions in global affairs may not 
affect the sovereignty of a state in legal terms, but these processes do imply an erosion of a juridical 
state’s material powers. Likewise, when liberal internationalists contend that interdependence and 
international organisations actually strengthen a legal state’s sovereignty, they are referring to the 
legal privileges and agreements that stem from such processes and manifestations. De jure 
sovereignty might be strengthened or supplemented, but not necessarily de facto sovereignty. In 
other words, liberal internationalism appears to confuse the fact that growing interdependence may 
not drive an erosion of de jure state sovereignty, but does signify a greater competition for who 
possesses its de facto sovereignty. 
Contrary to neorealist beliefs, thus, it seems that liberal internationalist sovereignty can and 
often will be “shared” between juridical states and/or institutions, yet, inconsistently, liberal 
internationalists consider this “divisibility” of sovereignty in de jure terms while missing the fact that 
neorealism’s perceptions of sovereignty as a unitary principle pertain to de facto sovereignty. Liberal 
internationalist views, as such, are again affected by a Westphalian myth that conjoins the legal 
statuses and rights of de jure sovereignty with the manifestations of power and political authority of 
de facto sovereignty. Even if liberal internationalist findings on interdependence ostensibly imply 
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that the Westphalian myth of universal de facto sovereignty over de jure state territory is 
challenged, they paradoxically still abide by that myth as they fail to differentiate between that 
challenged de facto sovereignty and an allegedly reinforced sovereignty of the de jure state. As a 
consequence, the de facto sovereignty of other global actors, such as geopolitical anomalies, 
remains underexposed.  
Both liberal internationalism and neorealism, thus, basically agree upon the idea that in 
international relations no other political bodies except de jure states are de facto sovereign 
(Keohane, 1984, 9-10), and adhere to the Westphalian myth in maintaining a juridical state-centred 
view on sovereignty and international politics. As Agnew (2003) concludes, ‘despite their 
difference... these theorists share the commitment to a [de jure] state-centred world... This is a 
conception inherited from a long line of political thinkers and practitioners. It is a vital ingredient of 
modern geopolitical imagination’ (p. 54). 
 
Constructivism and Critical Theory 
As a response to these two main theories of international politics, two other strands of thought 
about sovereignty have emerged, both of which attempt to criticise the overemphasis and 
essentialisation of the role of de jure state sovereignty in international politics. These are the 
academic factions of constructivism and critical theory, which tend to carry a more ambiguous view 
of sovereignty. Constructivists, as the name would suggest, contend that concepts of statehood and 
sovereignty are socially constructed, meaning that they are ‘defined and redefined by the rules, 
actions and practices of different agents’ (Biersteker, 2002, 157). Critical theorists takes this notion a 
step further by understanding the international political system as ‘a community structured by a 
historically contingent discourse of shared understandings, values, and norms about the principles of 
political authority and economic production’ (Fischer, 1992, 430).  
To begin with the former, in constructivist thought the predominant conceptions of 
sovereignty are perceived as coming about from within the international system, rather than 
externally or prior to it. In a classic constructivist work, for instance, Wendt (1992) argues that 
‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (p. 395). As a result, Wendt conceptualises sovereignty not as a 
preceding condition of the international political structure, but as a multidimensional concept 
emerging out of the process of formal state practice. While (neo)realists may find that sovereignty is 
not grounded in a set of principles but in a legal state’s ability to establish authority over a territory, 
constructivism tries to tell us that the very basis of the international legal state system rests on 
mutual understandings about belonging to a society of de jure states each with exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction.  
The type of jurisdiction that is characteristic of such a society, then, is not a natural but a 
moral, normative, or legal outcome (Barkin & Cronin, 1994, 110). Constructivist sovereignty, thus, is 
a product of interactions by legal states, and therefore neither fixed nor universal. It very much 
embodies ideas about de jure sovereignty existing through mutual recognition and international 
conventions, and constructivism – like neorealism and liberal internationalism – therefore suffers 
from a lot of the same limitations when it comes to thinking about de facto sovereignty. 
First of all, constructivism seems to overlook the fact that sovereignty might be a relational 
and constructed principle in a legal sense, but that such an interpretation does not exclude a 
conception of sovereignty as de facto power. A state’s de jure sovereignty may be a 
multidimensional concept and born out of particular developments, but that does not rule out that 
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its de facto sovereignty is absolute or precedential over those developments. Secondly, while many 
constructivists appear to imply that the de jure sovereignty of states varies through time and space, 
they in fact consider it still as the primary structuring principle of international society. In line with 
the Westphalian myth, they attach de facto sovereignty attributes to de jure sovereignty. They may 
justly demonstrate that meanings of de jure sovereignty have been historically diverse, but 
simultaneously incorrectly assume it, and not de facto sovereignty, as the indispensable condition of 
international relations (Lake, 2003, 308-309). In other words, they do not explore questions of how 
the international political society is constructed, but how sovereignty is constructed within the 
existing international political society.  
Constructivists, thus, still mainly “find” sovereignty through juridical states, leading to 
sovereignty again entering the essential nature of de jure states themselves (Paul, 1999, 227). 
Formal states are again taken as the ‘ontologically primitive units’ of international political theory (p. 
224); they are the units with de facto sovereignty. According to Wendt (1994), for example, ‘[a] 
theory of the states system need no more explain the existence of states than one of society need 
explain that of people’ (p. 385). This one-dimensional focus on systemic interactions between legal 
states has been described by Reus-Smit (1999) as systemic constructivism, which solely takes into 
account how conceptualisations of sovereignty, such as the Westphalian myth, shape and reproduce 
the identity of the actors (the juridical sovereignty of states) in international society, but not how 
those conceptualisations are constructed and transformed (pp. 165-166). 
One of the foremost examples of this somewhat narrower approach to constructivist 
sovereignty can be found in Stephen Krasner’s thesis on sovereignty as “organised hypocrisy” 
(Krasner, 1996; 1999; 2001). According to Krasner, de jure states have time and time again breached 
juridical sovereignty ideals, as the frequent violation of long-standing norms forms an enduring 
attribute of international relations. As a result, Krasner discerns four interrelated conceptions and 
manifestations of sovereignty, some of which official states do not actually possess. Domestic 
sovereignty refers to formal governing authority and effective governing capacity within a de jure 
state, while interdependence sovereignty refers to the control of cross-border issues. International 
legal sovereignty implies de jure state sovereignty as recognised in international law. Westphalian 
sovereignty, finally, should not be automatically conflated with the way that term is used in this 
thesis, as Krasner simply uses this fourth type of sovereignty to denote a de jure state’s right to non-
interference in its internal affairs. 
Yet, in Krasner’s conceptualisation, it is still the behaviour of legally sovereign states that is 
hypocritical. He does not seem to account for geopolitical anomalies that expose the myth of 
Westphalian sovereignty. Krasner goes down a ‘Westphalian blind alley’, essentially concluding that 
the central role of legal (Westphalian) sovereignty as an organising principle remains undiminished 
(Biersteker, 2002, 167). 
Admittedly, Krasner (1999) does argue that ‘the principles associated with…international 
legal sovereignty have always been violated’ (p. 24), and proceeds to try and demonstrate how legal 
states can lose one type of sovereignty but still be sovereign in another sense. However, while 
Krasner aptly exposes the inconsistencies within the constructed international state system, his 
notions of sovereignty again remain essentially de jure state-centered. Krasner stipulates a number 
of deviations from the ideal of legal states possessing full de facto sovereignty over their territories, 
but subsequently does not allow for the idea that such an idealistic, or mythical, view on sovereignty 
is therefore flawed (Lake, 2003, 310); the exceptions still confirm the rule.  
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Because of the limitations of such an approach, an array of critical theorists have attempted 
to find those constitutive dynamics “outside” the realm of international politics, emphasising the 
significance of meta-systemic processes – events, practices, and discourses – contingently 
centralising legal sovereignty within the international political structure and discourse (Biersteker, 
2002, 163; Eudaily & Smith, 2008, 323). Whereas constructivism, thus, would explain sovereignty as 
a principle that is dependent on criteria, practices, and circumstances within the international legal 
state system, critical theorists would argue that the entire international legal state system is 
dependent on social practices and circumstances.  
Returning to Reus-Smit (1999), we find he employs what he calls a holistic constructivist 
viewpoint. This stance aims to demonstrate how cultural norms and ideas define the terms of 
rightful governance in hegemonic states, which subsequently transmit them into the international 
arena as the prevailing standard for formal state conduct and legitimate sovereignty (p. 167). This 
means that those cultural norms and ideas are the processes that define the characteristics of 
international relations (p. 164). Sovereignty, for critical theorists, is not a self-referential principle 
lending its legitimacy from itself (p. 159). De jure states who want to claim their sovereignty ‘must 
reach beyond mere assertions of sovereignty to more primary and substantive values that warrant 
their status as centralised autonomous political organisations’ (Reus-Smit, 1999, 30). 
These latter assertions appear to denote, as such, that critical theorists tend to reject 
notions of de jure sovereignty inherently providing states with rights, privileges, and de facto 
sovereignty, but simultaneously also rejects the idea that those de jure states can simply rely on 
their de facto sovereignty to manifest themselves as international political entities. Instead of both 
de jure and/or de facto sovereignty, then, Reus-Smit comes forth with the idea of the moral purpose 
of the state providing justification and guidance for states’ status and practice in global affairs (Reus-
Smit, 1999, 31). A greater group of critical theorists, furthermore, proposes similar arguments. 
Already in the late 1960s, Walzer (1967) found that ‘the state is invisible’, and that it must be 
‘imagined before it can be conceived’ (p. 194), but particularly in the 1980s critical theory 
established itself in political science as a proponent of discursive views on international relations. 
Cox (1992) writes, ‘the state has no physical existence, like a building or a lamp-post; but it is 
nevertheless a real entity. It is a real entity because everyone acts as though it were’ (p. 133). 
As such, critical theoretical sovereignty is proposed as a discursive and intersubjective 
principle. For critical theorists, the concept of sovereignty is a product of norms and values that 
emerge out of infinitely complicated cultural, linguistic and social processes, and is consequently 
instituted and reinforced into the world of both politics (de facto) and law (de jure) in a very 
subjective and arbitrary manner. Because of this, a set and undeniable collection of characteristics or 
activities that makes a political entity sovereign does not exist. Rather, the circumstances and 
discourses under which an entity can be called sovereign vary from one historical and geographical 
context to another. 
Such an assertion means that sovereignty is historically, politically and culturally contingent. 
Rather than a legal notion of sovereignty being dependent on certain criteria (see Chapter Two), 
sovereignty is the effect of discursive practices – patterned, structured modes of thinking, saying, 
writing, and acting – establishing and reifying sovereignty and its associated images and attributes in 
international relations (Delaney, 2005, 53-55). It is the ultimate aim of critical theorists, then, to 
open up opportunities for other visions and practices of sovereignty, and thereby, global politics. 




To say that sovereignty is contingent is to say that it is not necessary or essential, but that 
its central and ambiguous place in modern political discourse is the outcome of prior 
accidents. To say the sovereignty is neither necessary nor essential is to say that we have 
to account for its place in modern political discourse in order to explain how and why the 
concept took on a necessary and essential character within it (p. 239). 
 
Critical theorists, then, find that the concept of sovereignty can be objectified neither in a 
legal context nor in a de facto manifestation of power. They reject (neo)realism’s ahistorical and 
scientific perception on sovereignty that implies a separation between an objective and knowable 
world, and individuals observing and describing that world (Mearsheimer, 1994, 41). According to 
critical theorists: 
 
[t]here are no constants, no fixed meanings, no secure grounds, no profound secrets, no 
final structures or limits of history... There is only interpretation... History itself is grasped 
as a series of interpretations imposed upon interpretation – none primary, all arbitrary 
(Ashley, 1987, 408-409). 
 
Indeed, critical theorists contend that international juridical and political society is intrinsically 
incapable of detaching itself from its inherent cultural, normative, and discursive dynamics. In other 
words, the actors within international politics cannot be independent or separate from the society 
they are constructing.  As such, critical theorists find that both de facto and de jure sovereignty can 
only be interpreted as intersubjective constructions that are eternally asking for (re)interpretation. 
To come back to Bartelson (1995), he contends that sovereignty cannot have a positive referent, and 
thus cannot be empirically researchable as a unitary concept (p. 52). It cannot easily be disentangled 
and analysed from international political theory, because it has become such a basic and intrinsic 
concept of that theory.  
We may wonder, therefore, what exactly is the “point” of critical theory. If everything about 
sovereignty can be true, and therefore nothing is true, what intellectual insights about sovereignty 
can we gain from a critical theoretical enterprise? Perhaps, however, while a critical theory of 
international relations does not envision or aim for a particular practice, mode, or quality of global 
politics, it derives its purpose from the emancipatory power it inherently carries. As long as there are 
prevalent notions, practices, and myths, in international relations, there will always be a strand of 
thinking (a theory) that critically examines those notions. As such, critical theorists’ contribution can 
be to aid in taking a stand against predominant ways of thinking about statehood and sovereignty 
within the global political arena. As this research aims to conceive of a world in which states and 
sovereignty are no longer visualised as absolutely juridical concepts, a critical theoretical approach 
could become a useful starting point for such research. If we want to change international politics by 
providing new perspectives on international political discourse and the Westphalian myth, critical 
theory becomes a helpful transformational tool. 
The value of critical theory, thus, lies in its observation that sovereignty is not founded on 
some objective legal criteria designed and maintained by the actors of international society. Critical 
theories about sovereignty, indeed, lead to very different conclusions about which entities allegedly 
possess sovereignty and which do not – an interpretation that certainly seems to feed into 
arguments about geopolitical anomalies and de facto sovereignty. However, as critical theorists 
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reject any factual or objective assumptions about any manifestation of sovereignty, I argue these 
rejections also carry certain shortcomings as a viewpoint on de facto sovereignty. A critical theory on 
sovereignty can be helpful as a challenge to conflations of de jure sovereignty with real power, and it 
may thus be helpful in exposing the significance of de facto sovereignty for international politics. As 
will be maintained in this thesis, however, it should be supplemented with a classical realist 
interpretation of sovereignty as supreme and indivisible power in a political entity, in order to 
provide better insights into the nature of geopolitical anomalies.  
The next two chapters will serve to clarify some of these differences between de jure and de 
facto sovereignty on the one hand, and between classical realist understandings of sovereignty and 
critical theoretical conceptions of sovereignty on the other. As I have attempted to demonstrate in 
this chapter, sovereignty has been conceptualised and utilised in countless ways, but that 
abundance has not contributed to more clarity about the concept in international political 
scholarship and discourse. There has been a link between a mythical status of Westphalian 
sovereignty in international relations, and an inconsistency in how we employ the term of 
sovereignty to denote juridical matters and/or effective manifestations of power. In an attempt to 
remedy these inconsistencies, Chapter Three will thoroughly explore the merits of classical realist de 
facto sovereignty compared to the limitations of critical theorists’ explanation of sovereignty as an 
intersubjective or intangible exercise of power.  
In the upcoming chapter, however, I will first investigate the nature of de jure sovereignty 
and identify its position in international law. While geopolitical anomalies seemingly expose a 
necessity for a “reconstructed” conception of sovereignty in international politics, they 
simultaneously contrast the idea that sovereignty can be “created” or “devised” in international 
legal arrangements. In Chapter Two, then, I will firstly elucidate what such legal sovereignty 
constructs look like. Subsequently, I will proceed to find out whether perhaps geopolitical anomalies 
could actually tap into those juridical-territorial frameworks. I will, indeed, explore different 
manners in which geopolitical anomalies may find some kind of “resolution” to their problems 









Sovereignty and International Law: A Route to Resolution? 
 
I believe in political solutions to political problems. But man's primary problems 
aren't political; they're philosophical. Until humans can solve their philosophical 
problems, they're condemned to solve their political problems over and over and 
over again. 
(From Tom Robbins’s Even Cowgirls Get The Blues; 1976, 378) 
 
International law, in this thesis, has hitherto been presented almost as the antagonist of geopolitical 
anomalies.  Apparently, one cannot exist where the other exists, and geopolitical anomalies are 
portrayed somewhat as “victims” of international legal practices and theories. However, is this really 
a correct interpretation of the relationship between geopolitical anomalies and international law? It 
has also already been suggested that international law may actually find its way in geopolitical 
anomalies’ organisational structures and processes, and some geopolitical anomalies may not be 
completely excluded from international legal statuses and agreements. In any case, it seems that, 
regardless of the question whether the two concepts are really mutually exclusive or antagonistic, 
international law and geopolitical anomalies are compelled to deal with one another. 
Indeed, I have repeatedly emphasised that there is a marked difference between de jure and 
de facto sovereignty, which is highlighted by geopolitical anomalies that possess the latter but not 
the former. At the same time, however, I have mostly focused on this difference – a difference 
generally overlooked in international relations thinking – while spending less time explaining what it 
is that these de facto sovereign geopolitical anomalies do not have. As I would argue, we can neither 
counterpose nor compare geopolitical anomalies to international law without any notion what we 
are counterposing or comparing them to. In other words, we cannot call for a more serious 
consideration of geopolitical anomalies in the de jure state system, without any identification of 
what de jure sovereignty and international law might embody. In addition, it has not been my 
intention to completely dismiss de jure sovereignty or international law as irrelevant concepts or 
arrangements for international politics; we cannot simply brush off any influence international law 
may have on global realities. As international law has been allocated a central position in both 
international political discourse and conduct, it has become necessary to analyse that centrality. 
This chapter revolves around these questions about the nature of international law and de 
jure sovereignty, and whether certain international legal principles and considerations might actually 
be useful for geopolitical anomalies to become part of that international legal structure. I will start 
off by discussing certain crucial components of this international legal system, consisting of a 
description and an analysis of the role and character international law itself, followed by an 
explanation of the foundational and originary components of the concept of de jure sovereignty. 
Afterwards, I will consider several potential approaches of the “international community” towards 
geopolitical anomalies by delving into issues of territorial integrity, self-determination, and 
recognition of legitimacy, as well as autonomy and power-sharing arrangements. These legal 
principles not only provide possible strategies on how to deal with issues of geopolitical 
“abnormality” or “exclusion” for both geopolitical anomalies and international law and politics, but 
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more importantly, also illustrate different aspects of geopolitical anomalies’ status and 
manifestations in relation to international law.  
However, as the preceding chapter has hopefully conveyed, the problem of the subordinate 
position and status of geopolitical anomalies may not solely rest with the nature of international law 
itself, but at least as much with the way in which the study and discourse of international politics has 
taken on a far too legalistic perspective on international political developments and manifestations. 
In other words, as we may not be able to discover a magic solution or a silver bullet for geopolitical 
anomalies within international law, perhaps we have to look outside of it instead – in a 
transformation of our discourse, our philosophy, or our conceptualisation of international politics. 
 
Sovereignty and the International Legal System 
At its initiation, the idea of international law emerged from concepts of natural law. Such concepts 
regarded laws as universally applicable across all natural and social life, and across all civilisations 
and cultures. These natural law considerations formed, rather than a formal body of law for states 
specifically, an ethical framework pertaining to all aspects of the lives and relationships of any 
human individual. As time progressed, however, these ideas of natural law transformed, as many of 
its theological foundations were increasingly discarded in favour of more secular views by, for 
instance, Francisco de Vitoria (Vitoria, 1991) and Alberico Gentili (see Van Der Molen, 1968). In the 
writings of Hugo Grotius (1925), furthermore, state practice itself became perceived as a source of 
law rather than merely as an expression of natural legal ideas (Neff, 2010, 8-9). Gradually, a 
distinctive rift began to form between a “traditional” natural (international) law school and a 
“positivist” school of (international) law. While scholars like Samuel Pufendorf (2005) retained a 
conviction that international law could be equated to natural law, others, like Emmerich de Vattell, 
started to assume a more “practical” orientation towards both of these legal convictions (Cohan, 
2006, 924; Shaw, 2008, 25-26). 
The nineteenth century, subsequently, became the era in which positivist international law 
truly found its form. From the 1800s onwards, positivism increasingly turned into something in 
terms of an “objective”, “scientific”, and “empirical” legal doctrine. Positivist thought, as such, 
prescribed that international law should be de-politicised, as it was no longer supposed to concern 
itself with contentious political issues (Neff, 2010, 16). While this way of thinking seems quite 
contradictory to any legal system’s apparent purpose, perhaps positive legal thinkers became 
increasingly reluctant to engage with issues of political controversy because they fully realised that 
ultimately international law could not meaningfully say anything about such controversies; I return 
to this argument later on in this thesis. 
Simultaneously, positive international law was given an instrumentalist outlook, replacing 
the idea of law having an innate universal, divine, or natural purpose. International law no longer 
functioned as a master but as a servant, becoming ‘a tool for practical workmen rather than a 
roadmap to eternal salvation’ (Neff, 2010, 15). Crucially, this positivist approach to international law 
transformed it into an outgrowth of the will of states. Positive legal thought emphasised that 
humans rather than (divine) morals should define the rules under which they live, and on the global 
level this entailed that de jure states specified what international law should look like. International 




As such, states attained legal personalities under international law, and gradually gained the 
status as the central subject of the law with exclusive rights and duties on the global level (Shaw, 
2008, 27-29). It is in this era, thus, that statehood, as a political exercise or phenomenon, became 
infused with legality, whereby one could not exist without the other. International law was designed 
by states for states, and it became impossible to imagine international politics separately from 
international law. 
 
Contemporary International Law 
Present-day international law is of course in many ways quite different from those nineteenth 
century characteristics, as it has evolved in a more substantial, significant, and extensive body of 
law. Two world wars, one of which included genocide of an unprecedented scale and nature, made 
stronger the desire for a set of clearly defined rules concerning global security, and for a 
solidification of certain fundamental rights pertaining universally to all human beings. Increased 
globalising processes, also, have created a stronger global sense that formal laws cannot be solely 
concerned with sub-state or state-level developments, even if many global actors might object to an 
excess of regulation on the global scale.  
These developments have surely furthered the maturation of international law in the 
twentieth century. This section, however, refrains from describing this maturation in detail, as the 
more imminent question seems to be what international law has become. The aim here is not to 
present a comprehensive overview of international law as it technically functions today, but rather 
to provide a tentative interpretation of what international law fundamentally is.  
It is perhaps, firstly, important to note that international law remains to this day very 
dissimilar to domestic law; international law does not consist of a legislature, a judiciary, and an 
executive in same way that national legal systems (might) do (Shaw, 2008, 2-3). It is, thus, a less 
institutionally coherent body of law that less easily lends itself to succinct description. Article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice outlines the (main) sources of international law as: 
 
(a) international conventions... establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting 
states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; (d)... subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law (ICJ, 1945). 
 
Yet, the usage of the term “sources” should be perceived here in a purely legal manner, not referring 
to any materiality or morality (Shaw, 2008, 70). Practitioners and scholars of international law refer 
to these as the sources of international law because international law has recognised them as its 
sources, and from this perspective international law originates from international law. In other 
words, international law is what international law says it is. More helpful than this self-referential 
definition, though, would be to define and explain international law in a broader context, asking the 
more fundamental question as to what the position of international law is within global politics. 
First of all, although the international legal order nowadays nobly intends to form a single 
global community in which (juridical) discrimination against certain (non-European) peoples is 
deemed no longer acceptable, it tries to combine this tolerance with a notion of international law 
representing and promoting civilisation (Keene, 2002, 146-148). The resulting tension between these 
two international legal endeavours is, as has been discussed earlier in this thesis, reflected in 
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tensions surrounding the position of geopolitical anomalies in international law and global politics. 
This international legal discrepancy between, on the one hand, promoting different ways of life 
while, on the other hand, promoting one specific way of life, can also be found in the two general 
purposes of international law. International law is designed to engender the objectives of 
(particular) international actors, but simultaneously as a singular code of conduct to which all 
international actors should abide.  
Indeed, one positivist remnant from the nineteenth century in current international law 
remains its instrumentalist nature. International law has no intrinsic value, but exists to enable us to 
fulfil certain human purposes. The practical foundations or reasons for a certain law, for instance, 
are considered more important than that law purely in and of itself (Koskenniemi, 2011, 251). Many 
international lawyers and judges, therefore, are now expected to assume a sense of “pragmatism”, 
“wisdom”, or “prudence” in interpreting laws, and to manage tensions between these practicalities 
and laws under the rubric of “fairness” (Franck, 1995, 7). International law, thus, does not simply 
entail an application of pre-existing formal rules, and as it is man-made, it thereby specifically cannot 
be “objective” or “scientific”.  
As such, while this pragmatic interpretation of (international) law seems to be very useful 
and logical, it also has its downsides. Many lawyers would accept that international law might be 
designed to be of practical value for humanity, but that that practical value remains mainly 
accessible for the most powerful actors within humanity. Instrumentalism in international law 
‘creates a consistent bias in favour of dominant actors with... sufficient resources to carry out their 
objectives’ (Koskenniemi, 2010, 41), and from this perspective international law functions to 
‘advance the values, interests, and preferences that those in dominant positions seek to realise in 
the world’ (p. 52). 
However, this is not the only characteristic of international law in its present form. 
International law is also instrumental in the sense that ‘it has a general function to fulfil, namely to 
safeguard international peace, security, and justice in relations between states, and human rights as 
well as the rule of law domestically inside states for the benefit of human beings’ (Tomuschat, 1999, 
23). International law also exists to create formal and substantive standards for sustainable 
international political life. Although concepts such as “peace”, “security” and “justice” may be seen 
as somewhat insubstantial, and it might be argued that this function is bound to be rendered void by 
international law’s other more power-sensitive characteristics, this purpose is not politically 
insignificant.  
According to some, for example, it means that international law can be a normative platform 
capable of socialising otherwise egocentric political actors into a more international communitarian 
spirit through ‘compliance strategies’ and ‘various manifestations of disapproval’ (Chayes & Chayes, 
1995, 109-110). The role of international law, then, is to enable both conflict and cooperation at the 
same time, taking the form of a ‘shared surface... of political community among social agents – 
states, other communities, individuals – who disagree about their preferences but do this within a 
structure that invites them to argue in terms of an assumed universality’ (Koskenniemi, 2011, 266). 
More importantly, as international law allegedly forms an ethical framework for 
international relations, it becomes a mechanism for actually critiquing power. Again, while legal 
terminologies of “human rights”, “justice”, or “peace” carry very little directly enforceable meaning, 
these concepts do provide a language for groups struggling against oppression to make claims 
beyond merely their political interests. Such claims can then be considered as universal rights or 
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entitlements, granting upon those groups an identity that they can affirm against the dominant 
elements of international society. International law, as such, makes those groups capable of 
imagining international relations as a set of institutions through which actors can be held 
accountable for their actions in an international community of equality (Knop, 2002, 210; 
Koskenniemi, 2010, 48). International law, as some would argue, has a ‘utopian, aspirational face’ 
(Cotterrell, 1995, 17). It represents a ‘Messianic’ promise of justice that cannot ever be solidified or 
enumerated in any substantive way and remains ‘eternally postponed’, but that nonetheless has 
authority and significance by placing upon international relations a semblance of equality, 
accountability, and community (Koskenniemi, 2011, 267). 
The problem is, however, that such a conceptualisation may present international law as a 
tool for those excluded from powerful positions, but does not account for those that have been 
excluded from international law itself. Geopolitical anomalies may at face value be capable of 
tapping into these legal narratives of legitimacy and global community, but in practice face 
tremendous resistance from the international legal-political framework against their integration 
within these narratives. De jure states, by definition, define their identity through their inclusion in 
international law, but the identity of geopolitical anomalies with de facto sovereignty thereby 
becomes formed as the contra-image of this international legal body. As such, perceptions on the 
role of international law in international politics need, as Koskenniemi (2010) argued, ‘to be rescued 
from the context of legal routines and reinstated in the political arenas where it can be used to 
articulate claims by those who are sidelined from formal diplomacy and informal networks’ (p. 39). 
 
The Nature of De Jure Sovereignty 
A crucial aspect of international law, then, is its inextricable connection to de jure statehood. 
International law exists through the legality of states, and vice versa. This is a rather tautological 
assertion, but it is an indication of how important the principle of de jure sovereignty is within the 
global political and legal framework. Given the argument that international law is designed to 
promote the interests of its constituent parts (states with de jure sovereignty) some even wonder 
whether the principle of legal sovereignty is international law, as in this “ship-of-Theseus” line of 
thinking the nature of international law can be (re)defined only through its de jure sovereign 
components (Suganami, 2007, 518-519).  
One of the most important international legal thinkers of the twentieth century, Hans 
Kelsen, posited this issue as a question of whether de jure states were (legally) sovereign over the 
international legal system, or the other way around, and conceded that this question was in practice 
unanswerable (Kelsen, 1960, 638-640; Kelsen, 1978, 334-335). Kelsen believed that: 
 
sovereignty is not a sensually perceptible or otherwise objectively cognisable quality of a 
real object, but a presupposition. It is the presupposition of a normative order as the 
highest order whose validity is not derivable from any other higher order (Kelsen, 1978, 
334). 
 
Thus, Kelsen’s question had to be framed in terms of formal states or international law being the 
highest normative order – in terms of where to find the locus of the universal grundnorm from 
which all law derives its authority. For Kelsen, a conflict between these normative orders, or a 
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precedence of one over the other, could actually never occur (p. 342), but others found that the 
primacy of international law over de jure states could be logically deduced.  
According to Kunz (1968), for instance, if national legal systems formed the primary 
normative order, international law’s binding nature would not only dissolve after revolutionary 
changes in juridical state constitutions, it would also have to be explained through the idle 
assumption that legal states tacitly consented to its authority (p. 85). Legal state sovereignty did not 
embody the possession of fundamental, intrinsic, or transhistorical rights, as these de jure states had 
to derive their rights from the (international) law (Kelsen, 2007, 248-249). For instance, one of de 
jure sovereignty’s fundamental principles (the equality of de jure sovereign states) ‘is possible only 
under the supposition that international law is supraordinated to the single states’, as ‘all states are 
“equal” because they are all subordinated in the same way to international law’ (Kunz, 1968, 86). 
As such, Kelsen (and Kunz as well) argued that if we view international law as the highest 
normative order, de jure sovereignty means that de jure states are ‘subordinated only to the 
international legal order’ (Kelsen, 1978, 217). Kelsen finds, and I would agree, that de jure 
sovereignty necessarily means legal state sovereignty, since other political organisations, NGOs, or 
polities that reside within the international legal framework are not considered sovereign according 
to the law. Such organisations might in some instances possess a certain juridical status, and 
insurgents might be granted certain rights and duties, but they do not possess a ‘fullness of 
competences’ (Suganami, 2007, 519) like juridical states do; only de jure states have de jure 
sovereignty, whereby no legal state is superior to another (Kelsen, 1960, 637; Malanczuk, 1997, 91-
108).  
Obviously, however, if we would interpret sovereignty in a de facto way, we might come to 
very different conclusions. Not only might we consider the possibility that these other political 
entities, such as geopolitical anomalies, possess de facto sovereignty over the legal state territories 
in which they reside, the perception of international law being sovereign over these formal states 
also becomes problematic. 
 
A Reconceptualisation of De Jure Sovereignty? 
In more recent decades, attempts have been made to combine the privileges and statuses of de jure 
sovereignty with “real” circumstances on the ground, in order to circumvent the question which 
legal/normative order – formal statehood or international law – is supreme over the other. From the 
early 1990s onwards, de jure state sovereignty has become increasingly seen as contingent, meaning 
that ‘in certain key circumstances... [legal] norms of sovereignty do not apply’ (Elden, 2006, 14). 
Robert Jackson (1990), for instance, coined the term “quasi-states” to identify those countries that 
were unable or unwilling to domestically deliver protection of human rights and socio-economic 
goods, yet whose de jure sovereignty, and thus their right to non-intervention, remained legally 
recognised. Michael Reisman (1990) differentiated between “old” international legal sovereignty 
protecting the individual sovereigns of de jure states, and “new” international legal sovereignty 
construed to protect “the people”. Such ideas have fed into a discourse on “state failure” 
(Fukuyama, 2004; Herbst, 1999; Kaplan, 1994; Milliken, 2003; Rotberg, 2003a; Rotberg, 2004; 
Zartman, 1995a), propagating a persistent conviction that there was not only a moral (global) 
obligation to protect the civilian populations of these countries, but also that, especially after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, these “failed states” formed “breeding grounds” for 
international terrorism, illegal arms trafficking, drug cartels, and many other problems.  
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More recently, this new view on de jure state sovereignty has become more and more 
thought of in terms of “responsibility”. Formal states are urged and envisioned to be “responsible” 
both internally and externally. A de jure state should promote the welfare and individual rights of 
citizens domestically and internationally, and is thus accountable to the global community. This idea 
of “sovereignty as responsibility” was introduced in this way by Francis Deng and others in the mid-
1990s (Deng, Kimaro, Lyons, Rothchild & Zartman, 1996), and developed further by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001. This commission emphasised how 
state sovereignty implies a “responsibility to protect” (RtoP), and more significantly perhaps, how 
‘the [de jure sovereign] principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to 
protect’ (ICISS, 2001, xi). This legalistic and normative interpretation of sovereignty, enthusiastically 
accepted at the 2005 UN World Summit (UNGA, 2005), has since been heralded as the most likely 
successful global effort to end mass atrocities once and for all (Bellamy, 2009; Evans, 2008a; Evans, 
2008b), in spite of continued criticism (Moses, 2014; Orford, 2011) and repeated inconsistencies in 
terms of its implementation (Badescu & Weiss, 2010). 
However, these reconceptualisations of de jure sovereignty evoke questions about on what 
authority (read: on whose authority) they (could) take place. Writers on contingent sovereignty and 
RtoP have openly advocated for a “supra-sovereign” authority; Deng himself discerns that ‘[l]iving up 
to the responsibilities of sovereignty implies the existence of a higher authority capable of holding 
the supposed sovereign accountable’ (Deng et al., 1996, 33). As such, proponents of contingent 
sovereignty move away from a notion of international politics in which de jure states form the 
highest international political order, shifting instead towards a global society governed by a 
legal/political body, institution, or set of values that prescribes and directs formal state behaviour.  
Anne Orford (2011) even invokes classical realist understandings of the relationship between 
sovereignty and responsibility, arguing that more and more the United Nations Secretariat has taken 
upon itself the executive authority to resolve crises on the international level (pp. 109-138). Herein, 
thus, international law would appear, in a Kelsenian manner, to be situated above de facto 
sovereignty, rather than as an expression of it. Anne-Marie Slaughter (1998), indeed, argues that 
‘states traditionally were... organised in any fashion their rulers wished’, but that the development 
of international law has brought us closer towards ‘the imposition of formal requirements 
concerning the way in which states are themselves constituted’ (p.144). 
This interpretation of state sovereignty as “limited limitlessness” – as sovereignty 
constrained by another sovereign authority – might be imaginable from a purely juridical 
perspective, but with regard to de facto sovereignty such an interpretation makes very little sense 
(Moses, 2013, 119). Chapter Three of this thesis provides a more expansive explanation of this 
aspect of de facto sovereignty, but certain practices in international politics already allude to this 
problem. Orford criticises the dearth of consideration, among R2P proponents, for the legal limits to 
the actions the international community may take in the name of its supposed responsibility to 
protect (Orford, 2009, 1013-1014; Orford, 2011, 137), showing concern for the potential for 
“authoritarian tendencies” espoused ‘by those who assume the mantle of protectors on behalf of 
the international community’ (Moses, 2014, 62).  
However, as is demonstrated in this thesis, this potential for “irresponsible action” is 
precisely illimitable through (international) legal arrangements. Orford (2011), therefore, rightfully 
contends that ‘the significance of the responsibility to protect concept lies... in its capacity to 
transform practice into promise, or deeds into words’ (p. 2), observing its functioning to rationalise 
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and render “responsible” the exercise of overwhelming force by internationally powerful actors 
(Moses, 2014, 71). Humanitarian interventions, for example, may have been employed behind a 
façade of ‘fundamental values of human dignity’ (Deng et al., 1996, 4), but actually appear to have 
more to do with ‘dashed expectations’ from the most powerful international actors ‘about... the 
functions that modern states should fulfil’ (Milliken & Krause, 2002, 753-754). The question, thus, is 
not whether legal sovereignty is contingent, but whose sovereignty is contingent on whose terms 
(Acharya, 2007, 276). 
Fundamentally, the notion of contingent sovereignty again exposes a pervasive confusion 
around the differences between de facto and de jure sovereignty in international politics, as at its 
very essence it carries a rather overt contradiction. De facto sovereignty has now seemingly become 
regarded as the guiding principle of international politics, as legal states can supposedly “lose” their 
de jure sovereignty if they do not have de facto sovereignty, yet de jure sovereignty remains the 
guiding principle of international politics because only that kind of sovereignty makes a political 
entity a full member of international society. Legal sovereignty becomes dependent on de facto 
manifestations, but de facto manifestations do not automatically lead to legal sovereignty. It appears 
that certain legal states may be condemned because they are unable to uphold certain standards of 
“responsibility”, but geopolitical anomalies who do uphold these standards successfully may still not 
gain legal recognition as de jure sovereign states. Certain criteria are used to judge de jure states, but 
these criteria are disregarded when geopolitical anomalies are judged. 
As such, this new conceptualisation of sovereignty actually rebukes its own principles: it 
concedes that “some de jure states are, de facto, not states”, yet remains unwilling or unable to 
discard the legal sovereignty “ideal” and look for alternative solutions beyond the Westphalian de 
jure state. For instance, the fact that a “failed” state loses control over its territory also means that in 
these “ungoverned” areas alternative forms of power and authority may evolve that are not de jure 
state-based. As Hameiri (2007) argues: 
 
[t]he label “failed state” is itself problematic because of its propensity to stifle efforts to 
contextualise and better understand what are in essence very complex social phenomena 
– some of which are rooted in global or regional, rather than in state-based processes of 
collapse (p. 123). 
 
It seems, as such, that the concept of failed states is actually an unviable empirical category of 
statehood (Newman, 2009, 437). Entire states do not fail, as even in those states there are ‘green 
zones’ (Foreign Policy Magazine, 2009) wherein local elites may possess some form of (informally) 
legitimised authority, political power, or even de facto sovereignty. Herbst (2004), therefore, even 
proposes to ‘let them fail’ (p. 302), suggesting that ‘a less dogmatic approach to sovereignty would 
allow the international community to adjust to reality and to begin helping substantial numbers of 
people’ (p. 316). 
 
The Origins of De Jure Sovereignty 
The main problem of contingent de jure sovereignty, then, is that it deals purely with the question of 
how formal states might “lose” their de jure sovereignty, not how geopolitical anomalies could 
“earn” it (Elden, 2006, 18; see Hooper & Williams, 2003; Scharf, 2003; Williams & Pecci, 2004; 
Williams, Scharf & Hooper, 2003). It therefore does not actually address the question where de jure 
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sovereignty is derived from. As such, Kelsen’s question about which normative order is sovereign, 
international law or the de jure state, should perhaps be put in a different way. Sovereignty in 
international law is either created solely through its connection to that international legal 
framework, or it emerges independently from it. In other words, de jure states are either established 
as members of the international (legal) community ‘by virtue of the will and consent of already 
existing states’, or they become de jure states ‘by virtue of [their] own efforts and circumstances’ 
(Shaw, 2008, 446).  
This dichotomy is generally framed in terms of constitutive or declaratory theories of 
recognition in international law, the former asserting that states have no standing in the absence of 
legal recognition, and the latter asserting that states exist independently from legal recognition. 
However, in the same way that Kelsen has contended that it is impossible to objectively determine 
whether either international law or de jure statehood comes “prior” to the other, neither of these 
theories can be considered as the more valid one. 
In fact, both theories of recognition leave room for a lot of confusion. It is, to begin, quite 
unclear what in this regard is meant by the term “theories”. Do they denote descriptions of how 
recognition can be either constitutive or, in another instance, declaratory? Or do they reflect 
divergent assumptions about the general nature of recognition? Moreover, the constitutive theory 
of recognition seems particularly counter-intuitive. Can a state ever be truly “created out of 
nothingness” by international law, without the consideration of any circumstantial factors? Even in 
the era of decolonisation, in which a large number of new de jure states were created, those 
creations were founded on some circumstances “on the ground”. Admittedly, de jure recognition 
provides a legal clarification in cases where the status of a new state is ambiguous or unstable, and 
an unrecognised entity cannot claim the international legal rights that are available to de jure states, 
but that does not mean that before juridical recognition that entity was a blank space. In James 
Crawford’s (2006) words, ‘where a state does not exist, rules treating it as existing are pointless, a 
denial of reality’ (p. 4). 
As such, most international legal thinkers now adhere to a declaratory theory of recognition, 
arguing that ‘a state exists as a subject of international law – i.e. as a subject of international rights 
and duties – as soon as it... fulfils the conditions of statehood’ (Lauterpacht, 1947, 41). Others have 
summarised this by arguing that ‘a state, if it exists in fact, must exist in law’ (Chen, 1951, 38). Such 
assumptions have been reflected in many examples of legal documentation and practice. The 
Montevideo Convention, for instance, outlines the conditions for de jure statehood, and maintains 
that in principle a political entity does not require legal recognition from other states in order to 
possess full legal state sovereignty in international law. Article 1 articulates that in order for an 
entity to be a state, or ‘a person in international law’, it should (among others) possess the ‘capacity 
to enter into relations with the other states’, but according to the convention this does not equate 
to recognition of de jure sovereignty: ‘The political existence of the state is independent of 
recognition by the other states... The exercise of [state] rights has no other limitation than the 
exercise of the rights of other states according to international law’ (SICAS, 1933). 
Yet, in this juridical statement a few issues immediately come to the fore. For one, an entity 
seeking a juridical recognition of statehood almost inherently does impede the rights of an already 
established de jure state, and (in theory at least) international law strongly abides by the idea that 
juridical rights cannot be derived from illegal actions or circumstances. In addition, the convention 
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speaks of a “political existence”, and in this way it actually exposes the main problem of a 
declaratory perspective of recognition.  
The declaratory theory implies that a polity has to “declare” itself as a state in order to be a 
de jure state, but often geopolitical anomalies behave like legal states regardless of whether they 
have declared themselves as such. Crawford (2006) contends that law and political fact should not 
be confused, critiquing the tautological nature of the declaratory view that implies that factual 
(political) existence and legal existence mean the same thing (p. 5). Shaw (2008) assures us that an 
entity that exists without de jure recognition is rarely ‘devoid of powers and obligations before 
international law [or] exists in a legal vacuum’ (p. 447), but in practice this is exactly the situation for 
those entities.  For Shaw, geopolitical anomalies are undoubtedly hampered in exercising their rights 
under international law, but that does not hamper the existence of such rights (p. 448); a seriously 
contestable argument, which maintains that a right can truly factually exist even before it is 
asserted. 
Again, thus, both declaratory and constitutive theories of legal state recognition each offer 
an incomplete picture. On the one hand, Lauterpacht (1947) discerns that ‘the full international 
personality of rising communities... cannot be automatic’ (p. 55), and that ‘it seems unhelpful... to 
say that recognition is purely... declaratory... or that a state comes into being as soon as there exist 
the requirements of statehood’ (p. 45). On the other hand, constitutive theories of recognition do 
not really account for the fact that recognition does not necessarily take a juridical form. Instances of 
de facto and implied recognition, such as maintaining mutual informal and unofficial diplomatic 
relations or signing multilateral treaties with unrecognised entities, are commonplace in 
international law and politics. Such practices do imply that an entity has a political existence without 
any full legal recognition. 
It would be more helpful, then, to not view these two theories as mutually exclusive. As Hall 
(1979) puts it, ‘although the right to be treated as a state is independent of recognition, recognition 
is the necessary evidence that the right has been acquired’ (p. 103). Lauterpacht (1947) has also 
attempted to reconcile constitutive and declarative conceptualisations of recognition by arguing that 
‘whenever the necessary factual requirements exist, the granting of recognition is a matter of legal 
duty’ (p. 24). In other words, when de jure sovereignty can “declaratorily” be recognised, it should 
be recognised “constitutively”. Whether such factual requirements can objectively be devised in 
international law (see Crawford, 2006, 37-95), whether recognition is a duty of individual de jure 
states or the international legal community as a whole (see Chen, 1951, 221-223; Ker-Lindsay, 2012, 
130-157; Shaw, 2008, 465-466), and whether such a duty could truly be called upon in the absence 
of a central international legal authority, are issues that I will not delve into thoroughly here. 
Nonetheless, Lauterpacht’s contentions do invoke the question as to why there are two theories of 
recognition in the first place. 
As constitutive theories expose the fact that sovereignty does not exist for international law 
without the possession of the rights and obligations that constitute this global juridical framework, 
declaratory theories expose the fact that such a possession of international legal rights and 
obligations must be based on certain material manifestations of sovereignty. Recognition, then, is 
actually both an acceptance and cognition of “state qualities” in a certain entity, and a consequent 
conferring of international law’s rights and duties upon that entity. If either of these components is 
missing, it is not recognition. This conclusion can also be reversed: the constitutive theory is just in 
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assuming that polities have no legal standing in the absence of legal recognition, but the declaratory 
theory is equally just in assuming that these polities do exist regardless of that recognition.  
As such, I would argue that this discussion about the nature of recognition is essentially a 
non-debate that is harmful for international political conduct and scholarship. Brownlie (1983) 
correctly asserts that ‘[i]n the case of “recognition”, theory has not only failed to enhance the 
subject but has created a tertium quid which stands, like a bank of fog on a still day, between the 
observer and the contours of the ground which calls for investigation’ (p. 197). Ker-Lindsay (2012) in 
fact asserts that ‘even within legal circles the [constitutive/declaratory] debate has come to be seen 
as rather sterile, if not harmful, inasmuch as it has detracted attention from the practical aspects of 
recognition’ (p. 16).  
Both theories, thus, obscure these “grounded contours” or “practical aspects”, one by 
assuming that a state can exist without any factual circumstances, the other by assuming that 
recognition can happen in isolation of international political considerations. On the contrary, while in 
these discussions recognition either means that states only exist as legal entities or that states legally 
exist independently from juridical recognition, such a consideration is valid only in a purely legal 
context wherein the concepts of statehood and sovereignty can only be defined in reference to 
international law.  
These discussions are reflective of the central position of legality in international politics. 
Shaw (2008) tellingly concludes that ‘[i]n general, the political existence of a state is independent of 
recognition by other states, and thus an unrecognised state must be deemed subject to the rules of 
international law’ (p. 471; my emphasis). This non-sequitur elucidates candidly the problems that 
geopolitical anomalies face. International law and international politics are not the same thing, and 
to think of international politics solely in legal state terms leaves many geopolitical anomalies “stuck 
in limbo”. They are neither lawless nor explicitly illegal, but nonetheless lack any substantial standing 
in international law. Therefore, I now turn this chapter’s focus onto the directions that geopolitical 
anomalies might take in order to integrate their existence with international law, and explore how a 
less strictly juridical perspective of international relations can shed new light on those directions. 
 
Territory, Law, and Discourse: Routes to Resolution? 
Importantly, the existence and practice of geopolitical anomalies is massively influenced by the 
centrality of legal statehood in international political discourse and conduct. Geopolitical anomalies 
are all incomplete or alternative versions of what otherwise are juridical state-proliferating 
processes. Geopolitical anomalies are the ad hoc products of failures or incompletions of geopolitical 
developments like secession and decolonisation, or of tensions between international legal norms 
such as self-determination and territorial integrity (McConnell, 2009a, 1904). Principles and 
developments such as these shape what geopolitical anomalies “look like” and how they are handled 
in international relations, and form the framework in which these polities try and find possible “ways 
out” of their geopolitical abnormality.  
To be sure, this thesis has already outlined how geopolitical anomalies lead an inferior life 
within the current international society. In Bartmann’s (2004) lyrical words, they live in a ‘legal fog’, 
they are ‘quarantined as pariahs’, they have been ‘sent to Coventry’ (p. 12). That being said, the 
question arises whether there is an escape for geopolitical anomalies from their predicament, and if 
so, in what directions can they find such an elusion? Kolstø (2006), for instance, outlines four 
particular ‘ends’ for de facto states: they may achieve international recognition as an independent 
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state, integrate into another state, come to a federal arrangement with their metropolitan state, or 
end up reabsorbed into that state without any form of accommodation for its claims to political 
autonomy (pp. 734-738). Alternatively, McConnell (2009a) categorises three potential ‘routes to 
resolution’ that may lift these entities out of their subordinate status in international relations (p. 
1905). In the remainder of this chapter, each of these routes will be discussed individually. 
 
A Territorial Approach? 
First of all, the seemingly most straightforward route would entail, – as McConnell (2009a) calls it – 
‘a territorial approach granting independent statehood’ (p. 1905). Yet, while such an approach might 
be the one that first comes to mind, it is accompanied by quite a few complexities. One of its most 
immediate complications, and one that has been studied extensively by legal and political thinkers, is 
the discrepancy between the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity. The notion of 
territoriality has already been discussed as the ‘spatial expression of power’ (Storey, 2001, 14), yet, 
at the same time, territoriality in itself is an insufficient condition for recognition of de jure 
sovereignty, as many geopolitical anomalies claiming self-determination have found (Berg, 2009, 
224). Rather, territoriality is entrenched into international law through the principle of territorial 
integrity, which is the ‘elaborated and sophisticated legal expression of territoriality’ (El Ouali, 2006, 
630), or ‘the end result of the institutionalisation or legalisation of territoriality’ (p. 631).  
Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, embodying a first attempt to establish a 
comprehensive legal institution preventing and moderating future interstate conflict (Shaw, 2008, 
1284), stated that ‘[t]he Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve…the territorial 
integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League’ (The High Contracting 
Parties, 1919). In 1933, the aforementioned Montevideo Convention (Article 1) solidified the state in 
international law as follows: ‘The state as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity 
to enter into relations with other states’ (SICAS, 1933). 
Legal statements such as these are just some initial examples of the numerous treaty articles, 
international agreements, and UN resolutions that have consolidated the ideal of legal sovereign 
territorial statehood in the twentieth century – not just for individual states, but particularly 
systemically through the principle of territorial integrity (Elden, 2005b, 2086-2087; Elden, 2006, 11-
12; Elden, 2009, 139-142). That term, however, has been food for general confusion. Article 2(4) of 
the United Nations Charter asserts that ‘[a]ll Members shall refrain... from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’ (United Nations, 1945). 
Here, thus, territorial integrity is taken to be one of two inviolable attributes of a state. Elden 
(2006), however, aptly comments that territorial integrity and political independence as presented 
in the UN Charter and interpreted in international law are actually interrelated, because ‘the notion 
of territorial integrity means both territorial preservation and territorial sovereignty, and political 
independence requires both exclusive internal and equal external sovereignty’ (p. 11). 
As Akweenda (1997) finds that there is ‘no general and exact definition’ of territorial 
integrity, he instead assumes it to mean a triad of ‘non-annexation, inviolability of boundaries, and 
respect for sovereignty’ (p. 6). Territorial integrity is not merely a principle protecting the 
“wholeness/unity” of a state’s territory, or the external aspect of a state, it also reflects the de jure 
sovereign territorial right of the state (El Ouali, 2006, 631).  
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The international legal term of territorial integrity, thus, entails both territorial inviolability 
and territorial de jure sovereignty (Elden, 2009, 66). This ‘norm of sovereignty-as-territorial-integrity’ 
(Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, 713) conversely means that ‘the power of a sovereign state is more 
than the authority of bureaucratic administration; it hinges on territorial integrity’ (Li, 2002, 141). 
Legally sovereign states are not only protected against external violations of their territory (Zacher, 
2001, 223-234), but also from internal challenges to their territorial sovereignty. The principle of 
territorial integrity not only protects states from external interference in their domestic affairs, 
implying territorial inviolability, it moreover discourages claims to self-determination by groups 
within the state – it promotes legal state sovereignty (Elden, 2009, 142). 
In this sense, it would therefore seem to be clear that territorial integrity stands in contrast 
to a concept such as self-determination, and some may conversely view self-determination as 
incompatible with territorial integrity. The concept of self-determination found its origins, in a 
normative sense, in the French and American revolutions of the 18th century, and in Locke’s and 
Rousseau’s writings about popular sovereignty, but it was over a century later that it emerged as a 
legal principle. United States President Woodrow Wilson introduced self-determination as an 
explicitly legal right after the First World War, and it was further developed and juridically 
entrenched in the United Nations charter (1945), the UN General Assembly Resolution on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples (1960), and other subsequent 
covenants and treaties.  
Importantly, the principle of self-determination can be interpreted in two ways. On the one 
hand, it can refer to an “internal” element related to popular sovereignty and the obligation of a 
state to allow its people to freely choose how they are governed. It entails the right of people to be 
free from authoritarian oppression (Cassese, 1995, 101), which is currently translated by some 
international lawyers as the right to live in a formally democratic state (Franck, 1992; Marks, 2011).  
Notably, this understanding of self-determination is not absolutely opposed to a concept of 
territorial integrity. Self-determination in this sense combines the people and the state into a single 
phenomenon: the nation-state. In this line of thinking, the nation becomes the sovereign, and the 
state becomes the ‘apparatus’ that enables the people to determine their status and identity (Roth, 
1999, 2). According to El Ouali (2006), therefore, the people are the real holder of sovereignty over 
territory, and a concept of territorial integrity is necessarily forced to incorporate the idea that its 
fundamental purpose is to protect the existence of the people – it has to incorporate a right to self-
determination (p. 645). In his words, ‘[t]he principle of territorial integrity is the principle that 
recognises the sovereign existence of peoples, represented by their own states, within territories the 
legal basis and the limits of which have been established in accordance to international law’ (p. 646). 
As such, self-determination is in fact one of the most important justifications for dividing 
nations/peoples into territorial states. However, while from this perspective self-determination 
provides a “solution” and amelioration to international territorial conflict, it is simultaneously a 
potential source of challenges to this territorial stability as it increases competition for sovereignty 
over territory within the state (Griffiths, 2003, 34-35). 
On the other hand, then, self-determination has an “external” component which can be 
conceived as the right of people to be independent or to choose ‘with whom they wish to associate 
politically’ (Cassese, 1995, 71; Horowitz, 2003, 7). Notably, although the two explanations of self-
determination are not immediately mutually exclusive, this latter one can be utilised as a challenge 
to formal state territory while the former is assumed to be protecting it. As Griffiths (2003) has 
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observed, ‘self-determination struggles have appealed to opposing values of community and 
individuality that coexist uneasily’ (p. 46). The principle of self-determination generally ‘has been 
held to constitute an example of jus cogens’ (Espiell, 1979, 167) – a peremptory norm in 
international law – yet “external” self-determination might actually represent particularity instead of 
universality.  While it may be appealing to proclaim the principle of self-determination as a universal 
right erga omnes (ICJ, 1995, 78), such proclamations have not managed to escape the fact that 
legitimisation of such a right for one group has implications for other groups. As such, the category 
of rightholders has to be limited, either through a principle such as territorial integrity or through a 
consensus on who the “self” is (Kingsbury, 1992, 498). 
Yet, problematically, there are no set international legal processes through which it can be 
decided which groups of people are eligible for self-determination, and on what bases it is legitimate 
to breach the territorial integrity of a state (Berg, 2007, 206; Griffiths, 2003, 30). Groups seeking 
“external” self-determination (mostly in the form of independent legal statehood) try to construct 
legitimacy – a recognised right to rule – first of all internally, as they try and justify their governing 
authority towards their populations that often live in dire circumstances. More importantly, 
however, this internal legitimacy forms a component of its external counterpart.  
Internationally, the credentials of a political entity are based on an assessment of its 
practical capabilities and the extent to which these are supported by ‘primary community loyalties’ – 
in sum, its sustainability and viability are assessed. Such an assessment of legitimacy, however, is not 
only a practical deliberation, but also a consideration of a people’s moral right to self-determination 
and to what degree this right can be accommodated within the framework of other (people’s) rights. 
External legitimacy, then, refers to the extent to which there is confidence in an entity’s ability to 
survive, and to ‘the extent to which there is positive commitment to [its] right to exist’ (Bartmann, 
2004, 15). Buchanan (2004) refers to this external legitimacy as ‘recognitional legitimacy’ (p. 261). 
The United Nations itself provides some clarity on the formal process through which a 
political community can become officially considered legally recognised. While de jure state 
recognition remains ‘an act that only other [de jure] states and governments may grant or withhold’, 
United Nations Membership constitutes the most eminent expression of recognitional legitimacy. A 
geopolitical anomaly may submit an application to the UN Secretary-General, which is subsequently 
considered by the UN Security Council (UNSC). If the UNSC’s five permanent members, along with 
four non-permanent members, accept the application, it recommends it to the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) for consideration. Once, then, two-thirds of the UNGA has voted in favour of admission, the 
geopolitical anomaly becomes a new UN Member and may be considered fully legally recognised as 
a legitimate de jure state (United Nations, 2015; see also UN Charter Article 4(2), United Nations, 
1945). 
Effectively, however, the relationship between international legitimacy and recognition is far 
from straightforward (e.g. see Berg, 2012). While, as mentioned earlier, a polity seeking self-
determination (or independent statehood) may practically fulfil all of the criteria attributed to such a 
claim, that in itself does not constitute sufficient legitimacy in order to achieve recognition of that 
right. As has been argued earlier in this chapter, in practice, a political entity or self-determination 
movement becomes a legitimate state if, and only if, it is legally recognised as such. The decision to 
recognise or not, thus, is more of a political rather than a legal matter, because ‘international law 
does not have a logically consistent legal doctrine that would treat sovereignty claims in a universal 
manner’ (Berg, 2007, 203). 
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The politics of recognition, signifying the strategic considerations of de jure states in their 
decisions to juridically recognise a new state, constitute a fairly perceptible component of 
international affairs. Jonathan Paquin (2010) has observed that while, for instance, the United States 
actually appears to be less and less reluctant to recognise break-away polities, that enhanced 
willingness for recognition stems from perceived political interests more than from a real concern 
with universal ideals of self-determination. More generally, ‘[t]he international states system is... 
characterized as an international community wherein influential members determine which aspiring 
states will succeed and which will be left outside to flounder’ (Coggins, 2016, 8). The international 
legal recognition of states ‘has been a practice led and shaped by major powers, especially the great 
powers’, as they have the ‘special preserve’ on questions of international order that arise in claims 
and struggles for de jure statehood (Fabry, 2010, 8). The ‘political jockeying’ of the “Great Powers” 
decides the fate of geopolitical anomalies (Coggins, 2011, 463). 
For less powerful de jure states faced with a separatist movement, parochial considerations 
of national interest similarly nearly always seem to prevail over beliefs about self-determination. 
While since 1945 norms and claims of self-determination have more frequently prevailed over those 
of territorial integrity, Griffiths (2014) argues that the proliferation of de jure states after World War 
II was particularly driven by the diminishing importance of the strategic possession of territory in the 
international system. As he puts it, ‘a combination of security, ideological, and economic factors 
began to change the milieu in which [formal] states evaluate the costs and benefits of holding 
territory’ (p. 560). 
While, thus, there may be normative reasons for recognition and non-recognition, grounded 
in certain ideals of statehood and in assumptions about the desirable outlook of international 
politics, more important are the very real political deliberations of particularly powerful states on 
the pros and cons of recognising a certain geopolitical anomaly striving towards international legal 
recognition. As a consequence, when geopolitical anomalies ask what they have to do in order to be 
granted de jure state sovereignty, ‘the lawyers and scholars have nothing to say but to refer them to 
the brutal contingencies of international relations or the unpredictable caprices of great power 
politics’ (Kurtulus, 2005, 190). In an international political environment that already views the de jure 
state as the pinnacle of social organisation, this is bad news for geopolitical anomalies seeking self-
determination at the cost of the territorial integrity of an already existing and recognised state. Their 
problem is not that territorial integrity and self-determination are inherently incompatible, but that 
both principles have been given an intrinsic de jure state-centred bias.  
Self-determination is only seen as legitimate when it is expressed within the confines of a 
legal state’s territory. The liberal values of inclusiveness and universality, that seem to be so alluring 
within the principle of self-determination, are in fact at odds with a principle such as de jure 
recognition that keeps certain groups ‘beyond the gate’ and transforms them into ‘international 
lepers in a world of lawful states’ (Bartmann, 2004, 14). By definition, legal statehood recognition 
does not universally attribute all peoples the right to self-determination impartially and equally 
(Berg, 2009, 221), as ‘the international community defends today the rights of established states 
against the nationalist claims of domestic ethnic groups’ (Pegg, 1998a, 125).  
The territorial integrity of formal states, furthermore, has been assumed in international law 
as the sacred factor assuring stability and order. International law largely attempts to protect 
existing state boundaries instead of acknowledging their artificial nature in many places. For Griffiths 
(2014), remarkably, this sanctification of territorial integrity actually formed a factor in the 
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proliferation of legal state recognition after 1945, as de jure states were thereby better protected 
against foreign incursions into their land, and thus somehow more inclined to relinquish part of their 
territory (pp. 566-567). This argument, however, seems to rather contradictorily suggest that 
solidifying the connection between territorial integrity and legal statehood simultaneously dissolved 
it. 
Boaz Atzili (2012), here, mentions the concept of ‘border fixity’ (the moral prohibition of 
breaching a de jure state’s territorial integrity), which, according to him, forms a powerful norm in 
international law and politics. However, he adds, while this norm was intended and remains 
presented as a safeguard ensuring international peace and stability, it may very well have the 
opposite effect. With the “fixity” of borders, weak de jure states survive even if they are stricken 
with, or on the verge of, internal warfare, while border fixity also precludes the potential for 
domestic conflict resolution through more fluid or overlapping juridical-territorial arrangements (p. 
1). In fact, Atzili contends, the historical absence of border fixity precisely fed into the development 
of stronger states, who were forced to protect themselves against external territorial pressures (p. 
2).  
In this way, thus, Atzili actually criticises rigid views and approaches towards both the 
territorial integrity of de jure states and the self-determination of peoples. Although the concepts of 
self-determination and territorial integrity in principle carry an equal standing in international law 
(Kaikobad, 1996, 48), in cases where they are pitted against each other it is almost exclusively the 
latter that prevails, as ‘territorial integrity is continually winning out in struggles with other principles 
of international law’ (Elden, 2005b, 2089).  In a world where the legal-territorial-state ideal has been 
made sacrosanct, any individual attempt at self-determination becomes a ‘threat [not only] to a 
country’s own borders, but to borders more generally’ (Elden, 2009, 149-150).  
Admittedly, in the second half of the 20th century the process of decolonisation and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union allowed for many self-determination movements to be awarded de jure 
state sovereignty (Bartmann, 2004, 12-13). However, these processes were guided through the 
principle of uti possidetis juris, ‘the effect of which has been to ensure that self-determination takes 
place within the boundaries determined by the colonial powers, or within pre-existing boundaries of 
federal systems’ (Brown, 2002, 78). As Zacher (2001) puts it, ‘states... do not like secessions, but if 
they are going to occur, they do not want the successor states fighting over what their boundaries 
should be’ (p. 235).  
While the norm of uti possidetis was first invoked during the decolonisation of Latin America 
in the early-1800s, it has now been adopted by many international organisations and institutions: 
 
The borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible 
reality (Organisation of African Unity, 1964). 
 
The principle of uti possidetis juris... is not a rule pertaining solely to one specific system of 
international law. It is a principle of general scope, logically connected with the 
phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs (ICJ, 1986, 172). 
 
Newly independent states, thus, are programmed to adopt the boundaries of the contemporary 
colonial divisions, and any later attempt for self-determination is overridden by the territorial 
integrity of the decolonised independent state (Elden, 2006, 12). Indeed, uti possidetis can be 
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critiqued for becoming somewhat of a ‘straitjacket’ (Owen, 1995, 33), ‘a permanent solution by 
default’ (Ratner, 1996, 614) in which a new de jure state’s territory is ‘irretrievably predetermined’ 
(p. 612).  
Although, according to Freeman (1999), ‘the UN... sought to reconcile the principle of 
territorial integrity of states with that of the self-determination of peoples’ (p. 358), in practice the 
latter has come to apply to “territories” instead of to “peoples” (Fitzgerald, Stewart & Venugopal, 
2006, 5). As such, recognition of claims to self-determination remains to this day an inherently 
territorial issue (Berg, 2009, 219), as the sanctity of state boundaries is continuously reinforced 
(Elden, 2009, 143-144). Graham (2000) notes that finding compromises between this sanctity of 
borders and self-determination will be the defining international legal issue of the 21st century (p. 
465). While some contend that the ‘territorial aspect of self-determination has effectively been 
exhausted’ (Fitzgerald et al., 2006, 5) and that the concept has transformed from carrying colonial 
and territorial meanings to more human rights-based considerations (p. 2), self-determination has 
simultaneously ‘descended from its status as an exercisable right to a mere privilege’ for certain 
groups (Simpson, 1996, 264). Whereas most geopolitical anomalies’ claims to self-determination 
thus are no longer coined in terms of decolonisation, they are now instead framed as “anti-state” 
instances of separatism and secession (Bartmann, 2004, 17). They are considered to reside outside 
of the legitimate (territorial state-centred) international political realm, and often represented as 
dangers to local and regional security.  
To be sure, whilst a self-determination claim does not in itself imply a claim to independent 
legal statehood and is therefore not necessarily disruptive to the territorial integrity of the affected 
state (I return to this issue later on), a secessionist movement in fact does attempt to deny de jure 
state authority over a certain group or territory, not by demanding more autonomy and 
independence within that state or by overthrowing its government altogether, but by redrawing 
state boundaries to create a new juridical state (Buchanan, 1991, 10-11). As Brilmayer (1991) has 
found, ‘without a normatively sound claim to territory self-determination arguments do not form a 
plausible basis for secession’ (p. 192). When we speak, therefore, of territorial approaches creating 
independent de jure states as a route to resolution for geopolitical anomalies, we are speaking of 
secessions.  
Buchanan (1991) has argued that ‘there are sound moral reasons, and reasons enough, for 
[allowing] secession’ (p. 151), and later extended this argument into a ‘remedial right’ of secession. 
In his words, ‘a group has a general right to secede if and only if it has suffered certain injustices, for 
which secession is the appropriate remedy of last resort’, and if the new state ‘makes credible 
guarantees that it will respect the human rights of all those who reside in it’ (Buchanan, 1997, 34-
35). That simultaneously means, however, that ‘international law should unambiguously repudiate 
the nationalist principle that all nations... are entitled to their own states’ (Buchanan, 2004, 331). 
Some geopolitical anomalies, thus, could in severe cases perhaps call upon a right to secede, but 
certainly not all of them.  
Horowitz (2003) adds to this, moreover, that international law should not ‘preempt social 
complexity with rules’ (p.14). According to him, a fully legalised right to secede, however constrained 
or circumscribed, will only serve to provide grounds for more problematic ethnic politics and violent 
conflict. For instance, he critiques the assumption that secession creates successor states more 
homogeneous than the old states, or that minority rights are better protected in those new states 
(p.8). In addition, he notes, since patterns of popular settlement are such that no boundaries can 
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ever be “natural”, carrying a right to redraw those boundaries will not lead to a rectification of their 
arbitrariness; it will not likely be ‘the end of an old bitterness but the beginning of new bitterness’ (p. 
9-10). Finally, it remains questionable whether secession is a movement reinforcing legal statehood 
as it creates more de jure states, thus strengthening international law, or whether it in fact is an anti-
state act; an international law that grants people a right to remedial secession risks to undermine 
the main structural components it is made of (p. 14). 
As such, although the right to secede is neither explicitly prohibited nor unequivocally 
recognised in international law (Buchanan, 1997, 33), state practice has clearly demonstrated a 
strong reluctance to accommodate such rights (Crawford, 1999, 114). David Lynch (2004) outlines 
five global political reasons why the “international community” usually condemns secession: (1) a 
fear of endless secession (the domino theory); (2) fear that minorities will be trapped within the new 
state; (3) recognition of problems of dividing assets and resources between states; (4) concern for 
the effects of secession on democracy and civil society, and; (5) a fear of the proliferation of weak 
states in the international system (p. 106). For geopolitical anomalies, thus, an “escape” into full 
sovereign state independence is rife with obstacles, as it ‘often involves harsh components’ offering 
not only ‘clean and simple solutions, but... also... new conflicts’ (Gottlieb, 1993, 2).  
 
A Juridical Approach? 
This territorial approach, however, is certainly not the only option geopolitical anomalies may have 
in seeking to improve their status and circumstances. Horowitz (2003) comments that ‘the choice 
between secession... on the one hand, or murderous conflict, on the other, is a false choice’ (p. 14). 
Whereas an act of secession inherently implies a striving towards independence as a full-fledged 
legal state, self-determination does not necessarily denote independent statehood or formal de jure 
sovereignty (Buchanan, 1991, 18; Kaikobad, 1996, 17; Kingsbury, 1992, 498). Griffiths (2003) 
suggests that in the 21st century ‘the historical link between self-determination, nationalism and 
territorial sovereignty’ must be severed (p. 29). Alternatively, therefore, McConnell (2009a) notes ‘a 
near-endless array of autonomous or confederal arrangements within existing states’ that would 
leave those states intact and simultaneously accommodate geopolitical anomalies’ demands 
through consociational institutional designs and/or power-sharing agreements (p. 1905). 
While such arrangements are certainly not particularly new, they have attracted a sizeable 
degree of attention and reconsideration in more recent decades. Political scholars and practitioners 
alike have over the past years increasingly engaged with questions surrounding autonomy and 
power-sharing, and have recommended and imposed such regimes on particular states. The Lund 
Recommendations drafted by the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, 1999), 
for instance, as well as the Liechtenstein Draft Convention on Self-Determination through Self-
Administration (Watts, 1997), both provide comprehensive suggestions for autonomy as a tool for 
good governance and state construction. Previously, autonomy was equated with potential 
“external” self-determination and secession. It was seen as ‘a first step onto that slippery slope that 
inevitably leads towards irredentist or secessionist claims’ (Wolff & Weller, 2005, 1-3).  Now, 
however, contrary to this earlier belief, autonomy and power-sharing are rediscovered as actual 
remedies to secessionist claims, accommodating self-determination movements while at the same 




As Buchanan (1991) reiterates, secession is only the most extreme example of self-
determination, and this latter concept can take many other forms that would allow for a broad 
range of political statuses (short of full legal sovereignty) for minority groups within their 
metropolitan state(s). If this is the case, he argues, ‘the impulse to secede may in fact be weakened’ 
as less radical forms of political independence could be satisfactory, seriously alleviating the costs 
and difficulties that secession would entail (pp. 20-21). International law, therefore, should 
encourage these less extreme alternatives to secession (Buchanan, 2004, 331) by promoting 
intrastate autonomy regimes (pp. 401-424). Self-determination can be expressed and 
accommodated not merely through a violent renegotiation of territorial state boundaries, but also 
through the promotion of minority rights, devolution of authority and federalism, and a greater 
acknowledgment for the legitimacy of cultural self-expression (Griffiths, 2003, 46-47). As Schell 
(2003) puts it, ‘[s]elf-determination... must yield to self-determinations and selves-determination – 
that is, to permission for more than one nation to find expression within the border of a single state 
and to permission for individuals and groups to claim multiple identities (p. 53). 
Examples of such reinterpretations of self-determination can be found in places like 
Quebec/Canada and Catalonia/Spain, where sub-state nationalist movements have achieved a high 
degree of self-government that is accommodated within the de jure state, all the while committing 
themselves to civic state nationalism based on common values and culture, and respecting the 
juridical principles of state democracy.  
While such movements have a long history of nationalist struggle, Keating (2001a) asserts 
that they should not be regarded as “tribalist” ‘remnants of the past’, but, conversely, as ‘harbingers 
of a new form of politics’ (p. vi) in which institutions and practices embrace the concept of plural 
sub-state/state nationality, and legal states share their prerogatives with supra-state, sub-state, and 
trans-state processes and systems (p. ix). Citizens in these new political formations, furthermore, are 
capable of adopting multiple identities and considering the disadvantages of strict de jure sovereign 
independence instead of other forms of self-government (p. viii). As he argues, we are moving 
towards a “post-sovereign” political order wherein traditional state sovereignty has not disappeared 
but ‘transmuted into other forms and is shared, divided, and contested’ (p. x). Others have made 
observations along similar lines (Linklater, 1998), discussing sub-state nationalism linking with supra-
state institutions and re-territorialising forces of globalisation in a triad of rival sites to de jure state 
authority (Tierney, 2005, 164-166). 
Whether we are indeed witnessing the emergence of such a ‘new, differentiated, 
asymmetrical’ (international) political framework remains up for debate (Keating, 2001b, 275), but 
some sub-state entities might be very well adapted and prepared for an international environment 
in which the role of juridical sovereignty has transformed – allegedly even better than formal states 
that do not possess a long tradition of challenging and reconsidering fundamental questions about 
constitutional state authority (Tierney, 2005, 168-173). As geopolitical anomalies’ manifestations 
have so far been presented in this thesis as manifold and viable alternatives to the juridical state, so 
have certain legal states already embraced a variety of institutional mechanisms of plurinationality 
within their borders; the resulting autonomous national entities are not inherently less prosperous 





There are a number of reasons why geopolitical anomalies might prefer a greater degree of 
representation and recognition within the state over a staunch secessionist stance. First of all, the 
legal state framework in which the national minority finds its autonomy remains a safeguard or 
buffer against supra-state processes that may otherwise undermine sub-state politics concomitantly 
to the legal state. Secondly, minorities in fact often carry strong ties of loyalty with their de jure 
state, and are therefore willing to opt for constitutional models accommodating autonomy 
combined with sustained relations with the state. McCrone (2001) argues that ‘there is something 
quite calculative about national identity which shifts according to political circumstances. It is far less 
a matter of sentiment than it is of political practice’ (p. 9). In relation to this, such pre-existing ties 
with the juridical state – both in socio-cultural and institutional terms – can shape and establish 
future debate surrounding minority accommodation within the state. New discourses on 
constitutional options for minorities are reframed and reinforced through the prism of those 
evolving arrangements and lineages already in place (Tierney, 2005, 176-180). 
The variety of constitutional schemes that has emerged from such preferences for autonomy 
and power-sharing over secession ‘contain[s] many threads, but no single strand’. Such 
arrangements are ‘masterfully divergent’ as they inherently carry a great diversity of forms and 
modes (Potier, 2001, 54). Pinpointing them to a single definition, therefore, is difficult. Broadly, 
‘political autonomy is a state of affairs falling short of [de jure state] sovereignty’ (Hechter, 2000, 
114), and, coming back to Potier (2001): 
 
should be understood as the means whereby an authority, subject to another superior 
authority, has the opportunity to determine, separately from that authority, specific 
functions entrusted upon it, by that authority, for the general welfare of those to whom it 
is responsible (p. 54). 
 
More specifically, Lapidoth (1997) distinguishes between ‘territorial political autonomy’ and 
‘personal autonomy’, the former indicating ‘a division of powers between the central authorities and 
the autonomous entity’, and the latter pertaining to ‘the right to preserve and promote the religious, 
linguistic, and cultural character of the group through institutions established by itself’ (p. 174-175).  
Somewhat along the same lines, Lijphart (2004) discusses these arrangements in terms of 
“consociational democracies” consisting of two key interrelated elements. Firstly, the element of 
power-sharing denotes representation and participation of all minority groups in decision-making 
bodies; group autonomy, secondly, means that these groups possess authority to govern their 
internal affairs (p. 97).  
Regardless of the extent and detail of such consociational democratic structures, they all in 
some degree entail a transfer of certain legislative, juridical and executive powers (or ideally a mix 
thereof) from the central de jure state government to the newly created political entity, as well as a 
recognition of minority-specific concerns alongside the concerns of individuals, on the one hand, and 
of the juridical state on the other (Wolff & Weller, 2005, 12-13). Naturally, correlating particular 
societal and state features with specific political mechanisms is paramount to the successfulness of 
the implementation of such power transfers and minority recognitions, and devising a “one-size-fits-
all” model for them is problematic and perhaps even undesirable. Nonetheless, there are some who 
do offer some more general recommendations on consociational constitutions for countries with 
deep-seated national cleavages.  
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Lijphart (2004), first of all, calls for an electoral system that is easy to understand and 
operate, especially in newly emerging democracies, and ensures a proportional representation in 
state legislature, with voting districts that are relatively small as to “decrease the distance” between 
voters and representatives. In order to avoid purely majoritarian elections and create broad power-
sharing executives, presidential forms of government should be discarded in favour of more collegial 
decision making bodies that parliamentary systems provide. The position of the head of state in such 
systems should be limited to symbolic roles, with a Prime Minister serving as the head of 
government. Autonomy for minority groups can be arranged on a non-territorial basis or via a 
federal system with a high degree of state decentralisation. The component units that form such a 
federation should not be too large in order to increase the socio-cultural homogeneity of each unit 
and to avoid dominance by larger provinces. Finally, power-sharing and minority representation is 
crucial not only in formal state parliaments, but also in political institutions like the civil service, 
judiciary, and police. Minority quota could aid in ensuring this, but Lijphart argues that often the 
consociational state parliamentary models in place are sufficient to achieve this goal (pp. 99-106). 
Other mentioned arrangements that would contribute to the successfulness of 
consociational democracies are affirmed constitutional mechanisms to resolve disputes between the 
autonomous entity and the legal state, guaranteed access to education specified for the minority, 
and lasting economic ties between the sub-state entity and the central government with a fair share 
of investment by the latter in the former (Wolff & Weller, 2005, 14). Whichever way such 
consociational democracies are constructed, any one of those schemes is based on the assumption 
that it is an effective strategy to ensure individual, group, and state security, and prevent and settle 
ethnic conflict (p. 13). They are, according to their proponents, successful as they – through the 
establishment of a legal framework – stabilise a potentially divided state society, depoliticise 
possible conflicts, and prevent one ethnic group from exerting its dominance over other groups 
(Ryan, 1995, 45). When applied early on and sustainably rather than through an ad hoc and 
temporary post-conflict instalment, consociational models can help to prevent violent disintegration 
of ethnically divided states. In the words of Weller and Wolff (2005), consociation ‘does not generate 
peace in itself, but provides space for a transition to peace’ (p. 269). 
Perhaps, then, such arrangements do appear to be more appealing for geopolitical 
anomalies and the “international community” than resolutions of territorial de jure statehood. In 
reference to de facto states, for instance, McGarry (2004) calls for ‘a negotiated re-entry resulting in 
a decentralised federal system combined with consociational power-sharing’ (p. xi). An issue that 
could be raised against this, however, revolves around whether (some) consociational models are 
really that different from secession.  
McConnell refers to these arrangements as juridical instead of territorial “routes to 
resolution”, yet the lines between these two routes are quite indistinct. The latter, as the above 
paragraphs have demonstrated, involves a significant quantity of legal considerations, and the 
former certainly does not dissolve the issue of territoriality into oblivion. Distinguishing between 
power-sharing and autonomy, we surely may envision the granting of the latter on a non-territorial 
basis, whereby dispersed minorities can enjoy their rights no matter where they live on the host 
state’s territory (Wolff & Weller, 2005, 15), but in many ways and instances autonomy still resonates 
with the idea of a single governmental jurisdiction over a particular territory. Tierney (2005) even 
asserts that nationalist demands for consociational models actually form a more radical challenge to 
the legal state framework than secession. According to him, secession ‘simply involves a reduction in 
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the size of territory over which the [de jure] state and its constitution have jurisdiction’, whereas 
consociational alternatives force the parent state to seriously re-imagine and reconfigure some 
central components of its main constitutional structure in ways that secessionism does not (pp. 181-
182). 
More importantly, however, critics of this consociational “way out” for geopolitical 
anomalies argue that it is mainly for reasons other than juridical ones that power-sharing and 
autonomy schemes work out well (Kingsbury, 1992, 512). It should be noted, for instance, that 
countries like Canada or Spain are far less diverse than other consociational states, such as Nigeria or 
Kenya. A major question remains, furthermore, around whether such “solutions” are only viable in 
industrially and economically advanced states with already well-developed constitutional structures 
maintaining democracy. Lijphart (2004) himself surmises that across the theoretical spectrum on 
autonomy and power-sharing it is agreed that ‘the problem of ethnic and other deep divisions is 
greater in countries that are not... fully democratic than in well-established democracies’ (p. 97), and 
Keating (2001a) deliberately focuses his investigation of consociational modes on ‘the most 
advanced cases of stateless nation-building in industrial democracies’ as these cases provide 
‘something of a laboratory for demonstrating what can be done’ (p. vii).  
Admittedly, one might argue that the success of such consociational frameworks in those 
states is in fact a reflection of the effectiveness of those “post-sovereign” models in de jure states 
with national divisions, rather than that it is a result of previously advanced political and economic 
circumstances. At the same time, it could be contended that autonomy and power-sharing 
arrangements such as these have proven to be viable particularly because it is these sub-state 
entities that were already independently capable of operating and functioning on levels beyond the 
state, for example within international organisations or the global economy (Tierney, 2005, 161-
163). 
The main criticism, finally, would point out that a central state government could still 
interfere with the acts of the autonomous entity in extreme cases (Daftary, 2000, 5). It still has the 
ability to act in a distinctly de facto sovereign way (see also Chapter Three), which again seems to 
imply that power-sharing or autonomy schemes are very much dependent on political rather than 
juridical dynamics. As Berg (2007) argues, ‘[a]lthough enduring compromises between facts and 
[legal] norms may allow talks about diffused power and fuzzy identities... they do not offer a recipe 
of how to end zero-sum games and provide communal security’ (p. 199). 
As such, it seems that both McConnell’s territorial and juridical “routes to resolution” do not 
truly address, let alone resolve, the challenges that geopolitical anomalies pose to the current 
international relations framework. Both of these routes remain founded on the prevalent 
conceptions of territorial sovereignty and de jure sovereignty that characterise this framework so 
forcefully, but it is precisely those conceptions that do not correlate with expressions of de facto 
sovereignty. Geopolitical anomalies are specifically material (de facto) instead of legal (de jure) 
phenomena, so resolving the issues they face and provoke requires more than just creating new sets 
of juridical agreements about a (territorial) division of sovereignty.  
 
Changing the Discourse? 
It is for these reasons that McConnell (2009a) notes a third approach, which she admits is certainly 
more utopian: through significant shifts in international norms and discourses, geopolitical 
anomalies could maintain their current form while they are accommodated in a ‘heterogeneous 
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international system’ (p. 1905). In such a final “route to resolution”, proposing an international 
society that no longer revolves around de jure sovereignty, could geopolitical anomalies be 
sustainable while apparently being “stuck in limbo”? Could retention of the status quo in fact be a 
workable “resolution” to the problems that geopolitical anomalies are presented with?  
Even in our current territorial state framework ‘the status quo may offer various forms of 
normalisation even when legal recognition has not been granted’ (Berg & Toomla, 2009, 44), as ‘in 
this better-the-devil-you-know-situation, enough groups profit enough... for the present to be 
acceptable’ (Lynch, 2004, 119). Bahcheli et al. (2004a) question: 
 
[t]o what extent is formal recognition still relevant in addressing the place and the fate of 
these disputed entities within the global system? In some cases these “nations in waiting” 
have already established the exclusivity of their writ on the ground and wait only for the 
outside world to come to terms with the realities of their existence (p. 8). 
 
In some respects, this third alternative for geopolitical anomalies already appears to exist. 
First of all, geopolitical anomalies like TGiE, TRNC, and the Faroe Islands have endured their present 
status for quite some time, in part exactly because of the propensity of international politics to 
narrowly focus on territorial de jure sovereignty. Secondly, a number of these polities, such as 
Taiwan (ROC), Palestine, and Western Sahara (SADR), have managed to obtain some degree of 
recognition and legal personality through the ad hoc admission in international institutions and 
tolerance from other states (McConnell, 2009a, 1913).  
There is, moreover, a difference between possessing full legal recognition and having ‘a 
degree of toleration’ (Pegg, 1998a, 98) and ‘limited accommodation’ (p. 198), and geopolitical 
anomalies such as the ROC are quite well aware of this distinction. Claypoole (2010), in addition, 
argues that there is strong evidence of a settled de jure state practice allowing certain geopolitical 
anomalies to enjoy juridical sovereign rights to natural resources located in their continental shelf. 
Returning to both facets of McConnell’s third approach – continued existence in their present 
ambiguous status, and acceptance into a more diverse international system – such developments 
might indicate that geopolitical anomalies already form a harbinger of things to come (Bahcheli, 
Bartmann & Srebrnik, 2004b, 254-255).  
What those things are – what a more diverse international system would look like – remains 
altogether quite unclear. This “resolution” has so far remained utopian in terms of both achievability 
and definability, and one might contend that it does not offer something new from the pluralisation 
of space and of international law that the first and second routes entail. McConnell mentions 
Gottlieb’s (1993) states-plus-nations model as a source of inspiration, whereby a formal state 
maintains its de jure and de facto sovereignty over territory but not immediately over all peoples 
living in that territory. Nations and other ethnic minorities would become part of a separate 
sovereignty system of ‘nations and peoples that are not organised territorially into independent 
states’ (p. 36) – they, in turn, would not necessarily be sovereign over that territory, but possess 
rights and international recognition based on their nationality or ethnicity (pp. 39-47). This system, 
importantly, would not be a replacement of the “old” sovereignty framework, but a supplement to 




Other thinkers that dwell on such “post-sovereign” or “post-Westphalian” orders similarly 
envision the emergence of ‘nations without states’ (Guibernau, 1999, 16-19) through their 
integration and proliferation in the globalised economy (Moore, 2001, 234; Waters, 1995, 139). 
Problematically, however, even if such models would be implemented successfully, any existing 
issues of de jure sovereignty – what are the criteria for a nation to be legitimate, and when should 
that “national legitimacy” be recognised – are seemingly not eliminated.  
Nonetheless, that does not take away from the fact that perhaps a more serious 
engagement with geopolitical anomalies could integrate them into international society rather than 
excluding them as outcasts frustrated with their marginalised status and position. Again, Lynch’s 
(2004) recommendation for ‘a solution that balances de facto with de jure sovereignty [as] the key to 
achieving a lasting settlement’ (p. 143) does very little to elucidate on the exact appearance of such 
a balance, but the persistent viability and manifestation of de facto sovereignty and effective power 
expressions do urge us to venture beyond the conventions of the contemporary international 
political and legal system. Geopolitical anomalies expose a global juridical structure that in many 
ways is already undermined by actual power considerations on the ground, and an international 
acknowledgment of such legal limitations would go a long way to finding this third “route to 
resolution”. McConnell (2010), therefore, concludes that ‘[t]his is not necessarily a utopian vision of 
a state-less world consisting of fluid political communities, but rather a situation of stretching the 
boundaries of the existing international legal regime’ (p. 766). 
This widening of the notion of sovereignty until it is ‘released from purely legal definitions’ 
(p. 764) inherently seems to necessitate a transformation in international relations thinking more 
than anything else. Again, the question could be asked whether such a discursive transformation 
would in itself suffice to better the circumstances and statuses of geopolitical anomalies, and 
McConnell’s motivations for suggesting this change in discourse perhaps already reveal certain 
shortcomings in her conceptualisation of de facto sovereignty (see Chapter Three). For instance, she 
maintains that this discursive metamorphosis would utilise geopolitical anomalies to highlight 
positive stories of political achievement – of cohesive communities, peaceful coexistence, and 
institutional innovation – instead of focusing on violence and conflict (McConnell, 2009a, 1911), yet 
the violent and conflictual nature of many geopolitical anomalies cannot be overlooked given its 
centrality to the emergence and existence of such entities. 
Still, a new perspective on geopolitical anomalies could perhaps enable us to critically 
examine the role of other “exceptions” in international relations discourse, not only taking away our 
attention from the prominent spheres of interest (e.g. the developed world, “great power” politics, 
and accelerated globalisation) but also considering that “the abnormal” has something to tell us 
about “the normal” (see also Navaro-Yashin, 2003). This transformed discourse would, firstly, regard 
geopolitical anomalies as providing ‘an invaluable window on the nature of international legal 
processes’. Looking at the way that these polities exercise their de facto sovereignty every day could 
provide us new viewpoints on the different ways in which formal de jure states articulate their own 
sovereignty (McConnell, 2009a, 1910-1911). Additionally, a shift in international political discourse, 
‘enriching our empirical vocabulary’ (p. 1915), would be a starting point towards a re-pluralisation of 





As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the term “geopolitical anomalies” 
itself is used in this thesis to highlight the inherent variedness and heterogeneity of international 
political society. Relinquishing clear-cut definitions of statehood, and in some sense viewing all 
political entities as anomalous in relation to each other, might help us consider alternative visions on 
what international politics is. Such a ‘re-valuing of the political’, in which geopolitical anomalies are 
acknowledged and embraced as “real” places in an international system of ‘geopolitical multiplicity’, 
would hopefully be a contributing factor in rendering a new and more successful global political 
framework (McConnell, 2009a, 1914-1915).  
The next chapter will try to make a start to such reconsiderations, discussing critical 
theoretical and classical realist notions of de facto sovereignty. As will become clear, however, while 
the former may present a good argument of how power relations in international politics are far 
more diverse that those between and within legal states, the latter provides a clearer and 






De Facto Sovereignty: Exceptionality and Regularity in  
International Politics 
 
Chaos isn’t a pit. Chaos is a ladder. 
(Quote from HBO’s Game of Thrones; Benioff, Weiss & Sakharov, 2011) 
 
How does it survive, you might ask. Precisely by being so slow. Sleepiness and 
slothfulness keep it out of harm's way, away from the notice of jaguars, ocelots, 
harpy eagles and anacondas... The three-toed sloth lives a peaceful... life in 
perfect harmony with its environment. 
(Description of the three-toed sloth in Yann Martell’s Life of Pi; Martel, 2001, 4) 
 
So far, this thesis has revolved around geopolitical anomalies and how they interact with different 
conceptions of sovereignty. I have contended that these polities are “real-life” manifestations of 
sovereignty existing in a world that seems to have more appreciation and understanding for legally 
recognised (constructed) sovereignty arrangements. Furthermore, I have suggested that through a 
very powerful myth these constructions are in fact transformed into natural realities that are 
seemingly unavoidable, unchangeable, and indispensible for international politics. Because of the 
tenacity of this myth, legal state sovereignty has become the absolute reality of international 
relations, while geopolitical anomalies, in contrast, are represented as the unnatural creatures that 
do not belong in this world. In this thesis, I have called for a reinterpretation of these perceptions of 
legal state sovereignty, and thus of our perceptions on geopolitical anomalies. International politics 
is not solely characterised by juridical state sovereignty.  
 Rather, the various entities of international politics can be better identified, investigated, 
and understood based on considerations of de facto sovereignty. That is, political entities may 
possess legal sovereignty or not, but that actually says very little about the “real” nature of those 
entities. In many examples of any form of polity, “actual” circumstances and developments are not 
reflective of their (lack of) legal status or arrangements.  As such, in this chapter I would like to 
challenge the central position of international law in our understanding of sovereignty, by exploring 
the conceptualisation of de facto sovereignty. This chapter will provide a thorough exploration of the 
concept of de facto sovereignty, and suggest how de facto sovereignty can be understood as quite a 
particular, and thereby also a more clearly discernable, form of power. 
There are, then, two types of critique imaginable about the way sovereignty is constructed 
as a legal concept. As suggested in the first chapter, critical theorists find that sovereignty is 
dependent on socially embedded rules and norms, yet these rules and norms are not necessarily 
formal or legal. Sovereignty is a relational rather than individual property, and power is therefore 
never “fixed” or “stabilised” in a political entity. For critical theorists, therefore, while sovereignty 
may have become constructed in the de jure state, it might be perceived in polities other than the 




However, a more classical realist assumption suggests that sovereignty is actually not 
normatively constructed at all. It is in fact something that can be objectively observed to reside 
somewhere or with some social or political body. Sovereignty, thus, is neither constructed nor 
dependent on perspective, but rather just there or not. Its only condition rests upon who possesses 
the ultimate sovereign power at any given time. The meaning of sovereignty, then, is perpetual and 
absolute, and not dependent on how international society constructs or perceives it. How the 
international community or international relations scholarship would conceive sovereignty is largely 
a secondary consideration, because in the end the possession of sovereignty is only reserved for 
those who are the most powerful in any situation. 
These two ways of thinking are not necessarily mutually exclusive in all aspects, and Barkin 
(2010) maintains that certain elements in classic realism open up space for a less rigid and more 
contingent view on international politics (pp. 166-173; see also Barkin, 2003; Jackson, 2004), but this 
chapter mainly focuses on those areas wherein these two theories do not correlate. As I observe, 
classical realists view de facto sovereignty as emerging in moments of chaos, whereas contrarily, 
from a critical theoretical perspective de facto sovereignty emerges in moments of peacefulness and 
regularity. Notably, however, these two conceptualisations do not so much contradict each other, 
but actually speak of very different kinds of power exercises.  
I argue, therefore, that classical realist de facto sovereignty, as the decisive factor in 
moments of exceptionality, offers a more useful approach to that phenomenon than critical theory’s 
conceptions of plural, varied, and subjective modes of power. Granted, critical theorists correctly 
argue that international politics is founded upon a seemingly endless diversity of different 
relationships of power, but it thereby overlooks the fact that de facto sovereignty remains very 
specific and, thus, neither diverse nor constructed. Critical theorists, as such, might helpfully uncover 
the various power manifestations other than de jure sovereignty that characterise geopolitical 
anomalies’ everyday existence, yet classical realism forms a more useful approach if we want to 
think about the extent to which geopolitical anomalies actually possess de facto sovereignty. 
This chapter, then, commences by utilising classical realist ideas to maintain that de facto 
sovereignty is a manifestation of power particularly connected to irregularity and crisis. I argue that 
de facto sovereignty as a specific power exercise relies on the legal exception, even if that legal 
exception may drag on for a long period or occur in relative social order. Subsequently, this chapter 
will proceed with a discussion of critical theory, critiquing its amalgamation of de facto sovereignty 
with any form of “actual” power that is not based on de jure sovereignty arrangements. I will first 
analyse Foucault’s notions of “governmentality” and “biopower”, and argue that neither of them 
should be perceived as manifestations of de facto sovereignty. Secondly, I will explore Agamben’s 
conceptualisation of “bare life” and “zones of indistinction” to suggest that de facto sovereignty 
remains a manifestation of power in which the exception is sharpened rather than muddled. While it 
could be observed that the “diverse” and “multidimensional” power relations as described by these 
latter two theorists may play a role in everyday existence of geopolitical anomalies, those relations 







De Facto Sovereignty as a Ladder 
Hobbes and De Facto Sovereignty 
Arguably the most foundational thinker for classical realism has been Thomas Hobbes, who 
published his theories most famously in Leviathan in 1651. In this classic text, Hobbes presented the 
human (societal) condition before de facto sovereign governance as one of chaos, anarchy, and 
violence. In Hobbes’s famous words, without absolute de facto sovereign authority ‘life of man 
[would be] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ (Hobbes, 1997, 70). This ‘axiomatic 
untrustworthiness of people’ (Agnew, 1994, 64) implied that in humanity’s state of nature 
individuals would become engaged in a “war of all against all” in which each individual human being 
was compelled to be solely engaged with self-preservation and survival.  
True security, then, could only be obtained by people collectively surrendering their own 
natural right to a single de facto sovereign authority of their own making in the form of an 
unconditional social contract (Oakeshott, 1975, 41-42). In a fundamental passage from Leviathan we 
find Hobbes’s idea of this social contract, in which anarchical people agree: 
 
to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that 
may reduce all their wills... unto one will... This is more than consent, or concord; it is a 
real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with 
every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man, I authorise and give 
up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, 
that thou give up thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner... This is the 
generation of that great Leviathan... to which we owe... our peace and defence... And he 
that carryeth this person is called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power; and every 
one besides his subject (Hobbes, 1997, 95-96). 
 
Hobbes, thus, proposed a conceptualisation of de facto sovereignty in terms of a supreme authority 
that functions to mitigate the otherwise violent nature of people and communities. Because of this 
arrangement, de facto sovereignty had to be perpetual, as life without this protection-obedience 
relationship of de facto sovereignty would be self-destructive for humans.  
Hobbes, thus, engendered the idea of the de facto sovereign as ‘an omnipotent political 
body-machine, an inhuman person with a force and will of his own’ (Neocleous, 2003, 21). Hobbes’s 
de facto sovereignty entailed a continuance of the absolute power of a monarch beyond his reign 
into a “body politic”, an impersonal sovereign that continuously inherited the absolute right to rule 
(Agnew, 2009, 52). 
As such, Hobbes conceptualised the de facto sovereign as the law-providing entity, which at 
the same time always possessed the potentiality to exercise its power beyond and above the law. 
The de facto sovereign had an unrivalled ability to determine and enforce the law, but ‘to those laws 
which the sovereign himself... maketh he is not subject’ (Hobbes, 1997, 164); Hobbes’s sovereign 
was the ‘uncommanded-commander’ (Cohan, 2006, 918). In such a way of thinking, de facto 
“power” becomes the most important (in fact only) requisite of a de facto sovereign person or 






Therefore, de facto sovereignty, according to Hobbes, can only be overthrown by an 
expression of power greater than that of the former de facto sovereign. In other words, as soon as 
the de facto sovereignty of one authority becomes limited, it will immediately become limitless in 
the form of another de facto sovereign authority (Moses, 2013, 120-121). Hobbes formulated these 
contentions not just in Leviathan but in other works as well: 
 
[W]hosoever thinking sovereign power too great, will seek to make it less; must subject 
himself, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater (Hobbes, 1997, 115). 
 
for if his power were limited, that limitation must necessarily proceed from some greater 
power. For he that prescribes limits, must have a greater power than he who is confined 
by them. Now that confining power is either without limit, or is again restrained by some 
other greater than itself, and so we shall at length arrive to a power which hath no other 
limit, but that which is the terminus ultimus of the forces of all the citizens together 
(Hobbes, 1983, 103). 
 
Perhaps the most contentious element of this Hobbesian conceptualisation of illimitable de 
facto sovereignty lies in the way in which the reciprocal tie between protection and obedience is 
interpreted. Hampton (1986), for instance, argues that de facto sovereignty cannot be limitless, 
because it is the people who decide whether obedience is conducive to their best interest. This 
means that ‘the ruler created by Hobbesian people... does not decide for his subjects the question 
whether or not they will obey his commands... [T]he subjects determine... whether or not he will 
continue to hold power’ (p. 206). From this statement it seems that the de facto sovereign is not 
absolute as the citizenry maintain the moral right and power to limit de facto sovereignty. Hobbes, 
as such, has been portrayed as a ‘consent theorist’ (Hoekstra, 2004, 34) who essentially viewed the 
de facto sovereign as intrinsically restrained from acting purely out of self-interest.  
However, it is quite debatable whether absolute power and pure self-interest can truly be 
conflated in such a way. It might be in the de facto sovereign’s self-interest to act in accordance with 
the will of his subjects, and thus those acts can, and will, still be absolute. The Hobbesian social 
contract may stipulate that de facto sovereignty (sometimes) has to take on an altruistic nature, but 
that does not mean that de facto sovereignty is thereby limited. Sorell (2004) might suggest that ‘the 
more [the de facto sovereign] acts out of narrow self-interest... the more he stands to lose the 
[absolute] power that makes such acts tempting’ (p. 184), but from this statement it may equally be 
deduced that absolute power allows the de facto sovereign to not act out of narrow self-interest. 
Hobbes, thus, explicitly distinguished between the “authorisation” of de facto sovereign power 
through a social contract, and the power and authority that the de facto sovereign then could 
exercise (Jackson, 2007, 17). Although the de facto sovereign was created by the people, he could 
nonetheless exist separately from the people as an indispensable and absolute ruler. 
This capacity to wield absolute authority was an indispensible requisite for the security-
enhancing function of Hobbes’s de facto sovereign, because ‘covenants without the sword are but 
words, and of no strength to secure a man at all’ (Hobbes, 1997, 93). For Hobbes, then, an individual 
de facto sovereign could only be replaced by another, as ‘those seditious persons who dispute 
against absolute authority do not so much care to destroy it, as to convey it on others’ (Hobbes, 
1983, 97). De facto sovereignty, thus, was seemingly created by the subjects, but that did not in turn 
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mean that those subjects could by their own volition simply dissolve de facto sovereign power 
(Agnew, 2009, 56). Hobbes maintained that although de facto sovereignty was enabled by a human 
collectivity, so that a particular de facto sovereign could be disobeyed and even overthrown, de 
facto sovereign power itself could not be dissolved by that same multitude because it constituted 
the natural “road to survival”. Because of the Hobbesian state of nature, de facto sovereignty 
followed out of necessity rather than out of a voluntary and specific granting of a de facto sovereign 
right; the subjects of de facto sovereignty ‘were compelled to obey their sovereign’ (Stacy, 2003, 
2033).  
As such, the establishment of de facto sovereignty does not follow out of the establishment 
of laws or morals, but rather the other way around, because such laws and morals are perpetually 
“unestablished” without an ultimate decision on them. For Hobbes there could not be a “will of the 
people” solidifying into a de facto sovereign entity, as it was precisely the absence of such a 
coherent collectivity that necessitated a de facto sovereign authority (for an insightful, though 
critical, outline of this argument, see Hampton, 1986, 104). Here, again, we are reminded of the 
discussion around the Kelsenian grundnorm – or the lack thereof. Hampton, indeed, observes that 
whereas Hobbes necessarily saw a political entity as a closed decision-making regime in which there 
had to be a final human decision-maker, Kelsen (and others) argued that such an entity can be 
“closed” even in the absence of such a final human authority, and that “finality” in a political regime 
can be achieved through fundamental rules.  
On the face of it, certainly, the formation of a commonwealth through a social contract may 
seem paradoxical to the Hobbesian state of nature. In a human condition in which there is truly a 
perpetual threat to survival and no possible guarantee of security, it would presumably be in discord 
with this condition for anyone to unilaterally renounce their rights on the condition that others do 
the same. Hobbes remedied this issue by maintaining that the relationship of protection/obedience 
runs from the former to the latter. ‘[M]ight implies consent’ (Hoekstra, 2004, 68), so that the social 
contract is established first between the de facto sovereign and its subjects, before it can exist 
between the subjects themselves. Still, for Hampton, Hobbesian de facto sovereignty essentially 
rests purely on certain (false) assumptions about the state of nature, and she finds Kelsen’s rejection 
of these assumptions through his theory of the grundnorm just as persuasive (Hampton, 1986, 98-
99). 
 
Schmitt and De Facto Sovereignty 
In order to develop a more precise understanding of de facto sovereignty, therefore, it is now useful 
to turn to the writings of Carl Schmitt, who can be seen as Kelsen’s intellectual opposite. Schmitt 
utterly rejected the Kelsenian idea of a normative foundation for a political and/or legal entity, 
maintaining instead that law and politics stem from real-life situations and ‘the normative power of 
the factual’ (Jellinek, 1960, 337; as cited in Suganami, 2007, 521). Michael Salter (2012) explains 
Schmitt’s critique on the notion of an ‘infite regress of norms’ in legal judgment, which actually 
inescapably requires ‘a sheer act of judicial decision, a quasi-legislative judicial act, determining both 
the factual implications of the relevant norms and the normative meaning of the pertinent facts... 





Schmitt, therefore, has been dubbed ‘the Hobbes of the twentieth century’ (Schwab, 1985, 
xxvi), and for good reason. Like Hobbes, Schmitt wanted to emphasise the human element in politics 
and sovereignty, as he argued that the ever-present propensity for violence in human nature could 
only be remedied by resolute personal action (Schwab, 1985, xvi). For Schmitt, ‘the ultimately unruly 
and unruled quality of human life’ necessitated rule to be ‘of men and not of law’ (Strong, 2005, 
xvii). Again in a Hobbesian manner, therefore, Schmitt found that ‘political life cannot be regulated 
by legal norms, because societies encounter crises that must be resolved by the use of political 
authority’, and that thus ‘the will of the sovereign stands above the law of the land’ (Luoma-aho, 
2007, 38). As Strauss (1997) observes that Hobbes based his entire political doctrine on the extreme 
case – the fear of violent death – in which the law is suspended by the unlimited sovereign (p. 330), 
Schmitt famously contended that the ‘sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (Schmitt, 1985, 
5). 
Pivotal in this reasoning was Schmitt’s understanding of politics as the friend/enemy 
distinction. According to Schmitt, just as other paradigms were fundamentally defined through 
antitheses – such as good and evil in morality, beautiful and ugly in aesthetics – the paradigm of 
politics was defined through the antithesis of friend and enemy (Schmitt, 2007, 26). Schmitt saw a 
political unit as the result of the fundamental struggle for achieving a human identity, and believed 
that these struggles were settled through de facto sovereignty instead of the sovereignty of norms 
or rules (Norman, 2012, 410). In an oft-cited passage, Schmitt (2007) argued that: 
 
[t]he political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as 
an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business 
transactions. But he is nevertheless the other, the stranger... existentially something 
different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible. These can 
neither be decided by a previously determined general norm nor by the judgment of a 
disinterested and therefore neutral third party. Only the actual participants can correctly 
recognise, understand, and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of 
conflict (p. 27). 
 
Crucially, thus, Schmitt’s “enemy” was not a “foe” that had to be annihilated, but merely a 
collectivity that had to be compelled to remain inside its own borders (Suganami, 2007, 521). In this 
sense, Schmitt’s theory did not amount to a celebration of violence, as the decision on who the 
enemy was, rather than the decision to fight a war with them, entailed the formation of a political 
community. Actual conflict was not a necessary occurrence for the existence of politics, merely the 
possibility that the relationship between different communities might escalate into violence 
(Norman, 2012, 410-411). Notably, therefore, political communities did not so much evolve out of 
the human desire to escape the state of nature and find relief from the Hobbesian fear of violent 
death, but rather out of the fundamental human need to clearly define and maintain a collective 
identity. In Schmitt’s argument, it is the desire to belong, more so than the desire to survive, that 
defines the political (pp. 411-413).  
Schmitt did find, however, that with the intensification of the self/other relation, perhaps 
aggravating in a friend-enemy relation, human capability for self-identification would strengthen as 
well (Schmitt, 2007, 36). In fact, if the distinctness between groups is weakened too much, another 
more intense “enemy” will eventually (have to) be found (Norman, 2012, 417). For Schmitt (2007), 
therefore, those moments ‘in which the enemy is, on concrete clarity, recognised as the enemy’ 
90 
 
form the ‘high points of politics’ (p. 67). Schmitt’s definition of the sovereign as the decider on the 
exception, then, refers to the sovereign’s de facto power both to decide on who the other is, as well 
as whether that other should be treated and perceived as an enemy (Suganami, 2007, 516). In other 
words, the sovereign decides both what the exception is and what to do about it (Strong, 2005, xi-
xii).  
Importantly, this meant that the exception intrinsically cannot be pre-defined as a concrete 
“enemy” or “irregularity”, and Schmitt therefore rejected Kelsen’s attempts to devise a juridical 
system in which the exception was banished. By definition, the exception cannot be “subsumed” in a 
legal order, and thus there has to be a de facto sovereign person or group who has the supra-legal 
monopoly – not to rule or to coerce – but to decide whether an extreme situation is at hand, what 
measures should be undertaken to solve it, and when order and stability have been restored 
(Schmitt, 1985, 13; Schwab, 1985, xvii). 
Given the unpredictable nature of the exception, for Schmitt a ‘preset rule-fixed definition of 
sovereignty’ could equally never be found (Strong, 2005, xiv). ‘The exception reveals most clearly the 
essence of the [sovereign's] authority’ (Schmitt, 1985, 13), as ‘[t]he exception in jurisprudence is 
analogous to the miracle in theology’ (p. 36); the exception is simultaneously the occasion for and 
the revelation of the exercise of sovereignty. Thus, with the arising of an exceptional situation the 
sovereign equally comes to the fore. Schmitt interprets sovereignty in a “decisionist” manner, as it is 
not legal norms or statuses that define a sovereign but the capability of making an ultimate, or 
‘genuine’, decision in a crisis situation (Strong, 2005, xx). For him, ‘[i]f [a sovereign] entity exists at 
all, it is always the decisive entity, and it is sovereign in the sense that the decision about the critical 
situation... must always necessarily reside there’ (Schmitt, 2007, 38).  
Schmitt saw sovereignty, therefore, as a “border concept” (grenzbegriff) that marked the 
line between orderliness and law, ruled by the sovereign, and that which lay outside of it. It is 
important to note that this means that, again, the nature and locus of sovereignty cannot be found 
within the law, but above and beyond it (Strong, 2005, xx-xxi). In Schmitt’s own words, ‘[t]he 
decision parts... from the legal norm, and... authority proves that to produce law it need not be 
based on law’ (Schmitt, 1985, 13). 
Two preliminary conclusions can be drawn from Schmitt’s writing. First of all, like Hobbes, 
Schmitt allocates a central role to the exception in his interpretation of the characteristics and place 
of sovereignty, arguing that de jure assumptions about sovereignty do not account for emergency 
situations that can only be resolved through an exertion of de facto sovereignty. Such emergency 
situations, however, also imply circumstances of order and regularity, and while Schmitt openly 
acknowledged this relationship, for him ‘the rule proves nothing’ about sovereignty, and ‘the 
exception proves everything’ (Schmitt, 1985, 14).  
More importantly, for now, is the realisation that Schmitt’s explanation of sovereignty 
challenged the conflation of that concept with a state purely in juridical terms. The political, for 
Schmitt, is not the same as the de jure state, as the position of the sovereign is dependent on 
effective decision-making capabilities and specifically not on legal arrangements. Defining 
sovereignty purely as a legal concept would be to depoliticise and to dehumanise it (Strong, 2005, 
xv; Strong, 2007, xv). Instead, Schmitt, in continuation of Hobbes, finds that manifestations of de 
facto sovereignty characterise a polity, nullifying persistent assumptions about classical realism as 





Morgenthau and De Facto Sovereignty 
A third prominent thinker within this classical realist sovereignty paradigm is Hans Morgenthau. Like 
Schmitt, Morgenthau rejected a Kelsenian primacy of international law over the (factual) sovereignty 
of de jure states, believing sovereignty to be a de facto manifestation of supreme authority instead 
of a juridical arrangement. Arguing that such a de facto kind of sovereignty was ‘incompatible... with 
a strong and effective, because centralised, system of international law’, he instead thought of 
international law as ‘a decentralised, and hence weak and ineffective, international legal order’ 
(Morgenthau, 1973, 308). For Morgenthau, ‘what really mattered in relations among nations was 
not international law but international politics’ (Morgenthau, 1978, 65). Any utopian, moralistic, or 
legalistic assumptions about the international political world were ‘either so vague as to have no 
concrete meaning that could provide rational guidance for political actions’, or they were ‘nothing 
but a reflection of the moral preconceptions of a particular nation’ (Morgenthau, 1951, 35).  
Institutions like the United Nations and international law, therefore, ‘were imagined as substitutes 
for power politics – while in fact they were simply new forums for it’ (Koskenniemi, 2004, 439). The 
nature of international politics was derived from the actions of its de facto sovereign units, rather 
than from the norms and regulations of international law. 
 Morgenthau’s conception of de facto sovereignty, thus, asserts that statehood inherently 
cannot have a purely juridical character. In his words:  
 
[de facto] sovereignty points to a political fact. The fact is the existence of a person or 
group of persons who, within the limits of a given territory, are more powerful than any 
competing person or group of persons and whose power... manifests itself as the supreme 
authority to enact and enforce legal rules within that territory (Morgenthau, 1973, 314). 
 
Here, Morgenthau’s indebtedness to Hobbes and Schmitt becomes apparent, particularly when we 
proceed onto Morgenthau’s views on Grotian or Lockean ideas of constitutionally divisible or 
popular sovereignty. 
 
[I]n any state, democratic or otherwise, there must be a man or a group of men ultimately 
responsible for the exercise of political authority. Since in a democracy that responsibility 
lies dormant in normal times, barely visible through the network of constitutional 
arrangements and legal rules, it is widely believed that it does not exist, and that supreme 
lawgiving and law-enforcing authority, which was formerly the responsibility of one man, 
the monarch, is now distributed among the different co-ordinate agencies of the 
government, and that, in consequence no one of them is supreme. Or else that authority 
is supposed to be vested in the people as a whole, who, of course, cannot act. Yet in times 
of crisis and war that ultimate responsibility asserts itself... and leaves to constitutional 
theories the arduous task of arguing it away after the event (Morgenthau, 1973, 323). 
 
Morgenthau’s de facto sovereignty cannot be divided or shared between different 
components of a political entity, because it precisely refers to that ultimate and supreme capability 
to act. This means that political entities cannot be “quasi-sovereign” or “half-sovereign”, as 
sovereignty, according to Morgenthau, always entails a “real”, “definitive” and “unitary” action. The 
fact that we may think of de jure states as possessing “limited” or “surrendered” sovereignty in legal 
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terms ‘is a significant symptom of the discrepancy between the actual and pretended relations 
existing between international law and international politics’ (Morgenthau, 1973, 320). De facto 
sovereignty never disappears, as it always resides somewhere and always asserts itself in 
exceptional circumstances (Moses, 2013, 126).  
Morgenthau, thus, reiterates Schmitt’s conceptualisations of “decisionist” sovereignty, 
defining the de facto sovereign as the maker of the ultimate decision to resolve a crisis situation. 
 
[T]hat authority within the state is sovereign which, in case of dissension among the 
different lawmaking factors, has the responsibility for making the final binding decision 
and which, in a crisis of law enforcement, such as revolution or civil war, has the ultimate 
responsibility for enforcing the laws of the land (Morgenthau, 1973, 321). 
 
Morgenthau’s thinking again exposes a pivotal role for the exception in understanding and locating 
de facto sovereignty. In general, classical realism portrays (international) politics as a structure in 
which the possibilities for emergency and crisis are always present, and in which thus order and 
regularity are fragile or even imaginary. However, periods of peace and stability do exist, also in 
places where the possession of de facto sovereignty is seemingly in contention or unclear. It is 
therefore necessary to analyse how to explain and interpret the nature and characteristics of 
classical realist de facto sovereignty in these moments of orderliness. If the exception functions as a 
ladder for de facto sovereignty to reveal itself, can we discern classical realist de facto sovereignty 
also in the regular, and if so, how? 
 
Classical Realism and Regularity 
Any of the three classical realist thinkers discussed above base their theory of de facto sovereignty 
on the assumption that, without it, chaos will ensue, and that thus inversely it is in the departure 
from chaos that we can find the true face of de facto sovereignty. Crisis and de facto sovereignty are 
bound to one another. Yet, in doing so, these thinkers must also deal with the fact that an exception 
requires a rule, and that thus de facto sovereignty must also have some sort of relationship with 
regularity. Scheuerman (2007), indeed, has contended that in explaining de facto sovereignty 
classical realism ‘suffers from a misleadingly one-sided focus on the emergency or crisis’ (p. 84). In 
circumstances of regularity de facto sovereignty is described as ‘dormant’ (Morgenthau, 1973, 323), 
or as Schwab (1985) puts it, de facto sovereignty ‘slumbers in normal times but suddenly awakens 
when a normal situation threatens to become an exception’ (p. xviii). From such statements, it might 
be deduced that for classical realism de facto sovereignty essentially does not exist in moments of 
regularity, but that would be a misinterpretation. 
 Instead, de facto sovereignty lurks in circumstances of regularity, waiting for the moment 
when other manifestations and relations of power – emergent from those orderly circumstances – 
to again come into conflict with one another and cause a crisis that begs for an ultimate and final 
decision on a resolution of that crisis. Classical realist de facto sovereignty, thus, actually forms the 
point of demarcation between order and disorder – it is the Schmittian grenzbegriff. The de facto 
sovereign, then, recognises an exceptional situation as well as decides on it (Suganami, 2007, 522), 
and as a logical consequence, the sovereign thereby defines and decides on the regular (Strong, 
2005, xxi). According to Schmitt himself (1985), ‘he is sovereign who definitely decides whether th[e] 
normal situation actually exists’ (p. 13). In other words, ‘the routine is made possible by the 
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exceptional circumstances in which critical decisions... are taken in the sovereign act of the political 
community’ (Suganami, 2007, 521).  
In addition, while it is in times of emergency that the de facto sovereign capacity to decide is 
exercised most obviously, for some thinkers that “decisionist” quality operates continuously even in 
orderly circumstances (Suganami, 2007, 517). For Suganami, the exception in which law is 
suspended does not have to manifest itself as a clear break with the regular, as long as in those 
“exceptions” the element of decision-making is “maximalised”. The operation of law depends on 
factual and political decisions by the de facto sovereign, but those decisions do not need to occur in 
extreme moments of anarchy or violence, as they essentially involve reinstating law and order 
repeatedly. While the exception, on those occasions, is a temporary suspension of the operation of 
the law, simultaneously de facto political order might be maintained (Suganami, 2007, 521-522).  
Schmitt, nonetheless, observed that legally ‘[t]here exists no norm that is applicable to 
chaos’, and that ‘for a legal system to make sense, a normal situation must exist’ (p. 13), thereby 
rejecting the possibility of de facto stability and tranquillity existing independently from the 
effectiveness of de facto sovereignty to decide on the law (Schwab, 1985, xxv). Moses (2013) 
reiterates this difficulty, writing that: 
 
while de jure theories of sovereignty find meaning for the term in shared understandings, 
practices, legitimacy and recognition, de facto theories find sovereignty in the opposite: at 
points of crisis, mutual misunderstanding, lack of recognition and, most importantly, in the 
(forceful) resolution of... intense political conflicts (p. 125). 
 
For classical realism, thus, it is precisely because the de facto sovereign (re-)establishes 
order in contexts of disorder and antagonism that a variety of power structures may come about in 
which the actors are not necessarily in discord with one another. Applied to geopolitical anomalies, 
as they try to create a political order that is separate from the de jure state, their success or failure 
seems to be dependent on respectively their own de facto sovereignty or that of the de jure state(s) 
in which they exist to decide on the exception and (re)instate regularity. Some geopolitical 
anomalies become exceptions to formal state law precisely because they manage to exercise de 
facto sovereignty and create a separate domestic political order.  
However, as geopolitical anomalies are supposedly “stuck in limbo” for a significant period 
of time, some may seem to be stuck not just between their own de facto sovereignty and a lack of 
international legal recognition, but also in a suspension of the de facto sovereign decision on the 
exception by either them or the formal state. In other words, as geopolitical anomalies manifest 
power in a variety of ways, some of them may sustain a prolonged juridically exceptional situation 
while creating a semblance of political order, as the decision on whether either geopolitical anomaly 
or de jure state possesses de facto sovereignty is suspended. As such, perhaps some geopolitical 
anomalies could be identified as occasions where there has not yet been a de facto sovereign 
decision on a resolution to their conflict with the de jure state. The mere manifestation of a 
juridically exceptional situation does not necessarily instantaneously provoke a decision. As a current 
example, we may tentatively think of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, which continues to uphold a 
political order of some form, in spite of long-standing conflict over de facto sovereignty in the region 
(Lister, 2015; Weiss & Hassan, 2016). 
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Certainly, the classical realist perspective on de facto sovereignty seems to uphold that the 
exceptional situation is unequivocally also the violent situation, apparently not accounting for the 
possibility that in crises of laws or norms extreme violence might not inescapably occur. Indeed, 
maybe the extreme situation does not intrinsically necessitate an immediate decision (Strauss, 1997, 
330). Morgenthau (1973) explains that in those circumstances ‘sovereignty is held in abeyance’, and 
while he contends that in such occasions ‘a struggle... between the pretenders to supreme authority 
will decide the question one way or another’, he immediately adds that the responsibility to decide 
‘must rest somewhere – or nowhere’ (p. 321; my emphasis). Schmitt (1985) writes that ‘[i]n the 
exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a mechanism that has become torpid by 
repetition’ (p. 15), but such statements overlook the question whether geopolitical anomalies may 
experience torpidity (or slothfulness) in their circumstances of enduring exception. For geopolitical 
anomalies, thus, it may not always be clear whether there is a difference between an “undecided 
crisis” and “normality” (see Chapter Five). 
In those situations, however, classical realists would argue that geopolitical anomalies exist 
in their exceptional predicament by coercion rather than by their own choice. De facto sovereignty, 
in such a line of thinking, is still carried by the formal state in which they reside, because that formal 
state still ultimately decides on the exception. Regularity, thus, remains inextricably tied to a de 
facto sovereign decision (perhaps by the de jure state), until another de facto sovereign (perhaps a 
geopolitical anomaly) decides to alter that regularity. Classical realism, therefore, remains a valuable 
theoretical lens for analysing the de facto sovereignty of geopolitical anomalies, as it reminds us how 
in (international) legal system(s) extra-legal decisions and activities are carried out repeatedly, and 
that in those moments of (international) legal exception sovereignty might not lie in the juridical 
realm. For classical realism, ‘[de facto] sovereign political communities are those which have a 
freedom, readiness, and capacity to decide for themselves whether and when to fight against whom’ 
(Suganami, 2007, 527). Upholding that geopolitical anomalies do not possess such freedoms or 
capacities is to ignore their origination, as well as their persisting resistance against their 
“metropolitan state”.  
Some geopolitical anomalies manage to garner a political order without any international 
legal status through a series of de facto manifestations of sovereignty. Others, alternatively, may 
exercise a variety of non-sovereign practices of power – be they norms, discourses, social rules, or 
more material forms of authority and control – in a constant state of domestic legal exception. As we 
will see in the paragraphs to follow, however, some thinkers on (international) politics have 
confusingly stretched the meaning of de facto sovereignty to denote any such practical power 
functionalities, misconceiving the concept of de facto sovereignty as any form of power not 
exercised by a legal state, and thus ignoring the specificity and exceptionality of possessing and 
manifesting de facto sovereignty. 
 
De Facto Sovereignty as a Sloth? 
As suggested earlier, a significant point of conflict between classical realism and critical theory 
revolves around the problem of the locus of de facto sovereignty. Critical thinking contends that de 
facto sovereignty can simultaneously be situated in different places or levels, while classical realism 
believes de facto sovereignty always resides in only one place at a time. As such, it seems that they 
actually utilise quite different conceptualisations of sovereignty. For classical realism, sovereignty 
denotes supremacy and thus indivisibility, but critical theorists appear to speak more of 
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“sovereignties” in a multi-layered and integrative structure of power. Litfin (1997) even argues that 
it might be better to avoid the term altogether, finding that ‘[g]iven that the empirical status of 
“sovereignty” is uncertain, we are well advised to proceed by unbundling the term into such 
elements as autonomy, control, and legitimacy, which are perhaps more readily amenable to 
empirical research’ (p. 178). 
Others conflate de facto sovereignty with authority, contending that the former is multi-
interpretable because the latter is concerned with a range of issues and thus varies through space 
and time (Biersteker, 2002, 168). Authority is never absolute, as its strength can be seen as a 
divergence of the authority’s command and the subject’s voluntary compliance. Authority, unlike 
absolute power, is a term that refers to some voluntary and justified coercion, and authority 
relations thus rely on some degree of legitimacy (Lake, 2003, 304-305). The concept of legitimacy 
has already been discussed in the context of geopolitical anomalies and international law, but it 
might also be thought of as the consent of the governed or the internal popular belief in the validity 
of an authority (Berg, 2012, 1273-1274). In any case, this relationship between belief and authority is 
seen as a matter of degree, and legitimacy is thus a multidimensional construct or a continuous 
variable rather than a fixed point on a scale in time or space (Gilley, 2006; Parkinson, 2003). 
These conceptualisations of multi-interpretable power, authority, and legitimacy, however, 
inform a view that is altogether different from de facto sovereignty as conceived in this thesis. Litfin 
(1997) rightfully argues that emphases on de facto sovereignty rather than on juridical 
considerations are far more likely to provide empirical insights into political organisations and 
activities, but then proposes ‘to consider the multiple dimensions of [de facto] sovereignty... in 
constant flux’ (p. 171). Berg and Kuusk similarly deconstruct (de facto) sovereignty into several 
(somewhat arbitrary) variables like “governance”, “monetary systems”, and “security structures” to 
“quantify/calculate” the ‘degree of [empirical] sovereignty’ of different kinds of political entities – 
from dependencies, through autonomous regions, de facto states, and governments-and-exile, to 
legal states (p. 48). Such scholarly contributions treat de facto sovereignty as if it could be conceived 
as any power relationship, but it is exactly the quality of the de facto sovereign to be that unique 
manifestation of power. 
Furthermore, John Agnew’s piece on sovereignty regimes (2005) criticises three dominant 
assumptions about sovereignty in international relations thinking, but familiarly fails to escape the 
pitfalls of conflating divergent types of sovereignty. For Agnew, first of all, sovereignty comes about 
not from a factual supreme decisional act in an exceptional situation, but ‘as a result of the purposes 
of states in interaction’. In doing so, again, he seems to speak of socially constructed and normative 
forms of sovereignty – forms that can be found, if anywhere, in de jure arrangements. At the same 
time, however, Agnew also dismisses suggestions of sovereign equality in international politics – 
equalities that reside precisely predominantly within such legal, relational, and normative 
considerations of sovereignty (p. 440). Thirdly, Agnew challenges the idea that sovereignty is 
inherently territorial, as he, in yet another conceptual u-turn, proceeds to present sovereignty as 
‘the socially constructed practices of political authority’ – not as the de facto sovereign material, and 
inherently physical and territorial, capacity to decide on the exception (p. 441). 
In terms of critical theorists’ engagement with the place of the concept of sovereignty within 
the international political framework, Cynthia Weber’s (1995) influential work on Simulating 
Sovereignty at first sight appears to pay heed to the significance of the friend/enemy distinction as 
revealed in classical realist views of de facto sovereignty. Contending that ‘the 
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sovereignty/intervention boundary is the location of the state’ (p. 127), Weber argues that the state 
is simulated, imagined, and represented fundamentally through presumed opposites: the practice of 
intervention and the rules of sovereignty (non-intervention) in international politics. However, while 
this initially seems to suggest a consideration of sovereignty as a Schmittian grenzbegriff, Weber’s 
argumentation still relies on ‘signs’ or ‘codes’ of sovereignty as they exist in legal/normative 
paradigms of international politics (pp. 127-129) – paradigms that are dismissed in classical realist 
understandings of de facto sovereignty (see also Walker, 1993). 
I maintain, as such, that critical theorists actually employ more concern for norms and 
networks of power than for the particular nature of de facto sovereignty. Certainly, the exercise of 
power is relative to another actor, and it is relational in the sense that the subjects of power can be 
agents themselves (Solomon, 2012, 212); power networks may be grounded in the logic of the social 
or the structural. However, it is the nature of de facto sovereignty that should still be interpreted 
through an individualist ontology as purposeful, effective, and intentional acts (Barkin, 2010, 166-
169). De facto sovereignty denotes a particular kind of power, and when it comes to geopolitical 
anomalies the term may actually signify something distinctly different from power in its critical 
theoretical meaning. I maintain that geopolitical anomalies may possess and exercise many forms of 
power in regular circumstances, but that in exceptional circumstances the characteristics of de facto 
sovereignty remain necessarily stable and unitary. 
 
De Facto Sovereignty as Governmentality and Biopower? 
As has been mentioned above, for critical theorists power is not an independent “thing” that can be 
gathered at the will of a pre-existing institution. For them, power is dispersed rather than 
centralised, as it originates in social interaction rather than being possessed, produced, or controlled 
individually. It does not exist in advance of the entities or persons to which it gives rise, as it is both 
derivative and formative of social interaction. It cannot, therefore, solely be understood as a top-
down phenomenon, as it does not only control subjects but also produces them. These ways of 
thinking are most explicitly derived from the many works of Michel Foucault, who preferred to speak 
of power relations rather than power in itself (Agnew, 2009, 88; Edkins & Pin-Fat, 2004, 2). In 
Foucault’s words: 
 
Power must be analysed as something which circulates... It is never localised here or 
there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. 
Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do 
individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously 
undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting target; 
they are always also the elements of its articulation (Foucault, 1980, 98). 
 
Foucault argued that ‘where there is power, there is resistance’ (Foucault, 1978, 95), by 
which he meant that power and resistance are mutually constitutive. Power can only be exercised 
‘over free subjects and only insofar as they are “free”’. In other words, ‘[t]he relationship between 
power and freedom’s refusal to submit cannot... be separated’ (Foucault, 1983, 221). Dillon (2004) 
lucidly summarises this argument: ‘As a force that circulates [power] only comes to presence in the 
context of the freedom of human being acting in effect as a conductive material for power’s very 
circulation... If we were not free... we would not conduct or enact power relations’ (p. 53). 
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Foucault, therefore, adamantly represents power relations as ‘directly productive’ (Foucault, 
1983, 185) instead of repressive or destructive. Power relationships are only power relationships if 
‘the one over whom power is exercised [is] thoroughly recognised and maintained to the very end as 
a person who acts’ (p. 220). For Foucault, thus, it was nonsensical to imagine subjects as pre-existing 
the power relations that actually produced them (Dillon, 2004, 53), because, in fact, ‘it is... one of 
the prime effects of power that certain bodies... come to be identified and constituted as individuals’ 
(Foucault, 1980, 98).  
Thinking of the concept of sovereignty, then, Foucault actually called for scholars of politics 
‘to cut off the king’s head’ (Foucault, 1980, 121), by which he meant that a political theory solely 
founded on de facto sovereignty as the absolute authority to create, uphold, and enforce the law 
should be discarded. Not only was de jure (state) sovereignty a legal smokescreen concealing its 
extra-legal de facto manifestations, Foucault also challenged the notion that those manifestations 
could be a purely coercive force unilaterally emanating from a single source (Edkins & Pin-Fat, 2004, 
3). Agnew (2009) has even labeled this a ‘non-sovereign or diffuse conception of power’ in which de 
facto sovereignty is ‘equivalent to energy moving in a circulatory system’ (p. 89).  
Indeed, Foucault argued that while theories of de facto sovereignty as supreme and absolute 
authority constantly attempt to explain and justify some essential discontinuity between sovereign 
(de facto) power and any other form of power, he, on the other hand, found that ‘in the art of 
government the task is to establish a continuity’ (Foucault, 1991, 91). In such a continuous and 
multilateral view, power is ‘produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in 
every relation from one point to another’ (Foucault, 1978, 93). 
Simultaneously, as Foucault thus rejected a rigid top-down approach to sovereignty, his idea 
of de facto sovereignty should not be misunderstood to be a purely Lockean conception. Instead of 
perceiving Foucault’s de facto sovereignty ‘as resting largely on power “from below”’, it is the 
relational character of Foucault’s power that makes his de facto sovereignty not just ‘a mechanical 
opposition’ between a source of power on the one hand and an obedient or disobedient subject on 
the other (Agnew, 2009, 89), but more of ‘a set of effects involving differential impacts of 
combinations of authority and control’ (p. 90).  
The de facto sovereignty of a polity, in Foucault’s argument, does not involve a 
monopolisation of power by either ruler or subject, but functions more as a coordinating device 
connecting and integrating different networks of power (Agnew, 2009, 101). In the words of 
American sociologist Philip Gorski (2003), ‘the capillaries and synapses of power within the social 
body are gradually plugged into and connected with the central circulatory and nervous system of 
[de facto sovereignty]’ (p. 23). As others have put it, Foucauldian de facto sovereignty ‘is necessarily 
about ceded, seduced, and co-opted diffused power as well as coercion by (and acceptance of) 
centralised power’ (Agnew, 2009, 116).  
Foucault amalgamated these conceptualisations of de facto sovereignty in the term 
governmentality, which can be defined as ‘the micro-political practices through which a governing 
agency conditions people to act in specific ways and through which people govern themselves’ 
(McConnell, 2012, 78). Governmentality posits de facto sovereignty not merely as a unitary 
possession of absolute power, but ‘as an activity, or an “art” that is plural and immanent’ (Dean, 
2010, 123). Rather than altogether displacing de facto sovereignty, in the processes of 
governmentality a political entity comes to ‘incorporate the disparate arenas of rule concerned with 
the government of the population’ (Dean, 1999, 2).  
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In the critical theoretical and Foucauldian view, then, de facto sovereignty is ‘the emergent 
and contingent outcome of a myriad of transactions and governmentalities’ (Agnew, 2009, 9), or, as 
Foucault (2008) himself puts it, it ‘is nothing more than the mobile effect of a regime of multiple 
governmentalities’ (p. 77). This means that, through the concept of governmentality, critical 
theorists find de facto sovereignty as a system of power without a singular centre (Neal, 2004, 375). 
To reiterate Foucault’s reasoning, ‘[W]e have to abandon the model of Leviathan, that model of 
artificial man who is at once an automaton, a fabricated man, but also a unitary man who contains 
all real individuals, whose body is made up of citizens but whose soul is sovereignty’ (Foucault, 2003, 
34). 
However, I would again argue that such assertions mix up the specificity of de facto 
sovereignty with the general nature of exercises of power. As has already been suggested in this 
chapter, perhaps in normal circumstances a political community may be able to engage in 
governmentality practices and may power be dispersed across the relational networks of that polity, 
but the formation of such a political entity in the first place is dependent on unitary and supreme de 
facto sovereign decisions on the establishment of those normal circumstances. Foucault (1991) 
writes that ‘it is the tactics of [governmentality] which make possible the continual definition and 
redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not’ (p. 103), but that power 
to define and redefine can only exist at moments in which de facto sovereignty is unlimited and 
singular. It is precisely the role of the de facto sovereign to bring together the “disparate arenas of 
rule” at times when they conflict with one another – at times when governmentality fails. Viewing 
governmentality as de facto sovereignty, thus, demonstrates a certain disregard for the critical 
importance of the exception to international politics – an importance actually symbolised by 
geopolitical anomalies.  
That is not to say that a decentralised notion of governmentality does not have any value for 
our understanding and perception of those geopolitical anomalies. For one, while Foucault would 
specifically view governmentality as a spatial strategy, it is not territorial in a Westphalian de jure 
state sense. For Foucault, governmentality is ‘essentially defined no longer in terms of its 
territoriality, of its surface area, but in terms of the mass of its population with its volume and 
density’ (Foucault, 1991, 104); it focuses on lives rather than places. As such, on a de jure state level, 
Foucault shows how actors and entities other than the legal state authorities and institutions may 
tap into those governmentalities available within the formal state’s territorial and organisational 
framework.  
As governmentality, thus, entails ‘a multidimensional and trans-scalar endeavour which can 
be undertaken by a range of non-state as well as state actors’, it thereby ‘refuses the reduction of 
political power to the actions of the [legal] state’ (McConnell, 2012, 80). The Foucauldian conception 
of governmentality presents us with ‘specific rationalities and technologies of governing’ (Cadman, 
2010, 539), the diversity of which makes many different forms of political organisation possible. In 
exposing ‘the actual daily experience of power exercised by a multitude of non-state sources’ 
(Agnew, 2005, 439), a consideration of governmentality could regard the power manifestations of 






However, as governmentality involves ‘practices dispersed throughout and across societies’ 
it becomes a rather ‘tentative and unstable project’ (Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, 3). To reiterate, 
such terminologies – instability, uncertainty, changeability – once more imply that, as power is 
unstable and unfixed, there is a requirement for de facto sovereignty to be centralised and absolute. 
Yet, for Foucault, the tentative and disparate nature of governmentality could still be successful in 
maintaining order and regularity. In Foucault’s theory, each of governmentality’s micropolitical 
practices could be seen as a moment of exception, but not of chaotic crisis or disorder. Rather, 
governmentality again becomes understood as ‘the circulation of power among a range of actors at 
dispersed sites’ (Agnew, 2009, 9); it becomes conceptualised as an everyday process constantly 
enacted. 
 To be sure, through a consideration of governmentality, geopolitical anomalies can be 
interpreted from an almost ethnographic perspective, from a perspective of day to day social 
interactions and lives lived producing power and subjectivities (Edkins & Pin-Fat, 2004, 2). Central to 
Foucault’s governmentality, then is his concept of biopower. On the one hand, this concept explains 
how de facto sovereign power might be specifically defined as absolute power over human life and 
bodies, emphasising the vulnerability of the human body as an inversion of the supra-legal 
inviolability of the de facto sovereign. Biopower signifies how the body of the subject(s) may form 
the ‘surface of inscription’ of de facto sovereign power (Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, 11).  
Yet, for Foucault, the human body is simultaneously the place where that biopower is 
resisted most clearly. As mentioned before, while certainly power relations subjugate, suppress, and 
reduce human life, they also create, cultivate, and even empower (Dillon, 2004, 55). Foucault 
describes how human bodies subjected to biopower, be it in excessive or subtler forms, may become 
symbols of resistance, if only through the mere fact of the simple life force they contain. Such life 
force may come to represent biopower’s counterpoint, a body that may be killed but that cannot be 
killed because it is the “object” of biopower (Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, 11-13). 
In this regard, Michel de Certeau (1984) distinguished between strategies and tactics, 
representing the latter as a “biopowerful” ‘art of the weak’ (p. 37). By employing an everyday and 
improvisational ‘artisan-like inventiveness’ or bricolage (p. xviii), subjects of domination actively 
create their own space, “poaching” territory from agents of power (see also Isachenko, 2012, 4-5).  
For Bataille (1991), this actually meant that everyday life possessed de facto sovereignty in 
itself, as he argued that ‘[l]ife beyond utility is the domain of the sovereign’ (p. 198). Bataille 
contended that de facto sovereignty could be found ‘in the desire to enjoy and revel in brief 
moments of careless freedom... in moments of simple non-anticipatory existence’ (Hansen & 
Stepputat, 2005a, 13). As de facto sovereignty was supposedly produced through “biopowerful” 
gestures disregarding death or danger, de facto sovereignty could reside in every human being 
(Bataille, 1991, 222-227). Such individual biopower, experiencing spontaneity of life, engendered 
‘the miraculous sensation of having the world at [its] disposal’ (p. 199), a sensation of de facto 
sovereignty. However, such an interpretation of de facto sovereignty as excessive enjoyment beyond 
any calculation (p. 226) again demonstrates how it remains an exceptional mode of power 
altogether quite different from other modes. 
In geopolitical anomalies, thus, de facto sovereignty may on the one hand be grounded in 
the exception and thus unitary and absolute, while on the other hand governmentality and 
biopower allow many different actors to exercise some form of power in regular circumstances. In 
the Foucauldian state of mind, however, these two distinct power manifestations are actually 
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combined so that the latter is referred to by the former. As (some) critical theorists of international 
relations have embraced these Foucauldian theories, their notion of de facto sovereignty becomes 
that of a dispersed process in which a distinction between regularity and exceptionality is 
indiscernible. As critical theorists bring governmentality, biopower, and de facto sovereignty 
together, they present geopolitical anomalies, and their inhabitants leading their daily lives, as 
possessing de facto sovereignty through their everyday existence (again see Isachenko, 2012).  
 
De Facto Sovereignty and Geopolitical Anomalies 
As such, from a classical realist perspective geopolitical anomalies may exercise de facto sovereignty 
by maintaining domestic order, having decided on the exception in the critical break from the de jure 
state(s) within which it resided. From a critical theoretical perspective, however, that everyday 
expression of de facto sovereignty is interpreted differently as an expression muddling the lines 
between regularity and disorder. In other words, for critical theorists, geopolitical anomalies create 
and maintain a de facto order even if they are hampered by exceptional circumstances. They 
normalise the abnormal by placing it in an everyday context (Navaro-Yashin, 2003, 107-108). Even if 
that context means being ‘[b]etwixt and between life and death, hanging in the middle of time, living 
in interruption’, and thus ‘[d]isruption... appears permanent’ (p. 121), geopolitical anomalies are 
able to keep up a day-to-day existence. McConnell (2010), therefore, actually finds that it is ‘from 
the perspective of quotidian practices... at the local level and through everyday interactions’ (p. 764) 
that geopolitical anomalies are ‘magicked into existence’ (Sidaway, 2002, xi) as political entities.  
In this critical theoretical paradigm, de facto sovereignty becomes more of a process found 
in geographical proximity and intimate relationships (Megoran, 2010, 383), rather than something 
that is tied to the spectacular, the antagonistic, and the exceptional. Again, as Megoran (2006) calls 
for a ‘re-peopling’ of international relations theory, arguing that ‘the study of elite discourses 
remains only a partial contribution to the construction of a fuller understanding of [international] 
political processes’ (p. 625), critical theoretical de facto sovereignty assumes a form that is very 
different from classical realist interpretations. Critical theoretical and Foucauldian de facto 
sovereignty is not an ‘entity set apart from society by an internal boundary’ (Fuller & Harriss, 2001, 
23), but rather a ‘multifaceted’ phenomenon with an ‘everyday reality’ (Williams, 2007, 159-160). 
With regard to geopolitical anomalies, as such, civil society, integrated communal relationships, 
associational economic networks, even individual agency, are seen as at least as important to 
maintaining a situation of order and regularity (to exercising de facto sovereignty) as the classical 
realist interpretation of a singular ruler more powerful than any other actor in society (pp. 162-173).  
Such conceptualisations of the quotidian and ambiguous nature of de facto sovereignty also 
reverberate in the way critical theorists represent the relationship between geopolitical anomalies 
and de jure states. Critical theoretical de facto sovereignty does not have an either/or quality, but is 
instead “flexible”. At the local level, officials of geopolitical anomaly and juridical state may interact 
with each other to constantly negotiate and integrate their respective de facto sovereignties as part 
of the continuous daily reiteration of both (McConnell, 2009b, 349). De facto sovereignty, in this 
sense, is neither ‘openly declared... nor explicitly acknowledged’. It is ‘tacit sovereignty’, which ‘is 
not sovereignty in its final instance, with everything stripped away’, but rather which ‘exists through 
practice, in what is done but not named, in what is held in suspension’ (p. 350). For some 
geopolitical anomalies, therefore, de facto sovereignty is ostensibly ‘based on implicit 
understandings and is assumed through... everyday interactions and performances’ (p. 351).  
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Instead of a classical realist definition which places it in moments of disorder and crisis, thus, 
McConnell (2010) proposes a very different understanding of de facto sovereignty in relation to 
geopolitical anomalies, claiming that ‘[w]hilst de jure sovereignty can be examined at the level of 
state interactions and through legal discourses, de facto sovereignty is articulated at the scale of the 
everyday, the mundane and the undramatic’ (p. 764). In a clear departure from any classical realist 
considerations, McConnell even speaks of ‘overlapping sovereignties’, implying that the boundaries 
between the de facto sovereignty of the geopolitical anomaly and that of the legal state might be 
very difficult to discern, and that the expression of the former may not coincide with a demise of the 
latter (McConnell, 2009b, 349; see also Grundy-Warr & Wong, 2002, 98). Territorial borders 
between de jure states and geopolitical anomalies might range from impermeable to fluid, and the 
authorities of either polity may be juxtaposed in a multifaceted spectrum of power and 
subjectivities.  
Sidaway (2003) attempts to refer to this in proposing ‘multiform sovereign visions without 
an original pure sovereign reference point’ (p. 160), and several examples of such visions can be 
found. Aihwa Ong (1999) introduces a notion of ‘graduated sovereignty’ to discuss ‘a series of zones 
that are subjected to different kinds of governmentality and that vary in terms of... disciplinary and 
civilising regimes’ (p. 7). Cassidy (1998) argues that a geopolitical anomaly’s de facto sovereignty can 
be ‘concurrent’ with that of another political organisation or entity (pp. 99-119). And Bruyneel’s 
(2007) exposure of the ‘third space of sovereignty’ opens up possibilities for placing geopolitical 
anomalies neither fully inside nor outside the de facto sovereignty of a de jure state, but precisely on 
the very boundaries between different de facto sovereignties (pp. 217-230). 
 To repeat, however, there are a few problems with such assumptions about de facto 
sovereignty. First of all, while we may think of power structures coexisting, overlapping, integrating, 
or otherwise blurring boundaries between them, it is the nature of de facto sovereignty to actually 
make those boundaries clearly visible. De facto sovereignty can never coincide with other de facto 
sovereign entities, as it is their respective fundamental purpose to draw the distinction between 
each other.  
Secondly, as McConnell observes how the relationships between de jure states and 
geopolitical anomalies are characterised by overlapping and multiform sovereignty arrangements, 
she familiarly appears to speak of de facto and de jure notions of sovereignty as if they were 
identical. De facto sovereignty and de jure sovereignty may not be mutually exclusive, but de facto 
sovereignties themselves certainly are. Finally, critical theorists might again be correct in assuming 
that international political processes are only partially characterised by manifestations of de facto 
sovereignty, but that does not mean that all power relations – perhaps implicit or without a pure 
centre – can be qualified as de facto sovereignty. An expression of de facto sovereignty always 
remains an expression in a final instance, openly declared and explicitly acknowledged. 
 
Geopolitical Anomalies as Zones of Indistinction? 
As such, another thinker on de facto sovereignty, Giorgio Agamben, actually attempted to take into 
consideration both the de facto sovereign exception and people’s daily lived experiences, utilising 
both Foucauldian and Schmittian ideas to inform new theories about biopower and the role of the 
exception in finding and analysing sovereignty. Following Schmitt, Agamben argues that it is the 
requisite of de facto sovereignty to ultimately decide on the exclusion of certain groups and 
individuals from the political community. And in line with Foucault, Agamben finds that this 
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sovereign power of exclusion leads to an inseparable connection between power and human bodies, 
between de facto sovereignty and people’s lives.  
To elaborate, Agamben in fact sees a distinction between two different forms of life. As both 
concepts originate from Ancient Greek language, zoe, on the one hand, signifies the simple fact of 
living that is shared by all beings, while bios denotes a specific way of life of an individual or group. 
For Agamben, zoe should be interpreted as ‘bare life’ outside of any political-legal structure, while 
bios should be perceived as politically qualified life. The operation of de facto sovereignty relies on 
permanently distinguishing between these two modes of living (Seri, 2004, 83). As Agamben puts it 
himself, ‘bare life has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the [polis]’ 
(Agamben, 1998, 12). 
It should be noted, as Derrida (2009) lucidly points out, that this distinction between zoe and 
bios appears to miss the contention that any human being is political ‘by nature’ (p. 315), and that 
thus there seemingly does not exist a difference between the two terms. Indeed, ‘[t]he specific... 
attribute of man’s living, in his life as a living being, in his bare life... is to be political’ (Derrida, 2009, 
330). Because of this, Agamben’s zoe/bios conceptualisation is perhaps better understood as a 
differentiation between legally qualified and unqualified life; as a distinction between life inside and 
outside the law.  
Agamben, indeed, proceeds on Schmitt’s ideas about the distinction between “inside” and 
“outside” as the prime foundation for de facto sovereignty and politics. In contrast to Schmitt, 
however, Agamben does not speak of an exclusion in a true friend/enemy sense, as an individual or 
group that exists only and completely external to the polity’s territorial boundaries, and that 
therefore embodies a clear “foe” that has to be kept at bay at all times. Instead, Agamben’s de facto 
sovereign excludes people from formal and legal politics while they remain internal to society and 
economy (Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, 17). Agamben, in fact, speaks of an ‘inclusive exclusion’, even 
contrasting his earlier statement by arguing that ‘the inclusion of bare life in the political realm 
constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power’ (Agamben, 1998, 11-12; my 
emphasis).  
Agamben, therefore, comes up with the concept of homo sacer: ‘an obscure figure of archaic 
Roman law, in which human life is included in the juridical order... solely in the form of its exclusion’ 
(p. 12). Homo sacer denotes a “sacred” (or rather “cursed”) man who is expelled from the political 
community, and therefore may be killed yet simultaneously not sacrificed in favour of the divine. De 
facto sovereignty, then, constitutes itself as it excludes bare life from its de jure component precisely 
by including it in its political realm (Edkins & Pin-Fat, 2004, 7; Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, 17). It 
produces bare and sacred life (Edkins & Pin-Fat, 2004, 4), while conversely, in doing so ‘the 
production of a biopolitical body [bios] is the original activity of sovereign power’ (Agamben, 1998, 
11). In order to create a community of political individuals, a de facto sovereign authority has to exist 
that can decide which human beings are not members of the legal framework of that community.  
As Agamben contends, however, the problem is that ‘life exposed to death... is the originary 
political element’ without which de facto sovereignty cannot exist (Agamben, 1998, 55). Bare life, as 
‘life amenable to the sway of sovereignty’, is required for de facto sovereignty’s own self-production 
as an entity being transcendent to its subjects (Dillon, 2004, 57). De facto sovereignty ‘needs bodies 
and bare life to manifest itself’ (Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, 31). As such, to demonstrate de facto 
sovereignty bare life has to remain included in politics in the form of a de jure exclusion. The de facto 
sovereign has to create a ‘state of exception’ occupied by homo sacer, where the differences 
103 
 
between order and exceptionality become invisible (Agamben, 1998, 12-13). In his words, ‘[n]either 
political bios nor natural zoe, sacred life is the zone of indistinction in which zoe and bios constitute 
each other’ (p. 56).  
Instead of a binary spatial arrangement of exception versus norm, inclusion versus exclusion, 
Agamben’s zones of exception (ergo zones of indistinction) exist within the polity (Seri, 2004, 80-84). 
For Agamben, the boundaries – territorial and conceptual – between zones of legal normality and of 
non-legal exceptionality become fuzzy or destabilised (p. 84), resembling a ‘Möbius strip... where 
exterior and interior in-determine each other’ (Agamben, 2000, 25). To put it in different terms, the 
zone of exception/indistinction ‘is a hybrid of law and fact in which the two terms have become 
indistinguishable’ (Agamben, 1998, 97).  
It may seem, therefore, that Agamben’s notions can function as useful analogies to identify 
geopolitical anomalies as ‘polymorphous yet vital’ and ‘permanent’ zones of indistinction (Hansen & 
Stepputat, 2005, 18). As the international legal order tries to create an international community and 
produce “proper” life in the interstate system, we might simultaneously consider geopolitical 
anomalies as spaces of exception leading a displaced and disenfranchised life. As international law is 
seen as an ideal realm of governance, order, and discipline, geopolitical anomalies are perceived as 
undisciplined and plebeian spaces. They become bare life that transforms into homo sacer in a zone 
of indistinction. They are legally unqualified life that nonetheless has entered the international 
political system (Molloy, 2004, 130).  
However, such an analogy would imply that the geopolitical anomaly’s “broken-from” state, 
or international law itself, is in fact a de facto sovereign entity; a supreme authority that 
purposefully decides to exclude geopolitical anomalies from legal state sovereignty. On the contrary, 
In keeping with Diken and Laustsen’s (2005) suggestion that a geopolitical anomaly ‘signifies a... 
community that offers a paradoxical ideal of belonging on the basis of not belonging, a community, 
in which undoing the social bond functions as the social bond’ (p. 147), some geopolitical anomalies 
might be better conceived as de facto sovereign polities creating a political community by excluding 
themselves from domestic and international law. Assuming that different political entities rather 
than international law exercise de facto sovereignty, geopolitical anomalies that possess that de 
facto sovereign capacity cannot truly be conceived as zones of indistinction. They decide on their 
own exclusion from formal state law through a classical realist manifestation of de facto sovereignty.  
On the one hand, then, certain geopolitical anomalies might represent a classical realist 
intensification of a de facto sovereign decision on the law, exposing a de jure state’s lack of effective 
control. By becoming an exception to de jure state while becoming a member of international 
political society, such geopolitical anomalies muddle the lines between what constitutes zoe and 
bios in international politics. Rather than only and always arguing that the lines between these two 
concepts should be drawn elsewhere – that their polity should be included in the international legal 
order – they also contest the international community’s capability to draw those lines in the first 
place (Edkins & Pin-Fat, 2004, 13-15). In other words, such geopolitical anomalies contest the idea 
that a global legal community could possess de facto sovereignty in any form, utilising their own de 
facto sovereignty to establish themselves as the ‘excluded remainder of the social edifice’ 
(Husanovic, 2004, 224). They expose an international legal and formal state deficit of de facto 
sovereignty precisely by accepting and embracing their regularity as international legal “bare life” 
(Edkins & Pin-Fat, 2004, 16-17; see also Chapter Four on Somaliland).  
104 
 
Alternatively, other geopolitical anomalies might be seen as suspensions of the decisional 
moment on the exception, as ‘frozen conflict[s]’ made possible by the reluctance or incapability of 
both geopolitical anomaly and de jure state to make a de facto sovereign decision (Elden, 2007, 827; 
see Chapter Five). For all geopolitical anomalies, their life excluded from the international legal 
community is certainly not a powerless life, as their predicament might be sustained either by their 
own de facto sovereign decision on being the formal state’s (and international) legal exclusion, or by 
their own power manifestations in the context of another de facto sovereign attempting to 
transform the exception into order. However, while in these latter geopolitical anomalies the 
exception and the rule – the state of nature and the state of law – might appear to pass in and out of 
one another according to the operation of their own power simultaneous to the de facto sovereignty 
of the formal state (Dillon, 2004, 56), in those situations de facto sovereignty retains its function as a 
clear classical realist threshold between law and non-law; it is then merely the position of de facto 
sovereignty that is in contention. 
For McConnell (2009b), nonetheless, the diverse and everyday power practices of 
geopolitical anomalies still signify de facto sovereignty. In her view, geopolitical anomalies still daily 
function as the primary source of authority over a population and engage in a variety of formal 
state-like practices. Again, she argues, unlike other types of institutionalised organisations 
(transnational companies, social movements, or NGOs) that also carry a significant degree of 
influence and authority in international relations, geopolitical anomalies are de facto sovereign 
polities as they form a population’s most revered governmental entity and attempt (and frequently 
succeed) to live not just outside but simultaneously also inside the international legal state system 
(p. 350). 
More accurately, however, whether geopolitical anomalies do possess de facto sovereignty 
is a question that will be more thoroughly investigated in the upcoming chapters, but if so, that is 
neither because they “look like de jure states” nor because they may occupy different but coinciding 
spheres of power within a political community. Indeed, whereas Agnew (2009) argues that in 
international politics ‘de facto sovereignty is all there is when power is seen as circulating and 
available rather than locked into a single centralised site’ (p. 7), he seemingly does not see the 
paradoxical nature of such a statement. Power, certainly, may be plural and polyvalent, but de facto 
sovereignty remains a specific exercise of ultimate capacity in moments of exception. The following 






Somalia and Somaliland: De Facto Sovereignty and  
Westphalian Myths 
 
Compare it to Somalia, and Somaliland is paradise. 
(Human Rights Watch's Christopher Albin-Lackey; Foreign Policy Magazine, 2009) 
 
The country of Somalia, straddling the eastern and northern parts of the Horn of Africa, has over the 
last few decades built up an image as perhaps Africa’s most dysfunctional state. As a place marred 
by piracy, famine, warring tribes, and Islamic extremism, Somalia has become a symbol of state 
failure, whereby formal state institutions have lost effective sovereignty over their nominal territory; 
Somalia has indeed been mentioned earlier in this thesis as the ‘archetypical failed or collapsed 
state’ (Elden, 2009, 99). In line with this image, Somalia has become of great concern for many 
prominent members of the international community. Navy deployments in the Arabian Sea and the 
Gulf of Aden, several humanitarian and military intervention missions, and a large quantity of foreign 
NGOs, are all examples of international involvement in Somalia. However, in spite of this seemingly 
overwhelming international dedication towards Somali peace-building and state-building, none of 
them has so far appeared to instigate any sustainable solution to the many problems of the region. 
Simultaneously, as Somalia has reverted into formal state weakness, a geopolitical anomaly 
has emerged that has proved to be relatively successful in performing state-like functions. 
Somaliland, the north-western part of Somalia, has over the last twenty years managed to hold 
multiple democratic elections, to build a comparatively functional government, and to preserve a 
situation of general peace and stability. It has tried to obtain full independence and legal recognition 
as a sovereign state, but has remained unsuccessful so far, even though it is a seemingly well-faring 
region. Many arguments about the effectiveness of its de facto sovereignty have been forwarded in 
favour of its recognition, but as yet to no avail. Somaliland, as such, actually seems to be a 
quintessential de facto state. 
As this situation carries on, it should expectantly become more and more obvious that 
Somalia’s presumed failure, coincidental with Somaliland’s success, can no longer be ignored. It 
appears increasingly impossible to overlook the irony of Somaliland’s lack of recognition in a country 
that seemingly continues to be incapable of devising centralised legal state institutions, and that 
cannot demonstrate any semblance of de facto sovereignty as a de jure state. This chapter, indeed, 
initially focuses on this tension between Somalia and Somaliland to demonstrate that both of them 
challenge conventional notions about statehood and sovereignty. More specifically, as this thesis has 
already briefly discussed some of the problems and limitations of new notions of contingent 
sovereignty, state failure, and the RtoP (Chapter Two), Somaliland’s manifestations as a geopolitical 
anomaly can be utilised to exemplify and illustrate these issues. 
However, this chapter offers neither strategic advice on what to do with Somalia, nor a true 
call for legal recognition of Somaliland. Rather, it utilises it as an example of de facto sovereignty 
emerging out of an otherwise chaotic environment. I argue that through its exertions of de facto 
sovereignty, Somaliland challenges Westphalian myths that might exist about Somalia. More 
importantly, perhaps, while such Westphalian ideals remain omnipresent and important in 
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Somaliland itself, it is its de facto sovereignty over north-Western Somalia that makes it a viable and 
sustained political community or geopolitical anomaly.  
In this chapter, thus, I will mainly focus on circumstances and developments in Somaliland 
itself, investigating the extent to which Somaliland decides on its own exception regardless of any 
international legal status. Consequently, the question has to be raised whether Somaliland actually 
truly needs de jure sovereignty, and moreover, whether its non-legal status may in fact be helpful in 
maintaining de facto sovereignty. Somaliland may actually be so “paradisiacal” in lieu of any 
meaningful or sustained external interference or juridical status, remaining a largely untouched 
political community devising its own de facto sovereignty arrangements. Before I come to these 
issues, however, I will first place the recent developments in Somalia and Somaliland in a historical 
context. 
 
Somalia: A Unitary State? 
The “nation” of Somalis (see Ahmed, 1995; Brons, 2001, 31) is dispersed over regions in Somalia, 
Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, a result of the fact that it was divided by British, Italian, French, and 
Ethiopian colonial empires. On June 26th 1960, the former colony of British Somaliland became 
independent, and was followed on July 1st by Italian Somaliland; under direction from the UN, they 
combined into the Republic of Somalia. This merger was initially greeted with a strong pan-Somali 
nationalism and a great domestic enthusiasm about the end of the colonial powers (Lewis, 2002, 
161-165; Samatar, 2005, 91), yet it was not without its problems. First of all, it is very questionable 
whether the Somali nation ever constituted a unitary state population. Other than most decolonised 
countries, the idea of a Somali state took root only at the end of – instead of during – the colonial 
period (Clarke & Gosende, 2003, 132-133). As Coyne (2006) puts it, ‘no meta-game around a central 
Somali state has ever evolved endogenously’ (p. 347), and Kaplan (2008) adds that ‘Somalia 
embodies one of postcolonial Africa’s worst mismatches between conventional state structures and 
indigenous institutions’ (p. 144).  
Traditional Somali culture, then, is generally more nomadically than sedentarily grounded, 
and is dominated by pastoralist communities and clan lineages (Le Sage, 2005, 15). Ioan Lewis, who 
became the foremost writer on Somali society after British decolonisation, labeled the Somali socio-
political structure as ‘a pastoral democracy’ (Lewis, 1961), and found that ‘[f]ew societies can so 
conspicuously lack those judicial, administrative and political procedures which lie at the heart of the 
western conception of government’ (p. 1). Lewis portrayed Somali pastoral society as ‘acephalous’ 
(Evans-Pritchard, 1940, 181) – as profoundly egalitarian without any hierarchy of political or 
administrative entities (Bradbury, 2008, 15; Renders, 2012, 40). Somali politics and society were 
organised along lines of kinship, which formed the most important basis for people’s identity 
(Bradbury, 2008, 13). Lewis’s works, however, have been subjected to some notable criticism for 
presenting Somali politics and society as essentially untouched or even “improved” by colonial rule 
(Kapteijns & Farah, 2001); this is an issue that I will come back to at the end of this chapter. 
These criticisms notwithstanding, it has been conceded that the amalgamation of the former 
colonies into a single formal state did unsettle the clan-based and kinship-based Somali political 
structure (Bradbury, 2008, 32-33). For example, the Isaaq clan had dominated politics in the British 
dependency, but when this former colony was joined with its southern counterpart the influence of 
the Isaaq was diluted by the other major clans elsewhere in the new republic (e.g. Dir, Darod, 
Hawiye, Rahanweyn) (Cornwell, 2004, 2; Srebrnik, 2004, 212). Furthermore, while the Italian officials 
108 
 
had tried to establish a ‘full fledged colony’ with formal political administrations (Hoyle, 2000, 80), 
British authorities had insisted on leaving Somaliland relatively “undisturbed” and recognised some 
of Somalia’s basic juridical and social arrangements as more informal foundations for the colony’s 
political framework (diya-paying groups, heer, guurti) (Le Sage, 2005, 16-17; Lewis, 2008, 30; 
Renders, 2012, 41-43). The colonial experiences of the two regions had thus been very different 
(Reno, 2006, 154-155). 
So, from the outset, the new Republic of Somalia was characterised by internal problems, as 
combining the divergent legal systems (British common law, Italian continental law, Islamic Shari’a 
law, and Somali customary law) proved very challenging (Le Sage, 2005, 18). Overall, no serious 
consideration had been made about the appropriateness of a western-style centralised state in 
conjunction with a highly decentralised traditional Somali political structure: ‘[t]his was an entirely 
Euro-centric exercise’ (Lewis, 2008, 34). The new unitary state government seemingly merely 
created ‘another layer in the... clan-oriented arrangements’ (Brons, 2001, 164) and became seen 
predominantly as a tool for obtaining benefits for the clan. Politics in Somalia thus became more and 
more fragmented by tribal alliances, leading to constant fragility and eventually a military coup in 
1969 (Kaplan, 2008, 146, Le Sage, 2005, 19; Renders, 2012, 46-47). 
 The oppressive “pan-Somalist” regime of Siyyad Barre that followed did very little to 
alleviate the tensions in Somali society, as his attempts to unify the Somali nation in a single state 
eventually failed (e.g. the Ogaden War against Ethiopia in 1977-1978, a state ideology of “scientific 
socialism”, and political formal state centralisation) (Clarke & Gosende, 2003, 134-139; Cornwell, 
2004, 2-3). As Barre allocated key political and military positions particularly to members of his own 
clan (Darod), several groups began to feel increasingly marginalised, and in the 1980s some 
resistance movements started to take up arms against the Mogadishu regime. In response, Barre 
manipulated clans against each other to withhold his power, but his actions only resulted in the 
further disintegration of Somalia (Coyne, 2006, 348; Kaplan, 2008, 146; Le Sage, 19-21). For instance, 
in the 1980s Barre mobilised different tribes against the Isaaq-dominated Somali National 
Movement (SNM) in the north-west and launched offensives against Isaaq villages and civilians, 
drawing even more Isaaqs into the rebellion. Barre’s ‘savage’ offensives (e.g. bombing of Hargeysa 
and Bur’o in 1988) against the SNM left tens of thousands civilian casualties and forced many more 
into displacement (Bradbury, 2008, 45-46). 
By the time Barre was deposed in 1991, international engagement with his regime had 
largely dissipated and Somalia had already reverted into a patchwork of clans, leading to atrocious 
reciprocal violence and the collapse of the Somali state (Bradbury, 2008, 41-45; Samatar, 2005, 94). 
In other words, the Somali state under Siyyad Barre had already “failed” to secure an order within its 
territory before it actually “collapsed” (Brons, 2001, 33-34). It remains subject to discussion whether 
the Somali societal structure of clanship inescapably obstructed (and obstructs) any attempt to form 
a centralised legal state framework, as it supposedly makes Somali society ‘pervasively bellicose’ 
(Lewis, 1998, 100), or whether, conversely, the Somali kinship-based political system was (and 
perhaps remains) corrupted by externally imposed (post)colonial state centralisation (Besteman, 
1998; Renders, 2012, 33-34; Samatar, 1988). What should be noted already, however, is that the 
numerous (sub-)clans constituting the SNM in north-west Somalia appeared to succeed in 





Somalia: Building Blocks or State Ideals? 
Around that same time, as the end of the Cold War necessitated a scholarly reconceptualisation of 
the nature and outlook of global society, certain new ideas emerged about state sovereignty and its 
relation to international politics. This thesis has already raised issues with the recent international 
(legal) norms emanating from the idea of contingent sovereignty, such as the failed state discourse 
and the RtoP-doctrine (see Chapter Two). This latter notion has not explicitly been applied by the UN 
or individual governments in the context of Somalia – the country’s long-lasting internal conflicts and 
state weaknesses are, for ICISS co-chair Gareth Evans, ‘not a classic [RtoP] situation’ (Lee, 2009) – 
but many important elements of this new perspective on state sovereignty can be traced back to the 
international response to the crisis in Somalia in the early 1990s (Bellamy, 2010, 155). To be sure, in 
the last twenty-five years Somalia has been one of the most prominent examples of countries whose 
legal sovereignty was breached under the pretext of it not fulfilling the benchmarks for de jure state 
sovereignty. 
At the start of the 1990s, ‘Somalia’s importance [came] to be measured by the misery of its 
people’ (Clarke & Gosende, 2003, 139). The images of starvation, destruction, and decay in Somalia 
led to calls for a greater international role in the country, and in April 1992 the United Nations 
Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was created to provide humanitarian aid and oversee a cease-fire. 
When this did not succeed, a US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was deployed in December 1992, 
later supported by a second UN Mission (UNOSOM II) until spring 1995. In 2006, a U.S.-backed 
intervention by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) sought to assist the Somali 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), established at a Nairobi conference in 2004, against a 
collective of Islamist groups who had seized control over large parts of the country. This intervention 
was transformed in 2007 into the AMISOM peacekeeping force under the auspices of the African 
Union (AU), which to this day remains in effect. Finally, since 2013, the United Nations Assistance 
Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) attempts to aid the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in peace- and 
state-building exercises. 
However, these series of external interventions in Somalia, well-intended as they may have 
been, regrettably confirm many of the problematic issues connected to the notions of contingent 
sovereignty. Questions, first of all, have revolved around the nature and scope of these 
interventions, and how successful they have been and will be in mitigating tensions in a “collapsed” 
state like Somalia. More fundamentally, in Somalia such interventions have been motivated ‘more 
by strategic concerns than by humanitarian concerns’ (Bellamy, 2010, 157). Somali legal sovereignty, 
and the international dismissal thereof, has been contingent not on an objective and universal 
higher sovereign authority or norm to which it is accountable (international law), but on the 
subjective political and ideological considerations of certain specific powerful de jure states 
(Acharya, 2007). In Somalia, the “failure” of the state has been compared to a certain legal state 
(Westphalian) ideal. The state has been abstracted from particular socio-political processes and is 
instead articulated in terms that are portrayed as universal (Coyne, 2006, 356-357). Interventions in 
Somalia, as such, have been mainly based on rather subjective (“Western”) views on political 
formation – views held by the more powerful actors and forces in international politics. 
All in all, since the early-1990s seventeen foreign-led attempts have been made to reconcile 
the Somali state (Walls, 2009a, 372). All of these interventions have (hitherto) been unsuccessful for 
a great variety of reasons (Bradbury, 2008, 47-49; Clarke & Gosende, 2003, 148-155; Lewis, 2008, 
77-85), but what seems to stand out is the fact that throughout these twenty-five years of 
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intervention maintaining the formal Somali state within the boundaries of decolonisation has 
ostensibly remained sacrosanct. For example, UN Resolution 2102 that established UNSOM again 
reaffirmed ‘its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of 
Somalia’ (UNSC, 2013), as to this day a central government within Somalia as a federal but singular 
state is pursued.  
From the late 1990s onwards, admittedly, a so-called “building block approach” to state-
building in Somalia was adopted, promoting ‘a decentralised state consisting of regions that have 
extensive power’ and suggesting that ‘Somalia should be federalised and that peace must be created 
locally before it can be achieved centrally’ (Hansen, 2003, 60). This “building block approach” would 
accommodate the fact that all around Somalia rudimentary governance structures and “grassroots” 
systems of order had already been established (Cornwell, 2004, 5), and anticipated that Somalia’s 
faction leaders could be called upon to create clan-based administrations eventually evolving into 
the organic federal components of the reunified Somali republic (Bryden, 1999, 135-140).  
Problematically, however, as the “building block approach” seems to have anchored the 
future of Somalia in a federalist vision (FGS), its adherents still appear to desire a single state within 
the territorial boundaries of Somalia. Additionally, one maintains a view of Somali governance as an 
externally imposed and “top-down” generated power-sharing arrangement between different 
“blocks” in a single government (Le Sage, 2005, 24). As the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2011) 
has argued, local ownership of governing processes has remained largely obstructed, and the 
international community has continued ‘its emphasis on restoring a European-style centralised state 
based in Mogadishu’ instead of ‘a much more decentralised system in which most power and 
resources are devolved to local administrations’ (p. 25). Furthermore, the international actors 
involved in the “building block” peace process have themselves been in competition with one 
another to see their own interests fulfilled (Menkhaus, 2007, 364), which has led to Somali actors 
perceiving this process as ‘a forum for political struggle rather than reconciliation and compromise’ 
(ICG, 2004, 12). The “building block approach” has in practice actually enabled certain tribal warlords 
to exploit its rhetoric and arrangements by gaining additional funds and power (Hansen, 2003, 60), 
as they proved very adept at manipulating the international intervention efforts to their own benefit 
(Cornwell, 2004, 4).  
Menkhaus (2004), therefore, notes that ‘it is... the process of state building which appears 
consistently to exacerbate instability and armed conflict’ (p. 18), or as Coyne (2006) puts it: 
 
one can make a strong argument that attempts by foreign governments to revitalise a 
central state since 1991 have only served to increase the level of armed conflict... While 
the aims of foreign powers to bring a central state to Somalia may be noble, these 
interventions have had the perverse outcome of inducing greater conflict and instability 
(p. 350). 
 
Indeed, although Somalia’s legal sovereignty has been deemed as contingent, the unitary legal state 
itself has not been. Somalia has been described as ‘a mere geographical expression, a black hole into 
which a failed polity has fallen’ (Rotberg, 2003b, 9), apparently dismissing other scholars who have 
observed Somalia’s many local authorities administering a degree of law and order. Many of such 
scholars have described ‘a system of governance within anarchy’ (Menkhaus, 1998, 222), 
endogenous networks and mechanisms of law-making and welfare provision (Coyne, 2006, 351-355; 
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Le Sage, 2005, 23-24), and a relatively flourishing informal economy (Little, 2003). Rotberg himself 
(2003b), actually, uses Somalia and Somaliland as an example of how sub-state actors can take over 
the position and activities of the former state after it has collapsed (p. 10).  
The collapse of Somalia, thus, might be better understood as a ‘culmination point’ in the 
struggle for political authority between different social forces – the point at which de facto 
sovereignty is decided and decisive – and thus not as the ending but merely as an exceptional 
moment in the continuous process of exercising de facto sovereignty (Raeymaekers, 2005, 6-7).  
As such, even more than the plethora of local political networks and informal frameworks of 
power in Somalia, the oxymoronic nature of the concept of contingent sovereignty seems most 
lucidly exemplified by Somaliland. While Somalia has experienced more than a dozen interventions 
in the past twenty-five years, all of which have failed to construct a unitary formal Somali state, the 
geopolitical anomaly of Somaliland is not legally recognised as a de jure state by the international 
community even though its de facto sovereignty is relatively effective. Moreover, it has established 
that political structure through local clan-based and low-cost peace initiatives rather than external 
interference. On the one hand, this latter assertion suggests that Somaliland has created its own 
manifestations of de facto sovereignty independently from any de jure sovereign (Westphalian) 
ideals or statuses; this geopolitical anomaly has decided on its own exception. On the other hand, 
the “grassroots” and apparently “peaceful” foundations of the creation of Somaliland seem to 
indicate that order and stability were actually established in this geopolitical anomaly without a true 
de facto sovereign decision. It is to this question of de facto sovereignty in Somaliland, therefore, 
that this chapter now turns its focus. 
 
Somaliland: Hybrid State or De Facto Sovereign?  
As mentioned before, the Republic of Somaliland was proclaimed in 1991 at a Somali National 
Movement conference in the town of Bur’o, after Siyyad Barre had fled Mogadishu and Somalia had 
de facto ceased to exist as a unitary state. It would be a misconception, however, to view the SNM 
as a traditional separatist movement that was established from the outset with the sole purpose of 
seceding from a de jure state. In reality, the SNM came into being as a diaspora movement, founded 
in Saudi-Arabia and London by Isaaq intellectuals in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Notably, it was 
never the intention of the SNM founders to establish their own independent state, or even to create 
a solely Isaaq movement. Rather, it aimed to dispose of the Barre regime in Mogadishu and 
subsequently retain the Somali union as a single de jure state (Bradbury, 2008, 60-61).  
Simultaneously, certain Isaaq professionals in Hargeysa (north-western Somalia’s main city) 
had set up some informal social welfare institutions and local protest groups to remedy some of the 
grievances brought about by the Barre regime. Initially, these groups and the SNM stayed largely 
unconnected, yet throughout the 1980s the SNM became increasingly dependent on the local Isaaq 
clan elders in north-western Somalia, particularly to provide it with contacts, materials, and 
legitimacy on the ground. These clan elders were at first merely given certain advisory roles in the 
SNM, but soon proved themselves indispensible for local logistical and political support. In fact, the 
clan elders seemed to have much more control over the armed militias in the region than the SNM 
itself (Renders, 2012, 60-75). While throughout the 1980s the SNM launched a series of guerrilla 
attacks on government installations in the north-west, as a rebel movement it remained relatively 
weak (Balthasar & Grzybowski, 2012, 150). 
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Following Barre’s bombing of Hargeysa and Bur’o in 1988, more and more Isaaq aligned with 
the SNM’s military and strategic causes, and the SNM consequently turned into a broader popular 
movement (Balthasar & Grzybowski, 2012, 150; Srebrik, 2004, 218; Walls, 2009a, 377). At the same 
time, however, Barre’s attacks left the SNM even more dispersed and weakened, and thus made 
them even more reliant on local communities and clan elders. Effectively, the SNM could no longer 
be seen as an integrated guerrilla force, but had instead split up into multiple clan-based units 
dependent on clan elders. The SNM thus became considered as ‘the Isaaq people up in arms’ 
(Prunier, 1990, 109), but thereby also transformed into little more than a symbolic referent for 
altogether quite independent guerrilla troops, who did not depend on the SNM but on the clan 
elders. As some former SNM officers have asserted: 
 
everything we had – men, vehicles, clothes, food, money – everything came from the clans 
(Dr. Aden Abokor, as cited in Richards, 2015, 6). 
 
[T]he SNM never had control over the Isaaq clans. It was the Isaaq clans who made up the 
SNM. It was them who gave SNM young men [and] guns (Abdulkadir Girde, as cited in 
Renders, 2012, 80). 
 
Gradually, the SNM became just one component within a popular uprising that was led by the clan 
elders, and by the time Barre’s centralised Somalia eventually collapsed in 1991, the SNM was left to 
its own devices in the north-west of the country ‘under the de facto control of the Isaaq elders’ (pp. 
79-80). 
Claims made by Srebrnik (2004), therefore, about the SNM receiving ‘widespread support 
from the Isaaq population for its demand for greater northern autonomy’ (p. 214), do not 
completely hold ground. Instead, it seems that the role of the SNM in expelling Barre’s central 
government forces from north-western Somalia should not be overstated. Whereas Bradbury (2008) 
argues that ‘the restoration of stability in Somaliland owes much to the existence of the SNM and 
the history of its struggle against the Siyyad Barre regime’ (pp. 60-61), and Richards (2015) finds that 
‘[t]hroughout its existence, the SNM maintained that the clan system was a building block of 
government in Somalia’ (p. 5), it actually seems that the Isaaq (sub-)clans and its elders were the 
ones to win the war in the north-west, thus forcing the SNM to align themselves with them.  
The SNM itself, actually, had made no provisions to establish an independent Somaliland 
administration after the war with Barre was won (Compagnon, 1998, 77). As a result, when Barre 
was finally defeated and the political future of the north-west had to be envisioned, the decision to 
proclaim the Somaliland Republic was not so much made by the SNM itself, but rather coerced upon 
them by the clan elders representing the SNM’s “rank-and-file” and the new state’s local populations 
(Höhne, 2011, 312). As such, the question arises on what grounds the clans and their leaders made a 
claim to independent statehood, and more importantly, why this claim even turned out to be 
successful. 
 
De Facto Sovereignty and Hybridity 
Given the SNM’s weakness, the guerrillas warring against Barre’s regime in north-western Somalia 
had become very clan-based. After Somalia’s collapse, consequently, the political landscape in the 
north-west could be characterised by clan institutions and roaming clan militias led by the clan 
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elders. Surprisingly, however, this did not instantaneously lead to violent and substantial clan feuds 
after Barre’s rule had been overthrown. Again, while Drysdale (2000) notes that the SNM saw clan 
institutions as useful, necessary and stabilising elements in a new government (p. 160), it in fact 
seems that it was largely through the efforts of the local clan elders themselves that a degree of 
peace between Isaaq clans (e.g. Habar Yunis, Habar Ja’lo) and non-Isaaq clans (e.g. Gadabursi, 
Dhulbahante, Warsengeli) was secured (Lewis, 2008, 75; Renders, 2012, 82-85; Walls, 2009a, 377-
379). As such, with regard to the issue of de facto sovereignty in north-western Somalia at the 
beginning of the 1990s, it seems that individual clan elders were the ones capable of both excluding 
central government Somali forces from the region, and establishing order in their communities. As 
Höhne (2011) observes, ‘Somaliland was not “born” as a... de facto state’ (p. 310).  
The SNM Conference in Bur’o in May 1991, then, was actually not initiated with a 
secessionist agenda in mind (Bradbury, 2008, 80). However, among the peoples and clans of the 
north-west, a strong sentiment existed against “the south” and in favour of separatism. As the 
conference was in session, major demonstrations in northern Somali towns ensued, and under 
increasing public pressure the Bur’o meeting promptly declared independence, claiming the 
boundaries of former British Somaliland. Altogether, this decision appeared mostly to reflect a 
pragmatic desire among Somaliland’s population for peace and reconstruction after protracted 
warfare (Lewis, 2008, 75; Renders, 2012, 91-92). Höhne (2011) argues that ‘secession was essentially 
a security measure. It created political distance from collapsing southern Somalia and provided 
people in the northwest with some political orientation and the incentive to halt the escalation of 
violence in the region’ (p. 313). It seems, as such, that the idea of independent statehood was not 
only founded on a certain historical precedent, but also on a deep-seated fatigue for inter-clan strife. 
As discussed above, however, independence was actually gained by the clans and their elders, and 
not at all through peaceful means; de facto sovereignty did not seem to exist at any centralised state 
level. 
 Yet, the clan elders in Somaliland were not simply the remnants of a pre-colonial past. These 
elders had played a major role in the war of independence, and some of them were thus closely 
connected to the SNM leadership. In 1989 already, the position of the clan elders in the SNM had 
been formalised through the establishment of an integrated clan council (guurti). What is more, the 
clan elders had become products of many decades of state-clan interactions, which made it easier 
for them to move beyond their pastoral contexts. They had become quite used to shifting between 
clan-based and state-based politics, and even though they did not rise towards effective leadership 
in the new state, they were indispensible in conceptualising and controlling it (Renders, 2012, 88-91; 
Richards, 2015, 9-11). Renders (2012) paints an insightful picture: 
 
What ensued... was a very particular political space... in which state-based and clan-based 
discourses and modes of action coexisted and interacted... [T]hey had coexisted and 
interacted since the introduction of the concept of a state in Somalia. What had changed 
was that now the clan elders were on top of the game (p. 91). 
 
As SNM Chairman Abdirahman Tuur was appointed at Bur’o as the first Somaliland 
president, he appeared to immediately realise that the real power in the new country, as well as his 
chances for political survival, lay with the Somaliland guurti. Bradbury (2008) again reiterates his 
conviction that ‘[i]n 1991 the SNM was the only organisation in Somaliland with sufficient authority 
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to establish law and order’ (p. 83), but he himself seems to immediately realise his conflation of legal 
authority and effective capacity (pp. 85-87). Although Tuur attempted to bring all of the former clan 
militias under his control, he never succeeded in these efforts of implementing certain elements of 
state centralisation, which actually invoked a period of military conflicts between several Isaaq sub-
clans. By the time these conflicts had come to some degree of resolution, the SNM had basically 
withered away, as Tuur had deliberately severed his ties to the movement, and the clan elders 
proved once more capable of consolidating their positions of power (Renders, 2012, 92-99). Again, 
while assertions have been made suggesting that the SNM ‘consented’ for the clan elders to 
reconcile between the fighting militias, framing it as a deliberate SNM ‘policy of peaceful 
coexistence’ (Bradbury, 2010, 125-126), others contend that it was the Somaliland guurti leading the 
peace process(es) following the inter-clan strife (Bradbury, Abokor & Yusuf, 2003, 459; Walls, 2009a, 
381-384). These clan-led peace initiatives culminated in ‘the watershed of peacemaking and political 
development in Somaliland’ (Renders, 2012, 100): the 1993 Borama Conference. 
At Borama, the SNM was officially disbanded and all of its powers transferred upon the 
guurti. As a result, the clan elders’ role in militia demobilisation and peacekeeping in the country was 
formalised, institutionalising their position in Somaliland governance. A Transitional Charter was 
devised that proposed the guurti as the highest governing body in the state (Upper House), with a 
lower House of Representatives, a President, and a Council of Ministers forming the other governing 
components (Bradbury, Abokor & Yusuf, 2003, 460-461). The elders at Borama elected Mohammed 
Ibrahim Egal as the new Somaliland president, which appeared to be a rather surprising move. Egal 
had been one of the architects of the Somali union in 1960, had then aligned himself with the Barre 
regime, and had denounced Somaliland independence. On the other hand, Egal had been prime 
minister of Somaliland in its five-day long spell of decolonised statehood in 1960, and was an 
experienced and well-respected statesman rather than some obscure guerrilla leader. In addition, by 
choosing Egal the guurti sidelined ex-SNM figures vying for top positions in government, while non-
Isaaq members of the guurti saw him as a “politician” rather than an Isaaq clan leader (Renders, 
2012, 100-104). 
Although, ironically, Egal would eventually marginalise the guurti as a force to be reckoned 
with in Somaliland politics, for the time being the central state government remained relatively 
powerless. Borama, as such, has been credited with establishing the image of Somaliland’s synergy 
of decentralised and centralised statehood (Bradbury, 2008, 97-100; Höhne, 2011, 314; Renders, 
2012, 115-117). It ostensibly epitomised the “hybridity” of Somaliland’s political order, signifying the 
amalgamation of “traditional” and “indigenous” forms of governance with “modern” and “state-
centric” modes; in recent years this hybridity has been championed by many (Balthasar, 2015; 
Höhne, 2013; Renders, 2012; Richards, 2015; Walls & Kibble, 2010).  
It would be a misunderstanding, however, to equate this notion of hybridity with the 
absence of a de facto sovereign, or to present it as an example of disaggregated (Foucauldian) power 
relationships. Instead, Somaliland’s hybridity as a geopolitical anomaly seems more accurately 
understood as a political space in which on multiple critical occasions decisions were made and 
order was restored, while simultaneously adhering to quite a strong “Westphalian” ideal for the new 
country. For instance, if we want to hail the SNM as a contributor to Somaliland gaining 
independence, it might be not so much in its actual material role in the people’s struggle, but 
perhaps more so as a provider of a normative framework symbolising peaceful clan coexistence and 
centralised statehood (Lewis, 2008, 94; Bradbury, 2008, 72; see also Samatar, 1997). Even if 
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effectively such central statehood remained mostly an ideal in the early years of Somaliland’s 
existence, state-based discourses in Somaliland did not disappear. 
Still, in those days it was the “traditional” power structures maintained by the clan elders 
‘that rose up during times of crisis’, thereby consolidating their formal role in Somaliland 
government (Richards, 2015, 12). As former government minister Mohamed Said Gees confirms, 
‘[t]he guurti was the seed... that the current administration was built on. Because of them, we have 
rule of law, order and a social system. They were absolutely necessary for statebuilding’ (as cited in 
Richards, 2015, 11). Or, in other words: 
 
Remarkably, Somaliland’s national heroes, the ones who are remembered as having 
defeated Siyyad Barre and birthed the nation, are not the guerrilla fighters or the political 
cadres of the Somali National Movement. Somaliland’s national heroes are by general 
consensus the clan elders (Renders, 2012, 87). 
 
In spite of Somaliland’s hybridity as a polity, thus, the de facto sovereign capacity to decide on the 
exception(s) never “dissolved” or “perished” from the region; it merely resided with individual clan 
elders who became increasingly drawn into a central governing structure. However, after Egal’s 
ascendance into the presidency that situation changed, as he gradually managed to become the 
single most powerful figure in Somaliland politics. Notably, from a de facto sovereignty perspective, 
that was perhaps also a necessary consequence of the incorporation of the clan elders into a central 
guurti, which assumingly required a powerful figure creating stability between clan elements at the 
state level. Indeed, the post-Borama period saw its share of conflict between different (sub-)clan 
militias, from which Egal emerged as the new de facto sovereign entity of Somaliland. 
 
A New De Facto Sovereign 
Immediately after his presidential installation at the Borama conference, Egal began to try and 
demobilise the remaining clan militias and integrate them into a Somaliland National Army. 
Furthermore, he saw the expansion of government control over public infrastructure (such as roads, 
airport, and ports) as crucial for the sustainability of central state control over Somaliland. In order 
to achieve these aspirations, Egal managed to garner a significant amount of funding through his 
connections with certain wealthy businessmen abroad, most of which belonged to Egal’s Habar Awal 
sub-clan. With this financial assistance from his own clan, Egal succeeded in mustering support from 
a considerable number of other clan elders, and in creating a nationalised Somaliland army 
(Bradbury, 2008, 112-114; Lewis, 2008, 95-96). That army would prove useful very soon, as in early 
1994 it managed to defeat a small armed group refusing Egal’s claim of central state ownership over 
Hargeysa airport. That conflict, however, turned out to be a mere prelude to a broader inter-clan 
strife, with elements from the Habar Yunis and ‘Idagalle (sub-)clans clashing with government forces 
and Habar Ja’lo fighters (Höhne, 2011, 314-316; Renders, 2012, 126-135). 
Instead of weakening Egal, however, the mid-nineties conflict in Somaliland turned out to 
only strengthen his central government (Bradbury, 2008, 121). The leadership of the military units 
opposing Egal was very unclear, as they themselves were divided on whether to merely depose Egal 
or to incorporate Somaliland in a re-unified Somalia. Most importantly, however, the crisis in the 
country gave Egal the opportunity to invoke a state of emergency, enabling him to replace certain 
clan elders in the guurti with local government officials. Furthermore, the ongoing conflict at Bur’o 
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helped Egal to convince the guurti to prolong his presidential mandate until peace had been 
secured. Utilising the increased financial, political, and military resources at his disposal, Egal 
managed to form a governing coalition of clans and subordinate the “clan factor” in Somaliland 
politics (p. 124). Although he had gathered these resources mainly through connections with his own 
clan, he deliberately included other clan networks in his state structure. As a result, whereas the war 
seemed mostly fought along clan lines, most Somalilanders increasingly appeared to perceive these 
conflicts as “political” instead of clan-based struggles – a perception that was happily perpetuated 
by Egal. He propagated a sentiment of “Somaliland nationalism” and increasingly vilified “anti-
Somaliland” external forces like UNOSOM II and Puntland (Renders, 2012, 138-151); I will return to 
these two factors later on in this chapter. 
At the conclusion of the conflict, Egal had succeeded in placing himself at the centre of 
peace processes and state consolidation. Steering any attempt at peace-making away from clan-
based initiatives, peace and stability were established very much according to Egal’s terms. The 
Hargeysa Conference that brought the peace processes to an end in 1997, therefore, was subjected 
to fierce criticisms for ostensibly dismissing the clans, yet it simultaneously signified a shift of the (de 
facto sovereign) capacity to sustain order from these individual clan leaders onto a centralised 
governing structure (Bradbury, Abokor & Yusuf, 2003, 461-462).  
Unlike the Borama conference, “Hargeysa” was paid for by the central government, which 
was also heavily involved in choosing conference delegates. Also, the guurti had by now become a 
component of the government, instead of the institution that defined and controlled it. Egal, thus, 
was able to manipulate the conference in his favour, and was re-elected as president without any 
difficulty (Renders, 2012, 154-156). As Bradbury (2008) concludes: 
 
[i]n many respects Egal’s first term in office had been a failure... Nevertheless, despite the 
social and physical damage caused by the civil war, this period ended, by and large, with a 
stronger government and a more integrated country than had existed in 1993... The 
agreements reached at the 1997 Hargeysa conference ushered in six years of 
uninterrupted stability (p. 127). 
 
After Hargeysa, Egal started to try and build local government administrations and institutions as a 
way to expand and strengthen state control. In doing so, however, he still very much relied on local 
clan elders who already had a prominent role in upholding local stability and security.  In some 
sense, thus, the hybrid political order of Somaliland remained and resembled some form of 
‘mediated statehood’ (Menkhaus, 2008), as the everyday maintenance of public order was laid in 
the hands of local clan elders and customary law (xeer).  
On the other hand, although those clan-facilitated peace and security arrangements seemed 
to largely function without central government interference, they were initiated on a rather ad hoc 
basis (Renders, 2012, 159-161). Moreover, in some sense the outsourcing of security maintenance 
merely worked to mask the transition of de facto political control from the clan leaders to the 
central government, as the latter still retained the capacity ‘to intervene in cases when political 





Furthermore, by that same time the Somaliland economy had really begun to flourish, and 
along with more centralised means to accrue tax revenue and (minimal) international aid, Egal’s 
opportunities for gathering resources to build his government had enhanced significantly (Höhne, 
2011, 318-319). According to Le Sage, ‘Egal…was able to run the Somaliland government as a 
combined mechanism for profit, patronage, and protection racketeering’ (as cited in Renders, 2012, 
156). Egal could now simply buy allegiance from clan elders and political opponents. Masterfully 
manipulating the clan factor in Somaliland politics – dividing government positions equally among 
different clans while regularly reshuffling these positions so that no ministerial department could 
become dominated by a single clan – Egal demonstrated that he was the one regulating access into 
central state institutions.  
This prerogative was further enhanced by the Hargeysa Conference’s proposal for a new 
constitution, which would replace the clan-based system of representation with a multi-party 
democratic system. The clans and their leaders had been pivotal in the early stages of Somaliland’s 
political development, but now more and more they had lost their legitimacy as the political actors 
capable of developing Somaliland any further (pp. 156-159). As Ahmed Silanyo argues, ‘in the end... 
one needs a modern government and a modern state: the use of traditional structures was only 
justified in terms of the reactivation and the revival of the modern structures that existed before 
state collapse’ (as cited in Renders, 2012, 158). 
Indeed, the people in Somaliland were purposefully demanding centralised statehood, 
seemingly convinced that a “modern” government would be better capable of providing welfare 
services and security than “traditional” clan-based modes of politics (Renders, 2012, 154). Again, 
thus, certain state ideals remained quite prominent in Somaliland’s political mindset, yet Egal’s 
capacity to repeatedly restore order when conflict erupted, and to increasingly centralise political 
power within a state structure, shows us that the de facto sovereign decision on the exception 
remained the most important foundation for the existence and sustainability of Somaliland as a 
state-like entity.  
Somaliland’s first local democratic elections in February 2002 were preceded by increasing 
political tensions between Egal’s supporters and his opposition, yet the election itself successfully 
took place without any noteworthy incidents. More significantly, when Egal eventually passed away 
just a few months after the elections, Somaliland’s political landscape remained remarkably quiet 
and orderly (Bradbury, 2008, 131-136; Renders, 2012, 198-223). Egal’s successor, Dahir Riyale Kahin, 
seemed to able to just pick up where Egal had left off. The de facto sovereign in Somaliland had been 
replaced, but apparently de facto sovereignty itself remained firmly positioned in the polity’s 
centralised governing body. 
In the post-Egal decade, Somaliland has appeared to have held on to its de facto sovereignty 
as a geopolitical anomaly. After the 2002 local elections and Kahin’s inauguration as president, 
Somaliland proceeded on its path to more democratisation and institutional maturation. The multi-
party democracy and the new constitution replaced clan-based political mechanisms (at least 
juridically) and the 2002 elections formed the official entry-point for three new political parties: the 
UDUB party founded by Egal and his government, Kulmiye led by opposition leader Mohammed 
Silanyo, and the UCID party of Faysal Waraabe. Since then, these parties have competed in two 
presidential elections (2003, 2010), a parliamentary election (2005), and another local election 
(2012), each of which has seen its level of preceding tensions and unrest followed by surprisingly 
peaceful and orderly election days and power transitions.  
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The two presidential elections are particularly remarkable in this respect. In 2003, election 
result margins were incredibly narrow, leading to widespread confusion around who – Kahin or 
Silanyo – had won the election. However, in spite of this potentially destabilising uncertainty, 
protests against the election outcome remained relatively small. On the one hand, Silanyo himself 
reiterated the general population’s – and his own – desire to “keep the peace”, while the Kahin 
government invoked emergency laws to prevent such an outbreak of public disorder (Bradbury, 
2008, 194-195; Renders, 2012, 245-248). For some, furthermore, ‘the lack of public protest... 
reflect[ed] the limited power of political entrepreneurs to mobilise the public’ (Bradbury, Abokor & 
Yusuf, 2003, 469-471), again implying that power in Somaliland had become increasingly centralised 
in a single de facto sovereign body (politic). Clan-based mechanisms to regulate struggles for political 
power did not disappear fully, but the multi-party system did unsettle the clan-factor in Somaliland 
politics, ironically making Somaliland a more ‘closed political system’ (Renders, 2012, 255).  
The 2010 presidential election was repeatedly postponed due to civil and institutional unrest 
and misgivings over the fairness and openness of the to-be-held election (Walls, 2009b; Walls & 
Kibble, 2011a), with some characterising Somaliland politics as a ‘largely “securocratic” or semi-
authoritarian model’ (Kibble & Walls, 2012, 41). When the election did eventually take place, 
however, the resulting presidential transition from Kahin to Silanyo proceeded with surprisingly little 
effort (Renders, 2012, 258; Walls & Healy, 2010).  
 
Somaliland: Centralised or Decentralised? 
For Walls (2009b), ‘the Somali tradition of dialogue and consensus-building’ remains the 
fundamental reason behind the peaceful resolution of crises such as these (p. 2). I argue, however, 
that Somaliland’s oft-heralded normative foundations of peaceful clan cooperation and involvement 
more seemingly remain fragile and reliant on a de facto sovereign ability to intervene in moments of 
crisis and conflict. As Walls and Kibble (2010) find, ‘customary clan-based structures have generally 
proven to be a stabilising influence’, yet ‘tensions between state, clans, territory and nation... may 
still undermine that stability’ (p. 52).  
Given the relatively young age of Somaliland’s political parties, for example, it remains 
tempting to perceive them in some sense merely as ‘clan turfs’ exacerbating ‘the fissions and 
fragmenting nature of the kinship system’ (Fadal, 2012, 46). Certainly, earlier elections in particular 
generally witnessed voting along clan lines, and political parties remained almost indistinguishable 
except on personal and clan differences (Bradbury, Abokor & Yusuf, 2003, 468). Additionally, local 
elections in 2012 actually exposed rather intransigent clan tensions underlying political disputes. 
After these most recent elections, particularly in Somaliland’s fringe regions, ‘events... arguably 
show a shift from the usual mix of politics and kinship towards a situation that is increasingly taking 
the form of a primarily inter-clan standoff’ (Kibble & Walls, 2013, 30). In introducing and sustaining a 
multi-party democratic system, thus, it may appear that Somaliland has moved beyond being an 
Isaaq “ethnocracy” (Srebrnik, 2004, 219), but inter-clan and intra-Isaaq relations, as well as 
interplays between clanship and central governance, remain tense. 
 For instance, through his study towards certain members of Somaliland’s returning diaspora 
population, Hansen (2013) exposes the ambivalence towards “traditional” and so-called “modern” 
elements in Somaliland’s social and political system. According to him, this group of returnees, who 
have lived in Western-Europe and North-America for many decades and are relatively well-
educated, is trying to impose a Westphalian ideal upon Somaliland’s social and political framework 
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through a critique of the usage of khat, a mild stimulant consumed daily by most of Somaliland’s 
men. These returnees point to the widespread consumption of khat as an indicator of the 
shortcomings of traditional clan structures and processes, arguing that ‘educated people like 
themselves, rather than uneducated clan leaders, should govern Somaliland, as what is needed in 
the political and developmental process is precisely what they embody – knowledge of and 
experience from Western democracies’ (p. 144). 
Richards (2015) actually does not regard such tensions between “tradition” and “modernity” 
in Somaliland as destabilising, but rather as a ‘flexible and responsive state-building process’, arguing 
that in situations of political crisis the traditional and non-state elements of Somaliland’s political 
structure can ‘fill the gaps when the government is weak, absent, or vulnerable’ (p. 16). Some 
thinkers, indeed, maintain that Somaliland’s central state institutions are relatively fragile, allowing 
civil society, traditional actors, and informal structures of governance to capture a large and very 
visible role in people’s everyday lives (Bradbury, 2008, 172-173; Walls & Kibble, 2011b, 343). Others 
reiterate such a stance, arguing that a lack of central governmental resources has reduced incentives 
for clan leaders to try and forcefully challenge central state power (Harris & Foresti, 2011, 17). In 
such lines of thinking, ‘the notion of a Somaliland state appears to be rooted in the popular 
consciousness, rather than imposed from above’, making Somaliland’s political order more 
representative and enhancing its popular legitimacy (Bradbury, Abokor & Yusuf, 2003, 475).  
At the same time, however, multiple discrepancies seem to remain between norms, ideals, 
and practices of (Westphalian) statehood, and those around clan traditions of coexistence and 
peacefulness. Höhne (2013), in fact, characterises Somaliland as ‘a “crippled” hybrid order that 
advances neither effective democracy nor strong traditional governance’ (p. 213). As such, Renders 
(2012) asks whether perhaps ‘Somaliland’s hybridity has... turned the wrong way’, as the clan 
element has remained part of Somaliland politics but now merely serves ‘the interests of an 
increasingly narrow political... elite’ (p. 264).  
On the one hand, the argument goes that the institutionalisation of clans and their elders 
into central governing bodies (beel system) has impeded the establishment of an inclusive and fully 
representative democracy, and makes that central government too amenable to “clanism” (Hashi, 
2005, 2; Kaplan, 2008, 151). Hersi (2012) contends that the ‘politicisation of the guurti’ through its 
transformation from a ‘traditional house’ into a central government institution ‘has compromised 
[its] legitimacy... and authority... in society’. He even calls, therefore, for a dismantling or restriction 
of the guurti’s power(s) in order to again ‘foster traditional, inclusive clan representation’ (p. 117). 
However, he thereby overlooks the fact that the guurti was already exactly set up with that purpose 
before its incorporation into a (de facto sovereign) central state structure. Clan elders were in fact 
the initial drivers of democracy in Somaliland, but are now considered to be largely powerless and 
ineffectual outside the context of central state politics.  
It seems, as such, that de facto sovereignty in Somaliland cannot be concealed behind 
notions of either traditional egalitarian clan-based customs and politics, or so-called “modern” 
Westphalian state discourses. Instead, the fact that neither democracy nor local and informal clan 
arrangements are considered to be particularly strong more convincingly suggests the existence of a 
de facto sovereign entity. Alternatively, the two different political frameworks – “modern” and 
“traditional” – that supposedly converge into a hybrid political order can more accurately be 




The case of Somaliland... illustrates that the traditional system based on local 
communities and customary law and the state system based on democratic principles and 
statutory law merge at best for the sake of convenience on a temporary basis. While such 
blending of systems of authority may in fact lead to an increase in legitimacy of the hybrid 
political order for some time, such orders never are in balance for long. Usually one side 
takes the lead to the detriment of the other (Höhne, 2013, 213). 
 
Hersi’s argument for a return to a ‘separation of modernity and tradition’ (Hersi, 2012, 117), then, 
may actually merely imply a re-instigation of conflict over who exercises de facto sovereignty over 
Somaliland. Indeed, ‘it is entirely possible that creation of hybrid institutional orders may lead to 
competition rather than cooperation’, which can only be remedied by ‘[a] common grounding’ (a de 
facto sovereign) that is capable of avoiding and resolving conflicts between ‘different realms of 
authority and decision making’ (Harris & Foresti, 2011, 8).  
 That is not to say, notably, that it is this chapter’s aim to legitimise any authoritarian or 
oppressive elements of Somaliland’s de facto sovereignty. Somaliland is not paradise, and many 
actors have raised legitimate issues about Somaliland’s human rights record (Albin-Lackey, 2009; 
Yusuf & Bradbury, 2012). Up until the introduction of the multi-party system, for instance, women 
had basically been excluded from political participation (Renders, 2012, 157), and gender equality 
and women’s empowerment remains a pressing issue for Somaliland’s socio-political environment 
(Jama 2012). Bryden (2003), furthermore, observes that ordinary Somalilanders are ‘hostages to 
peace’ (p. 363), implying that the Somaliland population might be ‘less likely to challenge 
questionable practices of the government for fear of destabilising a hard-won peace’ (Harris & 
Foresti, 2011, 18). As Albin-Lackey (2009) confirms: 
 
there are... severe limits to public willingness to openly challenge government actions for 
fear of threatening Somaliland’s hard-won peace and stability or damaging its chances of 
international recognition. The president and his party have successfully exploited this 
widespread aversion to direct confrontation to occupy a space well past the legal limits of 
their power but short of what would trigger real public anger (p. 4). 
 
Others, however, argue that this is ‘the flipside of a coin which on the other hand also 
helped forward a process which has led to prolonged stability’ (Walls, 2011). To be sure, perhaps 
justified criticisms on ‘the presidency’s consistent and brazen refusal to abide by the rule of law’ 
(Albin-Lackey, 2009, 3), or potentially correct observations that the legal and constitutional 
constraints to presidential power ‘are frequently swept aside and ignored’ (p. 4), also have to come 
to terms with the fact that those critiques simultaneously portray the de facto sovereign capacity 
both to decide what constitutes an exceptional situation and how to restore (the de facto 
sovereign’s) normality.  
Certainly, any “bad behaviour” by Somaliland’s central government might end up 
compromising its own de facto sovereignty, as it might lead to internal challenges to, and potentially 
the removal of, its de facto sovereignty. It remains not only imprudent, but more importantly, 
counter-effective for the Silanyo administration to mistreat, neglect, or oppress its citizens. So far, 
however, it seems that that point of crisis has been avoided or decided upon by the de facto 
sovereign entity that is Somaliland. Harris and Foresti (2011) even suggest that Somaliland’s de facto 
sovereignty has actually enhanced its capacity to provide key public goods to its population (p. 10). 
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The central government’s tendencies ‘to sacrifice civil liberties in the name of security’ (Kaplan, 
2008, 151) may certainly be lamentable, but that security is also often praised as one of Somaliland’s 
assets. Walls and Kibble (2010) ascribe that stability to Somaliland’s “unique” fusion of kinship and 
“modern” statehood, but above paragraphs have already indicated that such a hybrid order cannot 
truly replace unitary de facto sovereign power. 
Instead, Balthasar (2013) concludes that Somaliland is ‘not solely established on “bottom-
up” processes and “grassroots” democracy’, but appears to be more shaped by ‘“top-down” policies 
and elitist power politics’ (p. 231): 
 
Somaliland’s “best kept secret” lies less with the commonly emphasised processes of 
reconciliation and consensus-based governance driven by “traditional authorities” than 
with the shrewd politics and war projects that underpinned its state-making endeavour 
(p. 218). 
 
While clan leaders and traditional authorities might play a role in Somaliland’s security order, those 
local arrangements are only made possible as the central government’s de facto sovereignty 
compels those actors ‘to participate in a collaborative form of policing’ (Balthasar & Grzybowski, 
2012, 168). Furthermore, these “sub-state” actors may have been instrumental in clan disarmament 
and reconciliation, but have proved just as likely to mobilise (sub-)clans for conflict (pp. 166-167).  
The (sub-)clans in Somaliland, then, may perhaps be capable of creating peace in their own 
communities, yet simultaneously remain reliant on a de facto sovereign decision at the centralised 
state level in occasions where these clans come into conflict with one another; Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of governmentalities and its relationship to de facto sovereignty comes to mind 
here. Leonard and Samantar (2011), for instance, maintain that in Somaliland “social contracts” are 
negotiated between collectivities (clans), yet also concede that while these kinship groups might be 
effective at sustaining order within the clan, “social contracts” between them are nullified in 
extreme or conflictual circumstances. As such, these thinkers may be correct in contending that 
‘[legal] [s]tatelessness does not automatically mean disorder’, but fall in a familiar trap by confusing 
that absence of de jure sovereignty with a lack of de facto sovereignty. Peace in Somaliland is not in 
the first place derived from ‘[s]tructured interactions…through extended families’ (p. 577), those 
interactions are shaped by Somaliland’s de facto sovereign statehood. 
For Höhne (2011), still, the most remarkable contributions to Somaliland’s achievements as 
a geopolitical anomaly remain: 
 
the countless, everyday practices and decisions of ordinary people who increasingly left 
their guns at home when tensions arose, tolerated power-hungry and corrupt leaders 
patiently, worked for slow but steady transitions of the system of government, endured 
economic hardship due to lack of resources and non-recognition, and relied on self-help 
and their relatives abroad rather than on help from the government or the international 
community (pp. 336-337). 
 
Such norms and practices of toleration and peacefulness have undoubtedly aided Somaliland to 
become the extraordinary political enterprise that it is today. However, it seems that Somaliland’s 
extraordinariness is not so much derived from those ideals and activities, but that these are instead 




Somaliland: De Jure Statehood or De Facto Statehood? 
Naturally, the reasons and processes behind Somaliland’s existence and development as a political 
entity remain very complex. While its de facto sovereign capacity has been most fundamental, there 
are various other conditions and circumstances that have played a part in Somaliland’s relative 
stability and success (Bradbury, 2008, 90-95; Bradbury, Abokor & Yusuf, 2003, 462). Again, this 
chapter’s subordination of norms of clan coexistence and “modern” statehood to de facto 
sovereignty, for example, should not be interpreted as an assumption that such norms are in 
themselves completely irrelevant for polity-building in Somaliland.  
It should be noted, however, that Somaliland’s de facto sovereignty and its self-established 
Westphalian ideal of stability-through-statehood also clash with one another. On the one hand, 
Höhne (2009) finds that ‘the (partly deceptive) imitation and representation of contemporary 
standards of statehood and nationhood... strongly contributed to institution building in 
[Somaliland]’, and that they ‘play a role in the ongoing processes of identity formation and nation 
building’ (p. 254). Here, it seems, norms of differentiation from (southern) Somalia, to not devolve 
into a similarly violent state of affairs but instead build a “modern” Westphalian state, have 
functioned as the friend/enemy distinction involved in the de facto sovereign creation of a political 
order. Yet, at the same time, Somaliland’s de facto sovereignty does not appear universal; Bradbury 
(2008) asserts that by 2005 the Hargeysa government could confidently claim civil administration 
and control of 80 percent of the country, but that obviously also means that Somaliland’s presumed 
de facto sovereignty does not extend over its entire claimed territory (pp. 231-232). 
Hargeysa’s relationship with Somaliland’s eastern regions (Sool and Sanaag) has been very 
problematic, and these regions’ integration into the central political order remains slow and 
unsteady. Whereas they are partly inhabited by Isaaq sub-clans, non-Isaaq clans (Dhulbahante, 
Warsengeli) also have a large presence. These clans may have managed to construct tentatively 
peaceful relationships between one another, but their connections to Somaliland’s central political 
structure are very divergent. During Egal’s presidency, the Isaaq clans in Sool and Sanaag were 
successfully integrated in Somaliland’s government and army (Renders & Terlinden, 2010, 739-740), 
yet in those areas controlled by Dhulbahante and Warsengeli clans ‘any claim to governance from 
Hargeysa was just nominal’ (Renders, 2012, 179). The existence of Somaliland has been tacitly 
acknowledged (p. 105), and central “state” law in principle prevails over other local arrangements (p. 
112), but de facto presence of the government in these regions seems no more than skeletal (p. 
181). As a result, Sool and Sanaag are characterised by ‘a failure to develop a meaningful degree of 
supra-clan governance’, as the centralised state role in local inter-clan disputes is ‘limited to the 
facilitation of ad hoc consensus building between the sub-clans’ (Renders & Terlinden, 2010, 741). 
To make things more complicated, as Somaliland’s political control over its eastern fringe 
remains weak, those areas are now also claimed by bordering Puntland. Established in 1998, that 
political entity is, notably, not striving for independence, but for autonomy within a federal state of 
Somalia (Gaas, 2014). Höhne (2011), therefore, even contends that ‘the conflict between the two 
administrations in the north is not about land or resources, but about political vision’ (p. 329). 
Although Sool and Sanaag are spatially and politically peripheral to both Somaliland and Puntland, 
they are strategically important for both entities. For the former, the old colonial boundaries of 
British Somaliland remain a vital component of its legitimisation of independent statehood and de 
jure recognition, while the latter attempts to undermine these arguments by challenging those 
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boundaries (Renders, 2012, 194-195). The Puntland administration even went so far as to establish 
its own governors and security forces to work alongside Somaliland officials in Sool and Sanaag, as 
neither polity has gained political control over the regions (p. 185).  
From time to time, Somaliland’s border dispute with Puntland has turned violent, partly due 
to repeated international attempts at re-installing the Somali union, yet it has remained without any 
decisive result. Höhne (2007a) refers to the Sool/Sanaag/Puntland issue as a ‘Gordian knot’ – an 
‘intractable problem’ that can only be ‘solved by a bold stroke’ – ostensibly implying that this dispute 
requires a de facto sovereign decision, but none has been made so far. Borderland communities 
have suffered from the continuous instability in the contested territories (Höhne 2011, 329), as Sool 
and Sanaag now ostensibly constitute ‘a buffer zone between two entities, without clearly defined 
sovereignty’ (Battera, 1999, 12). In a somewhat circular fashion, therefore, due to the weakness of 
Somaliland’s de facto sovereignty in the east, the political status of those regions remains 
undecided, which leads to difficulty in building effective local political power structures tied to the 
central state (Renders & Terlinden, 2010, 741). 
It seems, then, that the political manifestations of Somaliland have certainly benefited from 
strong Westphalian ideals, yet those ideals of universal de facto sovereignty over a clearly defined 
territory also weaken its claim to independent statehood. Somaliland partly grounds that claim in its 
former territorial arrangements as a British protectorate and its few days of full independence, yet 
abiding by such ideals may also hamper its endeavour towards de jure recognition. As Harris and 
Foresti (2011) state, ‘insistence on the incorporation of the entirety of former British Somaliland has 
resulted in clear challenges for Somaliland’s... institutions of governance’ (p. 18). The situation in 
Sool and Sanaag remains a contentious issue in the broader discussion around Somaliland’s potential 
graduation into de jure statehood. At the same time, however, it seems clear that Somaliland’s 
troubled claim to universal de facto sovereignty over territory is certainly not unique (for instance, 
see Herbst, 2000), and that it therefore also serves as an example of the artificial nature of any de 
jure recognition of state territory. While the question of recognition of Somaliland perhaps remains 
impossible to ignore, Somaliland may also be seen as a challenge to the entire ideal and concept of 
international legal recognition. 
 
Somaliland and De Jure Recognition 
Almost no one trying to assess and analyse Somaliland is able to escape the issue of international 
legal recognition. As with so many other geopolitical anomalies, not only does it remain a pivotal 
issue for Somaliland’s future, it also retains a great influence on its manifestations to this day. 
Arguments against its de jure independence sound familiar, such as a wish to sustain Somalia’s 
territorial integrity, and a fear of opening a “Pandora’s Box” of countless secessionist attempts in 
Africa and elsewhere (Hoyle, 2000, 85; Samatar & Samatar, 2005, 123). In addition, Bradbury (2008) 
asks whether Somaliland is sufficiently economically viable to meet all costs that “modern” well-
functioning statehood would entail, or ‘whether recognition of its independence would leave it 
eternally dependent on international largesse’ (p. 253). As mentioned earlier, criticisms have also 
been made towards Somaliland’s upholding of certain human rights (Freedom House, 2014; Human 
Rights Watch, 2012), while the Somaliland political system has been described as tainted by 
corruption (Bradbury, 2008, 239-240). Finally, Somaliland’s colonial history and momentary 
encounter with de jure independence is not always seen as legitimate ground for its current claim to 
de jure statehood (Bryden, 2003, 342). Aside from such considerations, specific political 
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deliberations and pragmatic calculations by countries in both Somaliland’s neighbourhood and 
further afield remain a general obstacle to de jure status (Arieff, 2008, 68). 
However, among those writing about Somaliland, argumentation in favour of juridical 
recognition (or at least a discontent with the lack thereof) seems to be more omnipresent. Over the 
past decade, several news media have reported on Somaliland in positive terms (Gettleman 2007; 
Jeffrey 2015; Lacey 2006; McConnell & Mahon 2010), while Somaliland has been described as ‘[t]he 
little country that could’ (Shinn, 2002) and as ‘Africa’s best kept secret’ (Jhazbhay, 2003). 
Somaliland’s relatively well-established democratic system, its economic resilience, and its 
comparative peace and stability are repeatedly brought up as efforts to be rewarded with de jure 
status (Bradbury, 2008, 3-8; Kaplan, 2008, 152; Srebrnik, 2004, 223-226). Even the African Union has 
apparently ‘evaluated the case of Somaliland favourably’ (Höhne, 2011, 335), asserting that the issue 
of Somaliland recognition is ‘unique and self-justified in African political history’ and that it therefore 
‘should not be linked to the notion of “opening a Pandora’s Box”’ (AU, 2005). 
Also from a purely legalistic viewpoint, the idea of legal Somaliland statehood remains 
compelling for many. Already early on in its existence, Carroll and Rajagopal (1993) utilised an 
analysis of international, colonial, and Somali legal practices, principles, and arrangements to 
support their call for the de jure recognition of Somaliland. As suggested above, furthermore, 
Somaliland itself contests the uti possidetis-principle as a legal arrangement protecting Somalia’s 
territorial integrity, arguing that the new country would be a mere continuation of the old colonial 
territorial divisions (Arieff, 2008, 68).  
Additionally, Somaliland’s claims to legal independence are bolstered by what Hoyle (2000) 
calls the ‘human rights imperative’, arguing that Barre’s violence against the Isaaq in the late 1980s 
gives Somaliland a juridical right to statehood (p. 84). Moreover, in ‘the most detailed legal analysis 
of Somaliland’s claim for recognition’ (Höhne, 2011, 335), Schoiswohl (2004) contends that a new 
political entity which emerges out of a collapsed state and proves a sufficient degree of continuous 
stability could, albeit in theory, acquire legal statehood recognition (pp. 48-58). For many in 
Somaliland, indeed, a “return” to Somalia seems no option (Bradbury, 2008, 253). Jhabzay (2003), 
therefore, indignantly asks whether ‘emerging democracies [will] be supported, and allowed to 
breathe, or will the plug be pulled on the patient by neglect and diplomatic purgatory’ (p. 81)? 
Yet, statements such as these may also uncover certain problematic connotations of the 
whole discussion on de jure recognition of Somaliland – and de jure recognition in general. Qualifying 
Somaliland as a “patient” not only seemingly ignores the political attainments it has made, but more 
fundamentally, also seems to imply that Somaliland is reliant on a certain “caregiver”. As, 
presumably, any relationship of care inherently signifies a relationship of power and subjectivity, 
questions can be raised about the connection of such power relationships to the issue of de jure 
recognition. Such questions would touch upon postmodern debates around post-colonialism, neo-
imperialism, and the universality of Western liberal values – debates that this thesis has only 
implicitly addressed so far – in assessing the nature of legal recognition, geopolitical anomalies, and 
international law in general.  
In the context of this chapter, for example, perhaps even those international (mainly 
Western) reports that speak enthusiastically about Somaliland’s achievements and call for its legal 
independence should be consulted with certain trepidation, because Somaliland appears exactly 
testament to the fact that local, self-regulated, and indigenous attempts at constructing a political 
community without external involvement can work relatively well. In other words, while colonial 
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administrator Douglas Jardine (1925) described British Somaliland as the ‘Cinderella of the Empire’ 
(p. 100) – as an ugly duckling – the fact that it is now slowly being championed as a princess or a 
beautiful swan (as a great example of indigenous polity-building) might be considered as equally 
patronising and problematic. 
 
Somaliland as a Geopolitical Anomaly? 
Some arguments, then, in some sense circumvent the question of legal recognition as they try and 
inquire whether Somaliland might actually be better off without juridical statehood. Such arguments 
usually run as follows: Somaliland has managed to create a relatively functioning political entity, not 
so much despite the fact that throughout its existence it has largely had to fend for itself, but 
because of it. International legal recognition, therefore, would apparently actually have a negative 
impact on circumstances and processes both in Somaliland and in the wider region. Many 
Somalilanders themselves believe that the region’s success is due to the fact that the international 
community has barely been involved in its polity-building process; the advances that have been 
made are more sustainable because they are institutionally locally based. Such sentiments are 
mirrored by non-Somali thinkers, who find that Somaliland’s ‘own particular brand of democracy’ 
has carried the political entity a long way (Walls & Healy, 2010, 2). 
Admittedly, de jure recognition would endow people in Somaliland with certain desirable 
rights and privileges, such as the right to travel freely and to engage in global politico-economic 
arrangements and processes more easily (Höhne, 2011, 335). Foreign investors are presently very 
reluctant to become involved in a supposedly “lawless” region without any international legal status, 
and Somaliland’s currency remains unaccepted abroad (Arieff, 2008, 63). Melik (2009) also speaks of 
‘rich reserves of natural resources’ that can apparently only be exploited when Somaliland obtains 
legal recognition. Conversely, however, some predict that recognition may also lead to certain 
problems. It might be argued, for instance, that Somaliland’s peripheral conflicts with Puntland in 
the Sool and Sanaag areas have so far remained relatively calm because the ambiguous boundaries 
of today have not yet been solidified into fixed juridical state boundaries (Walls, 2011). Moreover, 
Reno (2006) analyses that throughout Somalia informal and non-state institutions have played the 
most important roles in constructing political authority. Such ‘marginal elites’ have historically been 
capable of settling disputes and protecting their communities, and thus carry very strong local 
legitimacy (pp. 172-173). He concludes, subsequently, that ‘where elites who adapt informal 
institutions… face competition from new institutions and outside resources, the risk of 
fragmentation is higher’ (p. 174). 
 Overall, certainly, the track record of international engagement with Somaliland can hardly 
be described as a success story. Lewis (2008) expresses his disdain for the numerous interventions 
that have taken place in Somalia, vilifying the incompatibilities of the Eurocentric organisations’ 
‘many fruitless attempts to re-establish governance in Somalia’ with Somaliland’s local customs and 
modes of politics (p. x). As suggested earlier, those humanitarian interventions in Somalia 
(particularly UNOSOM II) are now mostly perceived as nothing less than disastrous, because ‘[s]tate-
building in…Somalia had to happen on the terms of the international community’ (Renders, 2012, 
117). As such, UNOSOM II, committed as it was to retaining the Somali union, did not provide any 




More remarkably, it seems that UNOSOM II actively and deliberately obstructed any attempt 
at forming a stable political community in Somaliland. It organised Somali-wide conferences 
simultaneous to peace conferences in Somaliland in Borama and Erigavo, persistently opposed any 
suggestion that Somaliland could be a political authority to cooperate with, and supported political 
figures in Somaliland who were against the idea of independence (Renders, 2012, 120-126). The 
argument could certainly be made that ‘[i]nstead of supporting peace processes on the ground, 
UNOSOM II... chose to interfere with them and to corrupt them where possible, in order to achieve 
its own vaguely defined political goals’ (p. 126). 
Furthermore, compared to the rest of Somalia, international assistance to Somaliland was, 
and remains, rather limited. At the start of his presidency, Egal did try and obtain foreign aid, yet 
given the lack of recognition of its independence very little was actually acquired (Renders, 2012, 
118-119). Even though Egal’s efforts at obtaining international development funding proved slightly 
more rewarding later on in his presidency, the UN Secretary General’s report to the Security Council 
(UNSC, 1997) seemingly remained unable to distinguish between circumstances in Hargeysa and 
Mogadishu, or to regard Egal as anything other than yet another tribal faction leader (Renders, 2012, 
168-169). Not only was (is) foreign aid seen as more necessary in war-torn south-Somalia (Bradbury, 
2008, 92-93), Somaliland aid has also remained a mere component in wider-Somalia aid strategies, 
as these are ‘handicapped by international conventions that privilege only “legitimate” states... and 
are highly ambivalent about how to work with “quasi-state” polities’ (pp. 157-158).  
As such, arguments have been made stating that Somaliland in fact benefited from being an 
“aid-free zone” (De Waal, 1997, 178), as the absence of significant international aid revenues has 
supposedly prevented the monopolisation of resources in single political figures or institutions 
(Harris & Foresti, 2011, 15-16). In addition, it is quite plausible that the UNOSOM II machinations (or 
lack thereof) juxtaposed to Somaliland’s growth as an independent polity added to the legitimacy 
and stability of the Somaliland government and political frameworks (Renders, 2012, 153). Such 
convictions again emphasise the merit of indigeneity and locale in the creation and retention of 
peace and socio-political community. On the other hand, however, the absence of international legal 
recognition for Somaliland should not be conflated with a lack of international engagement. 
Somaliland itself, in fact, is a prime example of a political entity that is capable of doing without de 
jure recognition, but not without international linkages. While Somaliland is what it is with minimal 
external support, and has stayed rather immune to some of the tragic consequences of international 
aid and interventions in Somalia, it would remain a misconception to argue that therefore 
Somaliland should be “left alone” (Walls, 2011). 
For one, not only was the SNM originally a diaspora movement, Somaliland also remains 
heavily dependent on diaspora remittances. These money flows (hawala) are indispensible for many 
families in Somaliland, and have contributed to infrastructure, schools, hospitals, universities, and 
many other forms of development (Höhne, 2011, 321; Lewis, 2008, 134; Yonis, 2013, 6). 
Furthermore, the mere fact that foreign aid revenues have been comparatively small does not mean 
that they had no role to play in Somaliland’s social and political order. Also, it appears that 
‘Somaliland has achieved a high degree of de facto acceptance internationally’ (Bradbury, 2008, 
255), and is thus increasingly internationally seen as a de facto separate polity (Huliaras, 2002, 174). 
International institutions and players like the United Nations, the African Union, the Arab League, 
the European Union, European countries, the United States, and countries and organisations in the 
127 
 
Horn of Africa, all maintain unofficial bilateral or multilateral ties to the Somaliland government in 
the absence of legal recognition (Arieff, 2008, 68-74).  
As such, the political project of Somaliland remains not an entirely indigenous endeavour 
independent of any external involvement. As Walls and Kibble (2011b) conclude, even the traditional 
elements of Somaliland politics continue to rely on external inputs from non-Somali and diasporic 
agents, countering the assumption that “Somali’s will succeed if only they are left to themselves” (p. 
337). 
Maybe, then, de jure recognition is not necessary for Somaliland to survive, as it (perhaps 
paradoxically) seems able to sustain de facto sovereignty “on its own” while simultaneously creating 
informal external linkages even without the perks that come with international legal standing. Legal 
statehood recognition could potentially be beneficial for the polity, but Somaliland has gotten this 
far without it. However, while such assertions might find a middle ground in the discussion on 
Somaliland’s recognition, they do not appear to address, let alone resolve, any of the earlier 
mentioned postmodern power structures and discourses that come with it.  
 
De Facto Sovereignty and Colonised Somali Studies 
Those viewpoints that commend Somaliland yet do not wish to see it legally recognised might still 
perpetuate the power dynamics involved in aid provision and governance-building. Promoting 
Somaliland as a candidate for foreign assistance in spite of a lack of de jure recognition, for instance, 
neither truly rebukes any critiques on the inherent dependency relationships that define such 
arrangements, nor really challenges the assumption that powerful international actors have a 
responsibility and an obligation to be involved in local affairs (Renders, 2012, 14). The case of 
Somalia is a textbook example of the state-building catastrophes that those assumptions may lead 
to, as historically contingent Western liberal ideals of what it means to be a “state” (have) become 
transformed into “one-size-fits-all” approaches and “silver bullets” for governance and statehood. 
Moreover, these strategies of aid and governing assistance have seemed less aimed at bettering the 
political community involved than at reproducing and reinforcing such Western liberal modes of 
politics. De Waal (1997) has labelled this as ‘philanthropic imperialism’ (p. 178), as Somalia’s 
governing capability was more disempowered than strengthened by external intervention and aid 
(Richards, 2015, 3-5). 
Somaliland has generally managed to avoid such problems, and thinkers reiterating the 
superfluity of Somaliland’s de jure recognition often point to this fact to underline their argument. 
However, whereas those thinkers may progress from previous state-building narratives that see “the 
traditional” as an archaic and anachronistic remnant of pre-modernity, they may still co-opt “the 
indigenous” in governance-development theories to overcome the limitations of imported forms of 
politics (Höhne, 2007b; Ogbaharya, 2008). As Somaliland is now increasingly often suggested as a 
potential exemplar for bottom-up state-building, championing its indigeneity as proof against de jure 
recognition may equally risk reiterating the paradigm of Somaliland as a benchmark to be judged by 
external actors. Renders (2012) rightfully contends that (in Somaliland and elsewhere) the legitimacy 
and power of traditional institutions and practices is not a given, nor are they lifeless structures 
malleable at will (p. 24), but the issues related to this reconsideration of “traditionalism” run much 
deeper. Is there, for example, an overwhelming “whiteness” to the study of “traditional” societies 




Such questions recently came to the fore in a rather heated online debate on the newly 
launched Somali Journal of African Studies (SJAS), which, surely remarkably, had no Somalis on its 
editorial and advisory boards. The discussion truly exploded, however, after Markus Höhne – who 
has been frequently referred to in this chapter – carelessly complained that: 
 
I did not come across many younger Somalis who would qualify as serious scholars... 
because they seem not to value scholarship as such... I guess you would have to first find 
all the young Somalis who are willing to sit on their butt for 8 hours a day and read and 
write for months to get one piece of text out... But in my life, I met only very few diaspora 
Somalis who seriously pursued such a career (in social sciences) (Aidid, 2015a). 
 
For many participating in the debate, Höhne’s remarks truly reinforced those colonial tropes 
that portray Somali society as a mere ‘backdrop for [European] intelligence and understanding’ and 
as ‘superstitious, irrational, unsophisticated, and unscientific’ (Aidid, 2015b). While Höhne’s 
argument was more elaborate than presented above, and he later redeemed himself slightly 
(Höhne, 2015), this internet altercation does uncover the question whether any “outsider” writing 
on the nature of Somali society – even positively – can truly escape colonial epistemologies that 
presume that knowledge can only be produced for or about Somalis, not by them (Mire, 2015). As 
Ioan Lewis himself was enabled to start his research on Somali society by funding from the British 
colonial administration, he exemplifies the fact that ‘[t]he production of cultural and historical 
information about Somalis was tied to the expansion of European power’ (Aidid, 2015a); post-
colonial discourses should be wary of not reproducing such power relationships. 
Such arguments expose problems perhaps for the entire world of academia. This chapter, 
and this thesis as a whole, is certainly not isolated from such problems, although addressing them in 
depth is definitely beyond its scope. Nonetheless, the issue remains that even arguments finding 
that Somaliland need not be legally recognised on the basis that it would damage its indigeneity, 
should make sure to avoid the pitfalls of essentialising Somali society into a dehistoricised and 
decontextualised monolithic kinship system that is inherently incompatible with “modern” 
international politics (Aidid, 2015b). When it comes to the general discussion on de jure recognition, 
those contending that it would actually not be beneficial for Somaliland should not necessarily do so 
by discussing whether Somaliland’s traditions and indigeneity might be tainted by recognition, but 
rather by pointing out the problem that any recognition apparently intrinsically occurs at the 
detriment of tradition and indigeneity. 
As argued earlier, while the “international community” maintains an emphasis on “good 
governance” and democracy as prerequisites for de jure statehood, the inconsistent nature and 
application of such values, particularly in the context of Somalia and Somaliland, has been decried 
justifiably. Observing that Somaliland actually fulfils those benchmarks while Somalia does not, 
however, only brushes the surface of the issues related to juridical recognition.  
More fundamentally, the example of Somaliland demonstrates that formal statehood 
recognition might be framed in legal terms to give it an “objective” and “universal” connotation, but 
that it seems more accurate to argue that recognition is actually dependent on very specific and 
subjective terms and contingent circumstances. As Anne Orford (2012b) observes, many 
international legal experts stick to their claim that modern international law has transcended its 
European heritage and operates today as a universal law capable of governing and protecting all 
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humanity (pp. 1-2). Yet, precisely in issues of conditional de jure sovereignty and legal recognition 
we find how international law is actually heavily embedded in international relationships of political 
power, and how, thus, colonialism may in fact be seen as ‘continuing, systematic, and ingrained in 
international law as we know it today’ (Gathii, 2000, 2020).  
Regardless of such questions, aside from the particular political considerations of individual 
de jure states, recognition is dependent not just on whether a political community can demonstrate 
governance, but on it demonstrating a very specific type of governance. As Renders (2012) points 
out, ‘Somaliland [has] to demonstrate an internationally acceptable system of government’ (p. 198; 
my emphasis), and Bryden (2003) is convinced that ‘[a]s Somaliland edges ever closer to recognised 
statehood, its leaders would do well... to remember that they will ultimately be judged not merely 
on whether Somaliland becomes a state, but on the kind of state that Somaliland becomes’ (p. 364). 
Somaliland, then, exemplifies that recognition could also be perceived as a principle 
denoting a power relationship between those that grant recognition and those that receive it. 
Statements such as the above not only imply that it is actually in “the recogniser’s” prerogative to 
make demands on the domestic political order that might emerge after recognition, but also assert 
that it has the capacity to do so. 
That brings us back to the issue of de facto sovereignty, because the de facto sovereignty of 
Somaliland, in spite of its non-recognition, actually signifies that international law as a unitary global 
entity does not have that capacity. De jure recognition, instead, remains a political privilege for 
individual provider and receiver states, not a legal representation of universal norms and identical 
material circumstances. For geopolitical anomalies like Somaliland, that means on the one hand that 
they might try and adhere to certain norms presumed to be necessary for obtaining de jure 
sovereignty, but that they will have to come to terms with the shortcomings and potential futility of 
that adherence. On the other hand, however, it indicates that no norm, internationally or 
domestically, can be established or imposed without a de facto sovereign decision on it, meaning 
that certain values that are presumed to be universal are in fact contingent upon a de facto 
sovereign decision; sovereignty is not contingent upon legal criteria, but on power. Somaliland, 
therefore, is capable of repelling the international Westphalian adherence to Somalia’s juridical 
statehood, which will therefore, more than Somaliland, actually have to come to terms with the 
limitations of its de jure sovereignty ideals. 
Hansen (2003), for example, observes that ‘Puntland and Somaliland are cited as examples 
that have benefitted from [the building block] strategy’ promoted by the “international community” 
in Somalia (p. 60), yet Somaliland in particular was actually just capable of deciding on its own 
exception/separation from the violence and disorder in the rest of Somalia. Norms of 
decentralisation in Somalia seemed to follow from de facto sovereign decisions, not the other way 
around. Conversely, a reunion with the rest of Somalia may be preferred by many international 
actors over de jure recognition for Somaliland, but that would not by itself remedy the incapacity of 
any central Somali government so far to implement their law and order over its north-west regions 
(Samatar & Samatar, 2005, 121-122). Regardless of any international norms on the kind of juridical 
arrangements that will emerge in Somalia, thus, Somaliland has already established its own order 





Walls’s (2011) assertion that ‘Somalis are very good at... managing ambiguity’, then, may 
from one perspective imply that Somaliland’s conflict with Somalia has not yet been decided. This is 
mainly a result, however, of uncertainties with regard to Somaliland’s international legal status, not 
of a lack of de facto sovereignty. From another perspective, it may refer to those norms of peaceful 
clan cooperation and “traditional” governing practices that have been important factors in 
sustaining Somaliland’s political order. Those norms, however, are in essence derived from its de 
facto sovereignty. Somaliland has actually decided on its own exception, demonstrating its de facto 
sovereign capacity to “manage ambiguities” of power in north-West Somalia. Whereas Leonard and 
Samantar (2011) maintain that Somaliland’s ‘bottom-up, organic, disjointed negotiation of 
indigenous governance... closely tracks the history of state formation in Europe’ (p. 559), Balthasar 
(2013) more convincingly acknowledges that the creation of Somaliland, or any political entity, is 
based at least as much on violent conflict and autocratic leadership as it is on peaceful negotiations 






The Democratic League of Kosovo: De Facto Sovereignty in  
a Parallel State? 
 
We believe it is better to do nothing and stay alive than to be massacred. 
(LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova in 1992, as cited in Vickers 1998, 264) 
 
The Republic of Kosovo might be the best-known geopolitical anomaly in the world today. As it is the 
most recent, and probably final, entity declaring its de jure independence from the former Republic 
of Yugoslavia after a long period of resistance, and as it was the site of one of the most extensive 
NATO military operations in recent history, Kosovo has been the focus of attention in both academic 
and popular media for many years. It remains anomalous, however, due to its juridically undecided 
status: at the hour of writing this thesis, the Republic of Kosovo has not yet been legally recognised 
as an independent de jure state by 88 UN member countries – including both Russia and China. It 
has, thus, been “stuck in (legal) limbo” for quite some time, even though a large part of the 
international community has taken Kosovo more seriously than it has other political units striving for 
de jure statehood recognition (Caspersen, 2008). As Hehir (2010a) points out, ‘this small corner of 
Europe has served as something of a microcosm of broader international trends and also, in many 
respects, a guinea pig upon which new ideas and policies have been tested’ (p. 185). 
As such, the Republic of Kosovo provides a wealth of issues that are also brought forth in this 
thesis. How does it presently function as a geopolitical anomaly, and how should its current 
international legal and political status be considered How should we interpret the Western global 
powers’ (particularly NATO’s) willingness to intervene in 1999, and how can that intervention be 
considered in reference to notions of international law and geopolitical anomalies? And does the de 
jure recognition of Kosovo, by for instance the United Kingdom and the United States, set a 
precedent for legally recognising other geopolitical anomalies? These are all important questions, 
many of which will be addressed in the second of the two chapters on this example (Chapter Six). 
This chapter, however, aims its primary focus on another matter.  
This research has so far tried to expose the importance of considering de facto sovereignty 
when looking at geopolitical anomalies. By focusing on Somalia and Somaliland, I have attempted to 
rebuke certain persistent ideals about de jure sovereignty, and promote the merits of considering 
manifestations of de facto sovereignty as indicators of material power. Furthermore, I have tried to 
argue that in spite of a diversity of local grassroots arrangements and traditional norms of peaceful 
coexistence, de facto sovereignty cannot be transformed into a pluralistic or “shared” exercise. 
While de facto sovereignty is not intrinsically juridical or formal – it is not necessarily fixed in a de 
jure state – it is always centralised in a single entity. Moreover, the previous chapter in fact 
suggested that the conflictual nature of the emergence of de facto sovereignty implies that any 
political community is ultimately founded upon a resolution of crisis through some form of violence. 
The coming into being of de facto sovereignty is always accompanied by a disruption, which can only 
be remedied by an even more disruptive intervention that restores order. Peacefulness and 





Such assertions seem to argue that geopolitical anomalies are either created through 
violence, or do not possess de facto sovereignty. Indeed, these arguments raise questions about the 
role of violence and peace in the creation and maintenance of geopolitical anomalies. In order to 
investigate this issue, this chapter will focus on the Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja 
Demokratike e Kosovës, LDK) movement under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova during the early 
1990s. This political movement, coming to rise in former Yugoslavia at the end of the cold war, 
pushed for political independence of Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavia and later Serbia, and even 
declared an independent republic of Kosovo in 1991. Crucially, it promoted non-violent strategies for 
reaching this independence. When Serbian president Slobodan Milošević juridically stripped Kosovo 
of its autonomy and instituted a series of discriminatory practices against the majority Albanian 
population in the area, the LDK installed a “parallel state”. Coexisting with the formal Serb-governed 
institutions, Rugova operated a pacifist administration organising most aspects of life for the 
Albanian majority in Kosovo.  
By discussing this aspect of the Kosovo example, I hope to determine the extent to which 
geopolitical anomalies may exist as de facto sovereign political entities, even if they appear to 
establish their political community through peaceful means. Should we qualify the LDK’s parallel 
state as a de facto sovereign polity, or did it remain a mere “zone of indistinction” for the de facto 
sovereign Serbian government? Furthermore, the critical theoretical conflations of de facto 
sovereignty with “circulating power”, discussed in earlier in this thesis, will be worked through in 
reference to this example. As will be made clear, such conflations do not really make sense with 
regard to Kosovo’s parallel state, which remained a geopolitical anomaly that unequivocally lacked 
de facto sovereignty. 
 
A Short History of Kosovo 
The history of Kosovo, and of the Balkans in general, is often described in reference to its violence 
and bloodiness. Somehow, it seems very difficult to tell any story about the Balkans without 
mentioning its turbulent history and discussing how these old tales of conflict feed into the divisive 
nature of many contemporary issues. Debates remain, however, over whether the (repeated) 
eruptions of violence in this region can be attributed to ‘primitive Yugoslavs nursing ancient ethnic 
hatreds’, making them historically and culturally inevitable (Gagnon, 2004, xiv), or to the purposeful 
manipulations of norms of ethnicity and nationality by political leaders.  
On the one hand, certainly, it cannot be denied that ethnic conflict has been widely 
apparent and very bloody in recent Balkan history. Ethnicity was never meaningless, the Balkans 
never was a multi-cultural paradise, and more importantly perhaps, ethnic, religious and linguistic 
differences in the region have been accentuated by its turbulent history. More specifically to Kosovo, 
the mythical position of the region in Serbian history and national (ethnic) identity – the 1389 defeat 
against the Ottoman Empire on Kosovo Polje is annually remembered in Serbia as the epitome of 
Serbian heroism and cradle for the Serbian nation – has served as a major catalyst for warfare in 
Kosovo.  
Others, however, counter this view, arguing that trouble in the Balkans, and in Kosovo, did 
not arise due to a supposedly inevitable ethnic inclination towards mutual conflict. Rather, it came 
about through a specific configuration of political patterns and developments both within and 
outside the area (Gagnon, 2004, xiv-xxi; Hehir, 2010b, 4; Mertus, 1999, 5; Pavlakovic & Ramet, 2004, 
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77). According to this view, the overemphasis on an apparent “primordial strife” between different 
ethnic groups in the region has led to an ‘identity fetishism’, which in turn has led to a 
misrepresentation of the political processes and conditions that gave rise to these conflicts (Van 
Beek, 2001, 527-529).  
Notably, both of these arguments have some resemblance to arguments made about de 
facto sovereignty. One of these perspectives, presenting the breakup of Yugoslavia and the war in 
Kosovo as an outcome of naturally and eternally conflictual ethnic identities, can be seen as an 
example of the Hobbesian state of nature in the absence of de facto sovereignty. The “political” 
rather than “ethnic/primordial” perspectives, on the other hand, feed into the proliferation of norms 
of identity and ethnicity by political actors in power – the de facto sovereign’s friend/enemy 
distinction.  
Perhaps, therefore, something can be said for both these viewpoints; conflict is inevitable in 
any place without de facto sovereignty, and in the Balkans that conflict was politicised along 
specifically national and ethnic lines. When talking about current and historical animosities in 
Kosovo, however, this chapter will generally set aside this debate about the role of political struggles 
for power in Balkan identities and ethnicities. While this debate will be touched upon at several 
places in this chapter, it does not form its main component, nor is it to be discussed any further at 
this point. Instead, I will now proceed to first provide a concise historical overview of developments 
and events in the region before the emergence of Rugova’s LDK. 
 
Kosovo, Yugoslavia, and Tito 
The political dispute between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo might be traced back at least as far as 
the late nineteenth century, when the 1878 Congress of Berlin established a border between the 
Ottoman Empire and independent Serbia. In the subsequent decades, mostly Muslim Albanians 
were expelled from Serbia proper into Kosovo, while many Orthodox Serbs fled from the region in 
the opposite direction. These mutual expulsions have been recognised as the first real emergence of 
an ethnic divide between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, and more importantly, as the first 
construction of a concrete political division. When in 1913 the new Albanian state was created 
without the geographical entity that is now Kosovo, an area that was populated by a majority of 
Albanians became part of the Kingdom of Serbia, thereby turning Kosovo effectively into a Serbian 
colony. Ethnic cleavages in Kosovo were solidified, exacerbated, and politicised more firmly 
(Duijzings, 2000, 7-8; Malcolm, 1998, xxix-xxxi; Muharremi, 2008, 405-406). 
 Kosovo had been (re)conquered from the Ottomans by Serbian, Montenegrin, and Greek 
forces a few months earlier (1912) (Malcolm, 1998, 251-252). For the Serbs, this victory constituted 
a liberation of the Serbian minority population in Kosovo from the “Turks”, yet the Albanians in the 
region most probably merely perceived it as the replacement of one colonial empire with another (p. 
xxx). Citizenship rights for Kosovar Albanians in the new Kingdom of Yugoslavia remained rather 
limited. Albanian-language schools were gradually prohibited and closed. Also, Serb colonisation and 
land confiscation projects in Albanian-inhabited settlements were initiated, and Albanian migration 
to Albania or Turkey was actively encouraged. Yugoslav officials simply denied that there existed an 
Albanian minority in (southern) Serbia, regarding these minorities simply as “Serbs who spoke 
Albanian” (Vickers, 1998, 103-120). As a result, the interbellum years were characterised by sporadic 
armed clashes between Kosovar Albanian resistance movements (Xhemijet, Kaçaks) and Yugoslav 




 After World War II, then, Kosovo was given a legal status as a separate entity for the first 
time, thereby becoming an “Autonomous Region” and “national minority/nationality” in the new 
Yugoslav Federal Republic. That juridical status, however, was still subordinate to that of the six 
republics that actually constituted the federation (Muharremi, 2008, 406). Kosovar Albanians had 
been (justifiably) perceived as Axis collaborators during the war, and their resistance against the 
reinstatement of Yugoslavia was crushed down hard under martial law. Now, the region was subject 
to the power of a new de facto sovereign, Josip Broz Tito, who was able to place Yugoslavia (and 
thus Kosovo) under a highly authoritarian and centralised regime (Pavlakovic & Ramet, 2004, 82; 
Vickers, 1998, 142-143).  
Kosovo’s juridical status, therefore, was perhaps rather ‘artificial’, as ‘[p]ower in Yugoslavia 
had come out of the barrel of a gun – Tito’s own guns and those of his Soviet sponsor’ (Malcolm, 
1998, 317). Kosovo’s autonomy ‘mostly remained on paper’, as local political institutions were 
controlled by Serb and Montenegrin officials (Kubo, 2010, 1137). Furthermore, Aleksandr Rankovic, 
as the head of the Yugoslav security forces, became a particularly important figure for Serb policies 
of oppression, harassment, and terrorisation of Kosovar Albanians in the 1950s and 1960s (Clark, 
2000, 12; Judah, 2008, 51). 
 While the status of Kosovo was “promoted” in the new 1963 Yugoslav constitution from 
“region” to “autonomous province”, it was at the same time ‘constitutionally yoked closer to Serbia’ 
(Judah, 2008, 53). Malcolm (1998) contends that this constitution brought ‘the “autonomous” status 
of Kosovo... to its absolute nadir’, as it eliminated Kosovo from the Yugoslav federal level to make it 
‘a mere function of the internal arrangements of the republic of Serbia’ (pp. 323-324). Rankovic’s fall 
from Tito’s grace in 1966, however, has been described as a turning point (Vickers, 1998, 163). His 
purge was in itself a component of a wider transformation in Tito’s thinking, in which the endeavour 
towards homogeneous “Yugoslavism” was gradually discarded in favour of strategies and policies 
allowing for more national self-direction (Malcolm, 1998, 324). For the Albanians in Kosovo, this 
meant that several concessions were made in their favour, such as an increased number of Albanian 
officials in local political bodies, the right to raise the Albanian flag, and the establishment of an 
Albanian language university in its capital Priština (Judah, 2008, 53; Kubo, 2010, 1137). 
 The 1970s, therefore, are perceived by many Kosovar Albanians as a ‘golden age’ for Serb-
Albanian relations in Kosovo (Judah, 2008, 55). Culminating in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, 
Kosovo was given a juridical status that effectively made Kosovo almost equivalent to the (other) 
republics in the federation. To be sure, ‘[b]y 1974 Kosovo had become a Yugoslav republic in all but 
name’ (Judah, 1999, 8), and ‘[a]lthough the 1974 constitution continued to assert that Kosovo and 
Vojvodina were parts of Serbia, by most criteria of constitutional law they were... fully-fledged 
federal bodies’ (Malcolm, 1998, 327). That simultaneously meant, however, that whereas Kosovo 
and the Albanians were granted an unprecedented degree of freedom and autonomy, its powers 
remained ‘in many ways more theoretical than real’ as ‘Tito was the final arbiter and the real law of 
the land’ (Judah, 1999, 8).  
Kosovo’s status legally remained just short of that of the republics, not only because the 
Belgrade leadership feared the (juridical) possibility that Kosovo may leave Yugoslavia and join 
Albania, but also because it desperately wanted to avoid any political unrest among Serbs in Serbia 
and Kosovo itself (Malcolm, 1998, 328-329). Still, the “Albanisation” of Kosovo in the 1970s did 
enhance Serbian resentment (Clark, 2000, 13), and it would surely be misleading to claim that Serbs 
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in Kosovo could in no way be perceived also as victims of the ethnic and political tensions that 
presided over the region. Dragović-Soso (2002) cites a Serbian study which argued that: 
 
the [Yugoslav Communist] Party represented the vehicle of ethnic domination in all parts 
of communist Yugoslavia, which meant in Kosovo – as elsewhere – the ethnic group which 
controlled the Party apparatus at a particular time (Serbs from 1945 to 1966, Albanians 
from 1966 to 1988 and Serbs again from 1989) discriminated against members of the 
other ethnic community, using all the instances of power: the administration, legal 
system, media, security apparatus, and education (p. 121). 
 
Notably, the lines between the different “periods of oppression” as described above were certainly 
not absolute, further complicating any assessment of the nature and severity of mutual ethnic 
grievances. Albanians in Kosovo remained unhappy with their sub-republican standing, while Serbs 
grew increasingly uncomfortable with developments in the region – especially with regard to the 
alleged expulsion and emigration of Serbs from Kosovo and the growing population of Albanians in 
South-Serbia (Judah, 2008, 57; Malcolm, 1998, 329-333). 
 
Milošević and Serbian Nationalism 
Tito’s death in 1980, then, could on the one hand be perceived as the demise of the de facto 
sovereign that had been capable of maintaining order and stability in the Yugoslav federation, 
keeping conflicting elements within the political community in check. That does not mean, on the 
other hand, that the eventual outbreak of war in the Balkans was an inevitable and natural outcome 
of supposedly irreconcilable ethnicities in the area. A mere year after Tito’s death, Albanian students 
in Priština started to protest against bad conditions at university, which soon spiralled into a “nation-
wide” Albanian uprising against Kosovo’s subordinate status. For Judah (2008), these protests 
constituted a watershed point in Kosovar and Yugoslav history: ‘[i]n a very real sense the 
demonstrations changed the course of history and not just of Kosovo, but also of the whole 
Yugoslavia’ (p. 58). Dragović-Soso (2002) confirms that ‘[t]he Albanian revolt of 1981 shook the very 
foundations of the post-Tito regime’ (p. 116). The uprising was crushed harshly by Yugoslav/Serbian 
forces as Kosovo was again placed under martial law, and led to a purge of Albanian party officials at 
the regional political level (Dragović-Soso, 2002, 117; Pavlakovic & Ramet, 2004, 83). 
 These events served to further aggravate Serb-Albanian relations. To Serbs, the 1981 
protests fitted their conviction that Kosovar Albanians were out to “purify” Kosovo from its Slavic 
elements (Clark, 2000, 13), while Kosovar Albanians, on the other hand, were more alienated within 
Serbia; social segregation in Kosovo intensified. Moreover, Tito’s death invoked a surge in Serbian 
nationalism. The Serbian nationalist movement had been dissidents before 1980, but had now lost 
their fear of the centralised communist state. They began to voice their dissatisfaction with what 
they perceived as the “anti-Serbian” 1974 constitution and the persecution of Serbs in Kosovo (Clark, 
2000, 15; Judah, 2008, 61). As the Serbian population in Kosovo dropped to nearly 10 percent by the 
late 1980s, Serbian popular media actively turned to nationalist sensationalism, in which the 
declining Serbian population numbers in Kosovo were presented as the consequence an unrelenting 




Yet it was not only the Serbian news media that became involved in such narratives. A 
grassroots movement of Serbs in Kosovo had emerged (Vladisavljević, 2002), and the Serbian 
national movement was in fact led by a group of prominent intellectuals of the Serbian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts. As Dragović-Soso (2002) asserts, these intellectuals, under the guidance of former 
Communist Party expellee Dobrica Ćosić, gradually became ‘a de facto political opposition, directly 
challenging [Communist] state policy and providing an alternative political platform to the Serbian 
public’ (p. 115). They addressed the “Kosovo question” by ‘[a]pplying explosive language and a one-
dimensional historical interpretation proper to the new nationalist vision, exaggerating claims of 
Serbian mistreatment in Kosovo and portraying Albanians as collectively guilty of “genocide”’ (p. 
116). Indeed, ‘[d]uring the rest of the 1980s a stream of books would pour from the printing presses 
of Belgrade... presenting the whole history of the Serbs in Kosovo as an unending chronicle of ethnic 
martyrdom’ (Malcolm, 1998, 338). 
Most significant among these publications was an (unfinished) document called “The 
Memorandum”, snippets of which were published in a Serbian newspaper in 1986. Written by 
sixteen of the aforementioned intellectuals, this document has since be described as ‘explosive’ 
(Judah, 2008, 62) and ‘a bombshell’ (Dragović-Soso, 2002, 177); its ‘tone of shrill hysteria... was to 
light the fuse that led to the destruction of Yugoslavia’ (Judah, 1999, 9). It described the “Kosovo 
question” as an Albanian ‘physical, political, legal, and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in 
Kosovo’ (Mihailović & Krestić, 1995, 128), and called upon Serbs to mount ‘a resolute defence of 
their nation and their territory’ (p. 128). Condemning the 1974 constitution and Communist 
Yugoslavia’s (Tito’s) anti-nationalist policies, it warned that ‘[u]nless things change radically, in less 
than ten years’ time there will no longer be any Serbs left in Kosovo, and an “ethnically pure” 
Kosovo, that unambiguously stated goal of the Greater Albanian racists... will be achieved’ (pp. 129-
130). 
Given its contents and rhetoric, the Memorandum has become regarded as a ‘blueprint for 
war’ (Cohen, 1996, 39), as “Milošević’s Mein Kampf” (Soros, 1993, 15), and as an instigator of ethnic 
cleansing. However, Silber and Little (1995) find that ‘[t]he draft Memorandum did not create 
nationalism, it simply tapped sentiments that ran deep among the Serbs, but which were suppressed 
and, as a result, exacerbated by Communism’ (p. 31). Still, the Memorandum did demonstrate how 
politically potent the Serbian nationalist cause might be. Soon after its publication, Slobodan 
Milošević would prove very adept at embracing these nationalist sentiments in order to enhance his 
power. As Malcolm (1998) discerns, ‘[i]t was... the issue of Kosovo that brought about [Milošević’s] 
transformation from little-known Party apparatchik into demagogic political leader’ (p. 341). 
By the end of 1987, Milošević had succeeded in taking over the presidency of the Serbian 
League of Communists, and immediately initiated a purge of the Kosovo Party Committee which 
forced Kosovar Albanians leaders Azem Vllasi and Kaqusha Jashari to leave their posts in Priština. In 
addition, thousands of Albanians in Kosovo were removed from their jobs and government 
positions, and replaced with more compliant people (Pavlakovic & Ramet, 2004, 85). In 1988, 
Milošević began his “anti-bureaucratic revolution”, organising mass rallies in Serbia and Kosovo (so-
called “Meetings of Truth”) in which he masterfully presented himself as ‘the leader of Serbia 
reborn’ (Judah, 1999, 10) and as the guarantor of “the will of the Serbian people” (Dragović-Soso; 
2002, 211-212). This enabled him to quell any opposition within Yugoslavia’s communist apparatus 
against his rise to power (Malcolm, 1998, 342).  
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Milošević became president of the Serbian Republic in 1989, and proceeded to amend the 
Yugoslav constitution in order to repeal Kosovo’s (1974) autonomy and restore Serbia’s power over 
the province. These amendments were accompanied by Serb emergency powers in Kosovo, the 
mobilisation of Serb military forces in the region, and police and legal repression by the Serbian state 
(for instance, of a hunger strike by Albanian miners in Trepča) (Judah, 2008, 67; Vickers, 1998, 234-
235). At the end of the 1980s, Kosovo’s security, judiciary, and social and economic affairs were 
again placed under direct control of Serbia, again degrading Kosovo’s autonomy to ‘a mere token’ 
(Malcolm, 1998, 343-344). 
While Milošević, thus, rode the wave of Serbian nationalism to extend his power and acquire 
de facto sovereignty over Serbia and Kosovo (and, briefly, Yugoslavia), to portray his ascendance 
merely as an outcome of those nationalist currents would be to ignore his deliberate strategies to 
exacerbate and sharpen the distinctions between Serbs and Albanians in the region. In one (very 
Hobbesian) sense, the rising ethnic tensions in Kosovo in the 1980s can be perceived as an inevitable 
retreat into a more natural state of human existence after the demise of a de facto sovereign (Josip 
Broz Tito). From this perspective, perhaps, the eventual outbreak of full-blown conflict in Kosovo 
could actually be presented as a “natural” and “primordial” state of being in the ethnically divided 
Balkans. On the other hand, these antagonisms were very much politicised by leaders of the national 
communities themselves (like Milošević), who utilised these friend/enemy distinctions to increase 
their power and win de facto sovereignty over their own polities.  
To conclude, Julie Mertus (1999) argues that the “truths” that started the conflict in Kosovo 
are in some sense irrelevant, contending that ‘[t]ruths involve history as experience and myth rather 
than as fact’ (p. 2). In the end, arguably, what actually occurred in Kosovo in the 1980s and before is 
less important than the narratives about those occurrences. Ethnic tensions in Kosovo were real and 
significant for the eventual outbreak of conflict, but perhaps more significant were the norms, 
myths, and “truths” about these tensions that were constructed by politicians who wanted to 
be(come) de facto sovereign over their own political entities. 
 
The LDK and the Parallel State 
However, just as Milošević and other political leaders in Yugoslavia may have propagated norms of 
“otherness” and strife, the Albanian leadership in Kosovo began to promote very different norms – 
ones of peacefulness and coexistence. Figures like Adem Demaçi and Ibrahim Rugova, respectively 
referred to as the Nelson Mandela of Kosovo (Erlanger, 1999) and the Gandhi of the Balkans (Peric-
Zimonjic, 2006), proved particularly influential in urging Kosovar Albanians not to respond violently 
to their oppression and restrictions. After Kosovo’s autonomy was revoked and Serbia continued its 
discriminatory practices against Albanians in Kosovo, these Albanian leaders reacted by declaring 
Kosovo as a Yugoslavian republic independent from Serbia on July 2nd 1990; a new constitution for 
Kosovo was adopted in the town of Kaçanik on September 7th. As Serbia then proceeded to dissolve 
the Kosovo Assembly, and Yugoslavia began to disintegrate, Kosovar Albanians went even further by 
proclaiming the Republic of Kosovo to be a legally independent state on October 19th 1991. Still, 
these steps were taken without resorting to violence against Serbian armed forces which would have 





 The non-violent nature and context of these actions actually seemed surprising at the time. 
According to Shkëlzen Maliqi, ‘Albanians... could have hardly imagined themselves in that particular 
role’ as they had ‘never upheld such values as non-violence, patience, non-response to blows and 
insults... Warriors went out of fashion overnight’ (as cited in Johnstone, 2002, 223). In fact, in those 
early days ‘the feeling prevailing among the Albanians was... one of revenge: they waited for a 
moment of maximum mobilisation to start a massive armed uprising’ (as cited in Judah, 2000a, 63). 
Clark (2000), therefore, has found that nobody really seems to know where the transition from 
potential armed rebellion to peaceful resistance exactly came from. Obviously, however, there are a 
few underlying factors – ‘a series of formative experiences’ – from which non-violence originated (p. 
46). 
Firstly, contemporary ideas about pacifist revolution proposed by Central and Eastern 
European intellectuals at the end of the Cold War provided a certain ideological premise, as did the 
desire among Kosovar Albanians to counter their portrayal by Serbia as uncivilised and primitive 
(Kubo, 2010, 1138). Furthermore, Albanian armed guerrilla groups had remained relatively small, 
weak, and few in number throughout the 1980s, as other forms of protest, such as strikes, sit-ins, 
and the occupation of public buildings, were more prevalent (Pula, 2004, 810). External factors were 
also important. There was no support from the Republic Albania itself for an open violent rebellion 
(Kubo, 2010, 1139), while other (former) Yugoslav republics, as well as Western policymakers, were 
expected to be more sympathetic to pacifist resistance strategies (Pula, 2004, 811). Most 
importantly, however, it seems that the Albanians’ reluctance to use force was born out fear and 
pragmatism. As suggested in the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, peacefulness appeared 
far from a “free choice”, an issue I will address in more detail below. 
The political vacuum that was left behind by the disintegration of the Yugoslav Communist 
Party and the weakening of Kosovo’s provincial institutions opened up opportunities for new 
movements and initiatives to emerge. At the end of 1989, for instance, the Council for the Defence 
of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) was established by Kosovar Albanians, which would 
monitor and document human rights violations in Kosovo throughout the 1990s. Most prominent 
among these new organisations, however, would be the Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (LDK). 
Founded on December 23rd 1989, the roots of this movement did not lie in the functionaries of the 
old communist structures, but in groups of Albanian intellectuals. As Serbian members of the Kosovo 
Writers Association resigned in 1988, they in fact opened up the way for the association to begin 
expressing more Albanian aspirations. As such, the Association’s president, Ibrahim Rugova, became 
one of the leading voices propagating more independence for Kosovar Albanians, and he was 
subsequently chosen as the president of the LDK (Clark, 2000, 55-56; Malcolm, 1998, 347-348). 
Initially, however, the exact role and strategy of the LDK remained rather unclear even to its 
own leadership (Pula, 2004, 804), and its institutional structure remained very ill-defined (p. 822). 
Remarkably, Rugova was not even the Albanian academics’ first choice as LDK leader. According to 
Migjen Kelmendi, ‘Rugova was... a total loser who sat in the corner drinking too much coffee’, and 
was ‘a compromise candidate’ after others had refused or were passed over (as cited in Judah, 
2000a, 66-67). Furthermore, Maliqi (1994) suggests that both Rugova and “his” LDK became the 
leading motivators of Kosovar Albanian non-violent resistance only after the strategy had come into 
being almost spontaneously out of individual initiatives and practices from within the Kosovar 
Albanian population. Popular newspaper editor Veton Surroi described the LDK ‘as not so much a 
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party as a product of the popular response to so many years of repression’ (as cited in Magaš, 1993, 
250).  
At the same time, that meant that the LDK’s size and influence as a political movement 
enhanced spectacularly. Its leadership was derived from the Kosovar Albanian academe, yet it 
managed to absorb much of the former Communist Party membership in Kosovo (Judah, 2000a, 67) 
and transformed the Socialist Alliance for Working People (SAWP) into its ‘central mobilising 
structure’ (Pula, 2004, 805). By the end of 1990, Maliqi (2012) contends, ‘the political mood of the 
masses was controlled by a new centre of power, the LDK and its leader Rugova’ (p. 46). 
After the 1991 declaration of independence, the LDK organised parliamentary and 
presidential elections for the new republic on May 24th 1992. The purpose of these elections, aside 
from choosing Kosovar Albanian political leadership, was to consolidate the self-declared “republic” 
and to represent it to the international community as a legitimate and functioning polity (Vickers, 
1998, 259-260). Surprisingly perhaps, although the Serbian government deemed these elections 
illegal, it did relatively little to stop them. Monitored by groups from Europe and the United States, 
the elections took place mostly in private dwellings with little conspicuous signage on Kosovo 
streets. They resulted in an overwhelming victory for the LDK, and Rugova, who ran unopposed, was 
elected Kosovo’s president with 99.5 percent of the votes. After the elections, thus, the LDK and 
Rugova had ostensibly cemented their control over Kosovar Albanian resistance, institutionalising 
and consolidating their authority over the movement (Pula, 2004, 816-817). The elections seemed to 
signify the concretisation of the Albanians’ parallel state in Kosovo, generating a situation in which 
‘the Kosovars’ parallel institutional structure was completed’ (Vickers, 1998, 261). 
Yet, while ‘[i]n theory, Rugova now oversaw a government’ (Judah, 2000a, 68), perhaps in 
reality the LDK merely remained a ‘shadowy assembly’, first among its equals (Malcolm, 1998, 348). 
For one, aside from the newly created political bodies, certain practical measures had to be taken to 
remedy the Serbian limitation and oppression of Albanian life in Kosovo. Given the crackdown by 
Serbian authorities on Albanian public facilities and services, Kosovar Albanians, led by the LDK, set 
up a parallel mechanism for collecting taxes, retained an active Albanian media apparatus, initiated 
and nourished a parallel private economy, and kept alive their cultural and sporting life. Most 
importantly, they also devised parallel Albanian health and education systems. All of these 
alternatives were mainly financed through external funding and remittances from Kosovar Albanians 
abroad, yet, at the same time, Kosovo’s parallel state never really seemed to be able to foster 
substantial welfare development (Reitan, 2000, 90).  
Moreover, throughout the 1990s the Kosovar Albanian existence remained subject to 
continuous or repeated acts of violence and repression by Serbian authorities and forces, who 
systematically denied basic human rights for Albanians, banned the use of Albanian language, 
discriminated in judicial and administrative areas, and arbitrarily and unfoundedly arrested 
Albanians (Human Rights Watch, 1993; UNCHR, 1993). 
The question is, therefore, whether the existence of the LDK’s peaceful resistance and 
parallel state in Kosovo could in fact truly be qualified as either peaceful or state-like. To elaborate, it 
seems clear that as a geopolitical anomaly, the Albanian community in Kosovo in the first half of the 
1990s exercised many different forms of power, breaking down certain subjectivities in Serbian-
Albanian relations and counter-producing new ones. However, those exercises of power were 
simultaneously obstructed and negated by Serb authorities (often violently) while the extent to 
which they were employed in actual conflict with Serbian decision-making is debatable. Indeed, as 
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will be argued, agency over the exception in Kosovo stayed in Serbian political hands, so that the LDK 
and the Kosovar Albanian parallel state may have displayed myriad forms of governmentality and 
biopolitics, but not de facto sovereignty. 
 
Governmentality, Biopolitics and the LDK 
According to Clark (2000), there were four central aims for the civil resistance organised by the LDK. 
They wanted to contest the legitimacy of the imposed Serbian institutions in Kosovo and replace 
them with parallel institutions for Albanians; to raise attention for the Serbian violence without 
themselves being provoked by that violence; to safeguard the life and survival of the Albanian 
community in Kosovo; and to garner international support for its cause of de jure independence (p. 
71). As suggested above, at face value the LDK seemed actually quite successful in realising the 
majority of these objectives. As we will discover, the Kosovar Albanians’ expectation that the 
“international community” would eventually come to their aid proved woefully misguided, but the 
putting in place of parallel facilities and political mechanisms by the LDK, and the apparent absence 
of violent conflict between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo in the early 1990s, appear to indicate that 
the LDK was quite capable of maintaining an everyday life for the Albanian community in the region. 
Indeed, the LDK seemed to have mastered a Foucauldian “art of government”, engaging in a 
daily exercise of power by creating and maintaining a variety of socio-political networks. The 
‘impressive system of parallel schools, hospitals and other social service providers’, which was 
‘highly pervasive [and] touching virtually all levels of... Albanian-speaking society’ (Strazzari & 
Selenica, 2013, 120), signified the LDK’s ability to tap into that variety of governmentalities that was 
no longer performed by the Serbian formal state institutions. As the LDK branched out into civil 
society organisations like the CDHRF and the Mother Teresa Society (Devic, 2006, 260) – the latter 
supplying food, medical services, and medicine for the Kosovar Albanians – it became involved in the 
micro-political activities and alternative governance technologies that governmentality is founded 
on. Similarly, the “institutional void” left behind by the exclusion of Albanians from Serb-controlled 
juridical state systems in Kosovo opened up space for the re-emergence of traditional mechanisms 
of Albanian customary law (Kanun) to encompass an increasingly wide sphere of Albanian social 
relations (Kostovicova, 2005, 116-118). As Clark (2000) observes, ‘[w]hat was emerging was a set of 
methods and organisational structures to... strengthen social solidarity while emboldening the 
population to use the limited space available to communicate their defiance’ (p. 59). 
Kosovar Albanians certainly took great pride in their parallel structures and their eschewal of 
violence. Rugova (1994) himself, for instance, asserted that ‘in Kosovo only our system functions’ (p. 
139). As Igballe Rogova recollects, ‘[a]t that time there was great solidarity. All of Kosovo was doing 
some work in the parallel society, volunteering’ (as cited in Lippman, 1999). The ‘net of social 
security’ created by the LDK represented a ‘spirit of solidarity’ among Kosovar Albanians (Krasniqi, 
2010, 47), and according to Maliqi (2012), the Kosovar Albanian movement possessed a ‘spiritual 
power... based on an almost fanatical belief in democracy and peaceful protest’ (p. 45). Non-
violence, in fact, became embraced by Kosovar Albanians as part of a “modern” Albanian identity, 
enhancing the ‘self-worth’ of Kosovo Albanians in dire circumstances (Clark, 2000, 67-68). It became 
a central element in Albanian considerations about the “justness” of their struggle, strengthening 
their moral position and reinvigorating their determination to continue their non-violent resistance 
against the Serbs (Salla, 1995, 431).  
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The LDK’s non-violent parallel state also received acclaim from the world outside. Slavoj 
Žižek held the Albanian resistance in high esteem (Maliqi, 2001, 19), while some thinkers even wrote 
about the parallel state as ‘the miracle of Kosovo’ (Schwartz, 2000, 127) and as ‘a counter-power 
unique in political history’ (p. 131). In the words of a French lawyer at the time, ‘[t]he [Albanian] 
nation, which was, without any doubt, the most oppressed in former Yugoslavia, has created the 
most free man’ (as cited in Rugova, 1994, 101). 
Here, we see a reference to the biopolitics that the Kosovar Albanian community in the early 
1990s appeared to be engaged in. By managing to sustain a daily Albanian life in spite of Serbian 
oppression, they had ostensibly stripped the Serbs of the absolute power over everyday Albanian 
existence. Merely by retaining its “life force”, it seemed, the Albanian community in Kosovo 
produced and cultivated power that contested, contrasted, and rejected the Serbs’ authority and 
repression. As Igballe Rogova asserted that ‘[t]he Serbs tried to kill our society, but we woke up 
instead’ (as cited in Lippman, 1999, 9), Krasniqi (2010) argues that people involved in the parallel 
institutions and facilities were ‘sacrificing their personal well-being and interests for a greater 
collective cause of the Albanian population in Kosovo’ (p. 47). Reitan (2000) is similarly positive 
about the merits of the LDK’s non-violent parallel system, assuring us that it ‘successfully countered 
the intended totalitarian effect of Serbianisation’ in Kosovo (p. 84), as ‘the Albanians resisted 
disempowerment and depoliticisation in the face of Milošević’s efforts to monopolise power’ (p. 86).  
Thus, in spite of the revocation of its autonomy, the large-scale dismissal of Albanians from 
political bodies and any form of employment, and the continued acts of arbitrary violence by Serbian 
police in the region, it seemed that the biopower practices of the LDK and its parallel organisations 
helped to transform it from a movement for the mere defence of autonomy into one for full de jure 
independence from Serbia (Clark, 2000, 2). 
Especially the LDK’s parallel educational system became heralded as the success story of 
Kosovar Albanian resilience in the early 1990s. Denisa Kostovicova (2000, 2001, 2002, 2005) has 
analysed this subject extensively, describing how the Kosovar Albanians saw their ability to set up 
the parallel education system as proof of the maturation of their parallel state as a whole. 
Epitomising the amalgamation of “state-like” political power and peaceful resistance, Albanian 
parallel education embodied the hallmark of challenge to Serbian rule. In Kostovicova’s own words, 
‘it was equated with a very sense of nationhood and a freedom to nourish it’ (Kostovicova, 2005, 
95), and made the ideal of Kosovar Albanian “statehood” ‘more real’ (p. 120). Symbolising a ‘unique 
life school of resistance’ (Maliqi, 1998, 117), it was a sign of the ‘internal liberation’ of Albanians in 
Kosovo (Ibrahim Rugova, as cited in Kostovicova, 2001, 14). Paradoxically, Kostovicova (2005) 
contends, the Serbian activities to prohibit Albanian language education and reject Albanians from 
the physical spaces of education in Kosovo had the reverse effect, as the Serbs thereby actually lost 
any control over it (p. 96). By reinventing their education system in private homes, Albanians placed 
themselves in a position of strength and ‘rendered futile the Serbian strategy of [Albanian] 
deinstitutionalisation’ (pp. 120-121). 
At the same time, the Kosovar Albanian strategy of non-violent resistance against the 
Serbian regime did not emerge out of a clear, coherent, and deliberate consideration. Rugova, in 
fact, never really articulated a “theory” or “philosophy” of non-violence, which therefore seemed 
more of an improvisation to deal with Serbian oppression than a well-thought-out strategy (Maliqi, 
2012, 50). Rugova (1994) himself asserted that he was ‘a realist and not a man of fantasy’ (p. 176). 
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Likewise, according to Clark (2000), ‘it is a misrepresentation to call him a pacifist. Above all, he was 
pragmatic’ (p. 6).  
Albanian non-violence, thus, was not carefully planned but rather the result of a range of 
‘disconnected actions’ (Ağir, 2012, 115). As suggested earlier, the LDK and its parallel system ‘drew 
on the traditional clan hierarchy of Albanian society, as well as on the structures and authority of the 
now-defunct Communist Party’ (Llamazares & Reynolds-Levy, 2003, 3). Maliqi (2012) even contends 
that ‘Kosovo’s parallel institutions were in essence a continuation of the legal institutions of the 
autonomy era, and... the new leadership basically attached itself to them as a parasite’ (p. 55). 
Others have similarly argued that the Kosovar Albanian parallel system had its foundations much 
more in the old institutions and former communist nomenklatura of Kosovo’s years of autonomy 
(1974-1989) than in any purposeful mode of thought and action by the LDK (Pula, 2004). 
In reality, then, as will be explored more thoroughly in the next chapter, the LDK’s non-
violent resistance seemed incapable of assuming any other strategy than to passively wait and hope 
for international engagement to come to their aid. In spite of continuous international praise for the 
Albanians’ non-violence, however, no help would come. On the one hand, certainly, in many 
respects it was the international community who failed and abandoned the LDK’s and Kosovar 
Albanians’ plight in the early 1990s (Caplan, 1998, 746-748; Pula, 2004, 816), yet in other respects, 
the Albanians arguably brought international negligence onto themselves because ‘not much that 
was newsworthy actually happened’ (Judah, 2000a, 73). Given the more pragmatic rather than 
principled grounds of Kosovar Albanian peaceful resistance (Salla, 1995, 432), this was, according to 
Clark (2000), a ‘narrow non-violence’ wherein non-cooperation with “the enemy” was not combined 
with an “active” resistance or a Gandhian dialogue with the “Other” (p. 69).  
Instead, the parallel system constituted a ‘society within a society’ (Krasniqi, 2010, 43; my 
emphasis): one that nourished relationships within the Albanian community but not between the 
Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo (Pula, 2004, 818). Clark (2000) even suggests that in identifying 
themselves so vehemently against an “Other” – Albanian peacefulness versus Serbian violence – the 
Kosovar Albanians actually cultivated and embraced an identity of powerless victimhood (pp. 193-
196). Albanian self-understanding became increasingly derived from a ‘matrix of antagonism’, which 
only engendered ‘a lack of flexibility [and] ultimately a Manichean worldview where one is always 
the victim or martyr, the “Other” always the villain’ (p. 68). As one anthropologist observed in 1991, 
Albanians in Kosovo: 
 
cope with marginality by cultivating their identity as oppressed and suffering “outsiders”... 
[S]uffering, is considered a fact of life… They identify themselves as a backward, forgotten, 
plundered people, characteristics which they feel make them special (Reineck, 1991, 
193). 
 
As such, instead of empowering Kosovar Albanian life against Serbian persecution, the parallel state 
gradually turned into a symbol of being “stuck in limbo”. Rather than embodying a biopolitical 
power, it conversely became only practicable as a ‘delicate art of becoming invisible’ (Gessen, 1994, 
32). The Kosovar Albanian parallel state (of being) became one of ‘semi-resistance’ (Clark, 2000, 57) 
and ‘sullen stability’ (Judah, 2000a, 91), a frozen status quo that was ‘extremely tense, with a 
pervading sense of insecurity and fear of impending conflict’ (Vickers, 1998, 265).  
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Rugova (1994) himself believed that for Albanians in Kosovo ‘the situation is worse than a 
state of war’ (p. 169), as they lived an existence rife with contradiction and ambiguity. The parallel 
state was ‘both dull and bizarre’ (Judah, 2000a, 73), ‘stable and explosive’ (De Vrieze, 1995), ‘neither 
war nor peace’ (Maliqi, 1998, 185). As Kostovicova (2001) points out, it formed ‘simultaneously a 
metaphor of prison and freedom’ (p. 11). The Kosovar Albanians possessed an unprecedented 
degree of liberty to run their affairs in a seemingly autonomous manner, but that liberty existed only 
within the limits established by continued Serbian repression (Kostovicova, 2000, 147). In this 
context, ‘the Albanians’ very use of alternative space... emerged as a daily reminder of the 
imperfection of such freedom’ (Kostovicova, 2005, 129). Rugova (1994) himself lamented how 
Kosovo had become ‘a big prison and concentration camp’ (p. 60), while for Adem Demaçi, ‘the 
biggest prison in the world [was] the prison of Kosovo’ (as cited in Kostovicova, 2005, 127).  
Language such as this, uttered by two of the main motivators of the Albanian parallel state 
in Kosovo, reminds us of Agamben’s conceptualisations of the nature of biopolitics and its relation to 
de facto sovereignty. Albanians in Kosovo possessed ‘symbolic power and political leverage’ 
(Kostovicova, 2005, 121), were ‘partially able to circumvent the Serbian... crackdown’ (Reitan, 2000, 
86), cherished a ‘psychological freedom’ (Rugova, 1994, 176), and had supposedly gained ‘moral 
authority’ and even a ‘moral victory’ (p. 55), but none of these qualities amounted to any material 
power over the Serbs.  
Therefore, instead of promoting a certain change to Albanian life in Kosovo, the LDK and its 
parallel mechanisms turned out to be only capable of resisting change to it (Krasniqi, 2010, 46). To 
an extent, the LDK had devised a modus vivendi with the Serbs (Pula, 2004, 809), but this constituted 
a mode of living only reflecting prudence, patience, and endurance. For Maliqi (1998), Rugova 
‘precisely [was] the man who was best suited for this situation of neither war nor peace, the politics 
of non-doing’ (p. 239). As living conditions grew increasingly intolerable (Vickers, 1998, 273-278), 
Kosovar Albanians even took on an attitude of ‘inglorious submission’ (Malcolm, 1998, 346) and 
became infected with ‘[a] general sense of depression’ (Kostovicova, 2005, 94). While Rugova, thus, 
may have believed that Albanians were ‘defining a new reality against Serb domination’ in Kosovo 
(Clark, 2000, 116), all the realities in Kosovo in the early 1990s seemed first and foremost defined by 
that Serbian domination.  
To conclude, thus, Kosovar Albanian biopower manifested itself in the (perhaps logical) 
Albanian refusal to participate in Serbian socio-political life (Ağir, 2012, 111), yet this also essentially 
meant that in a sense they “resigned” themselves to Serbian oppression. As such, Salla (1995) may 
argue that the Albanians’ parallel state ‘[was] a blow to Serbian…claims of sovereign control’ (p. 
431), Rexhep Osmani may describe Albanian parallel education as a ‘handicap’ to Serbian 
sovereignty in Kosovo (as cited in Kostovicova, 2005, 120), and Kostovicova herself may even go so 
far as to contend that ‘[t]he initial defence of Albanians’ educational autonomy turned into the 
realisation of their educational sovereignty’ (p. 121), but none of these invocations of the concept of 
sovereignty really seem to account for the fact that Serbs were the ones to decide on the exception 
in Kosovo. Alternatively, Kosovar Albanians may have rejected the legitimacy of Serbian rule over 
Kosovo (Ağir, 2012, 98), and may have represented themselves as the legal institutions of Kosovo, 
but such juridical or normative claims proved futile in the face of Serbian overwhelming effective 
power (Maliqi, 2012, 47). As Rugova (1994) himself admitted, ‘[t]hey have the power, we have the 




De Facto Sovereignty and the LDK 
Returning to Agamben, the LDK’s parallel state did not create a “state of exception” or a “zone of 
indistinction” in Kosovo, but seemed to be its occupier after the Serbs had created it. The parallel 
structures may have resembled an ‘anti-politics’ model (Konrad, 1984) ‘to the extent that they 
operated entirely outwith Serbian state institutions’, but they did not themselves ‘hollow out the 
space of [Serbian] influence’ over Kosovar Albanian political existence (Devic, 2006, 259). Instead, in 
considering the LDK’s biopower, it seems that this was actually life “laid bare” by a de facto 
sovereign entity. Belgrade created the conditions that condemned the Albanians in Kosovo to a 
subsistence-level zoe. As one education official put it, ‘[w]e did not want to set up parallel education 
but were forced to’ (as cited in Kostovicova, 2005, 94). Ryan (2010) actually identifies the status of 
the Kosovar Albanians, throughout the twentieth century but in the early 1990s in particular, as 
homo (or terra) sacer. The Serbs not only attached a kind of “sacredness” to Kosovo, Kosovo thereby 
also became the subject of the Serbs’ de facto sovereign capability of inclusive exclusion. 
This situation simultaneously implied that Kosovo could not be relinquished from Serbia’s 
legal and political community. Rugova (1994) found that ‘the Serbs are aware that they cannot 
continue to keep Kosovo by force’ (p. 94). Similarly, Vickers (1998) contends that the establishment 
of Albanian parallel mechanisms in Kosovo implied that the “peace” maintained by the Serbs in 
Kosovo was an illusory order, as the Serbs had in fact already lost Kosovo ‘because they could only 
maintain control over the province by severe police repression and military force’ (p. 263; my 
emphasis). On the face of it, perhaps, Kosovar Albanians may have even appeared to perform the de 
facto sovereign function of (inclusive) exclusion themselves. The customary legal mechanisms of the 
Kanun, for instance, administered not only the proliferation of Albanian nationhood in opposition 
and exclusion of the (Kosovar) Serbs, it actually also outlawed Albanians who were sympathetic to 
Serbian policies in Kosovo as homines sacri within the Kosovar Albanian community (Kostovicova, 
2005, 115-119).  
Furthermore, at the beginning at least, the LDK succeeded in mobilising almost all parts of 
Kosovar Albanian society behind its struggle for independence and its strategy of non-violence. 
Remarkable, also, were the efforts to settle the so-called “blood feuds” within the Albanian 
community in Kosovo. Between 1990 and 1992, up to 2000 of these long-standing communal 
conflicts between different families were mediated through the Albanian ‘council of reconciliation’ 
(Clark, 2000, 60-64; Johnstone, 2002, 223; Krasniqi, 2010, 49-50; Kubo, 2010, 1138). Ostensibly, the 
Albanians in Kosovo were capable of restoring a political order within their community. 
That being said, as mentioned before, those apparently de facto sovereign efforts were 
mainly carried out by various social networks and movements like the Mother Teresa Association. 
Political mobilisation in the early 1990s was built along the lines of these networks or extended 
family alliances (Strazzari & Selenica, 2013, 121), and Albanian self-restraint and non-violence was 
created in practice mainly by a plurality of activists, youth organisations, and volunteers (Clark, 2000, 
56-59). The parallel state was more of a loose conglomeration of institutions and services, over 
which the LDK and Rugova possessed only nominal control (Maliqi, 2012, 55; Pula, 2004, 797-798). 
As Bekaj (2008) has found, ‘the delineating line between the political movement and civil society was 





The question remains, indeed, to what extent the LDK and Rugova were actually capable of 
resolving a crisis of any nature in Kosovo. Over the course of the parallel state’s existence, a growing 
amount of criticism emerged aimed at Rugova’s policies, and the LDK seemed unable to reconcile 
the widening divisions within the Kosovar Albanian community about the to-be-taken road towards 
de jure state independence (Maliqi, 2012, 61-64). In addition, the leader of the campaign to settle 
blood feuds himself admitted that ‘[w]e cannot force reconciliation’ (Anton Çetta, as cited in Clark, 
2000, 63), and in instances of Serbian police terrorisation of Kosovar Albanians, all the LDK could do 
was ‘[n]ot to calm the people... but to make an act of solidarity, to witness’ (Rugova, 1994, 134-135). 
The LDK could ensure peacefulness neither within the Kosovar Albanian community nor by the 
Kosovar Albanians. 
In apparent contrast to Rugova’s absence of decision-making capacity, the LDK leader in fact 
gradually appeared to assume a more authoritarian or monopolised attitude of governance (Maliqi, 
2012, 57-59). 
 
Although his speeches gave the impression of a modest and gentle politician, in essence 
he created a system of authoritarian personal power, based on a variant of a personality 
cult... Rugova became a self-contained figure of the movement, almost completely 
ignoring the LDK leadership when making (or blocking) decisions. Rugova blocked all 
political initiatives that could possibly endanger his own position within the movement (p. 
58). 
 
Paradoxically, it seemed, as Rugova and the LDK proved more and more incapable of devising a 
central and coherent strategy in order to find a resolution for the Kosovo Albanian situation, they 
increasingly began to search for that decisional unity (Clark, 2000, 117-119; Reitan, 2000, 78). As 
Strazzari and Selenica (2013) observe, ‘LDK leaders used simultaneously the hat of a resistance 
movement, of civil society, and of one-party state bureaucracy’ (p. 121). Particularly after the 1992 
parallel presidential elections, ‘a tight circle around Rugova took a firm grip on decisions that 
mattered’. For Rugova and the LDK, ‘the necessity for self-restraint and refusal to be provoked 
offered some rationale for this concentration of control’ (Clark, 2000, 118). In a description 
apparently elucidating a (Hobbesian) de facto sovereign’s relationship with its subjects, Maliqi (2012) 
explains how ‘[b]etween the collective and the leader there was a relationship similar to that 
between a shepherd and his flock, in which the leader/shepherd not only represented but also 
articulated the collective will’ (p. 59).  
At the beginning, certainly, while Rugova became increasingly remote and isolated from his 
own Albanian community, for a long period their faith in him did not waiver. As Clark (2000) 
observes, ‘[s]omehow the more Rugova refused to answer his critics, the more presidential his aura 
became’ (p. 199), and ‘the population esteemed him for being “above” the hurly burly of political 
debate’ (p. 118). Conversely, however, while any expectation among the Kosovar Albanians for 
democratic, transparent, and non-authoritarian leadership remained unfulfilled, their confidence 






It appears that Rugova had to face the problem of his position as Kosovar Albanian leader. 
He tried to wield absolute power and decisive control over Albanian lives in Kosovo, but not only did 
he thereby become the subject of accusations of despotism by the Albanian public and other 
Albanian political figures, his power was also exposed to be meaningless in the face of another entity 
that actually exercised de facto sovereignty over Kosovo.  
From one perspective, perhaps, Kosovo seemed to be a battleground between two de facto 
sovereign actors (Albanian and Serbian) vying for control over the region (Pula, 2004, 807), as the 
Kosovar Albanians may have felt as if they were uniting and homogenising to delineate a de facto 
sovereign political community in distinction to the Serbian “enemy” (Kostovicova, 2001, 13-14; 
Kostovicova, 2005, 115; Krasniqi, 2010, 49-52). At one time, the Kosovar Albanian leadership even 
admitted that they did not actually want to remove Milošević, because that would leave them 
without their profoundly evil constitutive “Other” (Vickers, 1998, 268). Also, again, the total spatial 
segregation of Albanians from the Serbs in Kosovo compelled other minorities in the region to align 
themselves with one of those two conflicting communities (Kostovicova, 2005, 95). ‘Fluid’ group 
boundaries and ‘ambiguous’ identities that tend(ed) to characterise social reality in Kosovo were 
solidified by apparently de facto sovereign actions, so that any ‘ethnic and religious anomalies’ who 
lived ‘betwixt and between’ and did not ‘fit into the neat system of the dominant Serbian-Albanian 
opposition’ were either absorbed into one of those dominant groups or expelled or eliminated by 
them (Duijzings, 2000, 24-27).  
Those practices of inclusion and exclusion, however, seemed to have been decided on by 
Serbs instead of Kosovar Albanians. It was actually a misconception to think that the Albanians could 
decide whether to pursue any de facto sovereign strategies of inclusion/exclusion (Serbian or 
otherwise) when it was the Kosovar Albanian community itself that was ostracised by Serbian de 
facto sovereignty. Kosovar Albanian life formed the exception to Serbian rule, not the other way 
around. As Maliqi (1998) wrote, ‘ethnic conflict in Kosovo ha[d] turned into a kind of intense war of 
nerves, in which one side stop[ped] at nothing… while the other side bottle[d] up its humiliation, 
despair, fury, rage, and hatred’ (p. 24). In a later work, he reiterates this representation of Kosovo as 
an apparent clash between two de facto sovereigns, which in reality could be resolved by only one of 
them: 
 
Two communities looked up to their leaders as gods, and their relation to the crisis 
determined the character of inter-ethnic relations... whereby the Serbian leader 
controlled through coercion, while the Albanian leader asked his community to remain 
passive, patient and non-violent. Such an anomalous status quo certainly suited the 
privileged side more than the other side which was objectively losing (Maliqi, 2012, 58). 
 
Not only did the LDK and the parallel state seem unable to decide on any Serbian exception 
in Kosovo, it would also be misleading to represent the parallel state as a de facto sovereign entity 
“overlapping” with that of the Serbs. The exceptional nature of de facto sovereignty itself actually 
precludes such fluid conceptualisations. For instance, Clark (2000) portrays “social empowerment” 
as “power-to” rather than “power-over” (p. 131), implying that Albanian non-violent resistance 
could have been powerful without thereby limiting Serbian power in Kosovo – in a form of an 




Rather, while the Albanians in Kosovo could perhaps have tried to establish convergences 
between themselves and the Serbian government (Salla, 1995, 423-433), they seemed incapable of, 
more than uninterested in, doing so as the ‘wholesale denial of rights’ by the Serbs forced them to 
accept a life ‘under Serbia’ (Clark, 2000, 92). The term “parallel state” itself implies that these were 
non-converging communities ‘living in an apartheid situation’ (Vickers, 1998, 263), and only one of 
these entities had the capacity to decide to break down this separation. The idea that the Serbian 
displays of overwhelming force and the Albanian parallel state in Kosovo could be understood as a 
compromise between two coinciding expressions of de facto sovereignty seemed nothing more than 
an ‘idealisation... based on a sort of blind illusion of ostensible stability in Kosovo... motivated by 
[Albanian] political pragmatism’ (Maliqi, 2012, 48). 
 Instead, the LDK and its parallel state were placed in a position of permanent crisis by 
Serbian de facto sovereignty. They were not necessarily powerless in absolute terms, but they were 
subordinated to the political entity that had the capacity to decide on their exceptional 
circumstances. Due to the sustained Serbian policy of Albanian disarmament in Kosovo while arming 
and mobilising Serbs in the region, the Kosovar Albanians lacked any kind of police or defense force 
that could form a more militant resistance movement (Salla, 1995, 432). Thus, because the LDK 
lacked the means to counter Serbia’s overwhelming and aggressive power over Kosovar Albanian 
political life (Pula, 2004, 811-812), ‘the strategy of nonviolence was... self-imposed’ (Maliqi, 1998, 
101). Rugova (1994) similarly asserted that ‘[s]elf-control was imposed on us because of the terror’ 
(p. 41), while Clark (2000) actually translates this as non-violence imposing itself on the Kosovar 
Albanians (p. 66).  
As such, rather than a symbol of freedom and independence, the parallel state came to 
embody the failure of peaceful resistance and the irremovability of Serbian de facto sovereignty 
(Kostovicova, 2001, 17; Kostovicova, 2005, 182). As Judah (2000a) finds, the parallel state was ‘a 
state of virtual reality’ (p. 65). Kosovar Albanians opted for a ‘simulation’ of statehood instead of an 
unfeasible push for independence as ‘the Yugoslav army and Serbian police remained very much in 
control’ (p. 66). Engaging in actual warfare in an attempt to resolve the crisis was a discussed 
possibility within both Serbian and Albanian circles, but their reasons for not pursuing it were widely 
divergent (p. 73). 
 In fact, the non-violent nature of Albanian resistance in Kosovo in a sense helped Milošević 
to stay in power (Judah, 2008, 70). The peaceful separation by the Kosovar Albanian community 
actually benefited both the local Kosovar Serbs and the Serbian government in their desires and 
strategies to “Serbianise” political and workplace positions in Kosovo (Salla, 1995, 430). Again, 
however, such assertions should not be confused with a suggestion that the Kosovar Albanians 
deliberately and decidedly “allowed” the Serbs to “keep the peace” in Kosovo. Rugova and the LDK 
‘effectively pacified the province, which was exactly what the [Serbian] authorities wanted’, but the 
Serbs were the ones with the capacity to calculate (and decide) that such passive Albanian resistance 
was preferable to violent conflict (Judah, 2000a, 84); they did not depend on Albanian cooperation 
and non-violence in Kosovo (Ağır, 2012, 112). Hence, ‘the temporary pacification of Kosovo suited 
Belgrade well’, because the Serbs were simultaneously dealing with many other crises elsewhere in 
dissolving Yugoslavia, but it was Serbia that had the ability to decide to leave the parallel state to its 




 The Serbs demonstrated this possession of de facto sovereign ability in numerous ways. The 
dissolution of Kosovo’s government in July 1990, for instance, was basically forced upon the 
Albanians through Serbian police and military coercion. Furthermore, Serbia was able to invoke a 
combination of legal emergency measures in order to dismiss, demote, and sack many thousands of 
Kosovar Albanian employees and officials and replace them with Serbian ones. In fact, the Serbs 
were capable of establishing and shaping the nature of Kosovar law in general (Vickers, 1998, 274). 
Thus, ‘the expulsion of Albanians from their jobs was’, for example, ‘chiefly a political act without a 
sound legal basis’ (Pula, 2004, 812-813). Also, there was a constant stream of violence, harassment, 
surveillance, and arbitrary arrests against the Kosovar Albanian community by Serbian police and 
paramilitary troops, Albanian protests were forcefully repressed, and Albanian mobility was limited 
by widespread Serbian blockades (Ağır, 2012, 104-105; Malcolm, 1998, 349-350; Reitan, 2000, 84-
88; Salla, 1995, 430-431). The Kosovar Albanians, thus, did suffer from severe human rights abuses 
at the hands of the Serbian regime, and the legitimacy and morality of Serbian de facto sovereignty 
at the time can certainly be questioned, but it would be much harder to dispute its existence or 
substantiveness (Judah, 2000a, 84). 
 Remarkably, some thinkers seem to do just that. According to Ağır (2012), for instance, 
‘Serbian political domination in Kosovo in the 1990s did not translate into an ability to control over 
[Kosovar] Albanians’, as the LDK’s efforts gave them ‘a de facto freedom’ that ‘fundamentally 
altered’ power relationships in the region (pp. 117-118). Reitan (2000) similarly rejoices how ‘Rugova 
and the LDK navigated the nonviolent movement towards numerous successes in achieving greater 
democratic freedoms’ (p. 76) that broke Milošević’s ‘monopoly on leadership’ (p. 84). She even 
contends that the non-violent Albanians asserted ‘their sovereignty as a republic and eventually an 
independent state’, as Belgrade ‘could not prevent legitimate political will from expressing itself’ (p. 
85).  
Both of these authors, however, seem to overlook or misinterpret the significance of the 
exception and the crisis in the nature of de facto sovereignty. In a manner comparable to Rugova 
and the LDK, they appear to perceive the tentative stability in Kosovo in the early 1990s as an 
environment in which democracy, legitimacy, legality, and morality could flourish and prevail over 
material power and violence, whereas fundamentally – in the essential, decisive spaces and 
moments of (Kosovar) social life – the Serbian capacity for military force ‘was still very much in 
control’ (Judah, 2000a, 67). In Rugova’s own words: 
 
All our weapons have been taken away by the Serbian police. We are not certain how 
strong the Serbian military presence in the province actually is, but we do know that it is 
overwhelming and that we have nothing to set against the tanks and other modern 
weaponry in Serbian hands. We would have no chance of successfully resisting the army 
(as cited in Vickers, 1998, 264). 
 
As such, it seems that throughout the early 1990s it was Serbia that maintained ownership over the 
crisis and the exception in Kosovo. In some sense, the Serbian authorities even ‘viewed the parallel 
system as non-existent’ (Ağır, 2012, 117). The parallel Albanian institutions were ‘irrelevant from the 
Serbian government’s perspective that “real” power – repressive institutional capabilities – 
continue[d] to be held by Belgrade’ (Salla, 1995, 430).  
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Again, Clark (2000), on the one hand, may contend that the Serbian strategy in Kosovo was 
guided by ‘inertia’, as the Serbs, ‘as much as the LDK, seemed to be incapable of initiative’, but he 
immediately thereafter argues how Milošević had the luxury to be able to “let the conflict simmer”. 
This justified the presence of the large Serbian police force in Kosovo, which ‘was permanently 
available if he needed a “crisis” to distract attention from problems elsewhere or if he had a 
“grievance” to invoke’ (p. 188). Indeed, regardless of the extent to which clashes between Serbs and 
Albanians were possible or actually did occur, it was the Serb forces and authorities who could 
“decide on the exception” and restore “order” in Kosovo. The LDK’s strategy of peaceful parallel 
statehood implied that the Kosovo Albanian community could survive and defend itself in a context 
of systematic Serbian repression, but they could neither prevent nor stop it, nor could they 
overpower the Serbs whenever any kind of conflictual situation – extreme or less so – did present 
itself (Ağır, 2012, 112; Clark, 2000, 95). As Pavlakovic and Ramet (2004) thus confirm, ‘the Serbs’ 






Kosovo’s Future: Legal Padding or De Facto Sovereignty? 
 
Such declarations are no more than foam on the tide of time; they cannot allow 
the past to be forgotten nor a future to be built on fragments of the present. 
(Bennouna, 2010, 13) 
 
Both of the previous chapters have discussed the limitations of juridical and non-sovereign 
arrangements of power, emphasising the importance of de facto sovereignty for the nature of 
different geopolitical anomalies. This was not to suggest that those legal and everyday power 
relationships were of no relevance to these entities, but the existence of geopolitical anomalies 
remains more fundamentally definable by their de facto sovereignty or the lack thereof. 
Furthermore, both chapters revealed that while peaceful and orderly constellations of politics 
possess many virtues, they should not be confused with an expression of de facto sovereignty. 
Particularly in the foregoing chapter, the argument has been made that norms and practices of 
peaceful coexistence remain essentially ineffective in the face of de facto sovereign power.  
That being said, however, while Kosovo’s parallel state in first half of the 1990s thus 
supposedly represented a subordinated space of exception to Serbia’s de facto sovereignty, it 
appears that Kosovo has now in fact secured its own de facto sovereign capacity, becoming one of 
the most mature geopolitical anomalies in today’s world. This chapter, therefore, will proceed from 
its discussion of the LDK onto an investigation of the means through which Kosovo did ostensibly 
obtain that de facto sovereignty, and draw a link between those means of acquiring de facto 
sovereignty and Kosovo’s present legal and political status.  
As will be explained, although the LDK’s efforts received widespread praise for its 
peacefulness, it was never legally recognised by the international community. This led to growing 
frustration among many Kosovar Albanians, who consequently resorted to violence through the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës, UÇK). Thereafter, intensifying clashes 
between the KLA and Serbian forces eventually provoked international action in the form of NATO 
airstrikes and a UN peacekeeping mission. As such, in a continuation of some of the issues brought 
up in the previous chapter, the political independence of Kosovo – its apparent de facto sovereignty 
– seems to owe a lot not only to violence in itself, but also to international forceful action.  
Secondly, that leaves us with the question how to assess those violent and forceful exercises 
in reference to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of legal independence (de jure sovereignty) on 
February 17th 2008. This declaration was (juridically) evaluated in the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion in July 
2010, yet this legal evaluation did in almost no way alleviate or resolve tensions between Kosovo’s 
burgeoning status as a de jure state and the specific ways in which it acquired and upholds material 
power. As Judge Bennouna poetically phrased it in his dissenting opinion presented above, the 
Kosovo declaration of independence and the subsequent Advisory Opinion by the ICJ appear to be 
capable of concealing neither NATO’s use of force, nor the forceful means necessary to effectuate de 




This chapter, indeed, raises the question whether Kosovo, whose road to full de jure 
recognition by now seems to be on a rather irreversible trajectory, would have actually existed as an 
independent polity without the violent (de facto sovereign) actions of both the KLA and NATO in the 
late-1990s. Furthermore, this geopolitical anomaly may form an example of the possible 
(international) legal ways through which the “international community” is able to “handle” and 
“approach” these entities, yet simultaneously brings up certain issues concerning the nature of de 
facto sovereignty in such situations. Certainly, given the seemingly intractable differences and 
antagonisms between Serb and Albanian communities in Kosovo, this rudimentary de jure state’s 
integrity will ostensibly remain reliant primarily on some (political) body’s de facto sovereign 
capacity to retain political order. Accordingly, Kosovo may embody the possibility of encapsulating, 
cushioning, or even effacing that potential for inter-communal violence in a collection of domestic 
and international legal arrangements, perhaps only insofar those legal arrangements are sustained 
by an (internationally cultivated) de facto sovereign for a sufficient period of time. 
 
Kosovo and Violence 
By the mid-1990s, the Albanian population in Kosovo had grown increasingly frustrated with the 
strategy of non-violent resistance, not least because of the absence of the expected and anticipated 
international assistance towards Kosovar legal independence. The international approach towards 
Kosovo and the LDK’s objectives was marked by inconsistency, ambiguity, complacency, and 
insincerity. As Weller (1999) describes, the international attitude towards Kosovo was 
‘schizophrenic’, as there were continuous acknowledgements of Kosovo’s dismal situation and its 
potential for conflict, but never any action taken to remedy the Albanian ordeal or to prevent that 
conflict from happening (p. 33). For the international community, ‘Kosovo was always just an 
afterthought. It was the place that the diplomats knew they should do something about, but were 
not sure what and anyway had more important things to do’ (Judah, 2000a, 92).  
Conferences and committees led by Lord Carrington and Robert Badinter, organised by the 
European Community in 1991 and 1992 to deal with the legal ramifications of the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, exemplified this. Because of Kosovo’s non-republican juridical status in former 
Yugoslavia, its claims to de jure state independence were not recognised, and while Rugova was 
invited to attend these international meetings, his Kosovar Albanian delegation was only allowed to 
sit on the sidelines and ‘watch the fate of almost everyone else in former Yugoslavia being discussed, 
except their own’ (Judah, 2000a, 93). 
Moreover, the so-called “Helsinki criteria”, pertaining to human rights and minority rights, 
were stipulated for the legal recognition of the new Balkan states, which for Serbia meant that 
Kosovo’s autonomy within the republic would have to be restored. Remarkably, however, such 
stipulations were eliminated or overridden at the last moment to gain Milošević’s acceptance of the 
outcomes of these international conventions (Caplan, 1998, 747). Not long after these conferences, 
in December 1992, then outgoing US president George H.W. Bush stated his “Christmas warning”, 
which represented the Kosovar Albanians’ ‘greatest success’ internationally as well as its ‘most 
damaging delusion’ (Clark, 2000, 89): ‘In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian actions’, 
Bush said, ‘the US will be prepared to employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo and Serbia 




As the years went on, this statement became a growing embarrassment as international 
inaction prevailed (Hehir, 2010b, 6). Time and time again, the Kosovo issue was internationally 
portrayed – by the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the “Contact Group” formed by Russia, 
the United States, France, Great Britain, and Italy – as an “internal” Serbian affair that should be 
resolved through human rights mechanisms and self-determination arrangements within Serbia 
itself (Gardner, 2008, 541). It seemed that one thought that resolving the Kosovo question depended 
on the democratisation of Serbia, rather than the other way around (Maliqi, 2012, 49). 
The most severe blow to Kosovar Albanian confidence in Rugova’s non-violent resistance 
came with the Dayton Agreements at the end of the Bosnian war in November 1995. While they had 
counted on an international acknowledgement of the fact that a lasting peace in Former Yugoslavia 
would require a resolution to the Kosovo issue (preferably through legal state independence) their 
plight never made it on the Dayton Agenda in any substantial way. The international actors involved 
appeared to feel that there was simply too much to address already, and they did not want to 
antagonise Milošević who had so magnanimously made peace with the Bosnian Muslims (Ağır, 2012, 
130; Caplan, 1998, 750). When in 1996 the European Union decided to recognise the new Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and lift international sanctions against it, they merely demanded a 
‘constructive approach’ by Serbia to minority rights and autonomy rights for Kosovo within the FRY 
(European Commision, 1996, 58).  
Indeed, as suggested earlier, the international community’s stance on Rugova and the LDK 
can be characterised by widespread praise, plaudits, and sympathy for their non-violence 
concomitant with a refusal to take real action in support of their striving for legal independence. 
Somehow, Clark (2000) observes, ‘[t]he Kosovo Albanians were more successful in securing 
statements of concern from bodies with moral authority than in influencing states’ to exert their 
power to the benefit of Albanians in the region (p. 89). Arguably, the eventual ineffectiveness of 
Rugova’s non-violent strategy for obtaining Kosovar (Albanian) independence can be partially 
explained by the misleading claims and repeatedly spurious assurances of the international 
community that his struggle was taken very seriously (Reitan, 2000, 77-78; Maliqi, 2012, 49). 
However, perhaps Rugova and the LDK were also paying “the price of peace”. Because 
Kosovo had not plummeted into violent conflict, there seemed no urgent necessity to address the 
issue (Caplan, 1998, 751). Rugova (1994) professed a near ‘unlimited belief in... international 
institutions’ (p. 58), and had put all his hopes in “the international factor” – ‘Western magic bringing 
a happy ending to the fairy tale, a latter-day deus ex machina resolving the tragedy’ (Clark, 2000, 
116). In doing so, however, he ignored, perhaps deliberately, the many signs and messages that the 
international community would actually not support Kosovo’s claim to legal independence (pp. 91-
92). As ‘the political institution which declared itself the representative of... Kosovo’s citizens did not 
possess coercive capacities’, the parallel state’s lack of de facto sovereignty apparently became a 
significant impediment for international players to boost Kosovo’s struggle towards juridical 
statehood recognition (Salla, 1995, 434). By the mid-1990s, as a consequence, Kosovar Albanians 
had become more and more divided on the effectiveness of peaceful resistance for the attainment 
of (legal) independence from Serbia, and a growing amount of more radical elements in the Albanian 






The Kosovo Liberation Army 
In the years after Dayton, the incapacity of Rugova and the LDK to mitigate the Kosovar Albanians’ 
newfound confidence in violence and conflict as a tool towards de jure independence became 
increasingly clear. As they slowly grew tired of peaceful resistance, the disillusioned Albanians in 
Kosovo first resorted to more “active” and confrontational forms of protest (Clark, 2000, 122-157), 
and eventually to forming actual armed militias. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA – UÇK in Albanian) 
in particular gained popularity. Founded in 1993, but with roots in other radical organisations that 
popped up in the early 1980s, the KLA actually remained rather marginal at least until 1996 (Bekaj, 
2010, 16-17; Kubo, 2010, 1139-1142). From that point onwards, until early 1998, sporadic attacks 
against Serb police and military forces signified the presence – albeit a rather feeble or undefined 
one – of the KLA as a more militant Albanian independence movement.  
Thereafter, violent conflict exacerbated between the Albanians in Kosovo and Serb forces, 
leading to severe Albanian humanitarian and refugee crises in early 1999, which in turn prompted 
international action in the form of NATO airstrikes against Serbia (Bekaj, 2010, 18-26; Pavlakovic & 
Ramet, 2004, 86-88; Vickers, 1998, 289-313). While I will not go into full detail about the emergence 
of the KLA or the lead-up to the NATO intervention, I do aim to present some general observations 
about these developments. 
First of all, aside from the growing doubts among Kosovar Albanians about the advantages of 
non-violent resistance and about the international willingness to assist, there are a few other factors 
that made more violent action attractive and possible. The most noted of these factors is the 
outbreak of civil unrest in Albania in spring 1997, which led to the collapse of central government 
control and the widespread looting of a large number of weapon depots. From this point, the 
Kosovar Albanians could use the Northern-Albanian territory ‘as a safe rear’ (Lani, 1999, 30-31), and 
found it much easier to arm themselves for a violent struggle, as they were now able to buy a 
massive quantity of firearms from their neighbouring country (Judah, 2000a, 126-129). Also, the 
harsh crackdown by Serbian forces on Kosovar Albanian guerrilla warfare later on in the conflict 
(from early 1998 onwards) only provoked further radicalisation among the Kosovar Albanians 
(Judah, 2000a, 140-143; Kubo, 2010, 1146). 
The most significant causes for the Albanian recourse to violence, however, remained with 
the limitations of non-violent resistance and “parallelism” itself (Kubo, 2010, 1143). The Serbian 
capacity for terror against the Albanians – its capacity to act “beyond” the law – was not mitigated 
by passive resistance, the legitimacy – domestic or international – of Serbian de facto sovereignty 
was not eroded by the Albanian “withdrawal of consent”, and the parallel system began to show 
signs of exhaustion after years of operating without a clear strategic purpose under very difficult 
conditions (Reitan, 2000, 94). In a clear endorsement of the KLA’s strategies, Veton Surroi declared 
that ‘anyone willing to show some kind of leadership, including military leadership, is welcome’ (as 
cited in Judah, 2000a, 147). Adem Demaçi, in an inversion of his previous beliefs, similarly stated 
that he would ‘not condemn the tactics of the Kosovo Liberation Army because the path of 
nonviolence has gotten us nowhere’ (as cited in Hedges, 1998). As Albanian activist Luljeta Pula-






[t]here is nothing unexpected, wondrous, or surprising in the emergence of the UÇK. At a 
time when the seven-year-old Kosovar movement can be pronounced a failure without 
any concrete results... when the international community has been underestimating and 
seriously ignoring the Albanian factor... when Serbia’s only way of communicating with 
Albanians is violence and crime, one should not be amazed if part of the people decide to 
end this agony and take the fate of Kosovo and its people in its own hands (as cited in 
Vickers, 1998, 313). 
 
By late 1997-early 1998, non-violence in Kosovo experienced its demise and failure, as it 
became clear that the Albanian leadership’s objectives to gain de jure statehood for Kosovo could 
not be reconciled with its ‘strategy of... waiting and doing nothing’ (Maliqi, 2012, 67). As Kostovicova 
(2000) observes, ‘[t]he walls of separation between the two ethnic communities in Kosovo were torn 
down not by an agreement but by shell and arson attacks’ (p. 148). Also, again, Dayton taught the 
Kosovar Albanians that ‘if you want international attention you must generate a conflict’ (Hehir, 
2010b, 6). As Hodge (2000) put it, ‘the metal in Kosovo was not hot enough to bring about political 
change [so] [t]he KLA decided to make it glow’ (p. 26). 
That being said, particularly in the early stages of the KLA’s existence, it remained a rather 
small organisation, and the intensity of violence it could muster remained relatively low. Judah 
(2000a) argues that ‘as late as the autumn of 1997, few foresaw the threat of an imminent and 
major guerrilla-led uprising in Kosovo’, and ‘few in Belgrade... took the slightest bit of notice of what 
was happening in Kosovo’ (pp. 117-119). The KLA found great difficulty in attracting large amounts of 
public support, let alone recruiting combatants, for its violent strategy, and remained a very loose 
and decentralised organisation, which came into being without any clearly defined leadership. It 
expanded in a chaotic and haphazard way without much sophisticated deliberation (Bekaj, 2010, 18-
20; Kubo, 2010, 1142-1147). Not unlike the LDK, in fact, the KLA initially consisted predominantly of 
‘village groups knitted together by clan connections and fear’ (Judah, 2000a, 147), and ‘although 
there was a theoretical high command, much of the KLA’s organisation came... from the grassroots’ 
(Judah, 2000b, 113).  
Pettifer (2001), therefore, contends that because of the KLA’s military and organisational 
weaknesses, its real power lay in the symbolism and imagery it provoked and represented. Its 
mysterious and undefined nature only added to its appeal. Pettifer firmly believes that ‘the mythical 
and secretive nature of the organisation assisted the KLA considerably in the early phases of its 
struggle’. According to him, ‘the time demanded a blanket organisation that any Kosovo Albanian 
could join, and the single common denominator was a belief that military struggle was a legitimate 
means of liberating Kosovo from Serbian rule’ (pp. 26-28). Bekaj (2010) makes a similar argument, 
finding that ‘every armed resistance cell had an identical political goal’, so that ‘a synergy and 
understanding existed across the board’ (p. 18). 
That simultaneously meant, however, that any consideration of the KLA’s violent strategy as 
an immediate reconfiguration of de facto sovereignty in Kosovo should seriously be questioned. For 
instance, while these local militias now took on the moniker of the KLA/UÇK, the rudimentary 
organisation itself was actually quite shocked and overwhelmed by this growing enthusiasm for 
violence. As the KLA spokesperson in Britain later confided, certain events ‘found us unprepared for 
a big war because it led to a big influx of volunteers…we just couldn’t [sic] stop it’ (Pleurat Sejdiu, as 
cited in Judah, 2000a, 140-141). It seems, therefore, that the large-scale Albanian guerrilla warfare 
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that erupted in 1998 did not come about out of a unitary, top-down, active decision. In addition, it 
was not immediately obvious that the LDK began to lose its power in Kosovo (Judah, 2000a, 124), 
and people appeared to initially see no contradiction in supporting both Rugova as well as the KLA. 
When Rugova organised new elections in March 1998, outraging the KLA, the large majority of 
Kosovar Albanians voted overwhelmingly for him and his party, apparently proclaiming that ‘the KLA 
is our army… but Rugova is our president’ (p. 146). 
This is not to suggest that after 1998 the LDK could seriously claim to have any coercive 
control over the region, as the KLA – or at least the Albanians’ conviction of the necessity of violence 
– did grow substantially stronger. While Rugova believed that the LDK’s electoral victory signified its 
legitimacy as the political representation of the Kosovar Albanians, and had initially even maintained 
that the KLA was merely a Serbian conspiracy, it became increasingly obvious that this was not 
actually some easily negligible force. Especially after the Serbian execution of one of the KLA’s 
founders (Adem Jashari) and his family in March 1998, the KLA gained popular support in increasing 
waves. It came to represent the Kosovar Albanians’ “will of the people”, an organisation one could 
identify with, whereas the LDK became even more regarded as above and separated from the 
Albanian community (Bekaj, 2010, 20-22; Judah, 2000a, 131-134; Pettifer, 2001, 28).  
In a sense, thus, the KLA formed a rebellion not only against Serbian oppression in Kosovo, 
but also against the “internal regime” of Rugova’s parallel government, and it even targeted and 
killed Albanians who allegedly “collaborated” with Serbia (Maliqi, 2012, 66). As the KLA finally 
“emerged from the shadows” and began to express an increasingly fanatical belief that they would 
‘have to shoot their way out of Serbia’ (Vickers, 1998, 312-313), Rugova just seemed incapable of 
interfering or mediating in any way, as he ‘appeared to have gone into a form of political paralysis’ 
(Judah, 2000a, 137-138). 
The main issue for both the LDK and the KLA, then, remained that de facto sovereignty in 
Kosovo continued to be exercised by Serbia. Particularly in the Drenica valley, the KLA seemed to 
grow more powerful, as in the first half of 1998 it ‘made a series of lightning advances’ into other 
parts of Kosovo (Judah, 2000b, 112); by mid-1998, it claimed to control about a third of the province 
(Pavlakovic & Ramet, 2004, 87-88). However, as Clark (2000) asserts, ‘[t]his was largely a piece of 
theatre’ (p. 172). While ostensibly ‘a rag-tag armed group had achieved more in a couple of months 
than Rugova and the LDK had in seven years’, and Serbian power in the region had seemed to have 
faded away (Judah, 2000a, 145), the KLA’s efforts merely amounted to a ‘soft control’ of Kosovo 
(Caplan, 1998, 752). 
That is, the KLA had mainly advanced into already Albanian-populated areas of Kosovo with 
very little Serbian resistance – not because the Serbs could not stop them, but because they did not 
yet seem to have an immediate strategy prescribing whether and how to do so. The KLA’s armed 
insurgency, thus, remained ‘a phoney war full of bizarre contradictions and oddities’ (Judah, 2000a, 
146), and in most of Kosovo, Albanian insecurity prevailed while the Kosovar Serbs waited for their 
government to step in (p. 149). The KLA’s false sense of optimism about their ability to take hold of 
Kosovo, in fact, was soon crushed by Serbian counteroffensives in July and August 1998. Milošević 
demonstrated that his indecision did not mean that he did not have the capacity to decide, and the 
KLA subsequently retreated – it ‘simply melted into the woods’ (Judah, 2001, 23). It had been 
capable of provoking conflict with Serbia, but could then not protect the Albanian population it 





However, the brutal crackdown on the Kosovar Albanian rebellion, which led to the displacement of 
enormous numbers of Kosovar Albanians, did finally provoke the international community into 
action. Remarkably, major international actors, such as US State Secretary Madeleine Albright, had 
initially condoned and perhaps even legitimated Milošević’s actions by labelling the KLA as a 
“terrorist group”, but in October 1998 they forced him to accept the presence of an unarmed OSCE 
“verification” mission to monitor the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo. This only instigated 
new conflict, however, as the KLA was thereby enabled to “fill the vacuum” left behind by the Serbs, 
and in response, Serbia only intensified its brutality against the Kosovar Albanians in 1999.  
The Contact Group, therefore, called the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians to a conference in 
Rambouillet, France. In a clear indication that Rugova’s power and influence had dissolved 
significantly, the Albanian delegation was led not by him but by KLA leader Hashim Thaçi (Judah, 
2000b, 113-114). While full juridical independence for Kosovo from Serbia was not actually on the 
table, debate remains about to what extent the Western powers designed the proposed solution for 
Kosovo to the advantage of the Kosovar Albanians (Clark, 2000, 182-183; Hehir, 2010b, 7-8; Judah, 
2008, 85-87; Lani, 1999, 31-32). In any case, after Milošević had refused to sign the accords at 
Rambouillet, on March 24th 1999 NATO initiated its 78-day campaign of airstrikes against Serbia, 
which was eventually forced to withdraw from Kosovo in early June 1999. 
Looking back on Rugova’s LDK as a peaceful geopolitical anomaly, then, some still highlight 
its virtues. In 1997, Judah (1997) was very positive about the LDK’s nonviolence, arguing that: 
 
[o]f all the leaders of former Yugoslavia, Rugova has perhaps played the shrewdest game… 
He has avoided giving the Serbs an excuse to use force to try to ethnically cleanse Kosovo. 
His policy is one of waiting until... somehow the province falls to his people like a ripe 
fruit... [D]espite discontent aroused by the belief that so far it has achieved nothing, in fact 
it has achieved much. It has saved lives and... kept Kosovo’s Albanian population… in their 
homes (p. 307). 
 
Clark (2000) equally emphasises how the Albanian non-violence averted war and Serbian aggression, 
maintained social cohesion and functioning social structures (he even claims that in many respects 
the parallel institutions functioned better than the Serbian administration in Kosovo), and provoked 
international condemnation for Serbian human rights violations (pp. 128-129). Non-violent 
resistance did not bring about the eventual NATO intervention, but it did supposedly provide the 
international community with the moral justifications for intervention and placed it, when it came, 
on the side of the Kosovar Albanians (Clark, 2000, 186; Maliqi, 2012, 67).  
Veton Surroi, therefore, finds that Rugova’s non-violent approach was ‘necessary’, as it 
‘prevented [Kosovo] from flaring up earlier when it was totally unprepared [and] prepared the world 
to deal with this issue’ (as cited in Borden, 1999a). Furthermore, LDK vice-president Fehmi Agani, 
before his assassination by Serbian forces in May 1999, not only questioned whether the eruption of 
large-scale violence in the late 1990s was a worthwhile cost for Kosovo’s goal of independence, but 






The real defeat of Serbia was a political defeat, and this was achieved by the LDK. It was 
not enough, but the KLA emerged at a time when Serbia had already become a strange 
presence in Kosovo. The ground was prepared for them… Serbia has been reduced in 
Kosovo to the police and army and force. Politically, it has been totally isolated in Kosovo, 
and has no support in any stratum of Albanian society (as cited in Borden, 1999b). 
 
Maliqi (2012) equally finds that the keeping under control of the silent and peaceful Kosovar 
Albanians cost Serbia not only economically, but even more so in terms of its legitimacy and 
credibility as a modern formal state. In another celebration of the LDK’s biopower, he even 
maintains that the Albanian non-violent parallel state ‘clearly showed the limits of [Serbian] 
sovereignty’ as it demonstrated and affirmed that ‘there is no power that can subdue [Kosovar 
Albanian] will’ to live (pp. 68-69). Clark (2000), finally, extensively discusses the qualities of a more 
“active” non-violence – more engaged and confrontational with the Serbs – that may hypothetically 
have been a more successful alternative to the LDK’s peaceful resistance. For Clark, non-violence in 
itself was not an unviable tool for Kosovar Albanians to attain their objectives (pp. 132-151). 
However, claims such as these, underscoring the LDK’s “waiting game”, its postponement of 
ethnic conflict, its gaining of the “international moral high ground”, and its biopower, do not account 
for the fact that all of these merits of non-violence were essentially insufficient for achieving that 
ultimate Kosovar Albanian goal: liberation from Serbia. Kosovo was allegedly already lost by 
Milošević before his violent crackdown on the KLA. Either he would “let the KLA win and take 
Kosovo”, or his lack of (international) legitimacy, induced by his excessive violence, would eventually 
expel the Serbs from Kosovo anyway.  
There is an assumption here, however, that a lack of legitimacy is an objectively discernable 
status in international politics, and more importantly, that those with power in international politics 
will always act upon a de jure state’s presumed lack of legitimacy. These assertions that the non-
violent Kosovar Albanians “had time on their side” (Clark, 2000, 187; Maliqi, 2012, 69) – that the 
Serbian expulsion from Kosovo by the international community was in the end inevitable due to 
Serbia’s “bad behaviour” – thus not only still rely on the use of some form of force, they also place 
an unrealistically high confidence in the moral consistency and normative character of the 
international community. Kosovo gained de facto sovereignty because NATO had at that moment 
the willingness and sufficient power to (violently) take it “on their behalf”, not because Kosovo 
automatically “deserved” it after years of patient non-violence. 
Furthermore, in a rather bizarre attempt to place the responsibility and agency over Serbia’s 
eventual downfall in Kosovo in 1999 back into the hands of Albanian peaceful resistance, Reitan 
(2000) actually portrays the hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanian refugees that fled Serbian 
violent oppression in the second half of the 1990s as a continuation of non-violent (bio)power: 
 
[C]hoosing to leave rather than fight is rooted in a strong conviction that political power is 
based in mutual consent. Using a last ditch mechanism of massive flight, Albanians were 
visibly withdrawing this consent with the hope that the [Serbian] regime could not survive 
the blow... [T]he impact of this action was more lethal to Milosevic’s war machine than 
any violent weapon the Albanians could have mustered among themselves, forcing those 
with military means to act on behalf of this largely peaceful populace whose non-violent 




Yet representing the massive stream of Albanian refugees moving out of Kosovo as a strategic 
“decision” to evade and undermine Serbian absolute power, and thereby as a supposed example of 
the Albanian capacity to overthrow that power, seems to depend on a misunderstanding of the 
relationship between biopolitics and de facto sovereignty. According to Reitan herself, this exodus 
was ‘spontaneous and haphazard, only half chosen’ (p. 96), and ‘performed under great duress’ with 
‘no strategic leadership’ (p. 97). Moreover, apparently the “non-violent” Kosovar Albanians still 
relied on “those with military means” to actually liberate them. Again, she admits a few pages earlier 
that ‘it would take... an international occupation force to remove the yoke of Serbian terror from the 
neck of ethnic Albanians’ (p. 89). 
Thus, for less powerful geopolitical anomalies like the Albanian community in Kosovo, a 
pacifist strategy may be a prime option for survival, but the only way in which such geopolitical 
anomalies can attain de facto sovereignty still seems to be through a resolution of a violent crisis. As 
Kosovar Albanian academic and novelist Mehmet Kraja has observed: 
 
however harsh and not humane this might sound, Kosovo was in need of a war also for 
internal reasons. Kosovo had to get rid not only of Serbia, but also dispose of the idea of 
subordination… Kosovo needed a war to help her understand that there were other 
political alternatives, apart from that capital deception that dictated one could live in 
occupation, whilst dreaming of their freedom (Kraja, 2003, 36; as cited in Bekaj, 2010, 
16). 
 
Duijzings (2000) outlines lucidly the crucial position of violence in the creation and consolidation of 
political communities in the Balkans (pp. 32-36). Throughout the region, nations, identities, and 
ethnicities may have remained mixed and ambiguous, but through the use of force de facto 
sovereigns have maintained the capacity ‘to erase the elements of mixture... and ambiguity’ (to 
create friend/enemy distinctions) in order to establish and bolster (new) political communities (p. 
32). As such, ‘violence in former Yugoslavia is in the end not only the result of opposite and 
incompatible identities, it is perhaps even more so the means to achieve them’. Violence denotes 
that moment of crisis being resolved by the construction of ‘solid and impenetrable boundaries’, so 
that the de facto sovereign resolution of a crisis through violence ‘creates purity out of impurity’ – 
order out of disorder (p. 33).  
As Sorabji (1995) says, ‘[v]iolence may achieve results that cannot otherwise be achieved’ (p. 
81) – it achieves a reconstitution of political order. It creates ‘new realities on the ground’, finds 
‘blank spaces’, and constructs ‘a new type of situation, new consciousness, statuses, loyalties and 
identities’. Additionally, not only does it ‘engineer new situations’, it also ‘makes reality resemble 
the ideological constructs that underpin the violence’ (Duijzings, 2000, 33). In other words, the 
nature of any (new) political order will resemble the decision(s) of he/she who in the moment of 
violent crisis proves to be the most powerful – the de facto sovereign (p. 36). 
In a sense, then, the KLA’s efforts to draw the Kosovo issue into violent conflict proved more 
successful as a strategy towards achieving Kosovar Albanian independence. According to Hehir 
(2010b), it actively sought to provoke the Belgrade regime into excessive violence in order to force a 
hitherto reluctant and indecisive international community into a more substantive engagement with 
Kosovo (p. 7). And indeed, as Pettifer (2001) argues, ‘it can be stated with certainty that NATO would 
not have intervened in Yugoslavia without the emergence of the KLA’ (p. 25). More importantly, 
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Judah (2001) points out that the successfulness of the KLA is especially remarkable given that it 
never actually won a battle itself (p. 20). As he states a year earlier: 
 
[i]t is hardly an exaggeration to say that the... KLA must rank as the most successful 
guerrilla organisation in modern history... having managed to subcontract the world’s 
most powerful military alliance to do most of its fighting for it. After all, it hardly matters 
how the Serbs were ejected from Kosovo; what matters is that they have been – and had 
it not been for the existence of the KLA, they would still be there (Judah, 2000b, 108). 
 
In the first weeks of the NATO campaign, in fact, the KLA came close to being trampled by 
Serbia’s overwhelming force, and the fact that it survived can be ascribed not to its own strength but 
to NATO’s persistence (p. 114). Clark (2000) is very critical of the nature of the NATO campaign, 
arguing that it did not actually attempt to protect Kosovar Albanians, but to instead defeat and 
punish Serbia in a final showdown. Yet, while NATO thus seemed to do very little against Serbia’s 
almost genocidal efforts in 1999 to rid Kosovo from its Albanian majority (pp. 183-184), in the end 
‘Milošević was presented with a fait accompli’ (Judah, 2008, 90). At Rambouillet, Milošević had 
already decried to US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke that ‘you will bomb us... there is nothing we 
can do about it’ (as cited in Judah, 2000a, 227), and during the NATO airstrikes US National Security 
Advisor Sandy Berger confirmed the ‘irreducible facts’ of NATO’s capacity to decide on the exception 
in Kosovo: ‘One, we will win. Period. Full stop. There is no alternative. Second, winning means what 
we [say] it means’ (as cited in Judah, 2000a, 271).  
Thus, while Hashim Thaçi (2000) himself maintains that ‘[t]he KLA brought NATO into 
Kosovo’ and that ‘Kosovo was liberated by the KLA with the help of NATO’ (p. 287), it was actually 
NATO that exerted its de facto sovereignty over Kosovo and took it from the Serbs. Through an act of 
overwhelming force, it was NATO that proved itself able to resolve the crisis between warring 
parties, and establish a new kind of political order in Kosovo. 
 
Kosovo and De Facto Sovereignty 
As such, a lot of questions actually remain about the viability of Kosovo as a political entity after 
NATO’s exclusion of Serbia in 1999. Indeed, issues of de facto sovereignty and violence are in 
themselves not the most important discussions of this chapter. Rather, it is their vital relationship 
with the sustainability of Kosovo as an independent state (de facto or de jure) that we must assess. 
After the 1999 intervention, UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) established the United Nations Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) which would be assisted by the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The KLA, in the 
meantime, set up a provisional government led by Hashim Thaçi. Rugova and the LDK, on the other 
hand, secured a landslide victory in October 2000 elections, and Rugova actually again became 
President of Kosovo until his death in January 2006. Regardless of all these developments, however, 
as Lani (1999) wrote in the aftermath of the NATO airstrikes, ‘[a]ny political power in Kosovo... 
whether headed by Rugova, Thaçi, or someone else, will to some extent be no more than “a parallel 
system” or shadow government to the international administration’ (p. 40). 
 To be sure, Resolution 1244, which created UNMIK, not only seemingly paradoxically stated 
that it demanded full account to be taken of “the will of the Kosovar people” while simultaneously 
reaffirming Serbia’s sovereignty over it (Judah, 2008, 93-95), de facto sovereignty over Kosovo 
actually also ostensibly remained to be exercised by UNMIK itself. Neither Serbia nor the Kosovar 
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Albanians were able to grasp any decisive control over the region, because there was a more 
powerful entity that exercised such control. In 2001, the new Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government were established, yet these remained firmly subject to the authority and executive rule 
of UNMIK (Moses, 2014, 122-126). Therefore, while UNMIK has now been formally dissolved and 
replaced by the European Union Rule of Law Mission to Kosovo (EULEX), and Kosovo’s and Serbia’s 
governments have moved toward gradual “normalisation” of their relationship, it still remains to this 
day altogether unclear who – Serbs or Albanians – would resolve an eruption of violence were it to 
occur in Kosovo. 
 
Converging Communities? 
This is crucial, because the possibility for such violence continues to be potent. Similar to the LDK 
period, in fact, Kosovo post-1999 has been characterised by the spatial separation of ethnic 
communities – only they have exchanged places (Kostovicova, 2005, 182-213). Particularly those 
areas with a Serbian majority not at all seem to identify either with an overarching Kosovar 
governing authority or with the international supervisory regime, and Serb communities have 
repeatedly been subjected to Albanian violence, even with the substantial presence of international 
security forces (Van Der Borgh & Lasance, 2013; Vladisavljevic, 2012). According to Dahlman and 
Williams (2010), these processes of “ethnic enclavisation” have the potential for prolonging conflict 
in Kosovo. Currently, the KFOR mission ‘creates de facto security perimeters’ along rather vague 
enclave boundaries, but without such international presence, strategies of mutual exclusion and 
border solidification within Kosovo’s nominal boundaries could violently erupt (p. 423). 
Many, therefore, envisage the creation of an inclusive civil society as a pathway towards 
sustainable post-conflict reconstruction and democratic peace in Kosovo (Sörensen, 2009, 256; 
Strazzari & Selenica, 2013, 117). Supposedly, civil society in Kosovo could be an ‘arena of voluntary 
collective action around shared interests, purposes, and values’ (Haskuka, 2008, 18) that would 
function as ‘significant leverage against the dominance of ethno-nationalist divisions in Kosovo’ 
(Devic, 2006, 257). Moreover, given the Kosovar Albanian spell of peaceful resistance in the early 
1990s, grounds for such a vibrant and integrated civil society are presumed to be already there.  
As we have seen in the previous chapter, however, civil society in the LDK-years did not 
consist of anti-nationalist organisations, but rather formed a parallel national community excluded 
by another (pp. 258-260). As a result, to this day it is nationalism – Serb or Albanian – that has 
formed the element of social convergence, the ideology of mobilisation, and the promise of 
emancipation in Kosovo (Strazzari & Selenica, 2013, 119-122). In other words: 
 
far from being disconnected from nationalism, Kosovo’s civil society has been consistently 
and intimately linked with it... To the extent that nationalism can be considered “part of 
the problem”, expectations concerning the role of civil society as “part of the solution” 
need to be revised (p. 117). 
 






civil society in the Western Balkans is, by and large, a fragmented sphere, characterised 
both by ethnic segmentation and by prioritising national over transnational modes of 
activism. Therefore, the relative vibrancy of civil society activism as evidence of 
democratisation is offset by its ethnic nature (p. 106). 
 
As such, in another reminder of the limitations of two political communities peacefully 
sharing de facto sovereignty, “civil society” in Kosovo – understood as a community of bios without 
zoe, as an apolitical contrast to a political friend/enemy distinction, as a society in which the 
exception is somehow “included”, in which the potential for conflict with an “Other” has been 
eliminated – still simply does not (yet) appear to exist. While the future of Kosovar Serbs may be 
portrayed as a minority rights issue within the wider political framework of the Republic of Kosovo, 
the reality seems to be that ‘those living in the [Serbian] enclaves... deal almost entirely with de 
facto Serbian rule’, as ‘the Serb enclaves are not minority communities in an undifferentiated space 
but an attempt to create localised majority territories that invert Kosovar Albanian rule’ (Dahlman & 
Williams, 2010, 407-408). Jarstad (2007) makes similar observations, even predicting that ‘[a]fter 
Kosovo’s [legal] status is settled, Serbia... is likely to retain control over these areas’ (p. 235). 
 Coming back, then, to issues of violence, de facto sovereignty, and Kosovo’s future, it almost 
seems as if Kosovo owes its existence as a singular political unit primarily to NATO’s ability to resolve 
the violent crisis between Serbs and Albanians in 1999, and to the ability of international actors to 
thereafter continue to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict within the polity. Kosovo does 
possess its own multi-ethnic security forces which are intended to independently maintain order 
(eventually in the new de jure state) but for now these forces remain firmly controlled by Kosovo’s 
international military presence (Bekaj, 2010, 33-36). Moreover, Ryan (2010) contends that those 
multi-ethnic security forces may represent an international ideal of peaceful coexistence between 
the two Kosovar communities, but these communities simply view those security forces as tools for 
mutual de facto sovereign exclusion (pp. 122-128). More broadly, Ryan (2010) reaffirms that any 
“peaceful coexistence” of the two Kosovar communities seems to be mostly realisable through the 
use of exceptional force. The international community aims to make Kosovo a multi-ethnic liberal 
democracy governed by the rule of law, but it seems that Kosovo can only be sustained by de facto 
sovereignty – by the capacity to act beyond those laws.  
Indeed, King and Mason (2006) have contended that “the world failed Kosovo”, lamenting 
the manner in which UNMIK and Kosovo’s international administration succeeded in grasping and 
withholding de facto sovereignty from Serbia, yet thereby were merely capable of maintaining 
“peace at any price” – of upholding a “securocratic” political order without engaging in the creation 
of a more sustainable political coexistence on the ground. However, the question then emerges how 
UNMIK could have forced ‘contrition from the Serbs and acceptance from the Albanians’ (p. 114), or 
‘compelled’ people in Kosovo ‘to adhere to the rules and norms of a peaceful, pluralist society’ (p. 
262), and simultaneously itself maintain a semblance of contributing to the creation of such a 
democratic and inclusive society (Tansey, 2007, 719). As King and Mason (2006) admit, ‘if such a 
transformation was to happen, it would have to happen spontaneously’ (p. 247) – a prospect that 





As such, any supposed “failure” of UNMIK (or any other international actor) to create a 
liberal multi-ethnic democracy in Kosovo seems not so much derived from alleged incompetencies 
among these international institutions, but from a more fundamental discrepancy between the aims 
of converging opposed political communities through purely (international) legal means, and the 
nature of de facto sovereignty. 
 
A Legal Padding? 
This is a discrepancy, Ryan (2010) discerns, which the international community, and especially its 
liberal internationalist proponents, has failed to understand. The example of Kosovo exactly exposes 
the liberal contradiction that the establishment and maintenance of a legal and peaceful order 
fundamentally rests on non-legal and violent means. As Gheciu (2005) concurs, there is a ‘tension 
between the norms around which the international administration defined its role, and its actual 
governance of Kosovo’ (p. 122). The liberal internationalist struggle to come to terms with this 
tension is particularly uncovered in the international legal arena. The Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo (IICK) (2004), for instance, famously assessed the NATO intervention as 
‘illegal but legitimate’ (p. 4) – a quintessential description of a de facto sovereign act. Some 
normative thinkers maintain that the NATO intervention was both juridically and morally just, but 
simultaneously do not deny that NATO “took the law into its own hands” (Biggar, 2000).  
The incapacity of international law to regulate the exception came to the fore even more 
clearly after Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in February 2008, a declaration 
that was evaluated by an Advisory Opinion (AO) from the ICJ in 2010. While the AO asserted that 
‘the [Kosovar] declaration of independence... did not violate general international law’ (ICJ, 2010a, 8) 
the majority judges only came to that conclusion by narrowing the issue down to a simple “speech 
act” of declaring independence: 
 
[T]he task which the Court is called upon to perform is to determine whether or not the 
declaration of independence was adopted in violation of international law. The Court is 
not required by the question it has been asked to take a position on whether international 
law conferred a positive entitlement on Kosovo unilaterally to declare its independence 
or, a fortiori, on whether international law generally confers an entitlement on entities 
situated within a State unilaterally to break away from it (ICJ, 2010b, 26-27). 
 
Thus, as Sterio (2013) finds, ‘[i]n an almost unbelievable twist of legal reasoning’ and ‘an 
incredibly narrow formulation of the legal issue’ (p. 81), ‘[t]he world court seemed to embrace a 
vision of declarations of independence as formalistic acts, or pieces of paper, completely separate 
from the act of separation’ (p. 82). The Court seemingly portrayed Kosovo’s UDI as ‘nothing more 
than ink on parchment: a sheet of paper, signed by a group of people, and about which international 
law could not care less’ (Kohen & Del Mar, 2011, 109). In an implicit acknowledgement of its 
inherent subordination to “realities on the ground” pertaining to Kosovo, the AO provided no 
perspective on the legal or material ramifications of the declaration – on whether it would have 
consequences for the recognition of Kosovo’s de jure sovereignty or the exercise of its de facto 




Furthermore, it did not incorporate in its judgment the de facto means through which 
independence was, or could be, decided. Given the fact that the AO did not wish to make any 
statements regarding a general international rule legitimating acts of secession, it explicitly argued 
that other individual UDI’s could still be found illegal insofar they ‘stemmed... from the fact they 
were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of 
norms of general international law’ (ICJ, 2010a, 7). In an apparent contradiction to this argument, 
however, the AO then made again no mention of the NATO intervention as a potential extra-legal (or 
rather, illegal) act violently establishing Kosovo as an independent political entity (Moses, 2014, 132-
136). This omission has been rather dubiously defended by arguing that the NATO campaign was 
‘too remote’ from the declaration to be of any legal relevance for it (Christakis, 2011, 83; Peters, 
2011, 107). 
The AO was also able to come to this conclusion, however, through a remarkable contention 
that any institutional and legal provisions set up under Resolution 1244 and UNMIK from 1999 
onwards did not pertain to the individuals declaring independence. The majority judges defined the 
authors of the declaration of independence as ‘persons who acted together... outside the framework 
of the interim administration’ established in Kosovo by the international presence (ICJ, 2010b, 48-
49). In doing so, the AO not only allowed itself to circumvent issues relating to the lex specialis 
established in Resolution 1244, which explicitly reaffirmed Serbia’s territorial integrity (Moses, 2014, 
128-129), it also served to conceal the fact that de facto sovereignty in Kosovo was actually held by 
international actors.  
Supposedly, Resolution 1244 did establish ‘a temporary, exceptional legal regime which... 
superseded the Serbian legal order and which aimed at the stabilisation of Kosovo’ (ICJ, 2010a, 10-
11); a de facto sovereign international presence was created. Contradictorily, however, the AO then 
pursued to argue that ‘[t]here is no indication, in the text of Security Council Resolution 1244... that 
the Security Council intended to impose... a specific obligation to act or a prohibition from acting’ on 
any person in Kosovo (p. 13), implying that the people of Kosovo – such as those declaring 
independence – were able to legitimately take their fate into their own hands (Sterio, 2013, 82-83). 
In an apparently tautological reasoning, the AO found that:  
 
[t]he authors of the declaration did not seek to act within the standard framework of 
interim self-administration of Kosovo, but aimed at establishing Kosovo as an independent 
and sovereign state... The declaration of independence, therefore, was not intended by 
those who adopted it to take effect within the legal order created for the interim phase, 
nor was it capable of doing so. On the contrary... the authors of that declaration did not 
act, or intend to act, in the capacity of an institution created by and empowered to act 
within that legal order but, rather, set out to adopt a measure the significance and effects 
of which would lie outside that order (ICJ, 2010b, 47). 
 
As the ICJ, thus, maintained that the declarers of independence did not act ‘in their role as 
provisional institutions deriving their powers from Resolution 1244, but as revolutionaries, in 
normative discontinuity to the pre-existing legal framework’ (Peters, 2011, 100), it was implying that 
these persons were acting beyond any existing international or local juridical order (Moses, 2014, 
136-138). Jacobs and Radi (2011) concur with this conclusion, confirming that as the AO ‘established 
that the authors of the declaration were a group of random individuals, it found, in essence, that 




If, as the Court affirms, neither the legal regime created by the UN nor the legal order of 
Serbia applied to those who adopted the declaration, then – to paraphrase Judge 
Bennouna – which legal order governed the authors of the UDI at the moment of its 
adoption? Apparently, the answer given by the Court is: “None” (p. 164). 
 
Whereas Moses (2014) presented this moment as ‘a non-legal moment – a point at which 
law is silent’, and as an occasion ‘where will and power are uncontained by any pre-given norm or 
legal rule’ (p. 137), it does not appear that those declaring Kosovar de jure independence were at 
that moment in fact deciding on the material de facto exception. Given the more “oral” nature of 
such declarations, it would be hard to surmise that the authors of the declaration possessed material 
de facto sovereign power. Rather, it seems that the de facto sovereign international actors of 
Kosovo, as well as the ICJ itself, simply decided that this de jure declaration did not constitute a real 
crisis. Somehow, the international presence in Kosovo did not see the declaration of independence 
as a challenge to its de facto sovereignty, nor did the AO equate the extra-legality of the declaration 
with a violation of international law. 
Such legal reasoning has been lambasted by the AO’s dissenting judges, who dismissed it as 
‘nothing more than a post hoc intellectual construct’ (Tomka, 2010, 57) and ‘a kind of judicial sleight-
of-hand’ (Koroma, 2010, 75). Others have expressed more general criticism of the AO’s judgment, 
describing it as ‘an exercise in the art of silence’ (Pippan, 2010). However, the fact that ICJ remained 
silent on Kosovo’s de facto existence as an independent state, on the manner in which de facto 
independence was created, and on the political and legal status of those declaring independence, 
should perhaps more accurately be interpreted as a tacit acknowledgement of the fact that 
international law just did not have any capacity to make a meaningful judgment on these issues.  
The Kosovo AO ‘may ultimately be remembered more for what it did not say than for what it 
did’ (Mills, 2011, 4), because its silence lucidly exposes the nature of the relationship between 
(international) law and de facto sovereignty. The outcomes of the Kosovo AO may be perceived as 
relatively insignificant, but this insignificance does provide a crucial insight into any international 
expectation of “ruling out” geopolitical anomalies in general – an insight which will be discussed in 
further detail in the conclusion of this thesis. 
 
The Future of Kosovo 
For Kosovo, certainly, the effective repercussions of the ICJ’s opinion could not have been anything 
other than minimal. As Peters (2011) wonders, ‘[w]hat could have realistically happened if the Court 
had qualified the declaration of independence as unlawful?’ (p. 108). Wilde (2011) responds to this 
rather rhetorical question as follows: in that case, ‘Kosovo would still be de facto independent from 
Serbia, and other non-state groups around the world... would still see that the prospects for their 
aspirations lie chiefly in the realm of international politics rather than international law’ (p. 307).  
Given the nature of respectively de facto sovereignty and international law, ‘any 
determination that the court made was destined to have no impact on the situation in question’ 
(Moses, 2014, 144). Kosovo appears to be sustained as a political entity primarily by the grace of an 
externally maintained and supported de facto sovereign that cannot be captured in any international 
or domestic juridical arrangements. Aside from the substantial international presence formally 
mandated by the UN, NATO, and the EU, from the creation of an extensive domestic juridical and 
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institutional framework, and from the unilateral declaration of independence that did allegedly not 
violate the rules of the international legal order, Kosovo remains an entity that is in essence 
governed by the extra-legal de facto sovereign power to forcefully maintain stability.  
Some argue, as such, that in the years after the 1999 intervention Kosovo has become an 
‘international protectorate’ more than a political entity (Jarstad, 2007), an international legal 
‘exception’ that produced (could only produce) no more than a ‘transitional state’ lacking locally 
controlled de facto sovereignty (Gow, 2009). Ryan (2010) equally finds that the international 
exercise of de facto sovereignty over Kosovo has actually kept Kosovo in its state of exception – in its 
state of unresolved conflict between two entities hoping to grasp that de facto sovereignty. As 
Maliqi (2012) contends, the international presence in Kosovo ‘certainly creates more possibilities for 
controlling the crisis than the situation of one side’s ethnic domination against another... which led 
to war’, but ‘we cannot expect the UN mission in Kosovo to simply eliminate the essential matrix of 
inter-ethnic conflict’ (p. 70).  
Attempts to mitigate this fundamental potentiality for intercommunal crisis on the one hand 
aim to legally dissolve Kosovo’s central governmental authority altogether in favour of peacefully 
integrated ethno-spatial communities (Stroschein, 2008), but on the other hand, cannot actually 
eliminate the possibility of violent conflict that exactly highlights Serb-Albanian intercommunal 
boundaries and power relations. The two (main) ethno-national groups in Kosovo have apparently 
hitherto remained polarised regardless of any externally imposed legal frameworks for multi-
ethnicity and power-sharing (Jarstad, 2007).  
Conversely, therefore, Vladisavljevic (2012) actually argues that a formal partition of Kosovo, 
implying the accession of Serb majority areas to Serbia proper, ‘stands more chance of putting an 
end to the conflict than do the solutions put forth by the international community’ (p. 40), because 
‘[a]ny attempt at the reversal of de facto partition and the forced remixing of Albanians and Serbs in 
a “multi-ethnic society” is virtually certain to increase hostilities’ (p. 38). For him, the international 
legal affirmation of boundaries between two de jure states – between two supposedly de facto 
sovereign entities – would throw up a sufficiently effective impediment to Serb-Albanian conflict in 
the Balkans. Whether this is indeed true will again be further considered in the conclusion. 
For now, the question remains whether Kosovo will obtain de facto sovereignty through the 
violent resolution of the ongoing crisis between Serbs and Albanians, or through the peaceful 
transition from one (“international”) de facto sovereign to another (Kosovar) one. The international 
presence in Kosovo wants to maintain a unitary political community, which certainly seems to be a 
noble pursuit, but at the moment it thereby merely appears to function as the de facto sovereign 
who prevents the violent crisis (or the likelihood thereof) that would establish such a unitary political 
community. As long as the two Kosovar political communities remain ostensibly opposed, the 
international actors in Kosovo appear to merely mask the potential for conflict that would eventually 
establish Kosovo as a de facto sovereign entity ruled either by Serbs or Albanians. The international 
presence in Kosovo, indeed, will have to come to terms with the fact that there cannot be a de facto 
sovereign over Kosovo which simultaneously aims to establish another de facto sovereign for the de 






Therefore, unless the notions of unavoidable and fundamental ethnic hatreds in Kosovo are 
definitively proven to be wrong, and the supposedly contingent ethnic animosities are irreversibly 
reconstructed into an integrated Kosovar political identity, an international departure from Kosovo 
will risk the outbreak of renewed violence. Kosovo’s political existence, whether as a geopolitical 
anomaly or as a de jure state, will fundamentally depend not on the rule of law – international or 






Borges’s World Map  
 
...In that Empire, the Art of Cartography reached such Perfection that the map of 
one Province alone took up the whole of a City, and the map of the empire, the 
whole of a province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps did not satisfy and the 
Colleges of Cartographers set up a Map of the Empire which had the size of the 
Empire itself and coincided with it point by point. Less Addicted to the Study of 
Cartography, Succeeding Generations understood that this Widespread Map was 
Useless and not without Impiety they abandoned it to the Inclemencies of the Sun 
and of the Winters. 
(Excerpt from Jorge Luis Borges’s On Rigor in Science; Borges, 1964, 90) 
 
The short story displayed here paints an image of a universally knowable world – a world of which 
no component has remained unexplored or unaccounted for. Borges describes a realm in which only 
exactitude suffices, and in which the comprehension of social and physical space has extended so far 
that any element of surprise has been eliminated from it. At the same time, however, Borges’s story 
concludes that such an expectation would not only be unfeasible, but even undesirable; apparently, 
any wish to completely understand and do justice to (geographical) reality runs into certain 
inevitable problems (see also, Lewis Carroll’s Sylvie and Bruno Concluded, Carroll, 1982, 727). 
This thesis has similarly taken the form of an analysis of the inherent incomprehensibility of 
global social and political space. Its purpose has been to present an alternative to certain 
predominant geopolitical views of the world by presenting and analysing geopolitical anomalies as 
significant inconsistencies with such worldviews. Through an examination of how these geopolitical 
anomalies manifest themselves in the international political framework, I have tried to demonstrate 
how the practice, discourse and nature of international relations will have to come to terms with 
certain intrinsic limitations. 
To return to Borges’s story, then, whereas it speaks to our desire to regulate and understand 
rather than to leave things unclear or uncertain, geopolitical anomalies are material manifestations 
of the fact that in international relations such a desire is unattainable. Accordingly, as I will maintain 
in this conclusion, Borges’s story actually forms a useful allegory for the ways in which geopolitical 
anomalies disrupt any conception of international politics as neat and orderly, and perhaps provide 
us with new possibilities for understanding and researching geopolitical anomalies and, thus, 
international politics in itself.  
As I argue, the map described above implies an infallible representation of reality, seemingly 
even to the extent that representation becomes reality in itself. In doing so, they remind us of the 
fallacious conceptualisations of international politics solely dominated by legal states. As geopolitical 
anomalies challenge such conceptualisations, they expose problems with representing the world as 
nicely compartmentalised into legal state territories. Indeed, at a time in which the various “indexes” 
devised and used in international political scholarship and practice, such as the Fragile State Index 
(Messner, 2015), the Good Country Index (Anholt & Govers, 2014), and the Global Peace Index (IEP, 
2015), may continued to be criticised for glossing over the complicatedness of actual global socio-
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political processes and circumstances, we can perhaps consider the world map in itself as an index of 
global politics – as something of a simplification of the enormously complex realities and spatialities 
of international political life. 
 On the other hand, as is again suggested by Borges, perhaps global social life simply does not 
lend itself very well to completely accurate representation. Assuming that the international political 
world remains an ever-evolving and unfixed landscape, dissecting (and thus perhaps “simplifying”) 
that landscape into intelligible concepts and geographies might actually be necessary to make sense 
of it. The view espoused in this thesis, however, is not that we should refrain from trying to make 
the nature of international politics more understandable, but that we should come up with an 
understanding that more closely reflects international political realities – one that will inescapably 
have to pay heed to geopolitical anomalies. If there is anything that geopolitical anomalies expose 
about international political practice and scholarship, it is that it is compelled to grapple with a world 
full of ambiguity and irregularity, while simultaneously taking into account certain irrefutable rules 
and realities of global socio-political life. In fact, as I have tried to argue in this thesis, we cannot 
“map the exception”, “chart the crisis”, or “delineate the emergency” – we cannot draw up a 
universally truthful image of international relations – precisely because there are certain 
insurmountable truths in international politics.  
In the conclusion to this thesis, as such, I will explain that the study and conduct of 
international politics will best be capable of dealing with geopolitical anomalies by beginning to 
acknowledge the fact that it will actually never be capable of ruling out the exception. In other 
words, I conclude that exceptionality is the regularity of international politics. That not only means 
that it will remain impossible to “regulate” or “know” everything about global social life, but more 
importantly, that any attempt to completely “solve” the “problem” of geopolitical anomalousness is 
doomed to be unsuccessful.  
 
On Geopolitical Anomalies Again 
The starting premise of this research has been the persistent difficulties of “conventional” and 
“traditional” discourses and practices of international politics to understand, come to terms with, 
and/or accommodate political entities outside of those discourses and practices. As I contended, this 
difficulty can, at least partly, be explained by an overemphasis on normative and legalistic 
perspectives within studies on these political entities. More specifically, as international law and 
legally recognised states have been generally taken as the primary structures and actors of 
international politics, polities without those legal rights and privileges have been subordinated as 
rather insignificant in international relations.  
This thesis, therefore, has adopted a classical realist approach to international relations in 
order to counter these “legalised” notions of international political life, contending that political 
communities existing externally to these (international) legal arrangements may teach us quite a few 
important lessons about the nature of international political practice and scholarship. It has 
employed the term “geopolitical anomalies” – political entities without the recognised rights and 
privileges of legal states, but with state-like structures and manifestations nonetheless – to call for a 
more serious consideration of these “actual” political exercises in international relations. This 
concept of geopolitical anomalies, thus, has been utilised as a signifier of the physical and spatial 
manifestations of a wide array of political communities that demonstrate the irregularity of the 
international legal and political system. 
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 I have maintained, furthermore, that the (over)emphasis of traditional international 
relations scholarship on legal state practices, and its concomitant disregard for geopolitical 
anomalies, can be related back to its diverse but thereby also confusing application of the principle 
of sovereignty. In particular, while geopolitical anomalies uncover the fundamental differences 
between sovereignty as recognised in international law (de jure sovereignty), and sovereignty as 
exercised in acts of material decisional power (de facto sovereignty), these differences appear to 
often remain overlooked in international political thought. 
In the first chapter of this thesis, therefore, I have attempted to unravel some of these 
primary confusions about sovereignty in international political discourse. By contrasting the “myth” 
or “ideal” of Westphalian sovereignty, in which legal state sovereignty is assumed to be intrinsically 
accompanied by absolute de facto sovereignty over territory, with the “real life” manifestations of 
geopolitical anomalies, I have tried to expose the functioning of this “Westphalian myth” in 
international politics. However, in spite of the clear challenges to Westphalian sovereignty by 
geopolitical anomalies, many traditional international relations theories (neorealism, liberal 
internationalism, constructivism) maintain a fundamentally Westphalian view of sovereignty, and 
remain rather unclear as to how they would distinguish between the legal sovereignty statuses of de 
jure states and de facto sovereign acts. This tenacity of the notions of Westphalian state sovereignty 
in studies of international relations forms a significant impediment to a revaluation of the effective 
power and de facto sovereignty manifestations of geopolitical anomalies existing without de jure 
state sovereignty. 
Chapter Two has served to provide a deeper insight into the juridical connotations of 
sovereignty as found in international law and de jure statehood. Importantly, in the international 
legal framework, (de jure) sovereignty embodies a normative principle and arrangement, rather than 
an objectively discernable act of supreme political power. De jure state sovereignty, therefore, 
comes about through its recognition by other de jure states in international law, which denotes an 
acknowledgement of “state criteria” in a certain political entity as well as a consequent conferring of 
international law’s rights and privileges upon that entity.  
However, while geopolitical anomalies, insofar as they are able to demonstrate these “state 
qualities”, may thus seemingly have a right to international legal recognition, in practice they face 
tremendous resistance from the international legal-political framework against their integration 
within this framework. Geopolitical anomalies could try and find a “resolution” to their secondary 
international political status by appealing to their international legal right of self-determination, but 
in the majority of cases that (principally universal) right is trumped by the overwhelming propensity 
of international law and politics to keep de jure state borders intact. Alternatively, a geopolitical 
anomaly could seek autonomy and/or power-sharing arrangements within their de jure state, but 
such juridical arrangements cannot guarantee that geopolitical anomaly’s survival in moments of 
crisis or conflict with the de jure state. 
As I have suggested, therefore, perhaps alterations in international political discourse, which 
would (re-)emphasise the nature and implications of de facto sovereign decisions in crisis situations, 
would help to make geopolitical anomalies more significant members of international political 
society. Chapter Three, as such, has been dedicated to these questions of de facto sovereignty. 
Utilising classical realist perspectives based in the ideas of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt, and Hans 
Morgenthau, I have demonstrated that a de facto sovereign act specifically constitutes the 
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decisionist act of supreme and absolute power in an exceptional situation, resolving a crisis or 
conflict in a political community. 
Remarkably, however, whereas classical realism thus represents de facto sovereignty as 
related to moments of chaos and conflict, scholars cultivating a “critical theory” of international 
politics portray it in the exact opposite manner – as emerging in moments of peacefulness and 
regularity. Grounding their ideas of de facto sovereignty in concepts like governmentality (the 
dispersed everyday practices of politics in a “network” of governance) and biopower (the power of 
human life to resist absolute sovereign power), as outlined by thinkers such as Michel Foucault and 
Giorgio Agamben, critical theorists consider de facto sovereignty as shared and overlapping 
modalities of power.  
On the contrary, in my contention, whereas these critical theories might helpfully uncover 
the various power manifestations other than de jure sovereignty that characterise (some) 
geopolitical anomalies’ everyday existence, classical realism forms a more useful approach if we 
want to find out to what extent geopolitical anomalies actually possess de facto sovereignty. A 
geopolitical anomaly, Chapter Three concludes, might then either take the form of a de facto 
sovereign political entity deciding on its own exception from de jure state law, or of a manifestation 
of (bio)power and governmentality attempting to challenge or resist the de facto sovereignty 
retained by a de jure state. 
The examples in this thesis have served to highlight and make clearer these theoretical 
contentions. Chapter Four has focused on the geopolitical anomaly of Somaliland, which has 
succeeded in creating a relatively peaceful and well-functioning de facto sovereign (effectively 
independent) political entity within the nominally legal boundaries of Somalia. This geopolitical 
anomaly, thus, first of all demonstrates the enduring nature of de facto sovereignty, which dissolved 
at the Somali state level in the early 1990s but was coincidentally gained by the different individuals 
in the country who were able to restore their kind of political order over their particular clan 
communities.  
In Somaliland, different clan leaders initially referred to a mix of state-based ideals and clan-
based norms and political processes to proclaim their independence as a state. Soon, however, 
these normative foundations of de facto statehood proved insufficient to prevent conflict between 
different clans within Somaliland, exemplifying geopolitical anomalies’ dependence on de facto 
sovereign power to decide on the exception and resolve political crises in a political community. 
Somaliland not only came into being through different clan militias’ de facto sovereign 
manifestations of military force, but subsequently managed to survive as a political entity by relying 
fundamentally on certain people’s de facto sovereign capacity to uphold political order on the (de 
facto) state level. In doing so, to this day Somaliland decides on its own exception from the legal 
order of Somalia. 
With regard to its international legal recognition as a de jure state, then, it may be argued 
that Somaliland actually does not need it in order to survive. Not only does this geopolitical anomaly 
expose how the concept of international legal recognition signifies contingent political privileges and 
international political power relationships more than international legal representations of universal 
norms and identical material circumstances, it also simultaneously demonstrates that geopolitical 
anomalies with de facto sovereignty essentially do not rely on international norms of Westphalian 
sovereignty and/or de jure state recognition. 
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My second exemplary discussion was aimed at clarifying another aspect about the nature of 
geopolitical anomalies (and de facto sovereignty). Analysing the Democratic League of Kosovo, which 
(under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova) organised a so-called “parallel state” and a peaceful 
resistance movement against Serbian oppression in the early 1990s, I sought to discuss the informal 
everyday power processes of governmentality, and the expressions of resistant biopower countering 
authoritarian and abusive sovereign power.  
However, while the LDK engaged in such daily and non-violent exercises of governmentality 
and biopower by creating and maintaining a semblance of everyday public life for Kosovar Albanians, 
this was not actually peacefulness by choice. The LDK’s strategy of peaceful parallel statehood 
implied that the Kosovo Albanian community could survive and defend itself in a context of 
systematic Serbian repression, but they could not overthrow Serbian de facto sovereignty. As a 
consequence, the LDK’s strategy of non-violence had many positive qualities, but it fundamentally 
did not give the Kosovar Albanians the ability to decide on their own exception – it proved 
essentially ineffective as a means to obtain (factual) independence. Geopolitical anomalies, thus, 
might exist without de facto sovereignty, even for a substantial period of time, but eventually 
require the de facto sovereign capacity to decide on the exception in order to establish themselves 
(more) permanently. 
A such, the final chapter of this thesis, which again involved the example of Kosovo, 
proceeded to argue that Kosovo has become a (politically) independent entity only after the decisive 
force of NATO airstrikes and UN missions took that de facto sovereignty from Serbia. As the Kosovar 
Albanians resorted to violence through the Kosovar Liberation Army, eventually provoking the 
“international community” into military intervention, the apparent de facto sovereignty of present-
day Kosovo seems to owe a lot to extremely violent action. In this light, Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence in February 2008, and particularly the subsequent Advisory Opinion by 
the ICJ in July 2010, provided some fascinating insights. As the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion remained silent 
on Kosovo’s de facto existence as an independent state, on the violent manner in which de facto 
independence was created, and on the political and legal status of those declaring independence, it 
tacitly – or in fact explicity – acknowledged that international law simply does not have the capacity 
to make a meaningful judgment on these issues. Geopolitical anomalies like Kosovo, once again, 
epitomise the inability of international legal declarations, opinions, or norms to capture or regulate 
issues and manifestations of de facto sovereignty. 
Kosovo, then, may embody the possibility of encapsulating, cushioning, or even effacing any 
potential for inter-communal violence in a collection of domestic and international legal 
arrangements, but such juridical arrangements cannot resolve the question as to who would restore 
order in a situation of exceptional crisis. As long as the international presence in Kosovo essentially 
still functions as this geopolitical anomaly’s de facto sovereign, it will remain unable to establish a 
new de facto sovereign capable of sustaining Kosovo as a political entity. Attempts by the 
international (legal) community to “handle” or “regulate” geopolitical anomalies, therefore, will 
inevitably run into the problem that geopolitical anomalies’ political existence fundamentally relies 






In sum, while such attempts continue to be grounded in certain assumptions about the 
(trans)formative and regulatory capacity of norms and legalities, precisely these assumptions are 
rebuked by geopolitical anomalies, signifying that any possible future vision for the dissolution of 
geopolitical anomalies from international politics will have to come to terms with its own 
exception(s). In this thesis, the question has recurred whether, and particularly how, geopolitical 
anomalies could be integrated into the international political framework. It is still unclear, however, 
how such an alternative way of (re)structuring and (re-)imagining international politics and 
geopolitical anomalies could take root and come into being. In the remainder of this conclusion I will 
elaborate on this issue. 
Generally, then, there seem to be two possible ways of envisioning a world devoid of 
geopolitical anomalies: one involving the establishment of a single global state, the other implying a 
vast plurality of individual de jure (micro-)states for every political community on the planet. Both of 
these visions somehow endeavour towards a global elimination of the exception, but do so in 
opposite ways.  
 
The Proliferation of International Law? 
To begin with the latter, in the sense that geopolitical anomalies form exceptions to legal statehood, 
a world that would countenance the continual proliferation of de jure states may in theory 
eventually become legally and politically all-inclusive. Exceptions to this expansive international 
politico-legal order may still occur, but they would immediately and without question be 
incorporated into this order. Again, as many individual geopolitical anomalies have already strongly 
considered and actively strived towards de jure statehood, can we start to entertain the idea of a 
more dramatic alteration of global political society into one in which each group possesses its own 
small state or micro-state? 
Intuitively, it seems that any desire to universally rule out the international legal exception 
by universally legitimating and allowing it seems rather contradictory. Indeed, objections have been 
widely raised about a political world in which all geopolitical anomalies could find territorial 
“resolutions” through the juridical recognition of independent mini-statehood. Former US President 
Bill Clinton commented in 1999 that ‘[i]f every major racial and ethnic and religious group won 
independence, we might have 800 countries in the world and have a very difficult time having a 
functioning economy. Maybe we would have 8,000 – how low can you go?’ (Brooke, 1999). 
According to Gottlieb (1993), therefore, ‘the fragmentation of international society into hundreds of 
independent territorial entities is a recipe for an even more dangerous and anarchic world’ (p. 2). 
This sentiment has been reiterated within the UN as well, as former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali 
warned that ‘if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit 
to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more 
difficult to achieve’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, 4). As Bartmann (2004), thus, summarises: 
 
[f]or many sceptics, universality in this extreme would extend the normal understandings 
of a state to the limits of absurdity, and undermine the tacit assumption that there [are] 
normal dimensions of statehood rooted in the intuitive but common-sense practices of 




My view, however, is that establishing a world of legal micro-states does not necessarily 
pose a moral problem, implying supposedly “normal” or “ideal” dimensions of statehood, but a 
practical one. In the arguments made above, we are reminded of the often expressed fear 
foreseeing a Pandora’s Box of secessionist struggles as a consequence of any individual legal 
recognition of a geopolitical anomaly. As one of the dissenting judges of the Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion complained: 
 
to allow any ethnic, linguistic or religious group to declare independence and break away 
from the territory of the State of which it forms part... creates a very dangerous 
precedent. Indeed, it amounts to nothing less than announcing to any and all dissident 
groups around the world that they are free to circumvent international law simply by 
acting in a certain way and crafting a unilateral declaration of independence, using certain 
terms (Koroma, 2010, 69-70). 
 
James Ker-Lindsay (2012), in this vein, actually devoted an entire book towards the question of how 
to ‘prevent breakaway territories from being recognised after an act of unilateral secession’ (p. 2) – a 
question, thus, not in terms of effectively maintaining such territories within nominal borders, but in 
terms of convincing other (legal) actors in world politics not to recognise them. In doing so, he 
clearly demonstrates that legal recognition constitutes a political decision by individual (legal) actors, 
instead of a universal legal rule.  
A first issue with a micro-state world, then, is not that every geopolitical anomaly could 
theoretically gain de jure statehood – prima facie they have that international legal right already. 
Rather, as has been discussed in Chapter Four on Somaliland, legal recognition a geopolitical 
anomaly remains a political decision. As James Crawford commented about Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence, ‘[a] declaration issued by persons within a State is a collection of 
words writ in water; it is the sound of one hand clapping. What matters is what is done 
subsequently, especially the reaction of the international community’ (as cited in Ker-Lindsay, 2012, 
1-2).  
More importantly, however, such observations still do not seem to address the “politics” of 
a de facto sovereign decision on the exception. The issue is not that a Pandora’s Box of secessions 
may or may not be a likely consequence of one (or more) legal recognition(s). Rather, from the 
perspective of the inevitability of the exception in international politics, that box is already wide 
open. The above-made projections of global instability appear to be founded precisely on the fact 
that de jure statehood in itself remains incapable of eliminating violent struggles over de facto 
sovereignty. Again, as has been laid out in Chapter Four, de facto sovereignty is actually not reliant 
on de jure recognition for it to exist. To put it conversely, therefore, disallowing or vetoing 
geopolitical anomalies’ legal rights to self-determination or statehood does not actually suppress the 
Pandora’s Box phenomenon, because the issue of a group’s will and capacity to separate from a 
legal/political community is primarily a political, not a legal, one.  
In other words, a micro-state solution to geopolitical anomalies would not negate the fact 
that legal sovereignty arrangements are frequently trumped by de facto sovereignty. While such a 
world would ostensibly eliminate all questions of legal recognition, and thus presumably eliminate 
the relationships of (imperialist) power that accompany such questions, politically and effectively 
such power relationships would not be eliminated. The problem is that a world of automatic de jure 
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statehood for any geopolitical anomaly would seemingly merely perpetuate the territorial state-
based rules and regulations of the current international legal framework. Otherwise, this solution 
would already destabilise the very foundational regularities on which it is grounded. A proposed 
micro-state order for geopolitical anomalies, thus, brings us back, for one last time, to questions 
around the nature of international law and the way it intersects with international politics. A 
universal rule of gaining legal statehood as soon as factual statehood has come into being implies an 
overarching “de facto sovereign” authority granting that legality – presumably international law – 
yet as has been demonstrated many times in this thesis, international law in fact does not possess 
such a de facto sovereign capacity. 
 Importantly, this is not to suggest that the purpose of this thesis has been to completely 
dismiss the value of the international legal order. For instance, many legal states appear to 
successfully retain de facto sovereignty – the capacity to decide on the exception over their full 
territory. Moreover, those (Westphalian) ideals of universal de facto sovereignty over de jure state 
territory also remain very powerful in themselves. International law possesses a normative power 
that is very hard to ignore, representing at least an aspiration towards justice and peace. As such, 
international law undeniably represents and fosters some semblance of an international order, 
although – oxymoronically – it is an unstable and insecure one. While Anne Orford (2012a) readily 
acknowledges the controversy of any notion of international law as a guarantor or even an 
embodiment of a constituted international order (p. 271), she also demonstrates that the norms and 
rules it promotes do garner a more substantive international communal regularity, even if this is 
only a product of the consent of international political actors (p. 287). 
If we want to talk about an international political structure, then surely de jure sovereignty 
boundaries serve as more than merely the decorative walls of that structure. Chapter Six already 
briefly touched on the question whether legally circumscribed territories somehow restrain more 
powerful entities from exerting their de facto sovereignty over those territories – in short, whether 
legalising boundaries creates a more formidable bulwark impeding a “transnational” de facto 
sovereign decision. And certainly, insofar as the legal equality of de jure states is safeguarded under 
international law, de jure sovereignty may function as a precaution against the dangers of a world 
dominated by warfare over de facto sovereignty. De jure sovereignty, indeed, may imply both a 
normative attenuation for the potential of interstate conflict, and an actual strengthening of the 
governing capacity of a (former) geopolitical anomaly. 
In spite of all of this, however, international legal provisions ultimately lack the capacity to 
rule out the exception, even if they could be developed into a regulatory framework of micro-states. 
Revisiting the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion (AO) on Kosovo’s declaration of independence, we learn how 
international law is inherently compelled to remain speechless, not just about Kosovo, but about all 
geopolitical anomalies. Indeed, Moses (2014) insightfully directs our attention to the question 
whether the ICJ should have actually taken on the question of the legality of Kosovo’s declaration in 
the first place (pp. 129-130) – an issue on which the AO’s dissenting judges were particularly 
scornful.  
As they made clear, the ICJ’s very decision to take on the Kosovo Question was problematic, 
as the Court was destined to thereby demonstrate international law’s ultimate impotence in the face 
of international political power (Moses, 2014, 145). The Kosovo AO merely ‘revealed the continuing 
truth... that the law cannot regulate the factual power that gives rise to the emergence of new 
states’, regardless of the ICJ’s ‘clunky and ultimately futile attempts’ to somehow conceal this fact 
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(p. 138).  Inevitably, therefore, ‘the Advisory Opinion... had a rather marginal effect in terms of how 
processes of secession and recognition are understood in international affairs’ (Ker-Lindsay, 2012, 
162). The AO did not actually clarify the question whether Kosovo was “allowed” to be legitimately 
independent, fully realising that it was in no position to “allow” or “legitimise” anything. 
An alternative view of legal recognition of statehood can be found in the notion of earned 
sovereignty – already briefly discussed in Chapter Two. While this would certainly not be a principle 
leading to the endless proliferation of micro-states, it is proposed as a universal – albeit conditional 
– right for geopolitical anomalies under international law. As Williams and Pecci (2004) present it, 
earned sovereignty ‘entails the conditional and progressive devolution of sovereign powers and 
authority from a state to a substate entity under international supervision’ (p. 350). The earned 
sovereignty principle, thus, could be considered as an international legal attempt to encapsulate 
existing crises between de jure states and geopolitical anomalies.  
Yet, once more, the glaring limitations of such attempts cannot be ignored. As is exemplified 
in the case of Kosovo, an imminent political problem with the notion of earned sovereignty is that 
the question of “deserving” sovereignty cannot be decided by international law as such. Proponents 
of the earned sovereignty approach do ‘not perceive “sovereignty” to be a unitary right, but rather a 
bundle of authority and functions which may at times be shared by the state and sub-state entities 
as well as international institutions’ (Hooper & Williams, 2003, 357). As such, while these 
proponents happily espouse notions of ‘phased’, ‘accumulated’, ‘conditional’, and ‘constrained’ 
sovereignty, such notions are completely antithetical to the nature of effective (de facto) 
sovereignty, which is always instantaneous, absolute, unconditional, and unrestricted.  
The assumption that de facto sovereignty can be voluntarily “handed over” – placed upon 
one entity by another – remains problematic, because of the inherent power inequality that such a 
transfer would imply. Ostensibly, such a transition would lead to an endless vortex of questions 
about who “receives” de facto sovereignty and who does the handing over. Williams, Scharf, and 
Hooper (2003) concede that, in cases where two entities in question cannot come to mutual 
agreements, ‘the international community may... initiate one or more of the elements of earned 
sovereignty against the interests of the state or sub-state entity’ (p. 353), but such a solution brings 
up a variety of different problems. In order to fully rule out the exception in international politics, 
such an international intervening power would ultimately have to take on the form of a world state, 
rather than of an international legal framework (I will come to this issue in a moment). 
Proposals for sovereignty to be ‘shared’ or ‘negotiated’ between a de jure state and a sub-
state entity (Williams, Scharf & Hooper, 2003, 352-353), thus, can only be interpreted as legal 
idealisations that in themselves cannot form any guarantee of preventing conflict between these 
two entities. The fact that Hooper and Williams (2003) emphasise that earned sovereignty is not ‘a 
panacea that can be applied to resolve all international problems involving disputes over rival 
territorial claims’ (p. 357) constitutes a direct acknowledgement of international law’s inability to 
form a universal remedy against international or domestic crises over political power.  
Reisman and Willard (1988), therefore, argued that international law should assume 
international “incidents” or “conflicts” as its new “epistemic units”. As Orford (2004) concurs, 
‘[i]nternational law understands itself as responding to crises, but is itself also perpetually in crisis’ 
(p. 443). Orford’s work, here, is particularly insightful, beginning from the premise that ‘[t]here is 
no... ultimate sovereign that can act as “guarantor of a right” and thus do away with the uneasiness 
or anxiety caused by an inability to ground international law’ (p. 466). While she understands this 
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inability as ‘a condition of late modernity’ rather than an inevitable characteristic of international 
relations, and somewhat paradoxically maintains that ‘international law is... a continuing source of 
extremely productive responses to that crisis of authority’ (p. 443), Orford’s proposal not to 
‘appropriate the anxiety this crisis engenders’ (p. 476) fits in nicely with the wider argument of this 
conclusion.  
Orford (2004) calls for international law to embrace its limits, instead of resorting to ‘the 
desire for a unitary authority’ (p. 469), reiterating Koskenniemi’s contention that for international 
law ‘the inner anxiety of the Prince is less a problem to resolve than an objective to achieve’ 
(Koskenniemi, 2002, 175). Other legal scholars have found that this emphasis on the international 
legal crisis ‘shackles international law to a static and unproductive rhetoric’ (Charlesworth, 2002, 
377). Charlesworth, therefore, proposes a ‘refocus... on issues of structural justice that underpin 
everyday life’ as a way to escape this cycle (p. 391), but thereby overlooks the fact that everyday life 
is in many ways premised on the de facto sovereign decision on the exception. As Orford (2004) 
repeats: 
 
[b]eyond the certainty of a sovereign law-maker is the unknown. This is the condition of 
possibility and the source of the productivity of international law... International law 
can, and at times has, involved the performance of another way of living with... 
uncertainty, anxiety, [and] instability. It may be that this sense of always occupying the 
place beyond what is known is the destiny, if not the destination, of international law (p. 
476). 
 
Thus, as a resolution for geopolitical anomalies and international political exceptions, a 
world of minute de jure states – let alone a less extensive proliferation of international legal 
recognition – would remain woefully ineffective. Geopolitical anomalies are “stuck in limbo” 
between their de facto existence and their lack of de jure recognition, and between their incapacity 
to decide on the exception and others’ capacity to do just that, and it remains very doubtful whether 
a resolution of one will also resolve the other. Therefore, international law now has to finally come 
to terms with the international political realities represented by geopolitical anomalies.  
For instance, Milena Sterio’s observation of a “great powers’ rule” of legal recognition in 
international relations and international law (2013) should be a starting point, not a conclusion, of 
an investigation into the issue of geopolitical anomalies. This “rule” does not constitute ‘a [new] de 
facto norm of external self-determination’, nor does it mean that ‘we have returned to a medieval 
conception of power’ in international relations (p. 183), but rather forms the obvious and 
inescapable limitation that international law has to live with. As one prominent legal scholar 
summarised it, ‘[t]he elephant in the room is the concept of power’ (Valerie C. Epps, as cited in 
Sterio, 2013, 175). Once again, ‘any thought on the possibilities for reform of international or global 
order must come to terms with the ineradicable prospect of crisis and the decision that it calls forth’ 
(Moses, 2014, 168). 
 
A World State? 
Another general response to the question of how to rule out the exception in international politics, 
and thus how to rule out geopolitical anomalies, can be found in contemplations about the 
establishment of a world state – a global governing entity capable of maintaining order and peace 
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around the world. Whereas the previously discussed world of micro-states ostensibly entails the 
multiplication of exceptions into (legal) regularity, this alternative creates a super-sovereign world 
entity that would apparently end all exceptions. In other words, one signifies the proliferation of 
international relations and international law, the other its end. Hans Morgenthau, who (perhaps 
surprisingly) extensively addressed and entertained this possibility, suggested that a world state 
would imply ‘the abolition of international relations itself through the merger of all national 
sovereignties into one world state which could have a monopoly on the most destructive 
instruments of violence’ (as cited in Craig, 2003, 109). Accordingly, two fundamental issues about 
such a world state need to be addressed here: its desirability, on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, its feasibility. 
 Concerning the former, it appears that the nature of a world state, and that of its 
relationship with notions of de facto sovereignty and crisis, makes the potential coming into being of 
such a “state” a rather daunting prospect. As Hannah Arendt (1958) maintained, ‘[s]uch a world 
government is indeed within the realm of possibility, but... in reality it might differ considerably from 
the version promoted by idealist-minded organisations’ (p. 298). Given the world state’s presumed 
purpose to uphold global order, its ‘attachment to a de facto definition of sovereignty darkens the 
image of what might otherwise be presented as the best hope for a peaceful future for all of 
humanity’ (Moses, 2014, 150). According to Morgenthau (2006), any expectation of spontaneous 
and universal popular support for such a state remained an illusion (pp. 514-516), as ‘a brutal and 
bloody global war of conquest would be necessary’ to establish it (Moses, 2014, 158).  
The subsequent “end of all wars” would denote the replacement of armies with an 
omnipotent and totalitarian police force from which it would have to remain impossible to find 
refuge (Arendt, 1968, 93-94). As both Arendt and Morgenthau, thus, forebode: 
 
[n]o matter what form a world government with centralised power over the whole globe 
might assume, the very notion of one sovereign force ruling the earth, holding the 
monopoly of all means of violence, unchecked and uncontrolled by other sovereign 
powers, is... a forbidding nightmare of tyranny (Arendt, 1968, 81). 
 
[A] world state created by conquest and lacking the support of a world community has a 
chance to maintain peace within its borders only if it can create and maintain complete 
discipline and loyalty among the millions of soldiers and policemen needed to enforce its 
rule over an unwilling humanity. Such a world state would be a totalitarian monster 
resting on feet of clay, the very thought of which startles the imagination (Morgenthau, 
2006, 518). 
 
More importantly, however, these disconcerting projections are made based on the 
hypothetical character of such a world state – a character that, in fact, appears highly unfeasible. 
Reiterating Schmitt’s concept of the political, Arendt (1968) argues that ‘[p]olitical concepts are 
based on plurality, diversity, and mutual limitations’ (p. 81), so that ‘[t]he establishment of one 
sovereign world state... would not be the climax of world politics, but quite literally its end’ (p. 82). 





Were a world state to embrace the entire globe and humanity, then it would be no 
political entity and could only be loosely called a state… It would know neither state nor 
kingdom, nor empire, neither republic nor monarchy, neither aristocracy nor democracy, 
neither protection nor obedience, and would altogether lose its political character (p. 57). 
 
However, any belief that such a “post-political” world would signify humanity’s freedom from (de 
facto sovereign) power remains nonsensical.  
Returning to the functionality of de facto sovereignty capable of upholding a political unity in 
spite of inevitable crises, the Hobbesian relationship of protection and obedience is of relevance 
here. On the one hand, the point has to be restated that given the inherently pluralist nature of 
human societies, and, thus, the inherently singular and undisputable nature of a de facto sovereign 
decision, ‘the people, as such, cannot act’ (Morgenthau, 1973, 323). Put another way, ‘[t]here does 
not exist a supranational society that comprises all individual members of all nations and, hence, is 
identical with humanity politically organised’, and that, consequently, ‘few men would act on behalf 
of a world government if the interests of their own [political community], as they understand them, 
required a different course of action’ (Morgenthau, 2006, 514). Again, therefore, a world state 
would have to take on the form of a ‘centralisation of decisive power’ that was capable of keeping at 
peace the different societies within global humanity (Moses, 2014, 150). Schmitt (2007), as such, 
revisits ‘[t]he acute question... upon whom will fall the frightening power implied in a world-
embracing... technical organisation’ (p. 57). 
Aside from this (again rather normative) question, however, as Morgenthau (2006) points 
out, ‘the power of the [de facto sovereign] is essential, but not sufficient, to keep the peace of...  
societies’ (p. 511). In this sense, certainly, de facto sovereignty should not be seen as a possession, 
but as an exercise in a perpetual relation of struggle; Hobbes himself, for example, had set up de 
facto sovereignty as a relationship of power, cultivating protection and obedience. Thus, whereas 
Chapter Five (on Kosovo’s LDK) might have been interpreted as a demonstration of the pointlessness 
of resistance against de facto sovereignty, any particular de facto sovereign could of course be 
challenged, and replaced, by an actor formerly subordinated in the political community.  
Because of the pertinent non-existence of global ‘supra-sectional loyalties’ (pp. 506-508), 
then, a world state would not actually eliminate the potential for crisis and conflict. Instead, 
‘challenges to the sovereignty of a world state could not be ruled out a priori’, but would rather 
‘take the form of civil war, sedition or revolution’ that would ‘generate the same questions of [de 
facto] sovereignty that we find within states today’ (Moses, 2014, 151). In such a situation, Schmitt 
(1996) demonstrates, a world state ‘would have to assert its own interests’, instead of the interests 
of global humanity, or risk losing its de facto sovereignty (p. 31). Given the truism of an intrinsically 
differentiated global society, thus, any semblance of a world state would be destined to revert back 
into mere expressions of power by a particular – and certainly not universal – political community 
(Moses, 2014, 157). 
Furthermore, the irresolvable potential for global crises means that a world state or world 
unity could not assume the form of an “alliance” or a “division” of global governing powers (Moses, 
2014, 150-152; Schmitt, 2007, 57-58). Such alternative “federal” visions of global statehood remain 
popular ideals in international political thought, embedded in cosmopolitan views about 
overlapping, coexisting, and “non-sovereign” global structures of authority that would 
interdependently create “peace on earth” (Paul, 1999; Ruggie, 1983; Ruggie, 1993). Daniel Deudney 
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(2007), for instance, argued that material power could be “bound” in a global “republican” security 
framework. According to Deudney, “republics”, founded on popular sovereignty and distributed 
power arrangements, ‘entail the simultaneous negation of anarchy and hierarchy’, combining 
authoritative government with anti-hierarchical modalities (p. 31). For Deudney, republican 
‘structures of mutual restraint constitute a distinctive ordering principle with a long and 
distinguished record of practical success’, so that, with regard to a world government, ‘it is the 
narrow conceptual vocabulary of Realism, not the actual range of real possibilities, that darkens the 
shadow of [global] hierarchical threat’ (p. 276).  
William Scheuerman (2007, 2011), on similar grounds, calls for a global reform “beyond 
Realism”, contending that ‘Morgenthau’s hostility to alternative forms of relatively decentralised 
supranational organisation rests on sand’, because ‘effective state action is by no means inconsistent 
with any of a host of complex forms of complex or differentiated sovereignty potentially realisable at 
the transnational level’ (Scheuerman, 2007, 85). Held (2002) conceptualises this globally 
differentiated sovereignty as ‘cosmopolitan law’; this cosmopolitan law would demand ‘the 
subordination of regional, national, and local “sovereignties” to an overarching legal framework, but 
within this framework associations may be self-governing at diverse levels’. According to Held, thus, 
cosmopolitan sovereignty denotes sovereignty ‘stripped away from the idea of fixed borders and 
territories’, and would instead comprise ‘frameworks of political regulatory relations and activities, 
shaped and formed by an overarching cosmopolitan legal framework’ (p. 32). 
Yet, once more, certain stubborn misconceptions about the nature of (de facto) sovereignty 
(and geopolitical anomalies) pervade these projections of global governance. Held’s cosmopolitan 
sovereignty as “political regulatory frameworks” beneath a global legal structure merely seems to be 
another description of the present international legal system overarching de jure states – the 
limitations of which have already been made clear in this thesis. Deudney’s claim of a longstanding 
tradition of republican “practical success” ignores the fundamental de facto sovereign decisions that 
lie at the heart of such political communities. According to him, a world state would possess no 
“external” threat – it would have no “enemy” – and thus would not need to “securitise” its 
population in a de facto sovereign order (Deudney, 2007, 276-277), but he thereby overlooks the 
incontrovertible potential for crisis within the global political community itself.  
Therefore, in spite of Scheuerman’s belief that a world state could be constituted from ‘the 
power-dispersing qualities of democracy and popular sovereignty’ (Moses, 2014, 164), he himself 
actually conceded that ‘when push comes to shove, federal institutions will have to be able to 
unleash preponderant power – if necessary, in opposition to powerful social groups or member 
states – in order to ensure the binding character of their decisions’ (Scheuerman, 2011, 153). Here, 
surely, Scheuerman is talking about an unlimited and unitary de facto sovereign deciding on the 
exception within the global political community. In an earlier statement, he finds it ‘difficult to 
fathom the possibility of global institutions exercising an effective monopoly over legitimate force… 
without them in fact gaining a preponderant power status in relation to their national institutional 
rivals’ (p. 120). Scheuerman, thus, despite his claims that any trepidation or criticism about the 
necessarily authoritarian nature of a world state is ‘conceptually dogmatic and ahistorical’ (p. 155), 
not only seems to return to a conception of a world state inherently resting on absolute and 
indivisible de facto sovereignty, in doing so he also appears very much aware of the inevitability of 




Geopolitical Anomalies and Exceptionality 
Returning to the world state’s supposed purpose to resolve, and dissolve, any international political 
exceptions, it appears that such a “resolution” would be no more likely to be able to regulate or 
incorporate geopolitical anomalies than a legally constructed world of micro-states. This actually 
brings us back to questions about what geopolitical anomalies look like, and how they organise and 
establish themselves outside any legally recognised international structure. As has been maintained 
throughout this thesis, certain specific geopolitical anomalies can be labelled as de facto sovereign 
entities deciding on their own exception from de jure states. Other geopolitical anomalies, however, 
like the Kosovo parallel state in the early 1990s, have been presented as stuck in a “critical 
regularity”, or conversely, in an “orderly crisis”. 
However, while these latter kinds of geopolitical anomalies might thus not appear 
“exceptional”, they have instead been incorporated in a political order maintained by a legal state. In 
other words, while some geopolitical anomalies may be understood through the informal, 
normative, and juridical arrangements permeating their everyday existence, these aspects of 
geopolitical anomalies’ existence do not actually contradict the presence of de facto sovereign 
decisions on manifestations of exceptional conflict. Some geopolitical anomalies may remain 
impeded from acquiring de facto sovereignty by “their” de jure state, yet the significance of 
exceptional (violent) de facto sovereign decisions for international law does not thereby diminish. 
Geopolitical anomalies can still only be “regulated” by de facto sovereign acts, rather than by 
international law or a world state. 
Some critical theorists and critical geographers wonder, still, whether we may question the 
intensity of crises, the revolutionary nature of de facto sovereign decisions, and the conflictiveness 
of the political, by focusing on realms of locality, closeness, and integrated lives – in short, in 
everyday space (Allen, 2003; Rose-Redwood, 2006). These perspectives not only entertain the idea 
of small-scale interactions as numerous de facto sovereign decisions on everyday exceptions, but 
also of personal and small group relationships potentially pre-empting international violent conflict 
at the local scale. 
 However, first of all, such perspectives have to be careful not to (again) conflate any type of 
power relationship with a de facto sovereign decision, nor to ignore the hierarchies that signify the 
relationship of de facto sovereignty with those other subordinate forms of power. Those conjectures 
about quotidian and “local” de facto sovereign decisions only make sense if such decisions truly 
originate from the supreme entity or figure within a (political) community. Hobbes (1994) actually 
clarified this issue in The Elements of Law, discussing the possibility of perceiving a “family” as a de 
facto sovereign unit. For Hobbes, if a “family” were to expand ‘to be so great and numerous, as in 
probability it may protect itself’ from any superior power, then that family could be called de facto 
sovereign (p. 133).  
The crux of the matter, thus, again lies in the way in which groups and individuals exist in 
and interact with a clearly definable exclusive space. Arguably, however, everyday spaces and 
practices are actually inherently part of a wider geographical context, instead of private or 
independent (de facto sovereign) phenomena. As Lefebvre (1991) writes, in a line of reasoning 
reminiscent of notions of de facto sovereignty as a unique event or a theological miracle (see 




in practical [everyday] life... magic only signifies the illusions men have about themselves, 
and their lack of power. And everyday life is defined by contradictions: illusion and truth, 
power and helplessness, the intersection of the sector man controls and the sector he 
does not control (p. 21). 
 
What this means for geopolitical anomalies, is that those who are primarily based on everyday 
arrangements and coexistences in fact remain essentially undecided, which means that they remain 
subordinated to de facto sovereign decisions on more intense crises, and integrated into more 
distinctive and superseding spatialities. As Chapter Five has demonstrated, non-sovereign 
geopolitical anomalies are unequivocally unable to decide on the exception or constitute a political 
order, but are instead part of exceptional spaces and circumstances created and sustained by 
overpowering de facto sovereign actions. Geopolitical anomalies might exist without de facto 
sovereignty, but de facto sovereignty is enormously important for their viability and survival. 
Whereas Somaliland’s existence “in limbo” has endured because it has been capable of exercising de 
facto sovereignty, Kosovar Albanians in Rugova’s parallel state suffered under their incapacity to do 
just that. 
 Moreover, geopolitical anomalies that are in a state of “constant crisis” may not experience 
much violence for an extended period of time, but their “limbo” existence will most likely be 
resolved by an act of violence one way or another. Recent work by Chenoweth and Lewis (2013), 
and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), has appealingly tried to emphasise the efficacy of nonviolent 
political movements over violent ones, but concede to ‘the exception... that non-violent resistance 
leads to successful secession less often than violent insurgency’ (p. 18). Such unsuccessfulness may 
be ascribed, first of all, to secessionist movements’ dependency on international legal and political 
determinants – ‘factors largely out of the campaigns’ control’ (p. 67). More importantly, however, 
‘campaigns with goals that are perceived as... fundamentally altering the political order may be less 
likely to succeed than goals perceived as more limited in nature’ (p. 66; my emphasis). As such, the 
catalysts for a particular political transformation –  either violent or non-violent action – are 
intricately imbued with the profoundness of such a transformation.  
Here, we may re-invoke the truism that a true separation of a political community from 
another can only occur through a de facto sovereign act, which, through its own violence, is capable 
of rigidly distinguishing between what constitutes political order/peace and political crisis/violence. 
In addition, as is exemplified in Chapter Five and Six, non-violent campaigns may be more accessible 
and morally attractive to a lot of people, but that in itself does not lead to political change. 
Chenoweth places a lot of confidence in “people power” (which may be translatable, perhaps, as 
biopower),  as non-violent campaigns may be able to engage more people than violent ones. As we 
have seen, however, the actual foundation of a (new kind of) political community is inherently 
coupled with violence. 
As a consequence, my argument in this thesis that geopolitical anomalies may help us 
broaden the way we talk about international politics and ‘[open] up theoretical spaces for the study 
of alternative geopolitical futures’ (McConnell, 2009a, 1911) should be forwarded with some 
trepidation. As has been suggested in Chapter One, de jure states are generally ascribed the same 
qualities as de facto sovereigns, which has led to an absolute perspective on legal statehood. 
Commonly, this fallacious amalgamation of these divergent concepts has been blamed upon realist 
thought in international politics. McConnell (2009b) herself exemplifies this, not only by 
185 
 
paradoxically claiming that de jure recognition constitutes ‘the apogee of realist interpretations of 
sovereignty’ (p. 345), but also by more generally complaining that: 
 
[r]ealist approaches perceive and theorise non-state entities in particular ways. Most 
simply, geopolitical “anomalies” are generally overlooked by realist IR theorists... 
Therefore, even though such non-state entities seek to operate within the international 
system, they are perceived by realist approaches as residing outside the territorial logic of 
sovereignty and operating in the “gaps” between and across territorially bounded 
sovereign states (p. 344). 
 
As I have demonstrated in this thesis, however, such accusations are largely unfounded and unfair. 
For this thesis, critical perspectives on international relations and geopolitics have formed helpful 
theoretical pathways towards emphasising the non-absoluteness of de jure statehood in 
international politics, and thus towards ascribing more significance to geopolitical anomalies as 
meaningful exceptions to a formal state rule. However, as I have maintained, such hypotheses 
cannot be appropriately addressed without an understanding of classical realist conceptions of 
sovereignty and international politics, in which de facto sovereignty (and, thus, effective statehood) 
is absolute. Classical realism, I have argued, helps us to more clearly understand in what way 
geopolitical anomalies may be considered as crucial manifestations of international politics; they 
uncover how the central position of de jure statehood in international relations rests on questions of 
de facto sovereignty, which means that de facto sovereignty, embodied by some geopolitical 
anomalies, becomes the core element of international politics. 
A discussion of the contingency of the current (Westphalian) interstate system, therefore, 
should keep in mind that de facto sovereign “statehood” in itself is unlikely to disappear. As I have 
contended in this thesis that we cannot do away with de facto sovereignty in international politics, I 
have been very sceptical towards any cosmopolitan assumptions about globalisation, and instead 
deduce that borders are in fact unlikely to end. Even if we could regard “peaceful” and loosely 
arranged geopolitical anomalies as spaces in which any crisis can be mitigated and resolved 
interpersonally, that in itself would not rule out the potential for violent conflict between larger 
polities – nor the capacity of those polities to resolve it. Again, therefore, even for geopolitical 
anomalies embodying the management of low-intensity and parochial altercations, the 
(international) exception, and its derivative de facto sovereignty, does not disappear. 
 
A Disciplinary Transformation? 
As a result, we have returned to a final consideration of any possibility of resolving the phenomenon 
of geopolitical anomalies – one that has been discussed in this thesis already. As was suggested in 
the introduction and in Chapter Two, an integration of the concept of geopolitical anomalies into 
mainstream international political discourse, and thus a transformation of international relations as 
a scholarly discipline itself, could perhaps help us to better understand, take more seriously, and 
thus de-marginalise, geopolitical anomalies in international politics. As geopolitical anomalies 
remain perceived as the outcasts of international political civilisation, could a more inclusive 
international political mindset form a way to extend a helping hand and “let them in”? However, 
given the arguments brought forth in this conclusion, and in this thesis as a whole, perhaps already it 
has become clear that such a hypothesis must likely be disclaimed. As Moses (2013) rhetorically asks 
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in relation to the normative international project of the R2P, ‘does “speaking differently” about 
sovereignty change sovereignty in any useful way?’ (p. 118). 
Here, the question (re-)surfaces whether de facto sovereignty actually derives at least some 
of its power from pre-existing laws and discourses, or, conversely, whether a de facto sovereign can 
actually act in complete independence from such norms established ex ante. The most fundamental 
prerequisite for a de facto sovereign continues to be material power, through which the de facto 
sovereign is able to establish certain norms within a political community, but from such an 
observation may perhaps also be deduced that these norms and discourses equally function to 
“give” power to de facto sovereignty. In the (Foucauldian) sense that ‘[n]orms... to the degree that 
they exert a discipline, represent a form of oppression’, presumably de facto sovereignty itself could 
be subjected to codes of behaviour that instruct and inform it to act in certain ways (Belsey, 2002, 
54). For instance, this thesis itself has devoted quite some effort in explaining the functionalities of a 
Westphalian myth from which de jure states ostensibly derive legitimacy and authority in 
international politics. On the one hand, thus, norms and myths do seem to contribute to de jure 
states’ paramount position in the international political framework.  
On the other hand, however, as geopolitical anomalies make clear, international myths, 
norms, and laws of conduct do not unequivocally grant de jure states with de facto sovereignty. 
Alternatively, while some may argue that dominant assumptions about Westphalian sovereignty 
originate from the power of de jure states being de facto sovereign over their complete territory – 
implying it has in fact a very real and unmythical character –  geopolitical anomalies also show us the 
fallacies of such an argument. International norms cannot give absolute material power, nor can 
they give it to all de jure states. While this thesis’s argument, indeed, has not been to wholly reject 
the value and significance of norms and discourses in international relations, it has been to explain 
why international legal and normative arrangements are intrinsically incapable of securing a 
universal international political order that will hold all humanity together. In international politics, 
norms cannot rule out crises or the exception, which is why a supreme act of effective power (de 
facto sovereignty) remains necessary to create political order(s).  
A useful concept, in this regard, is Derrida’s undecidability, wherein he explains that there 
cannot be any social norm or reality on which no factual decision will have to be made. While this 
concept has been mistakenly criticised as denoting an apolitical moral relativism, Derrida was 
actually adamant to differentiate it from any notion of indeterminacy (Campbell, 1998, 184). Instead, 
he argues, ‘undecidability is always a determinate oscillation between possibilities (for example of 
meaning, but also of acts). These possibilities are themselves highly determined in strictly defined 
situations’ (Derrida, 1988, 184). Undecidability, thus, in fact: 
 
opens the field of decision or of decidability. It calls for decision in the order of ethical-
political responsibility... A decision can only come into being in a space that exceeds the 
calculable program that would destroy all responsibility by transforming it into a 
programmable effect of determinate causes (p. 116). 
 
What Derrida demonstrates, here, is that ‘[i]f the realm of thought was preordained such 
that there were no options, no competing alternatives, and no difficult choices to make, there would 
be no need for a decision’ (Campbell, 1998, 184). In other words, ‘without the condition of 
undecidability, human decisions would be nothing but “programmed”, predetermined already by 
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some rule or principle; they would be no decisions at all’ (Bates, 2005, 6). Undecidability, thus, is in 
fact a highly political concept ‘in that it form[s] part of a wider... discourse on the nature of 
unprecedented decisions in situations characterised by crisis and the failure of all kinds of norms and 
formal systems defining order and organisation’ (p. 3). As Campbell (1998) concludes, ‘the very 
notion of undecidability is the condition of possibility for a decision’ (p. 184). Derrida’s 
undecidability, therefore, can be equated with a rejection of a Kelsenian grundnorm for international 
law and politics, and, thus, with a confirmation of the inevitable necessity of de facto sovereign 
decisions on normative and material crises.  
As such, any hope that geopolitical anomalies may be integrated in a new and more 
cosmopolitan normative order or school of international relations once again runs into inevitable 
disappointments. This conclusion has already outlined why both world state and micro-state 
“solutions” to this issue are practically problematic, yet that has not mitigated cosmopolitan 
thinkers’ resolve in conceptualising a “world society” ‘in accordance with the ideologies that bring 
individuals together into different types of non-state social relationships’ (Pella, 2013, 66). Such 
scholars (Baker, 2011; Beardsworth, 2011; Held, 2002) argue that contemporary cosmopolitan 
theories ‘have increasing purchase on empirical reality’ (Beardsworth, 2011, 2), as the successful 
“juridification” of international political antagonisms (Habermas, 1997) now means that ‘the line 
separating the “is” and the “ought” of world politics can no longer be sustained’ (Ranford-Robinson, 
2013, 251). Held (2002) similarly finds that cosmopolitanism is already enshrined in many 
international legal arrangements, and thus not ‘made up of political ideals for another age but 
embedded in rule systems and institutions that have already transformed state sovereignty in many 
ways’ (pp. 23-24). 
Again, however, these cosmopolitan ideas thus essentially seem to build upon current 
international legal provisions, and thereby do very little to overcome the limitations of international 
law. These cosmopolitan “rule systems”, indeed, actually have as much (or as little) sway over 
international political questions as present-day international law, as they again take 
“universalisable” norms as the fundamental point of departure for international political 
interactions. Beardsworth (2011), therefore, argues that ‘the cosmopolitan universalism that 
responds best to IR theory must be either fairly weak and/or expressly differentiated’ (p. 10). For 
him, ‘[t]he political game will go on regardless’, and attempts to devise a fully non-political 
cosmopolitanism without “mastery” risk exactly to reproduce the power structures they wish to 
dissolve (p. 221). As Baker (2011) aptly confirms, any endeavour towards a truly cosmopolitan “civil 
society” able to amalgamate international particularity with global universality should be met with 
scepticism, as it would have to efface particular identities into universal identities. Because personal 
identities cannot exist without a constitutive “other”, he argues, attempts to transcend societal 
differences in the direction of identical sameness are fundamentally flawed (pp. 90-100). 
Perhaps, then, in order to progress towards a truly cosmopolitan order in which geopolitical 
anomalies and de facto sovereigns would no longer have to decide on exceptions, a ‘pluralisation of 
space’ would have to be ‘matched by a deconstruction of identity’ itself (Campbell, 1998, 238). On 








today the concept of utopia has made an about-face turn – utopian energy is no longer 
directed towards a stateless community, but towards a state without nation, a state which 
would no longer be founded on an ethnic community and its territory, therefore 
simultaneously towards a state without territory, towards a purely artificial structure of 
principles and authority which will have severed the umbilical cords of ethnic origin, 
indigenousness, and rootedness. 
 
Nonetheless, it (obviously) remains for a very good reason that Žižek refers to such a 
community as a utopia. Hannah Arendt (1968), in accordance with her critique on the world state, 
candidly dismisses such utopian thinking in unequivocal terms, claiming that ‘the danger inherent in 
[a] new reality of mankind seems to be that his unity... breaks all national traditions and buries the 
authentic origins of all human existence... Its result would be a shallowness that would transform 
man... beyond recognition’ (p. 87). She restates that:  
 
[t]he solidarity of mankind may well turn out to be an unbearable burden, and it is not 
surprising that the common reactions to it are political apathy, isolationalist nationalism, 
or desperate rebellion against all powers that be rather than enthusiasm or a desire for... 
humanism. The idealism of the humanist tradition... and its concept of mankind look like 
reckless optimism in the light of present realities (pp. 83-84). 
 
What Arendt alludes to, here, is that normative structures cultivating a singular cosmopolitan 
humankind will inevitably be nullified by the intrinsic global potential for conflict among different 
political communities. 
Alternatively, then, as Ranford-Robinson (2013) discusses the ‘political feasibility of 
cosmopolitanism’, he argues that ‘IR must come down from its lofty perch to see globalisation from 
the bottom up’, or in other words, ‘must step outside the ivory tower to see cosmopolitanism for 
what it really is’ (p. 259). Here, thus, we may think of a scholarly shift away from the formal state, 
not so much in conceptualisations of some cosmopolitan world order, but perhaps more so through 
an increased focus on the level of the small(er) community. Space on the ground, locally based, 
would then actually start to play a bigger role in international relations thinking than the intangible 
and fuzzy understandings of de jure sovereignty. 
 However, such scholarly transitions notwithstanding, the practice of establishing and 
fostering political communities will not fundamentally be altered by such new perspectives. 
Geopolitical anomalies, regardless of the level at which they are analysed, remain manifestations of 
(un)resolved crises – either by themselves or by another political entity. They manifest themselves in 
the interstate framework, either as prolonged exceptions to the de facto sovereignty of legal states, 
or as separate political communities sustained by their own de facto sovereignty. They are, thus, not 
only exceptions to a rule, but also rules to an exception. As such, geopolitical anomalies tell us that 
the nature and practice of international politics is fundamentally constituted by de facto sovereign 
decisions on unforeseeable and inevitable exceptions. 
 I would argue, therefore, that the study and discourse of international relations should 
become much more aware of this irresolvable “insecurity” of global political life. No theory, conduct, 
or model of international politics will be able to fully overcome certain inherent limitations and 
uncontainable uncertainties of international society. Even a classical realist theory able to maintain 
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“the thought of the exception” will not be capable ‘to anchor it or eliminate it in philosophical 
theory, for the exception must always, by definition, represent a radical departure from (or breach 
of) a predictable and stable norm’ (Moses, 2014, 166). In Derrida’s (2009) words, ‘a theory of the 
exception, especially a juridical or political theory of the exception, is impossible qua philosophical 
theory, even if the thought of exception is necessary’ (p. 49).  
Anne Orford (2004), once again, reminds us of the imminent necessity, particularly for 
international legal thinking, to control ‘the anxiety produced by our inability to master our field of 
knowledge’ (p. 471) and fully acknowledge the “others” and limitations of the international legal-
political order (see also Orford, 2006). To reiterate Derrida (1990), the fact that international law’s 
‘ultimate foundation is by definition unfounded... is not bad news’, because ‘[w]e may even see this 
as a stroke of luck for politics, for all historical progress’ (pp. 943-945). In a statement that is 
apparently similarly supportive of geopolitical anomalies, Orford (2004) argues that: 
 
at those moments when international law manages to live with this unresolved – and 
unresolvable – crisis of authority, it may be best able to avoid the temptation to secure 
the grounds of law through a final solution in which those who are believed to threaten 
the health, security, emotional wellbeing, or morality of the international community are 
violently sacrificed for the good of the whole (p. 476). 
 
The same issues can be discerned in broader liberal internationalist aspirations towards an all-
inclusive international community, which fail to offer the conceptual or strategic means to 
understand and deal with the modes of power and de facto sovereignty involved in resolving 
international exceptions. As Orford (2007) phrases it, ‘[a]s scholars, we may become part of the 
problem if we make politics seem programmed and predictable’ (p. 223).  
Here, we may turn to Morgenthau’s classic text on the Scientific Man in international politics 
(1947), in which he established classical realism as the “limit doctrine” of international political 
thought. Morgenthau exposed the ‘unbridgeable chasm’ between liberal internationalist idealism 
and international political realities, whereby the former ‘in its perfectionist manifestation at least, 
does not recognise the permanency and inevitability of this chasm’ (p. 148). Therefore, Morgenthau 
was especially critical of the liberal internationalists’ non-acceptance of the irresolvability of this 
issue, as, paradoxically, they simultaneously espoused ‘confidence in the power of reason... to solve 
the social problems of our age and despair at the ever renewed failure of... reason to solve them’ (p. 
9). Instead of coming to terms with this intrinsic limitation, Morgenthau argued that such thinkers 
propose simple and rational “magic formulas” to deal with complicated, irrational, and incalculable 
issues, which compels them ‘to simplify the reality of international politics and to develop what one 
might call the “method of the single cause”‘ (p. 86). 
 International political scholarship and practice, as such, should relinquish its urge to find 
silver bullets to conclusively solve international exceptionality. This is not to suggest that we should 
become complacent or apathetic about international crises, but that highly contingent and 
contextualised approaches will prove more helpful in addressing them. Instead of “recreating” a 
Borgesian map of international affairs, in which all international political processes and 
circumstances are accounted for and controllable, the study and conduct of international politics 
should embrace and adopt its own exceptional “unknown unknowns”. That way, perhaps we can 
avoid the pitfalls of liberal internationalist projects to “solve” the “problem” of geopolitical 
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anomalies, which often risk becoming trapped in an intellectual cul-de-sac of simultaneously wishing 
to integrate geopolitical anomalies into an international legal/political regularity – for instance, by 
suggesting their legal recognition or their accommodation into a cosmopolitan humanity – while 
failing to acknowledge the exceptionalities presented precisely by the things (geopolitical anomalies) 
they try to incorporate.  
As geopolitical anomalies manifest themselves as abundant exceptions in/to international 
politics, they warrant more of our attention concomitant with an acceptance of the unpredictability 
and impossibility of a legal, normative, or discursive encapsulation of international political life. 
Geopolitical anomalies repeatedly exemplify that an “unestablished” and “exceptional” status in 
international law and politics may be preferable over an “included” and “regulated” existence, and 
therefore, we appear to have no choice but to accept the fact that our international political 
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